

Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj

MAHARASHTRA STATE GAZETTEERS



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MAHARASHTRA STATE GAZETTEERS



Government of Maharashira

HISTORY PART III—MARATHA PERIOD

सन्यमव जयत



BOMBAY

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HISTORY PART III—MARATHA PERIOD



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GENERAL VOLUME—HISTORY

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INTRODUCTION

This is the third part of the General Volume on History to be published in four parts. My thanks are due to the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Dr. V. G. Dighe, Prof. B. K. Apte and Dr. B. G. Kunte, for their scholarly contributions.

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May 1967.

HISTORY

PART III-MARATHA PERIOD

CHAPTER 1*

RISE OF THE MARATHA POWER (1630-1707)

Rise of the

CHAPTER 1

Maratha Power.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

A RACE OF MEN CAN BE CALLED A NATION only when they have a State or compact territory of their own, united under a universally accepted government not subject to any other power, besides a certain community of life and though among the general population. The Marathas had formed such a Nation and State in the far-off past. But with the fall of the Yadavas of Devagiri, early in the 14th century, a foreign sovereignty, alien to them in race and religion, was imposed on the land; and henceforth the population lived as scattered units under a number of barons of their own racesome large like the Yadavas of Sindkhed or the Mores of Javli, but most others petty owners of a few villages. All of them owed allegiance to the Sultan of Gulbarga or Ahmadnagar, paid him tribute, and served in his wars with their personal contingents in hope of reward. The mass of the Maratha people continued to live in seclusion in their villages, following their immemorial way of life. administering all local affairs through the hereditary village officials, and deciding their disputes by means of the village jury (Mahazan) who reported their findings to the district or provincial governor for confirmation and execution. The change of dynasties at the capital was to them no more than a two days' talk.

But this static condition of society was rudely disturbed when the authority of the central government dissolved, the Sultān became a puppet, factions nobles fought each other for selfish gain, and in the country-side every ambitious man raised his hand in lawless violence against his neighbours. Village life became unsettled and decay seized the seats of the country's wealth-production and the centres of culture and social progress. Fiscal oppression due to doamli (rival authorities administering the same place) impoverished the rulers and the ruled alike, quite apart from the foreign invasion which the anarchy invited.

The law suits about the right to the hereditary village offices, the partition of family-lands or service-emoluments among kinsmen, the

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar.

CHAPTER 1

Rise of the Maratha Power.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND.

encroachment of one village-headman (deśmukh) on his neighbouring villages — all these ever-rising cases could not any longer be decided by a common judge nor such a judge's decision enforced by a strong executive magistrate. From this anarchy and decay of social order the house of Bhosle delivered Mahārāṣṭra in the dim twilight following the death of Malik Amber (1626) and the dissolution of the Nizām Śāhī monarchy.

KEYNOTE OF
MARATHA
HISTORY,
17th CENTURY.

The creator of the modern Marāṭhā nation was Śivājī Bhosle, whose life, 1627-1680, bridges the gulf in Deccan history, between the extinction of the Ahmadnagar Sultanate and Auraṅgzeb's coming for the last time to the Deccan to wear out his life and empire there. Within two years of his death (1707) the Government of Delhi gave up all attempts to rule Mahārāṣṭra.

Before the rise of Sivājī the Marāthā race was scattered like atoms through many Deccani kingdoms; he welded them into a mighty nation. Since the fall of the Yādavas of Devagirī, they had been mere hirelings, mere servants of aliens; they served the State, but had no lot or part in its management. Sivājī founded a State in Mahārāṣṭra and taught his people that they were capable of administering a kingdom in all its departments. And this he achieved in the teeth of the opposition of four great powers like the Moghal Empire, the Bijāpur Sultanate, the Portuguese and the Abyssinians of Jañjīrā.

Sivājī was the son of Sahājī Bhosle and climbed to greatness on his father's shoulders. True, the Mahārājā Sahājī best known in history was a ruler of the Kanarese country only and lived to the end of his days as a vassal of Ādil Sāh, no longer administering any part of Mahārāṣṭra (after 1648). But his wonderful resourcefulness, unfailing opportunism, and pioneer spirit of adventure made Sivājī's success easy, some may even say, possible. The noon-day splendour of the son's career has thrown into the shade the morning brilliancy of the father's achievement. Sahājī was the founder of Greater Mahārāṣṭra.

Sahājī (c. 1595-1664), the son of Mālojī, received his early training in war under his paternal uncle Viţhojī, in the service of the Ahmadnagar Sultān, and after Viṭhojī's death (1623), succeeded him in the command of the family contingent. The discerning eye of Malik Amber first appreciated Sahājī's genius, and there are reports that this young captain launched the tactical move which led to the Nizāmśāhī victory at Bhātvaḍi (Oct. 1624). After Malik Amber's death (14¹, May 1626), he served that Regent's son and successor Fath Khān for a few years. But a hopeless decay and disorder now seized the Nizām Śāhī Government. Sahājī's father-in-law Jādhav Rāv, the highest Hindu vassal of Ahmadnagar, was murdered at Court on 12 August 1630. The Sultān and his vazir plotted against

each other, and Sahājī, unwilling to face a dark future, went over to the Moghal side in November of the same year, and was assigned jāgīrs in Junnar, Sangamner and Bezāpur (Bijāpur) from the Moghal Government. But he had first to conquer these places which had been seized by the Bijāpuris from the dead Nizām šāhī Government. His career of conquest and plunder in the Poona district was checked by a Bijāpuri army, and he was for a time driven to seek refuge with the governor of Junnar. On the retirement of the Bijapuri invasion, Sahājī built a new fort Sāhgad (on the site of the ruined Bhīmgad, misspelt *Pemgad*), raised troops, and again set out on conquest. Abandoning the Moghal service (June 1632), he began to seize the districts of Nāśik, Trimbak, Sangamner and Junnar, and parts of North Konkan. In concert with the Bijāpurī generals he offered opposition to the Moghals when they besieged Daulatābād fort, the last stronghold of the Nizām Sāhīs. But that fort fell on 17 june 1633, and the last crowned Nizām Sāh, Husain was taken away to die in Gvälior prison.

The Moghals captured the Sultān but not his kingdom. At once Adil Sāh and Sahājī Bhosle seized as much of the ownerless Nizām Sāhī kingdom as they could. With the consent of a widowed Nizām Sāhī Queen, Sahājī crowned a boy prince as Murtazā Nizām Sāh II in his own stronghold of Sāhgad (Sept. 1633). In the name of this puppet Sahājī carried on the Government for three years, seized districts and forts, and levied a large army. Thus, he quickly occupied all the old Ahmadnagar territory from Poonā and Cākan to Bālāghāt, and the environs of Junnar, Ahmadnagar, Sangamner, Trimbak and Nāśik, plundering on all sides. His ally was Murāri Paṇḍit, the local Bijāpuri commander and the favourite of the Ādil Sāhī Vazir Khavās Khān. He gained the trust and even the personal love of Murāri by his cleverness and ability, as we see in the tradition of Sahājī having weighed an elephant by the Archimedian principle, for Murāri's Tūlā Dān at Pābal (23 September 1633).

He made himself the master of the forts of Junnar, Jivdhan, Bhor, Māhuli, Kohij, etc., and practically all Taļ-Końkan from Mahāḍ to the frontier of the Javhār State. He next removed his royal puppet from Sāhgaḍ to Junnar and himself lived in the latter fort in great wealth and power; twelve thousand of the disbanded former troops of Ahmadnagar gathered round him.

We possess an accurate account of the political geography of Mahārāṣṭra in this year in the recently published Diary of the Viceroy of Portuguese India, which embodies the reports¹ that he received from his Brāhman intelligencer posted in Bijāpur during that year. The division was this: of the total Nizām Sāhī territory worth 84 lakhs of hon, roughly one-fourth each was held by the Moghals, Adil Sāh and Sahājī, and the remaining quarter was being scrambled for. Adil Sāh had annexed 20% lakhs of hon worth (besides Solāpur

Rise of the Maratha Power. KEYNOTE OF MARATHA HISTORY, 17TH CENTURY.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN 1634.

CHAPTER 1

¹ Reprinted by P. S. Pissurlencar in Antigualhas, Vol. I, fasc. 1 (1941).

CHAPTER 1

Rise of the Maratha Power. POLITICAL SITUATION IN 1634. and Ausā, worth seven and one lakhs respectively held by two of his independent Muslim nobles); the Moghals had seized 21 lakhs of hon worth, and Sahājī 20¾ lakhs worth, including Junnar (three lakhs hon), Sahgaḍ (one lakh) Nāśik (one lakh), Cākaṇ (one lakh), Cāmargoṇḍā (¾ of a lakh), nearly three-fourths of Tal-Koṅkaṇ (eleven lakhs) and minor places (three lakhs in all), but not Pooṇā (75,000 hon) nor Indāpūr (50,000 hon), nor Nilaṅga (one lakh), which then lay in the Ādil Sāhī portion (as also did Caul in Koṅkaṇ). His roving operations helped to baffle the Moghals in their siege of the fort of Pareṇḍā (24 Feb.—21 May 1634), under Prince Sujā, who was starved out.

During 1635, the new Moghal viceroy of Ahmadnagar, Khān-i-Daurān kept Sahājī in check. Next year the scales were hopelessly turned against Sahājī. Sāh Jahān arrived at Daulatāhād (21 Feb. 1636) determined to settle this Deccan business once for all.

A vast force of 50,000 Moghal horsemen under the best generals was launched to overawe Golkonda, invade Bijapur, and crush Sahajī Bhosle. The Maratha chief was driven away to Lehgad and his village of Camargonda captured. Saista Khan at the head of 8,000 troops wrested the parganas of Sangamner taluka from Sahajī's men and pursued Sahajī himself to Konkan. The city of Junnar was captured, but not the fort where Sahajī's family had sought shelter (middle of March 1636).

After some skirmishes and military demonstrations, the Bijāpur Government was forced to make peace with the Emperor (May 1636) on the following terms:—

(1) The Nizām Śāhī State was to be abolished even in name. All its territory was to be divided between the Moghals and Ādil Śāh,—the latter getting Solāpur, Vangi, Bhālki, Chidgupā, the Pooņā district, and North Konkan. (2) Ādil Śāh recognised the over-lordship of the Emperor of Delhi. (3) Sahājī was to be expelled from Mahārāṣṭra and not to be taken into Bijāpuri service unless he ceded to the Moghals the forts of Junnar, Trimbak and some others.

The full force of the imperialists was now turned on Sahājī, who fought long in the broken North Konkan; but after a long chase by Khān-i-Zamān, a general of Sāh Jahān and Randullā Khān his Bijāpuri ally, the Marāṭhā chief was forced to capitulate at Māhulī about end of October, giving up to the Moghals his puppet Nizām Sāh and his royal property, seven forts (Junnar, Trimbak, Tringalwāḍi, Harṣgaḍ, Jivdhan, Cāvaṇḍ and Haḍsar), with all his territories in Mahārāstra except his small jāgīrs in the Poonā district—which he was to hold merely as a revenue-paying vassal of Ādīl Sāh. His new over-lord made to him a formal grant of the Poonā jāgīr, on 25 Feb. 1637.

Thus Sahājī Bhosle made his exit from Mahārāṣṭrā. He later built up a vast estate, a kingdom except for the lack of independence, but that was in the Kanarese country, and he had no further connection

with Mahārāṣṭra except as a petty jāgirdār without political power, his locum tenens being subject to the authority of the Bijāpuri district governor. The creation of a national state in Mahārāṣṭra was the work of Sivājī and became an accomplished fact in 1674, ten years after the death of Sahājī.

Sivājī was the second son of Sahājī and Jijā Bāī (a daughter of the Jadhav lord of Sindkhed). He was born¹ (10 April 1627) in the fort of Sivneri which overlooks the town of Junnar, and there the mother and the son lived till 1637, when they were removed to Poonā by Sahāji's order. After entering Bijāpuri service at the end of 1636, Sahājī was sent away to the Mysore plateau to conquer fresh territories for his sovereign and jagirs for himself; he was granted Bangalore in 1639 and made it his seat. His favourite wife Tukā Bāī Mohite and her son Vyankojī accompanied him, while Sivājī and his mother were left behind. But he Dādājī Kond Dev as manager of his Poonā jāgīr and ordered him to remove Sivājī and Jijā Bāī and maintain them there. In 1640-41 Dādājī paid a visit to Sahājī at Bangalore, with his master's family. Here Sivājī was married to Sai Bāī Nimbāļkar, and a portion of the Pooṇā jāgīr, yielding about a lakh and a half of rupees in revenue, was formally bestowed on Sivājī as Sahāji's deputy while the father lived, and as full owner after his death. An administration in four departments under four heads² sent by Sahājī from Bangalore was set up in Poonā. Dādājī, as the guardian of the minor, presided over the law-court, along with Sivājī and Jijā Bāī, and latterly Sivājī only. On the death of Dādājī (7th March 1647), Sivājī became his own master at the age of twenty.

Dādājī Koṇḍ Dev was an exceptionally capable and active administrator. His own charge included the part of the Poona district from Cākan to Indāpūr, Sirval, and the frontier of Wāī, but not Supā (which was managed by another agent of \$ahājī). The country had been desolated by anarchy and ceaseless warfare for a full generation, cultivation and population had been greatly reduced, and wolves in large packs infested the villages on the Sahyādri hill-side. Dādājī very wisely offered rewards for killing them. He conciliated the Māval hill-men by rewards and kind treatment, and induced them to settle in the valleys and extend the cultivation by offering very liberal terms of rent such as a few pice per bighā for the first four years, a few annas for the next three years, and the familiar full rate of Malik Amber's assessment only from the eighth year onwards. Thus the whole country was brought under tillage. His strict justice and vigour in punishing wrong doers suppressed lawlessness in the country and caused his name to be still remembered. Dādājī established complete mastery over the Māvaļs adjacent to the Pooņā district. The local headmen (deśmukhs) were mostly won over by

¹ The more widely accepted date is 19th February 1630.

CHAPTER 1

Rise of the Maratha Power.

Political Situation in 1634.

Shivaji,

² The Chancellor (*Peśvā*), the Accountant-General (*Majumdār*), the Foreign Secretary (*Dabir*), and the Paymaster of the Forces (*Sabnis*).

CHAPTER 1

Rise of the Maratha Power, Shivaji, tactful handling and rewards; those who defied his authority were attacked and forced to submit. Thus peace and prosperity were established in that region, and it became a source of wealth and martial strength to the owner of Pooṇā.

Sivājī grew up in solitude away from courts and cities, a mateless child without brother, sister or father. The isolation of their life drew him and his mother very close together and intensified his love for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. She imparted her own deep religious spirit to her son. From a very early age Sivājī was thrown on his own resources and learnt to carry out his own ideas unaided, and to take the initiative. He became skilled in fighting, riding and other manly games. From the sturdy and brave race of the Māvļe people, Sivājī drew his earliest comrades, his most devoted followers, and his best soldiers. In the company of Māvļe chieftains of his own age, young Sivājī wandered over the hills and forests of the Sahyādri range, hardening himself to a life of strenuous exertion. He began to love independence and loathe a life of servile luxury.

Sivājī's early tentative efforts. The hill forts have played a part in the history of Mahārāṣṭra unequalled by any other country. The whole of the Western Ghāṭs often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock the highest points of which form natural fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space on the summit. Various princes at different times have cut flights of steps up the rocks, fortified the entrance with gateways, and erected towers to command the approaches. In many of them there are springs of the finest water or tanks filled during the rainy months.

Each fort was held by a killedār who was almost always directly under the Sultān's Government and independent of the jāgirdār of the surrounding country. A few villages below the fort were assigned to the killedār for feeding his garrison and their cattle. Thus Sivājī found in these numberless hillforts so many hostile garrisons planted in the midst of his own jāgīr territory, and he could not form a compact State unless he wiped out this rival authority.

After 1642, the Government of Muhammad Ādil Sāh fell into increasing decline owing to the Sultān's drunken habits, and alcoholism led to his being stricken down in 1646 with paralysis which kept him a bed-ridden invalid till his death ten years later. His chief ministers and best generals were all this time busy extending his dominions in the Western Karnāṭak (Ikeri, Basavāpaṭṭan, Serā), Central Mysore (Bangalore, Śriraṅgapaṭan, Bellur, Naṇḍiyāl), and the Eastern Karnāṭak (Vellore, Jiñji, etc.). But the Pooṇā district lying in the neglected north-western corner and being a recent acquisition by the Moghal treaty of 1636, had not been really brought under the control of the Bijāpur Government.

We have definite evidence that in 1644 Sahājī had turned refractory and his agent Dādājī Koṇḍ Dev was seizing territory in the Sinhagaḍ region, so that an Ādil Sāhī force had to be sent against him.

A little later, about 1646, Šivājī gained the fort of Torņā by tricking its Ādil Šāhī commandant. He also built some new fortifications in the neighbouring hills. But no notice of these acts was taken at the Bijāpur court. After the death of Dādajī, Šivājī got possession of some outlying parts of his father's jāgir such as Cākaṇ, Indāpūr, and Bārāmatī, and also secured the fort of Koṇḍāṇā by bribing its Ādil Sāhī governor.

Soon afterwards his progress was suddenly stopped by the news of the arrest of his father before the fortress of linji (25th July 1648) by order of the Bijāpur Government. The cause was that the Bijāpuri Prime Minister and Generalissimo had evidence of Sahāji's intrigues with his master's enemies, the Outh Sah and Sri Ranga Rāyāl. The captive was brought to Bijāpūr, but kept in honourable detention in charge of a Muslim noble. In the meantime, the Bijāpuri forces tried without success to wrest Koņdāņā from Sivājī and Bangalore from Sambhājī, his elder brother. At last Adil Sālı wisely made peace, conciliated Sahājī and restored him to his estates and honours (16 May 1649), on condition of his surrendering Bangalore, Kandārpī, and Kondāņā. So, Sivājī stayed his hand against Bijāpur for some years, after gaining the fort of Purandar by intervening in the disputed succession of its three brother-owners and then turning them out of the fort to live outside on a small landgrant (8th October 1648).

But seven years later he had increased and consolidated his power and felt that he had nothing to fear from Bijapur now, as the Adil Sahi Government was threatened with absorption by Prince Aurangzeb, the Moghal Governor of the Deccan. He first laid his hand on the State of Jävli, the heritage of the More family (named after Candrarav More), which covered practically the whole of the Sătără district. This principality by its position barred the path of Sivaji's ambition in the south and south-west of his small Poona jagir. Moreover, the Mores were jealous of the upstart Bhosles and naturally formed the core of local opposition to Sivaji's further advance at the cost of their common sovereign, the Adil Sah. But Sivājī by a daring combination of diplomacy and rapid movement resulting in the killing of the two leading More chieftains, seized their capital (15th January 1656) and annexed the whole principality, including the rock fortress of Rayagad, which was to be his future capital. Two miles west of Javli he built a new fort, Pratapgad, and here he installed his patron goddess Bhavani.

A few months later, Aurangzeb invaded Bijāpur on the plea that Ali Ādil Sāh II, was not a genuine prince of the royal house. A famous captain like Sivājī could not be ignored by any side in such a crisis, and he received tempting offers from both. In the end he felt it more profitable to side with Bijāpur and enrich himself than to join the Moghals, who were too deceitful to be relied upon and too strong to be defied afterwards.

Two of Sivājī's captains, Mānājī Bhosle and Kāśī, crossed the Bhīmā and plundered Cāmargonḍā and Rāisin, then in Moghal bands (end of April 1657). An attempt to loot the peth

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power.

SHIVAJI

Sivāji's early tentative offorts. CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power.

SHIVAJI Šivāji's early tentative efforts, of Ahmadnagar was defeated, but Sivājī in person entered the city of Junnar by escalade on a dark night (30th April) and carried away an immense amount of booty. The Mārāṭhā plunder in the Ahmadnagar district was stopped by a rapid march and great victory of the Moghal general Nasiri Khān on 4th June. Then began counter raids by the Moghal cavalry into Sivājī's own possessions. Then the monsoon stopped the fighting.

When in September the Bijāpur Government made peace with Aurangzeb, Sivājī decided to conciliate the Moghals. His envoy Raghunāth Pant met Aurangzeb (25th January 1658) and secured a letter of pardon for the Marāṭhā chief. Aurangzeb then set out on his march to Hindustan to fight for his father's throne, and for two years after the Moghal power merely bided its time in the Deccan, while a jealous quarrel among the Bijāpuri nobles about responsibility for their defeat in the recent war with Aurangzeb, led to the murder of the good Prime Minister, Khān Muhammad (11th November 1657) and deranged the Ādil Sāhī administration.

The field was clear, and Sivājī was not slow to rush into it. As soon as the rains ceased he burst into Koňkaņ. The northern part of this coast-strip formed the Kalyāņ or modern Thāṇā district, and was governed by a Bijāpuri noble. Mullā Ahmad of the Navāyat clan. In the absence of the governor at Bijāpur, Sivājī easily seized Kalyāṇ and Bhivaṇḍī (24 October 1657), and next the fort of Māhulī (8 January 1658), once Sahājī's last refuge. Then, having set up his own administration in the Kalyāṇ district, he pushed southwards into the Kolābā district, as far as the neighbourhood of Mahāḍ, where he stopped. Thus he became master of the whole of North Koňkaṇ except the sea-ports and the adjacent lands on the west coast, which still belonged to Bijāpur, the Siddis, and the Portuguese. The country southwards from Mahāḍ was won later.

During the years 1658 and 1659 the war among Sāh Jahān's sons for the throne of Delhi kept the Moghal Government too busy to attend to the Deccan. The Ādil Sāhī court seized this respite to bring its rebel vassals to order. An army was detached to suppress Sivājī. Its commander was Afzal Khān (original name Abdullāh Bhāṭiāri) who had shown conspicuous courage and ability in his master's wars, and now occupied the foremost place in the council of the regent queen Bari Sāhibā. But the recent invasion of Bıjāpur by Auraṅgzeb had so weakened that Government that only ten thousand horse and foot could be spared to follow Afzal Khān in this arduous enterprise.

As early as April 1659, the Bijāpur Government sent a circular letter to the deśmukhs of Māvaļ to join their forces to Afzal Khān's and help him in overpowering Sivājī. Some of them responded to the command, but a few also yielded to Sivājī's appeal in the name of Hindu independence to side with him. Leaving Bijāpur at the end of the monsoons, Afzal Khān first raised money by sacking the famous Hindu temples and demolishing their idols, at Paṇḍharpūr. Jejurī and Tuļzāpūr (September). Then marching towards Wāi, ihe seat of his subhedārī he seized the chief of Phalţan and extorted

2½ lakhs of rupees from him, and let terror and sacrilege loose on Sivāji's possessions. As the official history of Ādil Sāh records "The Khān's cavalry rode over the country of Sivā. Many of the enemy were slain, and the rest fled into holes".

Sivājī immediatly withdrew from Poonā and took post with all his troops in the broken and wooded Jāvļi district, whence it was impossible for Afzal Khān to expel him by force. The Khān's new policy was to lure Sivājī into a trap and then seize or kill him. He sent his steward Kṛṣṇājī Bhāskar to Sivājī, with this message; "Your father has long been a great friend of mine. Come and meet me and I shall use my influence to make Ādil Sāh pardon you and confirm you in the possession of the forts and Konkan territory that you have seized".

Sivājī was in a terrible dilemma as to how he should reply to Afzal Khān, who had established a reputation for treachery and atrocity; he had slain Kasturi Rangā, the Rājā of Serā, after inviting him to a conference for making surrender (1639) and was implicated in the murder of the Vazir Khān Muhammad when comming to walt on the dowager Queen of Bijāpur. Besides, it was widely known and even reported to the English merchants of Rājāpūr, that "because the Queen knew, with that strength (only 10,000 men) he was not able to resist Sivājī, she had counselled him to pretend friendship with his enemy, which he did."*

Sivajī also learnt through his own spies among Afzal Khān's officers that the Khān meant to arrest him by treachery. So, he made up his mind to fight in self defence, rather than yield to such delusive calls of friendship.

With masterly cleverness he completed his arrangements for turning his enemy's weapon against him. He agreed to visit Bijāpur and make his submisson if only Afzal Khān first gave him a personal assurance of safety. It was settled that the two chiefs should meet in a tent pitched below the fort of Pratāpgad, leaving their troops behind, and there exchange oaths of submission and protection.

On 10th November 1659, Afzal Khān was the first to reach the tent; Sivājī arrived after some time, both very slenderly attended. Sivājī mounted the raised platform, the Khān advanced a few steps and opened his arms to receive him in his embrace. Suddenly, Afzal tightened his clasp and held Sivājī's neck in his left arm with an iron grip, while with his right hand he drew his short straight sword and struck at the side of Sivājī. The hidden chain armour under the Marāthā chief's coat rendered the blow harmless. Feeling himself about to be strangled, Sivājī promptly ripped open the bowels of the Khān with the steel tigers' claws which were fastened to his left hand with iron rings. As the wounded man relaxed his hold, Sivājī drove his thin sharp dagger into his body, wrested himself free, and ran away to his own followers standing below. Afzal's head was cut off and his few attendants killed.

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[·] Revington's letter to the E. I. Co., 10th December 1659.

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Then, running up to Pratāpgad, Sivājī fired a signal gun. At once his troops lying in ambush round the source of the Koynā fell upon the panic—stricken leaderless soldiers of Afzal, encamped carelessly in the low valley. The invaders were easily routed and all their camp and baggage plundered by the Marāṭhās.

Then the victorious Marāthās poured into South Konkan and the Kolhāpūr district, capturing many places including the fort of Panhāļā (December 1659—February 1660). But here he was promptly besieged by the Bijāpuri general Siddi Jauhār (created Salābat Khān) and compelled to make a hair-breadth escape in the dark night of 13th July. His garrison yielded the fort on 22nd September to Ādil Sāh.

Aurangzeb, after being firmly seated on the throne of Delhi, sent Sāistā Khān, one of his highest generals, as Governor of the Deccan, to suppress Sivājī. This noble entered Pooṇā on 9th May 1660, after brushing aside the Marāthā opposition on the way. Then he took the fort of Cākaṇ after a siege of 54 days, but at a cost of 868 men killed and wounded on his own side (15 August). Early next year he wrested parts of the Kalyāṇ district from Sivājī's men. Though his lieutenant Kārtalb Khān was surprised and defeated at Umbarkhiṇḍ (3 February 1661), Saistā Khān recovered Kalyāṇ itself in May. But Sivājī remained master of the southern part of the coast down to Daṇḍa-Rājpurī.

On 5th April 1663, Sivājī struck a blow which created as much terror and bewilderment among the Moghal soldiery as his slaying of Afzal Khān had done at the Ādil Sāhī court. In that dark night, with only 200 men he noiselessy penetrated into Saistā Khān's harem in Poonā surprised and wounded him and retired in safety. In the scuffle one son and one captain as well as forty attendants and six wives and slave-girls of the Khān were killed and the Khān himself had his fingers cut off. The Marāṭhās lost only six men killed. Henceforth, supernatural powers were ascribed to Sivājī; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him.

Aurangzeb in anger transferred Saistā Khān to Bengal (December), but while the change of Subhedars was taking place at Aurangābād, the capital of Moghal Deccan, Sivājī crowned his success by the sack of the city of Surat (6th-10th January 1664). With marvellous rapidity and secrecy, he made long marches and quite unexpectedly appeared before Surat on 6th January. No defence was offered, the governor and some chief men took refuge in the fort, leaving the whole city to be pillaged by the Marathas at ease, only the English and the Dutch factory-houses were saved by the valour and gun fire of those foreigners. The city, consisting mostly of grass huts and wooden cottages, was three-fourths burnt down. The plunder yielded him above a crore of rupees, as he "scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, and diamonds and precious ware".

Throughout the year (1664) Sivājī reigned triumphant and ranged over the South Coast and Bijāpur territory without a check.

As the English merchants reported, "He is very nimble and active, imposing strange labour upon himself, he flies to and fro with incredible dexterity. Report hath made him an airy body and added wings, or else it were impossible he could be at so many places as he is said to be at all at one time".

The new viceroy of Moghal Deccan, Prince Muazzam, was a sluggard and so was his lieutenant Jaswant Singh of Mārwār. Their siege of Sinhgad failed (May). So, Aurangzeb sent his ablest Hindu and Muslim generals, Mirzā Rājāh Jai Singh of Amber and Dilir Khān, to put down Sivājī.

By rapid marches Jai Singh arrived from North India, and reached Poonă on 3rd March 1665, relieving Jasvant Singh the Moghal commander there. With marvellous foresight and skill and combination and promptitude of blows, he immediately set out on the campaign which he brought to a happy end in three months only, before the monsoon rains could start and enforce suspension of fighting. His clever diplomacy kept Bijāpur back from assisting the Marāṭhā chief, and united all the enemies of Sivā on his side. Seductive offers were made to Sivā's followers to desert him, and above all Jai Singh combined all power in his own hands to pursue his objective with singleness of aim, as the road to success.

Leaving Poonā only ten days after his arrival, he reached his base between Sāsvad and Purandar (only four miles from the latter) on 31st March, and immediately laid siege to Purandar fort, where the families of Sivājīs officers were sheltered.

Purandar is a double fort, with a crest 4564 feet above sea-level, and a lower fort or māci on a broad ledge round the waist of the hill, 300 feet below the crest, and four miles long in its winding circuit. From its north-eastern corner runs a spur for a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge ending with the outwork called Rudra-māl (now Vajragad). This Vajragad commands the māci on its northern face where the garrison lived, and Jai Singh decided to capture it first, so as to make the māci untenable by gunfire from Vajragad.

By incessant bombardment, the Moghals demolished one tower of Vajragad; Dilir Khān's Paṭhāṇs stormed the lower end, and forced the garrison to capitulate (14th April). Fire was opened from the position thus won, upon the mācī of Purandar, while Jai Singh's flying columns ranged through the Marāṭhā country, plundering the villages and preventing relief from coming to Purandar. The Marāṭhā efforts to raise the siege were many, but they failed in the end. Advancing along the spur, Dilir Khān laid siege to the mācī and on 30th May stormed the White Tower, and two days later the Black Tower that guarded the entrance to the mācī. Already Murār Bājī Prabhu, the gallant Killedār, had fallen with 300 of his Māvļe infantry in making a desperate sortie upon Dilir Khān's trenches.

Purandar was now doomed. And Sivājī very wisely decided to make the best term he could by a personal visit to Jai Singh. Of the interview between these two great historic personages we have

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The meeting took place on 11th June and Sivājī spent a couple of days there as Jai Singh's guest, while the terms were being settled. Jai Singh knew the strength of his own position and his pressure was inexorable. By the Treaty of Purandar, signed on 12th June 1665, Sivājī agreed:—

- (1) To cede to the Moghals 23 of his forts with their adjacent lands yielding four lakhs of hon a year.
- (2) To retain only 12 of his forts and their lands of the annual value of one lakh of hon.
- (3) To serve the Delhi Government as a loyal vassal, by sending a contingent of 5000 horse under some officer of his own, to fight in the Emperor's wars, these to be paid for by the assignment of a suitable jāgir from the Moghals.

In addition, Jai Singh made a secret engagement with Sivājī, by which the Delhi Government promised to confirm Sivājī in the possession of lands worth four lakhs of hon a year in the Konkan lawlands (Pāyin-ghāt), and five lakhs in the uplands (Bālāghāt) after he had himself conquered them from Adil Sāh, provided that he paid to the emperor a nazarānā of forty lakhs of hon in thirteen annual instalments.

So, Purandar was surrendered to the Moghals, on 12th June and the other forts followed. What Sivājī retained included Rājgad, Rāiri (Rāyagad), Pratāpgad, Jāvļi, and Vardhangad. The Moghals gained possession of Purandar, Sinhgad, Lohgad, Māhuli, Kohij, Songad, etc., besides retaining Pooṇā, Kalyān, Trimbak, Cākan and Sivner (Junnar) which they had seized earlier.

Šivājī allied to the Moghals. After closing the war with Sivājī, Jai Singh set out on the invasion of Bijāpur on 19th November 1665. Under the terms of the Treaty of Purandar, Sivājī accompanied him with a contingent of 2000 Marāṭhā horse and 7000 Māvļe infantry. At first the advance was unresisted, and the Bijapuri forts on the way, Phalṭaṇ, Thathvāḍā, Khaṭāv and Maṅgalvedhe, were easily gained by the Moghals. The first battle took place on 25th December, when a detachment under Dilir Khān and Sivājī advanced ten miles from Jai Singh's camp and lought a Bijāpuri army under Sārzā Khān, Khavās Khān, Jādav Rāv of Kalyāṇi, and Vyaṅkojī (the step-brother of Sivājī). The Deccanis evaded the charges of the heavy cavalry of Delhi, but harassed them by their "Cossack tactics" of loose fighting. The enemy retired at the end of the day, but as soon as the Moghal detachment set out to return to their camp, the Bijāpuris turned back and galled them from the rear and the wings.

^{*} Storia do Mogor, ii, 136.

After two days, Jai Singh resumed his march, and on the 28th fought another battle of the same kind, with the same result. On 29th December, he arrived within 12 miles of Bijāpur, and came to a halt, as the country round had been devastated by the Bijāpuris the wells filled and all trees cut down. A Bijāpuri detachment under the famous general Sārzā Khān was raiding the Moghal dominions in Jai Singh's rear. It was impossible to take Bijāpur fort by siege or corruption of the Ādil Sāhī nobles. So, Jai Singh in despair, began his retreat on 25th January 1666.

He sent Sivājī to make a diversion on the west by trying to wrest Panhāļā from Ādil Sāhī hands. On 16th January, Sivājī delivered an assault on Panhājā, three hours before sunrise. But the surprise failed, the garrison offered a stubborn defence, and Sivajī had to retire baffled after sacrificing a thousand of his men on the hillside. For this result, Netājī Pālkar's failure to turn up at the right time and attack his sector of the fort was responsible, and he was punished by dismissal from his post of Sivaji's Master of the Horse (sar-i-laskar) or second-in-command. The degraded officer at once went over to the Bijāpuri side and began to raid Moghal territory. But Jai Singh lured him back (20th March) with large promises of reward. The Marathas had no further part in Jai Singh's invasion of Bijāpur, which ended in complete failure; not a single fort taken by him during his advance remained in Moghal hands at its end. After much indecisive moving about, Mirzā Rājā died broken down and in disgrace, at Burhanpur on his way back to Delhi (28th August 1667).

Jai Singh had persuaded Aurangzeb to adopt the policy of inviting Sivājī to visit the Emperor in person and there conciliating him with high favours, so that in future he might be always on the Moghal side and counteract the alliance between Bijāpur and Goļkondā for wresting the Moghal territorial gains in the Deccan, because Sivājī's adhesion would have made such an anti-Moghal confederacy invincible. With many promises of high gains in territory and dignity as the gift of the Emperor, Jai Singh at last induced the Marāthā chief to pay that visit to the imperial Court at Āgrā, which ended in completely revolutionising the destiny of the Marāthā race.

The recently discovered Jaipur State records in the Rājasthāni dialect and Jai Singh's full Persian correspondence which Jadunāth Sarkār was the first to bring to light, have entirely set aside the hitherto prevalent story of this historic visit to Āgrā. In the light of the most authentic contemporary evidence, we see that it began as a comedy of errors due to Rajput incompetence but developed into a tragedy through Aurangzeb's crooked policy; thus the honest and highly politic plan of Jai Singh in which the journey originated was nullified, and Sivājī was turned into an eternal enemy of the Moghals.

After making masterly arrangements for the safety of his territories during his absence and their orderly administration even if

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he were treacherously arrested or killed, Sivājī left Rājgad on 5th March and arrived one stage short of Āgrā on 11th May 1666. He was to have been presented to Aurangzeb at that Emperor's birthday darbār in the morning of the 12th. But owing to his host Kumār Rām Singh Kachvā's bungling, there was confusion in the customary arrangements for welcoming him by advancing (istiqbāl) and he met the Kumār in the heart of city, at noon, after the public darbār in Āgrā fort-palace had broken up, and there was no time left for instructing him in Court etiquette. Rām Singh, in order not to miss this auspicious day, hurried Sivājī on to Āgrā fort, where the Emperor was now holding the select Audience (Divān-i-Khās).

Sivājī was presented to the Emperor, who received his gifts but said not one word of welcome in return. Then the Marāṭhā chief was led back from before the throne and made to stand in the third row of nobles, the five-hazāris, even behind Jasvant Singh. He felt so much humiliated that he angrily protested to Rām Singh, ran away from the presence to a corner behind the pillars, and refused to accept a Moghal mansab. His wrangle with Rām Singh who tried in vain to pacify him, created a disturbance in the Court, and threw Sivājī himself into a fever. So, the Emperor told Rām Singh to take Sivājī back to his tent, without a formal leave-taking, and there pacify him.

Immediately after this strange scene, the Court-party opposed to Jai Singh, the nobles who had suffered from Sivājī's aggressions, and even the Emperor's aunt and eldest sister combined to urge Aurangzeb to punish Sivājī for his rudeness and thus avenge Sāistā Khān. Aurangzeb's inner council induced him to accept the policy of either killing Sivājī or confining him in a fortress. But Jai Singh's solemn promise to Sivājī that he would be allowed to return home in safety and Kumār Rām Singh's insistence that he himself should be killed first before Sivājī was harmed, stayed the Emperor's hands, and he wrote to Jai Singh to learn what promises that Rājā had actually made to Sivājī. In the meantime, Sivājī was kept in detention in charge of Rām Singh, but with a guard of the Āgrā police-prefect's men round his tents.

Finding that he had nothing to hope for from the justice or generosity of the Emperor or his ministers, Sivājī turned to effecting his own deliverance. He sent home most of the officers and escort that he had brought with himself to Agrā, and then in the night of 19th August escaped from his tent with his son Sambhājī (a boy of nine) concealed in big baskets of sweets which he had been daily sending out for distribution to holy men. By moving in the disguise of an Hindu ascetic, with breathless speed, through unfamiliar jungle routes, he reached his home in safety, but there fell ill from the effect of the privations he had to undergo during his flight.

For full three years after his return from Agra (1667, 1668 and 1669), Sivājī lived very quietly, and in peace with the Moghals. He used this respite to organise his government, provision and repair

his forts, and consolidate and extend his power on the western coast, at the expense of Bijāpur and the Siddis. Prince Muāzzam, the new viceroy of Moghal Deccan, was an indolent pleasure-seeker. Sivājī appealed to the Prince's favourite Jasvant Singh to become his patron, and at their recommendation Aurangzeb recognised Sivājī as a Rājā and a loyal vassal (early 1668). A Marāthā contingent under Pratāp Rāv joined the Moghal prince at Aurangābād. The peace was broken at the end of 1669 by Aurangzeb's confiscation of Sivājī's new jāgīrs in Berār, and his secret orders to seize Sivājī's son when attending Muāzzam's court at Aurangābād as his father's deputy.

Sivājī opened his offensive with great vigour and immediate success, as the Moghal power in the Deccan was paralysed by a deadly quarrel between Prince Muāzzam and his chief general Dilir Khān. In March 1670, the English factors at Surat wrote, "Sivājī marches now not as before as a thief, but in gross with an army of 30,000 men, conquering as he goes". He recovered many of the forts he had ceded to the Moghals by the Treaty of Purandar, especially Koṇḍāṇā, in capturing which the gallant Tānājī Mālusare fell (4th February 1670). In October he looted Surat a second time, carrying off 66 lakhs of rupees worth of booty. When returning from Surat with his plunder, he was intercepted by Dāud Khān between Vaṇi and Diṇḍori (17th October), and an obstinate battle was fought with heavy loss on both sides; Ikhlās Khān Miānā was wounded here.

The Marāthās flushed with victory burst into all directions. The Peśvā recovered the fort of Trimbak; Pratāp Rāv (Śivajī's commander-in-chief) captured Ahivant and three other forts in the Cāndor range, and made a daring and successful raid into Khāndeś and Berār, looting Bahādurpurā (two miles from Burhānpūr) and Kariñjā, a city famous for its countless wealth, from which a crore worth of booty was carried off. Moro Trimbak Pingle at the same time raided West Khāndeś and Bāglānā; Sālhir, the chief fort of Bāglānā was taken (c 5th January 1671). But next month the Moghals recovered Ahivant from the Marāthās.

After the recess of the monsoon months, Aurangzeb's new generals Bahādur Khān and Dilir replaced the slow Mahābat Khān. Dilir seized Pooṇā and massacred all its inhabitants above the age of 9 years (end of December 1671). But the Moghal force besieging Sālhir was defeated with heavy slaughter, and all its camp and baggage taken by Pratāp Rāv and the Peśvā, and soon afterwards Mulhir was captured, completing Śivājī's conquest of Bāglāṇā, (February 1672).

Then the energies of the Marāṭhās overflowed into the Koļi country or Koļvan; here the Javhār and Rāmnagar (Dharampūr) States were conquered (June-July 1672), thus giving Sivājī a short and easy route from Kalyān up North Konkan to Surat. That great port now became subject to constant extortion by Marāṭhā armies, while the Nāśik district no longer remained safe for the Moghals.

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In November of this year, Sivājī's cavalry made a lightning raid into Berār and Telangana, the Moghal forces being baffled in their attempt to come up with them. But in the end the invaders were expelled without having been able to gain much (December).

Ali Ādil Sāh II died on 24th November 1672 and soon afterwards the government of Bijāpur fell into weakness and disorder, which Sivājī fully utilised. He took Panhāļā (6th March 1673) and Sātārā (27th July), while Pratāp Rāv Gujar raided the inland parts of Bijāpur Kānarā, looting Hubli and many other rich cities. Sivājī himself, at the head of a vast army, plundered and occupied Kanarā, (October—December 1673). The Moghal viceroy could do nothing serious, and the rising of the Khaibar Pass Afghān clans called away Aurangzeb himself from Delhi (April 1674), leaving his Deccan representative without hope of support. Sivājī seized this political lull to crown himself, as a sovereign king, on 6th June 1674.

Conquest of West Kanarā Coast.

Sivājī's annexation of the Kanarā coast was effected in 1675, but it had been preceded by many years of raiding and small local conquests. After the fall of Afzal Khān, he had first pushed into the Ratnāgirī district, but spared Rājāpūr port, as belonging to his family friend Rustam-i-Zamān (1660). It was however occupied on 3rd March 1661, and so also was Khārepāṭan. All the country northwards, forming the petty State of Sringārpūr was now annexed by him. Desultory fighting followed for some years. In 1663, he made a dash to Vengurlā by way of Kolhāpūr and Kuḍāļ, exacting blackmail but giving the local people his safe assurances. Vengurlā was held by a garrison of his own (June). Throughout the second half of 1664 Ādil Sāh renewed his attack on Bedņur, and the coast region was disturbed, which enabled Sivājī to reign victoriously and uncontrolled, daily increasing in strength.

Lakham Sāvant, the chief of Kudāl, had earlier made peace by accepting Sivājī's vassalage, but he now conspired with the Bijāpuri General Khavās Khān to recover his principality. In the first battle, early in October 1664, Khavās repulsed Sivājī after a bloody contest. Sivājī, however, turned aside to intercept, defeat and kill Bājī Ghorpade, the chief of Mudhol, who was bringing reinforcements to Khavās, and then sacked the town of Mudhol, massacring all the Ghorpades found there (end of October). Khavās fled away from Kudāļ and Bāndā, and Sivājī burst into the Sāvantvādī district, the petty desāis of which were driven into Goā territory for refuge, and the country placed under a desāi loyal to Sivājī. He next plundered Vengurlā and Hubli (December). None could check him in his conquering and plundering career in this region. On 8th February 1665, he embarked at Mālvan in his fleet and sacked Basrūr (Barcelore), the chief port of the Bedņur kingdom, but spared

Karvar for a contribution. Indecisive fighting went on for some years afterwards, the places frequently changing hands between Sivaji and the Bijāpuri barons.

In 1673, Sivājī made his second incursion into the upland of Bijāpuri Kanarā; Pratāp Rāv sacked Hubļi (May). Bahlol Khan the Rijāpuri general, was enveloped at Umrāni (15 April) but bought a safe retreat from Pratap Rav. Next year Pratap Rav was killed in making a rash charge on Bahlol Khan with only six horsemen at Nesari (24th February 1674), but Anand Rav rallied the Marāthā army, raided Sampgānv (20 miles from Bankāpūr), and defeated Bahlol Khān in March. The Adil Sāhis were able to expel the Marāthās from the Kārvār country. Sivājī himself set out on Dasarā day (10 October 1673), with a vast force, robbed many rich towns, including Bankāpūr and reached Kādrā, but was defeated and forced to evacuate Kanara, early in December. But in April next (1674) Sivājī was back in the Kārvār country and kept his hold on Kudāļ. In 1675, Sivājī took the frontier fort of Phondā from Bijāpuri hands after a hard fought siege (8th April-6th May) in consequence of which all the Karvar district as far south as the Gangavati river, passed from Bijāpuri possession into Marāthā hands. The Bednur Rani promised Sivaji an annual tribute. His possession of South Konkan and North Kanara remained unchallenged till his death.

Sivājī celebrated his coronation in June 1674 with full Hindu ceremonials, at a cost of nearly fifty lakhs of rupees, mostly in the form of money gifts and other presents to holy Brahmins and his own ministers, and charity to nearly fifty thousand Brahmins assembled in Rayagad for four months. There were two coronations on different dates, celebrated according to Vedic rites by Gaga Bhatta and Balam Bhatta and according to Tantrik rites by Niscal Puri. The significance of the coronation lay in Sivail's assertion of the claim that the Bhosles were pure Ksatriyas entitled to all the privileges of the twice-born castes, and that he was a suzerain monarch (Cakravarti, Chatrapati) and no longer the vassal of any other Power, Adilsah or the Padsah. The performance of the long forgotten Vedic ritual was a trumpet blast informing the Indian world that a Hindu Svarāi was born once more.

The war in the Deccan having now receded to the South, Siven's Conquest Aurangābād and Ahmadnagar were found to be posts too far north to serve as a convenient base for the Moghals. So, the new viceroy Bahādur Khān (1672-1677) encamped at Pedgānv on the Bhīmā eight miles south of Camargonda, where permanent cantonments grew up, to which the name of Bahadurgad was given.

After the death of Ali Adil Sah II (1672), the Bijapur government rapidly broke up, the boy Sultan was a puppet and factious nobles quarrelled for monopolising power and wealth. The Moghal Subhedar found it more profitable to side with one or other of these Adil Sahī factions than to face the risky and difficult duty of fighting Sivaji. The Marāthā King's clever diplomacy by secretly bribing Bahādur Khān

CHAPTER 1:

Rise of the Maratha Power.

SHIVATI Conquest of West Kanard

Coast.

of Eastern Karnāţak.

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the
Maratha Power.

SHIVAJI Sivāji's Conquest of Eastern Karnāṭak. ensured Moghal neutrality for some years; while Bijāpur was paralysed and Golkondā became his ally. Seizing this opportunity, Sivājī made his grandest conquest, that of the Eastern Karnāṭak.

The dominions of the fallen Vijaynagar empire in that quarter had been mostly seized by Adil Sāh and Qutb Sāh. Bijāpur had annexed northern and eastern Mysore, and the Madrās Plain from the Pālār river southwards to the Kolerun, i.e., from Vellore to 20 miles north of Tañjore, while Goļkoṇḍā had seized the country north of the Pālār river, namely from Cicācole to Madrās. South of the Kolerun lay the kingdoms of Tañjore (conquered by Sivājī's step brother Vyankojī in 1675) and Madurā. The Qutb Šāhī minister Mādaṇṇā Pāṇḍit, planned to conquer Bijāpur Karnāṭak with the help of Sivājī, and a secret alliance between the two sovereigns was arranged by Sivājī's envoy, Pralhād Nirājī.

Leaving his capital at the beginning of 1677, Sivājī reached Hyderābād early in February, maintaining strict discipline among his vast army and preventing any robbery or molestation of the villagers on the way. He was welcomed by Abul Hasan Qutb Sāh, and during a month's stay at Hyderābād made an offensive and defensive alliance with that Government, according to which the Sultān agreed to pay him a subsidy of four and a half lakhs of rupees a month and assist him with a contingent of 5,000 horsemen and some guns and ammunitions to co-operate in the conquest of the Karnāṭak. In return Sivājī promised to his ally such parts of his conquests as had not formerly belonged to his father Sahājī. For defending him against the Moghals, Qutb Sāh promised to the Marāthās one lakh of hon every year.

Descending into the Madras plains, Sivajī took the strong fort of Jiñji by treaty with its Bijāpuri Governor Nasir Muhammad Khān (May), promising him a money compensation, and laid seige to Vellore (which was yielded to him for a price as late as August 1678). As the Maratha incursion swept over the country, only a few fortified places offered any resistance, the rich men every where fleeing to the woods or to the European trading cities on the coast. Ser Khān Lodi, the Adil Sāhī Governor of the North Trichinopoly district (with his capital at Vali-Kandapuram), was defeated in battle (20th June) and forced to give up all his territories. Then marching to Tirumala vadi, on the north bank of the Kolerun river, Sivaji halted and called his brother to an interview with him. Vyankojī came, but rejecting Sivājī's claim for the surrender of threefourths of what Sahaji had left at the time of his death, the Tañjore Rājā cleverly escaped to his own dominions (22nd July). Finally, in November, Sivaji set out on his return, exacting money from every place on his way, and leaving an army under Santāji Bhosle to administer his new conquests. He reached Panhālā at the beginning of April 1678.

The territory annexed by Sivaji in the course of this expedition covered an area of 180 miles by 120 miles, with 86 forts and

a revenue of 44 lakhs of rupees; Jiñji was the seat of its Governor. On his return journey he took easy possession of his father's Jāgīr districts of Kolār, Uskoṭā, Bangalore, Bāļāpūr and Serā, in the eastern and central parts of modern Mysore. These latter areas were, however, restored to his brother Vyankojī a year later, as a friendly act.

Rise of the Maratha Power, Shivaji's Conquest of Eastern Karnājak.

Soon after his return from the East Coast, Sivājī had a rupture with the Golkondā Government. Qutb Sāh had borne all the expenses of this expedition, but Sivājī had not kept his promise by giving him a single one of the forts conquered there, nor shared the fabulous booty of that land of gold. So, the Sultan of Golkondā arranged a mutual arrangement among the ministers of Bijāpur and helped them with funds to prepare for a war to "confine Sivā to Konkan". But this anti-Marāthā coalition was broken up; the slothful Bahādur Khān had been replaced by that active and unyielding enemy of Sivājī, Dilir Khān, who wrongly decided to capture Bijāpur in alliance with the Afghān faction at the capital, instead of crushing Sivājī first by the united forces of the three Muslim Powers.

Sivājī's eldest son, Sambhājī was a brave but capricious, selfwilled and depraved youth, and his father had to detain him under watch in Paraļi fort. If we can believe the story told later by the poet Kavindra of Nevāsā, who was an eulogist of Sāhū Chatrapati, Sivājī had been instigated by his wife Soyrā Bāi to grant Mahārāṣṭra and the old dominions to her son Rājārām (a boy of ten) and offer the newly conquered and unsettled Karnāṭak territory to Sambhājī as his heritage, and Sambhājī naturally objected to it. Dilir Khān, knowing of the division of Sivājī's ministers into two factions for the rival heirs, sent secret messages to Sambhājī and induced that prince to escape from Paraļi to the Moghal Camp (13th December 1678).

With his new Ally Dilir Khan stormed the fort of Bhopalgad (45 miles south-west of Pandharpūr) where Sivajī's stores and the families of his chief subjects were lodged for safety (2nd April 1679), and treated the prisoners with brutal ferocity. At the end of the rains, he opened his invasion of Bijapur whose Vazir Siddi Masaud made a defensive pact with Sivajī. The invasion was a failure and Dilir had to retire in disgrace. Even Sambhājī was induced to return to his father (4th December).

In November Sivājī effectually helped the defence of Bijāpūr by raiding Moghal territory in the rear of Dilir Khān, with 18,000 horsemen, plundering and burning all the places on the way. At Jālnā his troopers sacked the hermitage of the Muslim Saint Sayyad Jān Muhammad, where the property of the rich men of that city had been deposited for safety. As the Marāṭhās, loaded with booty, were retreating they were enveloped by Moghal pursuers under Ranmast Khān and Kesarī Singh, but escaped after fighting bloody rearguard actions and fleeing through hill-tracks for three days and nights.

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power, Shivaji After reaching Rāyagad (early in December), Sivājī tried to reform Sambhājī by persuasion, but found it necessary to continue his detention at Panhāļā.

On 4th April 1680, Sivājī died after a short illness, when still in his 53rd year.

Stvájí's achievements and character.

The Marāthā State, backed by the nation, was the creation of Sivājī. The secret of his success lay in his inborn genius for action and leadership and the nobility of his character. His conduct was marked by a high standard of morality, and he remained throughout life abstemious, free from vice, and devoted to religion. As a king he extended his toleration and bounty to all sects, opened the public service to talent regardless of caste or creed, and ensured efficiency and purity of administration. A new vista of expansion and glory was opened to all able men of the country. He had the born leader's personal magnetism and threw a spell over all who knew him, choosing the best instruments by an unfailing judgment of his servants' characters. No other Hindu has shown such constructive genius in modern times.

At the time of his death, Sivājī's kingdom included all the country (excepting the Portuguese possessions) from Rāmnagar to Kārvār; its eastern boundary embraced Bāglāṇā in the north and then ran southwards through the middle of the Nāśik and Pooṇā districts, encircling the whole of the Sātārā and much of the Kolhāpūr districts. These formed the natural expansion of his "Old Dominions" or 'Svarāj'. A recent but permanent acquisition was the Western Karnāṭak or the Kanarese-speaking country from Belgānv to the Tungabhadrā opposite Bellāry. East of this last province he had conquered a large slice of the Eastern Karnāṭak from Koppal to Vellore and Jiñjī, or much of modern Mysore and portions of the Madrās districts of Bellāry, Cittur and Arcot, which was ruled by a viceroy at Jiñji.

Outside these parts of his kingdom, there was a wide belt of neighbouring territory, where his army invaded every year after the Dasarā day and exacted tribute (called Khandanī or Cāuth), because popularly calculated at one-fourth of the land-revenue). It was his policy that his soldiers should "feed themselves at the expense of foreign parts for eight months in the year".

Sivājī was a statesman and not a mere conqueror. We obtain a vivid picture of his civil administration and military organisation in the Adnyāpatra of the Amātya and the Sabhāsad Bakhar. His council of eight ministers (Aṣṭa Pradhān) consisted of the Peśvā (President), Mujumdār (Auditor-General), Vāqenavis or Vāqnis (Court Diarist), Surnis (Secretariat Superintendent), Dabir (Minister for Foreign Relations), Senāpatī (Commander-in-Chief), Pandit Rāv (Ecclesiastical head), and Nyāyādhiś (Chief Justice). It was in no

sense a Cabinet, and hardly a Council, because it very seldom met all together, and the king consulted the ministers, when he chose, only individually, except in great crises, which were rare (when it acted like the Privy Council of England on a king's demise). Each Pradhān was only a departmental head.

CHAPTER 1.

Maratha Power,
Shivaji

Reign of Sambhaft. 1680-1689

After the death of Sivājī at Rāyagad Aṇṇājī Surnis and other ministers crowned his second son Rājārām there (21 April 1680). But the army chiefs under Hambir Rāv Mohite refused to obey this boy of ten who was a mere puppet in the hands of a ministerial faction; they went over to Sambhājī, who seized control of Panhājā fort, and coming to Rāyagad gained peaceful possession of the capital (18 June). The leaders of the party against him were at first imprisoned, but later released. In August 1681, a dangerous conspiracy to murder Sambhājī and give the throne to Rājārām was detected and relentlessly suppressed; Aṇṇājī Datto, Bājājī Āvjī Prabhu and a few other officers were executed for complicity. Sivājī's widow Soyrā Bāi, the mother of Rājārām died in prison either by suicide or poisoning.

Thus the able and experienced local men trained by Sivājī were excluded from his son's Government, and Sambhājī fell under the influence of a Kanauji Brāhmaṇ, on whom he conferred the title of Kavi-kalāś (the Pinnacle of Poets), as his only faithful adherent. By this vazir's advice the Rājā became a worshipper of the Tāntrik cult, and the birth of an heir to him (Śāhū, on 18, May 1682) after the adoration of the goddess Kālī, confirmed the dominance of Kavi-Kalāś over the Rājā's mind. This sect was abominated by nearly all the Brāhmaṇs of Mahārāṣṭra, and as a result the reign of Sambhājī was disturbed by frequent plots against him. This is attested by the records of the English merchants of Bombay and the French of Pondicherry.

Hence, the reign of Sambhājī was a period of arrested growth for the Marāṭhā State. Its inner strength was paralysed by the mortal antagonism between Sambhājī's followers and Rājārām's partisans. And this internal weakness was utilised by Auraṅgzeb, who was present in person in the Deccan with all his best generals and forces. This nearness of his enemy imposed caution on Sambhājī's movements, except westwards, against the Siddis and the Portuguese. Bijāpur and Goļkondā were now too weak to help him, and soon ceased to exist as independent States.

Sambhājī's troops only carried out the customary raids into Moghal territory wherever they could, every year after *Dasarā*, but these sporadic activities were mechanical and did not lead to any extension of his State, nor even its strength. At the end of January 1681,

Rise of the Maratha Power, REIGN OF SAMBHAJI. 1680-1689 they looted the suburbs of Burhanpur for three days, digging up the floors of the houses for buried treasure, without any obstruction. In October an attempt to enter Ahmadnagar was defeated.

Muhammad Akbar, the fourth son of Aurangzeb, rebelled against his father in Rajputānā, but being defeated fled away from Aimer to Sambhājī for shelter. He reached Pālī (ten miles east of Nagothna) on 1st June 1681, and was hospitably entertained by Sambhājī, who visited him on 13th November. But even with such a valuable pawn in his hands, Sambhājī could do nothing against the Moghal empire. Akbar was a proud, thoughtless, self-indulgent youth, and Sambhājī could never trust him. None of their plans for invading North India or Rajputānā in Aurangzeb's absence matured, as the interests of the two allies were not the same. At last, weary of Sambhāji's inaction, Akbar in anger went off to the Goā frontier and lived at Banda (in Savantvadī) and then at Bicolim (which was then a Marāthā territory), trying to sail to Persia in a Portuguese ship. Kavi Kalāś and Durgādās placated him with fresh promises of Maratha support, and in Sambhaji's war with Goa the Moghal prince acted as a peace-maker (1684). He spent a whole year at Sakharpe (in the Ratnagiri district) and Malkapur and finally left India, in utter despair, in February 1687 for Persia, where he died in exile (November 1704).

Leaving Rājputānā in the middle of the year 1681 after patching up a peace, Aurangzeb arrived in the Deccan at Burhānpūr, on 13th November, and took post at Aurangābād on 22nd March next year, directing the operations of all his forces. He thus served as a constant check on any grand design of the Marāthās. Up to the fall of Bijāpur and Golkondā (1686 and 1687) his war with the Marāthās went on languidly with no decisive result.

While Sambhājī was busy personally bombarding Jañjīrā (1682), a Moghal force under Sayyad Hasan Ali Khān descended from Junnar into North Konkan and took possession of Kalyān, burning all the Marāṭhā villages on the way. Sahābuddin Khān (afterwards created Firuz Jang) laid siege to Rāmsej (April), but failed after repeated attempts, and at last the siege was raised in October. Ranmast Khān reoccupied North Konkan (November) defeating the Peśvā and Rupājī Bhosle in many battles. Prince Āzam invaded Mahārāṣṭra from the east, and once in his absence his heroic wife Jahānzeb Bānu inspired her Rajput escort under Anurudh Singh Hādā to defeat the Marāṭhās in a great battle, in which 900 Rajputs fell and many Marāṭhās too. The year 1683 saw a strange inactivity on the part of the Emperor, he accomplished nothing notable, because his mind was upset and he could trust nobody.

Sivājī's unrivalled genius was shown by his organising a Marāṭhā navy and creating a chain of sea-forts on the western coast. His first capture of Kalyān (1660) was followed by his forming

a dockyard there and building a navy for the protection of his subjects on the coast strip and promoting marine trade. An Abyssinian Colony, settled in the 15th century on the rocky island of Jañjirā, with some land-possessions on the coast, such as Danda-Rājpūrī, Taļā dominated the sea. While Sivājī held the eastern or inland part of the Kolābā district, these Abyssinians (called Siddis) held the western or coast strip. Hence there were frequent skirmishes and cruel raids between the two Powers. Every enemy of Sivājī could count on the help of the Siddis. In 1660 he arrested the coast for a time and even captured Dandā, but his annual attacks on Jañjīrā from the mainland always failed, and the Siddis even recovered Dandā in 1671. The same chronic fighting continued throughout his reign and Sambhājī's also. A grand assault in 1675-76 failed to dislodge the Siddis, with heavy loss in men and munitions to the Marāṭhās; and also their frequent battles at sea (1676-80) had no decisive result.

The impossibility of capturing Janjira induced Sivaji to create a naval base near it. He fortified the little rocky island of Khanderi (called Kennery in the English records). This post was maintained inspite of many naval battles with the English and Siddi fleets, in which the young Maratha navy triumphed once or twice. But the Siddis fortified the neighbouring island of Underf, defeated the Marāthā navy under Daulat Khān and thus neutralised the post at Khānderi (January 1680). Throughout Sambhāji's reign, the policy of the English Council in Bombay was "to keep fair with both" the Siddis and the Marāthā Rājā by all contrivances. Thus the Siddi fleet with convenient shelter in Bombay harbour close at hand, formed a constant menace to Sambhāji's coast villages. They had sacked Apta twice, in 1673 and 1681. In December 1681-January 1682, Sambhājī in person bombarded Jañjīrā with heavy guns, for 30 days. The attempt failed, and also two battles at sea, in July and October next.

Then Sambhājī invaded the Portuguese dominions for their help to his enemies, especially the Moghal armies invading North Konkan. In April 1683, he raided their territory of the North, i.e., Daman, burning many towns. Caul was assaulted by the Paśvā without success (August). The Viceroy of Goa attempted to take Phonda by escalade, but was driven back in a disastrous retreat (1 November), lossing many hundreds of seamen and Kanārese sepoys. Sambhājī next invaded Goā. On 14th November 1683, his men occupied the island of Santo Estevao (2 miles north-east of Goa), beat back an attack by the Viceroy in person, but evacuated it on the 16th. In December, the Marathas entered and plundered the districts of Sälsette and Bärdes, for a month. But the invasion of the region by a Moghal army under prince Sah Alam, by the Ramghat pass, drove Sambhājī away in flight to Rāyagad. A peace was arranged between him and the Portuguese at Phonda by Kavi Kalas and Prince Akbar (20 January 1684) on the basis of the mutual restitution of conquests. CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power; REIGN OF SAMBHAJI 1680-1689. CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power, REIGN OF SAMBHAJI 1680-1689, The invasion of Sah Alam failed through lack of provisions to do any harm to Sambhājī.

While Aurangzeb was involved in the sieges of Bijāpūr and Golkondā (1685-87), Sambhājī frittered away his strength in small predatory incursions, having "too many irons in the fire" to effect any decisive success. There were frequent desertions to the Moghal side. His rebel vassals kept South Konkan and Kanara in turmoil while Harjī Mahādik, his Viceroy of Jiñjī, became practically independent on the East Coast. The Moghals gained some successes, such as burning Pācād (at the foot of Rāyagad), and capturing Kondānā (December 1684). It was recaptured by the Marāṭhās in the succeeding year.

In the midst of this gathering darkness, Sambhājī, attended only by Kavi Kalaś and a small escort at Sangameśvar, was surprised and captured by an able Moghal officer, Śaikh Nizām, after forced marches in secrecy (1st February 1689). A month later, Sambhāji and Kavi Kalaś were cruelly mutilated and killed by order of Aurangzeb at Koregānv (11, March).

The ministers crowned Rājārām at Rāyagad on 8th February, but that fort was besieged by Zulfiqār Khān and captured on 19th October, when Sambhājī's wife Yesu Bāī and son Sāhū became prisoners of the Moghals. But Rajārām had already slipped out of the fort, and he reached Jinjī in disguise on 1st November 1689.

RAJABAM,

In the year 1689 Aurangzeb seemed to have reached the summit of his success. Bijāpūr, Golkondā, Rāyagad had all fallen to him and their kings were his prisoners. But though he had crushed the Marāthā King, the heroic Marāthā people rose up and in eighteen years totally defeated the power of the Moghal empire directed by its ablest head. In November 1689, Rajārām reached Jinjī and set up his independent government there, while his ministers left behind with full power of initiative most effectively organised the national resistance to Aurangzeb in the homeland. The disappearance of one common head and central Government among the Marathas only multiplied Aurangzeb's difficulties, as every ambitious Maratha captain, armed with a signed grant of Rājārām, fought and raided in a different quarter on his own account. Aurangzeb could not put an end to this people's war, because there was no Maratha Government or State-army for him to attack and destroy once for all. The Marāthās were no longer mere banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics,—an enemy all pervasive across the Indian peninsula from Bombay to Madras, and elusive like the wind, yet overwhelming large Moghal forces like a whirlwind (as Santăji Ghorpade and Dhanāji Jādhav proved so often). The Moghals could not defend every place, and the forts won by them were easily recovered by the Marathas as soon as the Emperor's army retired from them leaving only small garrisons. The local officers of the Emperor were driven to buy peace from the Maratha captains by secretly promising them an annual blackmail of one fourth of the revenue. Many imperialists made a concert with the enemy and enriched themselves by robbing the Emperor's own subjects. In fact, the Moghal administration, like that of the Chatrapati, was now dissolved, and outside the petty village-communities there was do-amli or rather anarchy. The whole country was fast turning into a wilderness through ceaseless warfare. Every year Aurangzeb's camps in the Deccan lost one lakh of soldiers and camp-followers through war, pestilence or famine, and three times that number of transport animals. The economic exhaustion of the Deccan was complete, "the fields were left devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts" (Manucci, an eye-witness).

Rājārām was a sickly, softnatured youth, and his State was run by his ministers. At Jiñji his chief confidant and real prime minister was Pralhād Nirājī, on whom the title of Regent (*Pratinidhi*) was conferred, while the *Peśvā* Nilo Moropant Pingle had no power. But the administration of the kingless Mahārāṣṭra land was very ably conducted by Rāmcandra Niļkanth¹ (of Bāvdā) holding the office of *Amātya*, and Sankarājī Malhār the Sacio, and after 1701 by Paraśurām Trimbak who rose to be Regent. Among the generals the men of supreme genius were Santājī Ghorpade. Dhanājī Jādhav and Nemājī Sinde.

On reaching Jiñjī, Rājārām took over the government from Harjī Mahādik's widow (a daughter of Sivājī), but suffered from extreme financial distress. But the Moghal cause, too, was weakened by the dismissal of the old Qutb Sāhī officers in control of the Eastern Karnātak and the rebellion of the Rajput contingents against Aurangzeb's order for temple destruction². Zulfiqār Khān arrived with a vast imperial army and began the siege of Jiñjī (September 1690) which at first drove the Marāthā forces in that province into the defensive.

The three fortified hills of Jiñjī cover such a vast area that a blockade of them was impossible and the Moghals simply sat down before one gate of it and fired at the defences opposite, but the garrison got supplies by a round-about jungle path on another side. Nor was Zulfiqār in earnest to take the fort, because he had made a secret pact with Rājārām for sparing each other while making an outward show of fighting. Aurangzeb's death was soon expected and in the inevitable dismemberment of his heritage, Zulfiqār planned to make himself independent ruler of the Deccan subhās, and placate Rājārām by recognising Marāthā independence and ceding the Bijāpūr subhā to him (Martin's Memotres). Thus the so-called siege dragged on for eight years (September 1690—January 1698), with

² Memoires of Fr. Martin, iii, 59.

Rise of the Maratha Power, RAJARAM,

Siege of Jiñjī.

Ramcandra was given the title of Hakumat-panah or Dictator, all other officers having to obey him like the king.

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power RAJARAM Siege of Jiñjī varying success for the two sides. At last under threat of Aurangzeb, Zulfiqār captured the fort on 8th January 1698, after secretly enabling Rājārām to escape from it with all the combatants before its fall. The Bhosle Rājā of Tañjore greatly helped his kinsman Rājārām with money and provisions throughout the siege.

In December 1691, Zulfiqār received reinforcements under his father Asad Khān and Prince Kām Bakhṣ, the youngest son of Auraṅgzeb, but could gain no decisive success that year or the next. The coastal country, however, was continually pillaged by the campfollowers and irregular plunderers of both the sides. In 1692, the excessive rainfall reduced the Moghal army to the greatest distress. Early in December two vast Marāṭhā forces, totalling more than 30,000 cavalry, raised in Western India by Rāmcandra Amātya arrived in Eastern Karnāṭak. One division of it, under Santāṭi Ghorpade surprised and captured Ali Mardān Khān, the Moghal fauṭdār of Conjeveram (13 December) with all his property. The other division under Dhanāṭī Jādhav attacked Zulfiqār's siege camp and captured Ismāil Khān Makā, commanding the western outpost with all his property, and replenished the garrison.

Worse than these disasters, the imperial camp was torn by dissensions between the general and the Prince. Kām Bakhş resented the dominance of Zulfiqār and Asad Khān, and planned to flee to Rājārām. His position being untenable, Zulfiqār abandoned his big guns and fell back from the trenches to his base four miles behind. Here he placed the prince under detention, and went through almost daily fights with the exultant Marāṭhās outside. At last his food being exhausted, he bribed Rājārām's ministers and effected a safe retreat to Vāndivāś (23 January 1693). The siege of Jiñjī was abandoned for the time.

In February 1694, Zulfiqār set out to conquer the South Arcot district, and coerce and exact a large tribute from the Rājā of Tañjore. Towards the close of this year he resumed the siege of Jiñjī, in the same insincere manner. In 1696, Santājī and Dhanājī who had returned from a visit to Mahārāṣṭra, pressed Zulfiqār very hard, and forced him to remain on the defensive in Arcot fort. The civil war between Dhanājī and Santājī enabled Zulfiqār to issue forth in 1697, exact tribute from Tañjore and return to Vāndivāś (June 1697). In November, he renewed the siege of Jiñjī in right earnest and took it on 8th January next. Rājārām, escaping in time, reached Viśalgad in safety in February. Thus the capture of Jiñjī was undone.

People's War in Marāthā Homeland, 1689-1699.

In 1689, Rājārām after slipping out of his beleagured capital Rāyagad had come to Panhālā and there the strategy of national defence was matured. The Moghal power was to be distracted by transferring the Rājā and his Government to the far off Eastern Karnātak, while the Delhi forces were to be harassed on the Western

side by another party of his officers under the supreme direction of Rāmcandra Bāvdekar (Hakumat Panāh or Dictator) and his energetic assistant Sankarājī Nārāyan Sacio, without having to refer to the distant Chatrapati for orders.

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power. RAJARAM

Marāthā Homeland. 1689-1699.

At first Aurangzeb's success had been uninterrupted; the Mogha!s People's War in had by the end of the year 1689 gained Salhir, Trimbak, Sinhgad, Rājgad, Panhāļā and Rāyagad. In North Konkan, Mātabar Khān, the able faujdar of Kalyan, captured many forts. The west coast was mostly under Moghal sway. Caul was lost and the Marathas evacuated Khānderī island for Cheriā.

But the Marāthā revival started even before the year 1689 was out. Sankarājī struck one or two hard blows. On 25th May 1690 they gained their first resounding success by capturing the Moghal general Rustam Khān with his family and entire camp after killing 1500 imperialists, near Sătără. In the same year, Rămcandra recovered Pratāpgad, Rājgad and some other forts. Even Panhāļā was recovered in 1692; the long desultory siege of this last fort by Aurangzeb's grandsons (1692-96) ended in failure,

In 1692, there was a renewal of Maratha activity with conspicuous success in many quarters. Santājī Ghorpade made rapid raids far to the east over the Bijapur plains. He and Dhanaji threatened Western Kanarā, Belgānv, Dhārvār and Bankāpūr; then they went off to Jiñji for nearly a year. In October 1693, Santāji returned and resumed his raids in the West, collecting Cauth as far east as Mālkhed. Nothing decisive resulted from the sporadic fighting during 1694 and the first ten months of the next year.

In 1695, Santājī Ghorpade by masterly tactics and dispersal and concentration of his swift cavalry divisions, drove Qasim Khan, the Subbedar of Moghal Western Mysore (Sera) and Khanazad Khan, one of the highest Court nobles, in helpless defeat into the small fort of Dodderi, where they were forced by starvation to make an abject surrender, giving up all their property and promising a ransom of 20 lakhs. Qāsim Khān himself died. Next Santājī slew Himmat Khan, a very able and vigorous general, (on 20th January 1696) near Basavāpaţţam.

Santājī then went to the Madrās Coast, and the rivalry between him and Dhanāji Jādhav for the office of Rajārām's Sendpati (Commander-in-chief) developed into a civil war. Dhanājī was defeated by Santājī near Conjevaram. Santājī returned to the home land, but was defeated by Dhanājī near Sātārā and when fleeing was beheaded by Amrt Rav's brother (June 1697). Next year Jiñjī fell in January, and Rajaram returned to Viśalgad in February, but there could be no revival of Maratha aggression for some time owing to his broken health and financial distress. In October 1699, Rajaram issued from Sātārā with his family in order to avoid falking into the

¹ Keśav Pandit's Sanskrt poem on Rājārām's Journey.

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power RAJARAM People's War in Marāthā Homeland, 1689-1699. hands of Aurangzeb, who had personally marched out of Islāmpuri to besiege that fort. The fugitive Rājā was chased by the Moghals, defeated near Pareṇḍā and driven back towards Viśālgad. In January 1700, Zulfiqār (now created Nusrat Jang) defeated Dhanājī and Haṇumant Rāv near Masur. But on 2nd March of this year, Rājārām died at Sinhagaḍ of fever caused by the hardships of his swift flying raids. His famous widow Tārā Bāī assumed control of the administration and crowned her son as Sivājī II, though her co-wife Rājas Bāī tried to make her own son Sambhājī II king with the support of a faction among the nobles, and defied Tārā Bāī, who however triumphed over her rival in the end.

Aurangzeb's last campaigns in Deccan.

After the annexation of the Adilsahi and Qutbsahi kingdoms Aurangzeb marched up and down the country and then settled in camp at Galgali¹ for 3½ years, and finally at Brahmapurī (renamed by him as Islampuri) on the Bhima for 4% years (1695-1699). Leaving his family in this base-camp (1699), he set out with the army to conquer the Maratha forts, an attempt which occupied him till 1705, a year before his death. This final scene of his life's story was a tragedy of unrelieved failure. It was a repetition of the same sickening tale, a Marāṭhā hill fort captured by him after a vast expenditure of time, money and men, the fort after a few months recovered by the Marathas from the weak Moghal garrison left there, and the siege begun again by the Moghals a year or two later. His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable hardships from rain and flood, lack of grain and transport, fodder, pestilence and enemy harassment, but the old Emperor refused to listen to advice, make peace, and return to Northern India. The Moghal Empire really perished in Mahārāşţra, though that country itself was turned into a wilderness by the horrors of endless war. In the end, the last Moghal prince withdrew from Mahārāṣṭra in 1709 and Marāthā independence was finally achieved.

The Moghal endeavours in these six years from 1699 to 1705 need be told in brief outline only. The Emperor captured Sātārā on 21st April 1700, Paraļi (1st June), Panhāļā (28th May, 1701), Kheļņā or Višāļgad (4th June 1702), Koṇḍāṇā or Sinhgad (18 April 1703), Rāyagāḍ (16th February 1704) and Torṇā (10th March 1704), besides five forts of lesser note, but none of them except Torṇā was taken by assault, all others capitulated for a price. He, last of all, besieged and took Vāgingerā, the capital of the Beraḍ tribe (in the present Solāpūr district, south-east of Bijāpūr City) on 27th April 1705, but became completely broken down in health at Devāpūr (May—October 1705), and was brought back to Ahmadnagar (January 1706) to die there on 20th February 1707.

MARATHA RESISTANCE UNDER TARA BAL Tārā Bār's administrative genius and strength of character saved the nation in the awful crisis following Rājārām's death and Sāhū's captivity. As Khāfi Khān bears witness, "under Tārā Bār's guidance

¹ On the Krsnā, 34 miles south-west of Bijāpūr City.

Marāthā activity began to increase daily. She took into her own hands the control of all affairs, such as the appointment and changing of Generals, the cultivation of the country, and the planning of raids into all the six subhās of the Deccan, nay, even up to Sironj and Mandesor in Māļwā, and winning the hearts of her officers, so that all the efforts of Aurangzeb against the Marāthās failed".

CHAPTER 1.

Rise of the Maratha Power Maratha Resistance Under Tara Bai.

The colossal failure of Aurangzeb proves that a nation is greater than even the greatest individual.





सन्यमेव जयते

CHAPTER 2*

EXPANSION OF MARATHA POWER

(1707-1720)

The Death of Auranges in Ferruary 1707 ushered a new era in the history of the Deccan. The armies of the Great Moghal were everywhere on the retreat and falling back towards Hindustān from where they had been led forward to the conquest of the Deccan twenty-five years ago. The change was writ large for any discerning person to read. A few months before the Emperor's death the shrewd Manucci had noted 'King Auranged repents of having entangled himself in the war with the Marāthās, for it has not succeeded as he had hoped. The Marāthās move about with their armies and pillage the empire in all directions. Every day they display their power and audacity to a greater extent in every part of the empire. In this war over a hundred thousand souls have died yearly, and of animals, horses, pack oxen, camels over three hundred thousand. The great nobles are in distress, their families are begging.¹

Khāfi Khān wrote, 'for all the struggles and schemes the campaigns and sieges of this prince the power of the Marathas increased day by day. By hard fighting, by the expenditure of vast treasures accumulated by Sah Jahan and by the sacrifice of many thousands of men, he had penetrated into their country, had subdued their lofty forts, and had driven them from house and home; still the daring of the Marathas increased, and they penetrated into the old territories of the imperial throne, plundering and destroying wherever they went. In imitation of the Emperor, who with his enterprising armies was staying in these distant mountains, the Maratha Commanders cast the anchor of permanence wherever they penetrated and having appointed Kamāvisdārs (Revenue Collectors) they passed the years and months to their satisfaction with their wives and children, tents and elephants. Their daring went beyond all bounds; they divided all districts among themselves, and in the imperial fashion they appointed their Subhedars, Kamāvisdars and Rāhdars, They attack

CHAPTER 1

Expansion of Maratha Power.

DEATH OF AURANGEES AND AFTER.

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

¹ Storia Do Mogor, by N. Manucci, Vol. IV, pp. 96-97.

CHAPTER 2.

Expansion of Maratha Power. and destroy the country as far as the borders of Ahmadābād and the districts of Māļwā and spread their devastations through the provinces of the Deccan to the environs of Ujjain.¹

DEATH OF AURANGZEB AND AFTER.

Aurangzeb himself was not unaware of the drift of events and during the last years of his life had tried to come to an understanding with the Marāṭhās, to obtain peace with honour. He had an idea of making use of the captive Sāhū to gain his ends, but his suspicious nature defeated the move. On his death, therefore, his son Azam began his march northward without concluding any formal agreement with the Marāthās. The Marāthās in his rear were soon active and renewed their attacks on imperial territory. The captive Sāhū unwilling to be dragged to far off Delhi, began efforts to regain his liberty. The party in his favour at the Emperor's court consisting of Zulfiqār Khān and the Rajput nobility, advised Azam to allow Sāhū to return to the Deccan, reclaim his patrimony and rule it as a feudatory of the empire. That would, they contended, ensure the safety of Moghal dominions in the south by having a friendly prince as their neighbour or should Sahū fail to obtain general recognition, embroil the Marathas in civil war and remove this source of danger for some time.

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Azam, therefore, gave a willing ear to Sāhū's proposals. Between March and May 1707 there were two or three audiences between the two princes and robes and titles conveying royal favour were conferred on \$āhū. The talks, however, appeared to have a tendency to protract over a long period as the Moghal prince, busy planning the campaign for the throne, had little time for delicate negotiations. Uneasy at the prospects of further detention Sahū left his Moghal friends one night at Duraha near Sironi about 8th May with a very slender escort consisting of his immediate attendants. To elude pursuit he plunged in the Vindhya forests and made his way to Bijagad, south of the Narmada. The Rawal of that place Mohan Singh gave him a cordial welcome and helped him to get on to Sultānpūr in Khāndes. Near Sultānpūr Amṛt Rāv Kadam Bānde joined the Prince's cause and they advanced to Lambkani in Khandes. Word went round that the exile prince was returning and now veteran soldiers, loyal servants, adventurers began to flock round his standard. In his imprisonment Sāhū had contacted several Marāthā chieftains; to them and to others he wrote tactful and conciliatory letters inviting them to come and help him in the task of rebuilding the shattered Marāthā State, or reviving its faded glory. One of the first influential chiefs to respond to the Prince's call was Parsoji Bhosle of Berār. His example proved infectious; Nemājī Sinde, Cimnājī Dāmodar Moghe, Haibat Rāv Nimbāļkar and a host of Marāthā captains in Khāndes hurried to join his standard and swear allegiance to their new yet rightful master. His army thus swollen,

Sahu advanced to Ahmadnagar; this old town was the seat of Muhammedan authority for over two centuries and occupied a central position and to it Aurangzeb had repaired in the last year Maratha Power. of his life. From here Sāhū paid his respects to the remains of that venerable figure buried at Khuldabad and communicated his arrival to his aunt Tārābāī who was ruling as regent at Sātārā on behalf of her infant son Sivājī, eleven years of age.

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Sāhu's struggle with Tarabal,

Sāhū having informed the ruling party at Sātārā on his return, invited from them proposals for the future government of the Marāthā State. The Regent Tārābāi was a woman of imperious temperament and the prospect of resigning the reins of administration to her nephew and accept a subordinate position was distasteful to that masterful lady. She refused to believe the reports of Sāhū's release, discredited his letters and declaring the new claimant for the Gādī to be an imposter, ordered her generals to destroy wherever they should find him. This ruse could not stand for long; Sāhū was personally known to the leading Mārāthā chieftains and officers who had come in contact with him. As a proof of greater conviction Parsoji Bhosle publicly dined with him. Tārābāi then put forth another and a stronger reason why she was not prepared to admit Sāhū to government. She argued, 'that the Marāthā kingdom had been reared up with painful toil by the Great Sivājī. This was lost by Sambhājī, Sāhū's father and her husband Rājārām raised the edifice anew out of ashes. He defended it against the Moghals' onslaught and hurled them back. The present Maratha State, she contended, was her husband's creation. She also argued that the Maratha State. The Regent Tarabai was a woman of imperious Great Sivājī had expressed a wish on his death-bed that the succession should go to his second son Rājārām, the elder Sambhājī being unfit to rule. Sāhū thus in no way could lay any claim to the Gādī!.

Tārābāi's specious arguments could make little impression on the Marathas, always jealous of the right of the elder or the senior branch to which Sahū belonged. They had fought all these years to liberate their homeland and obtain the release of their legitimate Prince Sähü, to whose freedom and reinstatement they looked forward as the natural culmination of that struggle. The sacrifices the nation had made, were not to uphold the cause of Rajaram or his son, but to save the honour of the House of Sivajī of which Sahū of the senior branch was the living symbol, and whose return had great significance to them. Even Rājārām at the time of ascending the Gadi in 1690, had declared that he was holding the office of Chatrapati (the king) only in trust for his nephew then absent in the Moghal camp and that he would be only too happy to make way for the rightful owner. The issue had always been presented to the people of Mahärästra as the restoration of the senior branch

¹ Letter published in Vividh Dnyan Vistar, 1924 February.

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Sāhū's struggle with Tārābāi to its rightful authority and Tārābāi's quibbles regarding the superior claims of her son deceived nobody. Herein lay Sāhū's advantage. The common people and soldiers were solidly on his side. It was ultimately this support of the common people that sustained his cause and helped him triumph over odds. Though commanded by the queen to swear fidelity to her son on milk and boiled rice, Tārābāi's officers did so with a reservation that their first loyalty would be to support the cause of legitimacy and uphold the dignity of the house of Sivājī.

Sāhū advanced to Khed on the Bhīmā; his further prospects depended on the attitude of the great Marāṭhā captains and especially on Senāpati Dhanājī Jādhav who commanded the largest Marāṭhā army in the field. Dhanājī knew young Sāhū personally and was convinced of his superior claims to Marāṭhā leadership by his Diwāṇ Bāļājī Viśvanāth and Khaṇdo Ballāļ, the Chatrapatī's hereditarv Secretary. The old soldier refused to take arms against his lawful sovereign and carried with him the major part of the army. The remnant was too small to make a stand against the combined forces and fled to Sātārā (Battle of Khed, 12th October).

Important consequences flowed from the battle of Khed. It opened to Sāhū the gates of the Marāṭhā Svarāj, the heart of the hilly country of Poona and Satara, where the great Sivaji had begun his wonderful career and which he took care to fence round with formidable fortresses. The powerful forces led by Senāpatī Dhanājī had declared in his favour; Sahū decided to press home his advantage. He marched on to the capital occupying on his way Jejuri, Sirval and Candan Vandan. The Saciv of Bhor Sankarāji Nārāyan held some of the important hill forts in the region; he was summoned by the young Prince and assured of royal favour. Torn between his personal loyalty to the queen and his higher duty to his nation and the cause of legitimacy, the old veteran decided the issue by putting an end to his life1 (27th October 1707). Sāhū sent message of sympathy to the bereaved family and by his conciliatory conduct made an excellent impression on his compatriots and obtained the hill forts of Rajgad, Torņā, Rohidā, Vicitragad without striking a blow. His rear thus secured, he was free to commence the siege of the capital. Tārābāī had fled to Panhāļā with her son and her Amātya, Rāmcandra, leaving the defence of Sātārā to Paraśurām Pratinidhi. The garrison and the commandant had no heart to fight their own brethren. By seizing the commandant's family at Wai Sahu forced him to open the gates of the city. It was a Saturday in January 1708 that the victorious entry was made; and the memory of the happy event was greeted by the custom of beating of drums on Saturdays at the fort.

¹ Itihas Sangraha, Volume VI, Petva Daftarantil Mahiti, pp. 188-189.

After a week's time Sahu ascended the Gadi in ceremony and appointed his new ministers. Anxious to conciliate old families he made few changes and made them where absolutely necessary. The post of Peśvā went to a son of Moropant Pingle, Dhanāji Jādhav was confirmed as Senāpatī and the right of making collections in several His coronation and districts was delegated to him. At this period of confusion (as new appointments remarked by Grant Duff) the revenue was realized on no fixed principle but levied as opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution. The infant son of Sankarājī Nārāyan was likewise confirmed as Saciv; Cangadhar Pralhad Nirājī was elevated to the post of Pratinidhi as Paraśurām Pant Pratinidhi refused to abjure his oath to Tārābāī. The Citnis family was continued in its office. Dhanājī's Divān, Bāļājī Viśvanāth, who had materially helped the Prince's cause, was taken in direct service of the King, appointed Mutalia or Deputy to the Amatua and was honoured with the dignity of 'Senā-Kartā', probably in appreciation of his skill in raising new contingents and furnishing them properly. The great Marāthā Captains, Nemājī Sinde, Parsojī Bhosle, Haibat Rāv Nimbālkar and a host of others received high sounding titles and dresses as the sovereign had little else to confer on the powerful chieftains.

But Sāhū was not yet out of the wood. His aunt had fled before him to Panhālā and from there was busy fomenting discord among Marāthā ranks and sowing disunity among Marāthā chiefs. Many Marāthā leaders like Ghorpades, Cavāns, Dābhādes, Thorāts, had risen to greatness in her husband's service; the great house of Santājī Ghorpade was the rival of Dhanaji Jadhav and competed with the Jadhav family for the honours of the generalship. Ramcandra Amātua and the queen who had directed the defence of Mahārāstra for over a long period, from Panhālā, claimed personal devotion from not a few commandants of forts in the Ghat region. Sahū therefore had to follow Tārābāī to the hills. He offered to cede to his cousin territory south of the Vārṇā to put an end to the internecine strife. Tārābāi refused the concession. How could she accept this small consolation when she wanted the sovereignty of the entire Maratha State for her son? The offer was spurned and the struggle went on for quite a while; Sāhū's forces occupied Kolhāpūr and invested Panhālā; Tārābāī abandoned it for Rāngnā, and feeling insecure there moved to Mālvan. Panhāļā was occupied by Sāhū's forces: he attempted to storm Rangna, but failed and returned to the capital to spend the monsoon (1708 June).

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and pursuit of Tarabai.

¹ The dates given by Sardesai of the capture of Sātārā by Sāhū and of his coronation and followed by later writers lack authority. Sardesai takes these from Sedganokar Bakhar and in looking up the calendar makes a slight mistake. If Satara was captured on a Saturday, that day cannot be 1st January of 1708 as given by Sardesai, which according to the calendar was a Thursday. Then the Sarvadhari Hindu year given in Sedganvkar Bakhar accords with 1709 and not with 1708.

CHAPTER 2. Expansion of Maratha Power. SHAHU. tiations with Bahadur Sah.

It was not possible for Sāhū to resume the offensive against Tārābāī after the close of the monsoon. The new Moghal emperor Bahadur Sah had been called to the south by the assumption of authority by his brother Kam Baks. Bahadur arrived in the Deccan in Failure of Nego-January 1709 and called upon Sāhū to aid him, sent a general call to the Deccan chiefs to lend him support in suppressing the revolt. Sāhū's relations with the Moghal authorities were of a nebulous kind; vague promises had been held out to him, but no definite agreement concluded, no firman granted. Sahu despatched an envoy to the Emperor's presence to obtain the firman of Svaraj, Cauth and Sardesmukhi, while a strong force under Candrasen Jadhav hovered in Khāndes to back up his request. By Zulfiqār Khān's representations Bahādūr Sāh was inclined to favour Sāhū's cause; but Tārābāī (about this time) sent counter proposals saying that her son was the lawful sovereign of the Mārāthā State and offered to accept much lower terms. The enemy's game of throwing an apple of discord amongst the Marāthās succeeded. Bahādūr Sāh refused recognition to either party asking them first to settle between themselves as to whom he should deliver the goods. He retired to Hindustan in the summer of 1709; Moghal goodwill was one of Sāhū's assets, its hollow nature was now exposed publicly. The Maratha prince if he was to rule his kingdom in the plenitude of his grandfather's powers, must do it on his own. The failure of his mission to the Emperor thus revived the embers of the civil war which before this were flickering out.

> The suspense in which things were left by the retiring Emperor stiffened the attitude of some of the local officials. Lodi Khan of Cākan had become quite an eye-sore to Marāthās by his depredations in the Poona district as far south as Purandar. He now showed the audacity of blocking up the path of the Maratha force retiring from Khandes through the Junnar pass; he was defeated and killed, his assistant Karim Beg of Junnar was taken prisoner. At the same time Tānājī Jagtāp, Yāsin Khān, the Siddi of Jañjīrā and several others became restive and started trouble in Maratha territory. However, so long as Dāud Khān, a nominee of the friendly Zulfiqār Khān, continued as Deputy Governor, there was for Sāhū no fear of general opposition to the establishment of his authority. But it was obvious that the most he could expect from this quarter, was neutrality and not active help in his cause.

> The second prop that gave way about this time was the loss of Sāhū's Senāpātī. About this time died Dhanājī Jādhav¹ (1708 August). His army had materially contributed to the early successes of Sāhū. The great Marāthā soldier died at Vadgānv on the Vārņā

¹ Itihas Sangraha, Peśva Daftarantil Mahiti, p. 12 Rajwade Vol. 21, No. 94.

from the effects of one of his old wounds. His son Candrasen inherited the father's army, but not the old tradition in which his father had been reared.

CHAPTER S.

Expansion of Maratha Power. Shahu.

Sāhū's third prop disappeared when Parsojī Bhosle died in 1710. Parsojī was one of the few great chiefs to declare themselves early in Sāhū's favour. He was of the same house as the Prince and had been able to carry with him a number of chieftains in Khāndeś.

The situation demanded of Sāhū quick decision, high organizing capacity, and daring and swift action of a skilful general which by rapid successes would overwhelm his opponents, and rally to his standard not only the common peasantry who believed in the righteousness of his cause, but the waverers and trimmers who were but too anxious to throw in their lot with the winning party. Unfortunately young Sāhū though full of personal courage, lacked initiative and vision and was altogether bereft of qualities of military leadership. All his youth he had passed as a prisoner in the Moghal seraglio and had no opportunity to cultivate habits of active life, no chance to obtain administrative experience, to learn military tactics and planning, and neither had he that iron discipline so essential for a successful soldier in those rough times when the king was primarily a military leader before anything else. A great landslide began round Sāhū.

Tārābāi's partisans who had lain quiescent in the first rush of Sāhū's victory now came out in the open. Hindu Rāv Ghorpade joined Hamid Khān and opposed collection by Sāhū's officers near Bijāpūr (14th November 1709). In March 1710 Hamid Khān surrounded Jādhav near Burhānpūr. Before the end of the year (1710) Tārābāi's intrigues began to bear fruit. Rambhājī Nimbāļkar walked over to the Moghal camp and accepted service as Faujdār of Ahmadnagar. The air was thick with whisperings of a wide-spread conspiracy¹. The blow descended in the form of the revolt of the King's Senāpatī, Candrasen Jādhav.

Candrasen was in a peculiar position about 1710. At the head of one of the largest forces in Mahārāṣṭra he was being courted by Tārābāī on the one hand and by the Moghal Subhedār on the other. Young Candrasen's head was swollen with his importance; he had little regard for the monarch whose resources were of a very meagrekind, who looked to his chieftains to do for him the hard work of fighting and who refused to share his confidence with the youthful commander. Candrasen lent a willing ear to Tārābāī's overtures. A conspiracy was formed under his leadership. Prominent Marāṭhā chieftains, the Thorāts, Sahājī Nimbāļkar, Dābhāḍe were to join under Candrasen, march against Sātārā and oust Sāhū in favour of Tārābāī's son. These secret negotiations perhaps did not pass quite

Candrasen's Revolt.

¹ Jaipur Akhbārs Mss.

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unnoticed. Sāhū had invited the chiefs to Sātārā in October 1710 and when Candrasen moved out in the next campaigning season Bāļājī Viśvanāth was sent after him to watch his steps. Already jealous of the great influence Bāļājī Viśvanāth had obtained over his father as his Divan, the latter's elevation in the King's council had done nothing to abate that jealousy. Early in 1711 Candrasen's force was foraging round Bārāmatī with Bāļājī trailing behind him as a revenue official of the king. There was no love lost between the two and a petty dispute between the followers of Candrasen and Bāļājī was taken up by the principals. Candrasen attacked Bāļājī, dispersed his force and sent the latter flying to the King. To the King's protest against the outrage, the Senāpatī sent a minatory reply that Bāļājī should surrender to him or he would no longer consider himself bound to the sovereign by his oath of fealty. Such an open defiance of authority Sahū would not tolerate. He ordered his Sarlaşkar, Haibat Rāv, to hold up the rebel's advancing columns and sent him reinforcements. Candrasen was defeated in two battles near the Adarki pass and Sāļpā pass (Phaltan Taluka) and turned back to join Daud Khan near Bahadur Gad. His later movements till he was befriended by Nizām-ul-Mulk in 1713 are uncertain. If he joined Tārābāī he seems to have achieved precious little1.

Candrasen's revolt was a sign for a general rising all round. Tārābāi's followers Ghātge, Ghorpade, Cavān took up arms, occupied Vadgānv, Kumthā, Sirāļā, Karhād and other places and threatened to advance on Sătără. Candrasen with the aid of the Moghal officers began raising fresh troops to renew the contest. Even much nearer Sahū's authority came to count for nothing. The petty Inamdar of Khaţāv, Kṛṣṇarāv, proclaimed his independence. Damājī Thorāt another dependent of Tārābāī at Pāṭas Hingangāny (Poonā) turned out the King's officers. Parasuram Pant who some time back had made a show of being reconciled to the new regime, had been granted the dignity of Pratinidhi and rewarded with the Visalgad jāgīr. His son in possession of the jāgīr, now declared for Tārābāī. Sāhū suspected the father to have instigated the treachery and losing his usual equanimity of temper ordered the jagir to be confiscated and the old Pratinidhi to be blinded. The execution of the extreme penalty was stayed by the intercession of Khando Ballal Citnis, but Parasurām was thrown into jail once more².

The most serious danger to Sāhū's State, however, came from Konkan. Here the powerful Angre on Tārābāī's orders drove Sāhū's garrisons out of the Konkan forts of Rājmācī, Tung Tikonā, Ghāngad, occupied Lohgad, seized his *Peśvā* Bahiropant Pingle and threatened to march on Poonā.

Attihåsik Patravyavahör, pp. 5-8, Sähü Bakhar and Selections from Petvä Däftar, Volume VII, 13.

² Sáhû Rozniši, p. 55.

The skies were falling round Sāhū. Though he had tried hard to conciliate the leading members of the old nobility they had with few exceptions refused to respond to his call and work with him whole-heartedly. On slight pretences they were changing sides and thwarting his plans for the settlements of the country. The Senāpatī was in arms against him; his Peśvā had shown himself altogether devoid of initiative or capacity, the Pratinidhi was wavering in his loyalty and the Sarkhel after capturing the Peśvi, threatened to march on the capital; Dabhade, Ghatge and Thorat were all either sitting on the fence or actively taking part in fanning the civil war. The only party that stood to gain by this internecine struggle was the Moghal Subhedar of the Deccan. The Deccan governorship had in the meanwhile changed hands, and in the place of the friendly Zulfiqar and his nominee Daud Khan, brought on the scene Nizām-ul-Mulk a man of different metal, who meant to follow a different line of action towards the Marathas.

His intimate friends and Councillors, foremost among whom were Khando Ballāl Citnis and Bālājī Viśvanāth Bhat, advised the King an immediate change of policy. The lesser nobility and the common masses believed in the righteousness of Sāhū's cause as being the senior member of Sivājī's house and therefore the lawful and hereditary heir to the Marāthā throne, had been greatly impressed by his loving, god-fearing saintly disposition and were therefore solidly behind the new king. What was necessary was to organize this general good-will in the king's behalf and to assure the warring nobility that the new position they had acquired in the changed circumstances would be duly recognised and maintained. For the time being at least, there was no going back to Sivājī's days and Sivājī's constitution of centralised monarchy.

Sāhū being at his wits' end called upon Bāļājī Viśvanāth to shoulder the responsibility and carry out the policy he advocated. Băļājī was not an altogether unknown figure in politics. His forefathers were hereditary Deśmukhs or revenue collectors of Mahāl Danda Rājpurī and Srivardhan in Konkan about fifty miles south of Bombay. The family had left Konkan and migrated to Des country owing to troubles with the Siddi rulers of Janjira. Balaji's native cleverness, his experience as revenue officer and pleasant manners brought him employment immediately and secured his advancement in the Marāthā country. He worked as Subhedār (administrator and revenue collector) in Poonā and Aurangābād districts in Rājārām's time, and thus became familiar with the currents and cross currents of Moghal Marāthā politics and the leading personalities in both the camps. Since Sahu's return to Deccan he had faithfully followed his fortunes and had shown great organizing capacity and skill as a mediator. It was his advocacy that had brought to Sāhū's cause the veteren leader Dhanājī Jādhav in 1707 and secured him his ancestral throne. Again in 1711 by his activity, watchfulness and tact he had foiled Candrasen's conspiracy and defeated Sahū's rivals.

CHAPTER 2,

Expansion of Maratha Power.

Shahu.

Rise of Bāļāji Vikvanāth. Expansion of Maratha Power.

Shahu.

Bāļājī

Višvanāth.

Kanhoji Angre, conciliated.

By defeating Kṛṣṇarāv Khaṭāvkar he had taught a stern lesson to rebels. Sāhū felt Baļājī was the only man whom he could trust to save his affairs and bring order out of chaos. On 17th November 1713 he appointed him his Peśvā or Prime Minister, gave him a fresh jāgīr of six Mahāls and two forts to meet the expenses of his troops and asked him to proceed against Kānhojī Āṅgre¹.

The threat from the Angres was quite a formidable one. Kanhoji Angre was brave and active and had risen to the admiralty (1698) by personal prowess. He had attracted to his service some of the most daring souls of all nationalities. His ships scoured the western waters and brought him treasure that was reported to be fabulous. His name had become a veritable terror to his neighbours, the Siddi, the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese. To contend with the Sarkhel looked quite a perilous task, but Sāhū's new Peśvā showed himself quite the master of the situation. In dealing with Kānhojī Āngre he decided to rely more on his powers of persuasion and diplomatic skill than on force. His personal friendship with that great chief in his former days proved a great asset to him. Marching towards Konkan at the head of about 4000 troops he invited the great Angre to a personal meeting, and told him that a great future awaited their country provided they closed their ranks and did not fight among themselves. "Your father Tukoji" he told Angre, "was raised to his high position by the great Sivaji. Is it right that you, his son should so far forget your loyalty to the senior branch of Sivājī's house that you should overrun Sāhū's kingdom and seize his minister? This is outright treachery. If you feel you have given your word of honour to the Queen, go and stay with her in peace. Why disturb our provinces? The best course for you, when the junior branch was defeated, was to acknowledge your mistake, reaffirm your allegiance and win Sāhū's favour. There is no third alternative for a subordinate chieftain. I have been asked to fight you and recover the territories you have seized. Remember you are surrounded by enemies who would be too glad to attack you at the first opportunity. Once hostilities start, it may be difficult to obtain royal pardon." The great Angre was a shrewd man, knew the strength as well as the weakness of his position. Bālājī's friendship secured his land frontier and promised him support in dealing with his enemies. Perhaps about this time Tārābāt's power at Kolhāpūr was eclipsed and she herself thrown in prison2. Kānhojī felt he was no longer bound by his oath to the Queen, and Sambhājī (the successor to Tārābāi's son) had nothing alluring about him nor showed promise of repeating the glories of his father or grand-father. Kānhojī entered into Bāļājī's proposals and accepted his offer. 'On being confirmed in command of the fleet, his territory

¹ Sāhū Rozniśi p. 45-56, Itihās Sangrah, Peśvā Daftarāntīl Māhiti, pp. 13, 122-124, Rājwāde Volume 4 pp. 32-37, Selections from Peśvā Dafar Volume VII Nos. 1, 2 & 40, Tritiya Sammelan Vṛtta, pp. 85-91, 149-152.

² Bhárat Itihás Samsodhak Mandal's Quarterly, Volume XXVIII, p. 76.

in Konkan and his title of Sarkhel, he agreed to renounce Sambhājī, to release the *Peśvā*, to restore all his conquests except Rājmācī and maintain the cause of Śāhū².'

Expansion of Maratha Power.

Shahu. Bāļājī Višvanāth.

This agreement which was soon ratified at Sātārā was a great triumph for Bāļājī Viśvanāth's diplomacy. It won over to Sāhū's cause, without bloodshed, the most powerful chieftain from Tārābāī's party and established his power on firm foundations. The new policy enunciated by the *Peśvā* in dealing with the Angre chief, carried assurances of security to other chieftains who willingly came forth with declarations of loyalty.

About this time Tārābāī, the source of all this trouble, lost her power in Kolhāpūr and was thrown in confinement.

It was none too early that Sāhū secured peace on the home front. The several revolutions at Delhi had removed from the scene his old friends and brought in new personalities and developed a new situation. Imperial authority was on the decline and the empire was showing signs of dissolution. The friendly Zulfiqār Khān was no more, his place at Delhi having been taken by the Sayyad brothers Abdullāh and Husain Ali. They appointed to the Deccan governorship Nizām-ul-Mulk who had different ideas about the policy to be pursued towards the Marāthās.

The Deccan had peculiar fascination for the Nizām. Having spent his early career in the south in the Emperor's campaigns, the Nizām had obtained an intimate knowledge of the province, its people and its problems. Separated by a long distance from the heart of the empire, the southern province offered great possibilities to an ambitious man in the declining days of the empire and the Nizām was not one to miss them. The only effective opposition to the establishment of his independent authority in the Deccan came from the Marāṭhās; they were his rivals in the field. To check their rising power and keep it in effective bounds became the watch-word of his policy.

This advocate of a strong policy towards the Marathas arrived in the Deccan in June 1713. He found his charge in a strange condition. The local representative of his predecessor, Daud Khan Panni, had conceded to the Marathas the rights of collecting Cauth which Bahadūr Sah had refused in 1709: Maratha agents had established a kind of parallel government and were everywhere active collecting their tribute direct from the ryots. No merchandise could pass without paying their toll. A Maratha chief Nemājī Sīnde had been taken in Moghal service and held charge of Aurangabād division which enabled him to extend his influence right upto Mālvā and Central India. The very existence of Moghal authority in the south was at stake.

Nizām in the Deccan.

² Sāhū Mahārāj Yāñce Caritra, p. 40, Rājwade Volume II, pp. 23-25; Treaties, Engagements and Sanade edited by Mawji and Parasnis, pp. 197-199.

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Shahu.

Bāļājī Višvanāth. Nizām in the Deccan The Nizām immediately set himself to put the house in order. He repudiated the convention entered into by his predecessors and turned out the Mārāṭhā officers from their military posts from his territory. The Bhīmā Godāvarī basin became the battle-ground where the two powers impinged on each other. Here the Nizām sent a strong force to drive away the advanced posts of the enemy. At the same time he decided to take advantage of the dissensions in the Marāṭhā court, invited to his service the traitor Candrasen Jādhav from Kolhāpūr and through him opened negotiations with the Kolhāpūr party.

To counteract the Nizām's activities the new Peśvā took the field immediately on his return from the Konkan. A number of indecisive engagements took place; in one such Haibat Rāv Nimbāļkar was killed at Cāndā; in another the Nizām claimed to have defeated the Peśvā near Purandar; in yet another the Moghal Bakhṣi and Vaqainigār of Bāglāṇā Muhammad Ibrāhim Tābrizi was lured into an ambuscade and killed by Khanderāv Dābhāde while convoying a caravan from Surat to Aurangābād. The Peśvā also instigated several risings within the Subhedār's territory with the help of the Mārāṭhā officials who had entrenched themselves in Moghal districts.

While the Nizām was trying to grapple with the Marāṭhās in the Deccan, his enemies at Delhi gave him no rest. They appointed as his Divān Haidar Quli Khān who affected to act independently of the Subhedār. This enraged the Nizām who removed him from service and sent him back to Delhi. While he was contending with enemies outside and within, he was recalled to Delhi, his place being taken by Sayyad Husain Ali (1715 May).

Agreement with Husain Ali

The Nizām's transfer from the southern scene did not bring on an immediate improvement in the situation. His successor Sayyad Hussain Ali for a time tried to follow the Nizām's strong policy towards the Marāṭhās. One of their chiefs Khaṇḍerāv Dābhāḍe had established himself in Khāndeś and levied fee on all merchandise passing from Surat to Burhānpūr and Auraṅgābād. The Moghal Viceroy despatched a strong force of ten thousand under his Bakhṣi Zulfiqār Beg to bring Dābhāḍe to book and clear up the road. The Beg's column pursuing the enemy dispersed into the hills, when it was surrounded and cut-up to a man. 'Not one bullock, camel or horse belonging to that army was saved'.

Husain Ali retaliated by sending yet another and a stronger expedition under his Divān Muhkam Singh accompanied by his brother Saifud-din Khān and Candrasen Jādhav. Dābhāde skillfully retired before the enemy fighting rear-guard actions. A major engagement took place near Ahmadnagar. The Marāṭhā troops succeeded in breaking out and crossing the Bhīmā. Sweeping aside the enemy's

light cavalry that was harassing his flanks and rear, Muhkam Singh pressed towards Sātārā in the hope of coming against the main army. Dābhāde bided his time and went to Rājā Sāhū who had moved to Sātārā fort. The Marāthā garrisons which were posted in various places, held their ground. Whenever the Moghal army approached, the Marāthā force dispersed, and as soon as it departed they returned and occupied their positions. Against such a wary enemy the Moghal force could make little impression. Muhkam Singh and Jādhav retired the way they had advanced. (Dec. 1716 Jan. 1717).

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Husain Ali's discomfiture against Khanderav Dabhade was learnt by Emperor Farrukh Siyar with evident satisfaction. Farrukh Siyar was a strange admixture of bravado and cowardice; he owed his elevation to the two Sayyad brothers yet had not the wisdom to surrender himself completely to their advice. He was jealous of the great powers wielded by them, plotted against them practically from the first day of his accession and wrote to his distant governors and feudatories to make war on them to bring about their ruin. Among others Sāhū and several Marāṭhā chieftains received those royal farmañs with which they complied most readily. Bands of horsemen overran imperial districts in the Deccan reducing everything to utter chaos.

Distracted by Marāthā attacks on one side and court intrigues on the other, Husain Ali had recourse to negotiations with Sāhū. To this course he was advised by Sankarājī Malhār, a former Minister of Rājārām, now in the confidence of the Sayyad. The Subhedār deputed Sankarāji Malhār, to Sāhū's court to find out a basis for peace. The Marāthā viewpoint in the discussions was set forth by Peśvā Bāļājī Viśvanāth.

Some kind of formal agreement between the two powers was long overdue. Aurangzeb had not been able to make up his mind on what terms to purchase peace. Azam held out vague promises which both parties were interpreting differently. Bahadur Sah evaded the issue asking Sāhū to settle first the question of succession with his rival of the Kolhapur party. Though the highest authorities were thus balking the issues on some pretext or other, the ground was slipping under the feet of their local representatives. No longer able to hold their own against growing Maratha pressure, they very conveniently sought accommodation with Maratha chieftains as best as they could. This indefinite state of affairs only served to increase the general anarchy and profited none of principals. The Marathas were extending their depredations to Gujarat and Malva. Bold and intrepid spirits raised levies and began to make collections on their own. Partisans of Sambhājī were overruning the Karņāţak Subhā of Bijāpūr. No wonder both parties were keen on a settlement.

Selections from Peiva Daftar XXX, pp. 235-240, Khili Khin, pp. 484-465.

CHAPTER 2.

Expansion of Maratha Power.

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Balaji

Visvanath.

Agreement with Husain Ali.

Bāļājī Viśvanāth in the name of his master asked the right of raising Cauth throughout the six provinces of the Deccan-(Aurangabad, Berār, Khāndeś, Bidar, Hyderābād and Bijāpūr, which included the whole of Karnatak including the tributary states of Mysore, Trichtnopoly and Tañjore) to be granted. He argued that the Marathas over two decade were levying contributions over the Deccan provinces of the Moghals and this fact should now be formally recognised by an imperial grant. He also demanded Cauth of Malwa and Gujarāt which Marāthā horse had invaded. He demanded likewise the right of raising an additional impost of ten per cent, for the Raja as Sardeśmukhi or head of the landed gentry. The old conquest of Sivājī in Mahārāstrā Svarāj were to be completely restored, the Subhedar to issue orders for the release of such forts and districts as still continued under Moghal occupation. Sivneri (Sivneri fort) Sivājī's birth place, was required to be given up, as also the fort of Trimbak in Nāśik district. Conquests lately made by Parsoji Bhosle in Berär and Gondvan were to be confirmed. The old Bijāpūr districts in Karnātak were demanded in the name of Fateh Singh Bhosle. The mother and the family of Sāhū detained at Delhi were likewise to be set free and restored to the Rājā.

On his side for the grant of Cauth the Peśvā on behalf of his master, promised to maintain 15,000 troops with the Subhedār to aid the Emperor; for the hereditary right of Sardeśmukhi he agreed to pay the usual fee of 6.51 per cent. of the annual income from that source and bound himself to keep law and order in the country and suppress banditry; for the Svarāj or old territory the Rājā agreed to pay a tribute of ten lakhs of rupees every year. It was a condition of all these grants that the Rājā would be faithful to the imperial throne and serve it loyally.

The choice of the envoy had evinced the Subhedārs anxiety to come to an understanding with the Marāṭhās. The proposals worked out by his envoy were immediately accepted with the exception of claims on Gujarāt and Māļwā. Husain Ali delivered a sanad containing the articles of peace under his seal to the vakil of Rāṭā Sāhū and made no delay in writing for a royal firmān confirming the agreement. He introduced the agents of Rāṭā Sāhū everywhere and orders went round for restoring Svarāṭ territory to the Rāṭā's officials¹.

The importance of the treaty was not lost upon the Emperor. Complete abdication of imperial authority in the Deccan which it involved and at the same time strengthening the hands of his tormentors, he could not tolerate. He refused to ratify the agreement and prepared for war. He called to his aid Sarbuland Khān from Pāṭṇā, Nizām-ul-mulk from Morādābād and Ajit Singh from Gujarāt.

¹ Thorle Saha Maharajatice Caritra, pp. 50-55, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads selected by Wad and edited by Parasnis and Mawji.

¹ Khafi Khan, p. 468.

They arrived in the capital but found they had neither the Emperor's confidence nor authority to act and wisely made their peace with the Sayyads. The Sayyad brothers informed of the monarch's intrigues, prepared to strike. Husain Ali marched to the capital with his Marāṭhā allies and arrived in Delhi in February 1719. The brothers surrounded the palace with their troops, entered the palace, and seized the Emperor's person after some altercation. The hapless monarch was thrown in confinement and power passing into the hands of the Sayyads. The treaty entered into between Rājā Sāhū and Husain Ali Khān was ratified and firmāns confirming the arrangements for Cauth, Sardeśmukhi and Svarāj were issued on 13th and 24th March respectively. Bāļājī Viśvanāth who had accompanied the Amir-ul-Umarā to the capital returned to the Deccan in May 1719 with the deeds and the Rājā's family.

A right royal welcome awaited the minister at Sātārā. He had at last obtained recognition of the claims round which the Moghal-Marāthā struggle had centred over two decades. The treaty marked a triumph for Rājā Sāhū. His recognition by the Moghal authority gave him a distinct advantage over his rival Sambhājī and made other Marāthā chieftains look up to him as the fountain of authority. The Moghal rulers accepted the fait accompli and recognised the supremacy of Marāthā interests in the south by granting them the right of collecting revenue from the six provinces of the Deccan.

The treaty had been criticised variously by different writers. While some have hailed it as a great diplomatic triumph, others have questioned its moral basis; yet a third school of historians condemn the Minister for accepting Moghal suzerainty and perpetuating Muslim shackles. They contend that while Sivajī fought for an independent Maratha state his grand-son acting on the advice of his Pesod threw away the jewel of liberty accepting in exchange the badge of Moghal slavery. This is an extreme view and loses sight of the fact that in politics satisfactory solutions of vexed problems are often found in face-saving devices or fictions. To accept the fictions literally, to analyse them in a legalistic way without taking into account how they worked in actual practice is mere casuistry and evinces a frame of mind ill-becoming a dispassionate historian. A tributary state has no independent authority to make war or peace, has no claims on the sovereign. Cauth and Sardesmukhi over the six Subhās of the Deccan were granted to the Marāthās who went on exploiting their advantage till they demanded tribute from the whole of the imperial domain. No man of commonsense would look on this relation as one of subordination to the Moghal Crown. The Marathas were realists and were satisfied with the direction of policy leaving ostentatious display to the effete successors of Aurangzeb.

Criticism can rather be levelled against the scheme for realising the claims through a number of agents instead of obtaining the revenues direct for the royal treasury and thereby putting central

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authority on firm foundations. For, according to this scheme, the collections in Gujarāt were assigned to the Senāpati, those in Berār and Goṇḍvan to the Bhosle of Nāgpūr, of the Sātārā region to the Pratinidhi, of the Māvals (Pooṇā district) to the Saciv; to the Peśvā was granted Khāndeś and Bāglāṇā and Central India for his activities; the Sarlaṣkar obtained the basin of the Godāvarī and Fateh Singh Bhosle was expected to make the annual levy from the Karnāṭak. Koṅkaṇ was left in the possession of Kānhojī Aṅgre. It was of the essence of the scheme that the chieftains whose authority had been established in a particular area should be recognised as the immediate ruler or law-giver of the region, should administer it and appropriate its revenues towards the maintenance of his troops while he contributed a small share to the Royal Exchequer.

Bāļājī perceived that the revival of Marāṭhā power in its old monarchical form was no longer possible, that it would be difficult to harness the nation's military resources to the common cause unless concessions were made to the great warlords who had won an important place for themselves. He made them subordinate allies or confederates of the Sovereign, granting them a free hand in administering their conquests, called from them no greater sacrifice than uniting on matters of common policy. The arrangement, however, left too much authority in the hands of these chiefs without providing for checks to call them to account. This was the beginning of the Jāgīr system or Confederacy of the Marāthā States which was responsible for the speedy expansion of the Maratha power and its rapid dissolution. Historians point out that this granting of authority over territory instead salaries to the officers by Balaji Viśvanath was a departure from the wise rule of Sivājī, but throw the blame on the master and not on the minister. They suggest that Balaji substituted for the autocracy of the sovereign the Marāthā Confederacy because he saw that Sāhū had not the commanding talents and energy which had made possible the great King's concentrated dominion'. But it has been made plain in these pages that it was the support of the common people, of the Maratha peasant and the Maratha Siledar, that enabled Bāļājī beat down the opposition of the great war-lords and wrest victory for his master. In his desire to conciliate the great barons Bălăji Viśvanāth appears to have gone too far and compromised royal authority. In leaving large powers to them Bāļāji undoubtedly surrendered the gains of the battle after winning it.

But it would be wrong to hold the *Peśvā* responsible for the defects the system developed later. He accepted the situation and found in the *jāgīr* system the best solution possible to bring peace to the distracted country. He had seen the Marāthā State wilting under fierce onslaughts of the Moghal and had also witnessed the tide slowly turning against the enemy. He grasped as few men of his generation did, the significance of the changes in the political atmos-

phere and was determined that his country should profit by them. His conciliatory approach enabled the great Marāthā soldiers to come under the common flag and unite their skill and resources for common purposes. Playing cleverly on the rivalries and factions of the Moghal Court he wrested from them terms which secured for his state the gains of the bitter fighting of a quarter century and established the supremacy of Marāthā interests in the Deccan.

Bāļājī Viśvanāth did not live long to work out his scheme in detail. After the monsoon he marched south and dispersed the Kolhāpūr force at Aṣṭā and laid siege to Kolhāpūr. After some desultory fighting he retired to Sāsvaḍ near Pooṇā and died there on 2nd April 1720. He left behind his widow Rādhābāī, two sons, and three daughters. The eldest son who had been his companion in most of his campaigns in his later years succeeded him to the Peśvāship.

Bāļājī Viśvanāth has been truly called 'the second founder of the empire'. He piloted the ship of the State through dangerous waters and brought it to a safe haven. His greatness has been dimmed by the brilliant victories of his son and immediate successor to the Peśvāship. But it need not blind us to the fact that it was the father's statesmanship that brought order out of choas, upheld national interests and preserved the unity of the state when it looked as if the Marāthā people would once more sink into a number of petty principalities, making war upon each other and ending in submission to a foreign aggressor. The treaty with Husain Ali was a great diplomatic triumph which secured to the Marāthā people the gains of their suffering of a quarter century and created a wide field for their restless ambition.

The term of Bāļājī's *Peśvāship* marks the transition from the royal period to the age of the *Peśvās*. It ushers a new era in the history of the Marāṭhās. The feeble successors of the House of Sivājī fade into insignificance and become mere figure-heads with the passage of time. The reins of government pass into the hands of the able Prime Ministers, who direct the course of Marāṭhā policy for the next century.

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Shahu,
Bajāji

Viévānāth,



सन्यमेव जयते

CHAPTER 3*

EXPANSION OF MARATHA POWER

(1720 - 1740)

CHAPTER 3.

Expansion of Maratha Power. Shahu.

Peśva Baji Rav L

BALAJI'S ELDEST SON BAJI RAV SUCCEEDED HIM in the Préväship on 17th April 1720. The training and experience gained under his father's tutelage and the responsibility of office early matured the Peśva's character and gave him a poise and ample grasp of affairs. A much more vigorous personality, he quickened the pace of events. The energies of his people that were being wasted in petty disputes and Civil War he directed into fresh channels and carried Maratha arms into Hindustan. With a statesmanship of high order he combined military leadership suited to the genius of his people and under him the Marathas made rapid progress. During his father's life time he had seen enough of the Moghal Darbar to convince him of its weakness. The parties anxious to dominate at the court were bidding against each other for Marāṭhā co-operation and the new Peśva was too shrewd not to perceive the advantage such a situation gave him. He realised early, as few of his contemporaries appear to have done, that the Moghal empire was rushing to its doom and that it was time for his people to march into Hindustan and seize supreme power instead of remaining confined to the narrow limits of their Deccan homeland. His early victories secured his position at home, increased his resources and confidence and in 1728 his armies burst into Central India. With Rajput help he secured a safe base in Māļvā for his plan of Hindu-pad-Pādsāhī which became the watch-word of Maratha policy and animated all Marāthā activities in the years to follow.

Problems nearer home demanded the Peśvä's first attention. He could not look northward before setting his own house in order. The great feudatories of the Marāthā State owed but nominal allegiance to the sovereign, and enjoyed freedom of action that was undesirable. It was necessary that the Royal authority, if it was to be effective, should be strong enough to override that of its feudatories and bend them to its will. The security of the Marāthā State was closely bound with its supremacy in the Deccan wrested from the Moghals after a bitter struggle of a quarter century. This had been unwillingly conceded in the treaty of March 1719

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

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concluded by the Sayyads and its preservation called for constant vigilance. The Sayyads had been driven from power and the very extensive Deccan Province encircling Maratha homeland on all sides except the west had been seized by Nizām-ul-mulk, the ablest Peśva Baji Rav I among the Moghal chiefs and the most consistent opponent of the Marāthā State. The Nizām was not likely to respect an agreement which cut at the root of his authority. A part of the Svarāj territory was yet in the hands of Moghal officials and foreign powers like the Siddi of Janjira and Portuguese of Bassein and had to be wrested from them. The Civil War with the Kolhāpūr party was only in abeyance, the faction of Sambhaji refusing to accept a subordinate position. The situation was thus bristling with difficulties.

Contest with Nizām-ul-mulk.

The safety of the Maratha homeland was the key to the situation. This was always in peril till a satisfactory settlement was made with the Deccan subhedar. The Nizam had arrived in the Deccan in 1724 after his failure as Vazir at Delhi and meant to stay. Within a year he beat down all local opposition, obtained formal recognition of his titles and was free to oppose Marāthā claims. But he knew that the Marathas were too strong to be attacked in their homeland and had not forgotten the lesson of Aurangzeb's fruitless campaigning against them. He proceeded very warily in his plans. He removed his capital from Aurangabad to Hyderabad, a place distant from Maratha territory and occupying a more convenient position for his province. By offering a jagir in Berar he persuaded Raja Sahu to exempt his new capital from Cauth. The Peśva protested in vain against the exchange as he saw that this was the thin end of the wedge to eliminate Marāthā influence in the Hyderabad quarter. His protest was overruled by the Raja in the hope of establishing cordial relations with the Deccan Subhedār.

Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr now played into the hands of the Nizām. The Kolhāpūr Prince had refused to be reconciled to Sāhū's superior authority and was now roused into hostility by the Nizām's blandishments and by activities of Sāhū's armies in Karnāṭak. Two Marāṭhā armies under Sāhū's chiefs had swept southward as far as Srirangapaṭam in 1725 and 1726 and on this Sambhāji looked as encroachment on his rights. He made common cause with the Nizām on the promise that the latter would support his claims against Sahü. Anxious to embroil the Marāthās in a civil war such a promise was readily forthcoming from the Navab.

The Nizām now affected ignorance of the respective claims of Sāhū and Sambhājī, withheld payment of Cauth by dismissing Sāhū's agents from his dominions and asked Sāhū to submit his claims to be arbitrated. The proposed arbitration was a mere

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cloak to conceal his design of reviving the old controversy over succession and once more embroiling the Marathas in their domestic dispute.

Maratha Power. Contest with Nizām-ul-mulk.

Sāhū was dumb-founded at the Nizām's proposal. He had always Peśva Bāṇ Râv L been anxious to live in amity with the Moghal Subhedar and his friendly overtures had been rewarded with the challenge to his authority. The Pratinidhi's timid advice of accepting the proposal of arbitration was stoutly opposed by the Peśvā and war was declared on the Nizām in August 1727.

Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr joined the Nizām and this the Subhedār felt would be the sign for the civil war to flare up. In a letter to Savāi Jai Singh he unfolded his scheme. "With a view to carrying out the Emperor's order I have with God's help, called to my side Rājā Sambhājī who is Sāhū's rival, conciliated him and engaged in punishing and exterminating Sāhū I am hopeful that other partisans of Sāhū would desert him for my side and his party would cease to exist - according to our hearts' desire." But the Peśva's genius and strategy defeated the Nizam's design. Orders for general mobilization were given on 1st August 1727. Forts were warned to be on the defensive and before the rains had stopped a large Marāṭhā army consisting mainly of light cavalry took the field under command of the Peśvā and entered the Aurangābād district. As the Marāthā army was plundering Jālnā the Nizām taking Sambhājī with him set out to punish the Marāthās. On 6th November 1727 a skirmish took place and the Peśvā avoiding a contest turned in the direction of Burhanpur. To save the wealthy city the Nizam hurried towards Burhanpur but failed to come up with the Marathas owing to his baggage and equipment. In the meanwhile the Peśva had entered Gujarat clearly with the intention of drawing the Nizam into the hilly country. His plan was to exhaust the enemy before attacking him in the field. The Nizām turning from the pursuit set his face towards Poonā to destroy the place of the Peśva's abode. Taleganv, Narayanganv, Bărămati all surrendered and the main army advanced as far as Poona. Learning that the Peśva had re-entered Vaijapur district along the Godavari the Nizam retraced his steps to his country. His army had been tired out by marching and countermarching and the Maratha allies on whom he had placed great reliance proved utterly worthless and lacking in daring. In the mountainous country near Palkhed in which he was marching, grain and forage could not be procured. The Moghal army was completely surrounded, attacked on 25th February and forced to seek terms. On 6th March 1728 was concluded the treaty of Mungi-Sevganv. The Navab granted recognition of Sahū as the sole king of the Marāthās and promised to abandon the cause of Sambhājī. He also agreed not to oppose Sāhū's claims of Cauth and Sardeśmukhi

¹ Mss, letter, Sir Jadunath Sarkar's Collection.

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over the six Subhās of the Deccan. The Nizām's attempt to sow dissensions and involve the Marāthā State in a Civil War was decisively defeated by the Peśvā and Marāthā supremacy over the Deccan was firmly established.

Peśva Baji Rav I. Contest with Nizam-ul-mulk.

Abandoned by the Nizām it was easy to bring to book Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr. Incited secretly by the Navāb's agents and Udājī Cavān he again declared war on Sāhū in January 1730. He was surprised in his camp on the Vārṇā and his camp equippage and his family fell into Sāhū's hands. Sambhājī threw himself on the mercy of his cousin. Sāhū anxious to wipe out bitter feelings invited Sambhājī to a personal meeting, and after much feasting and amidst scenes of splendour was concluded in April 1731 the treaty of Vārṇā which defined the relations of the Kolhāpūr Prince with the Marāṭhā State. Sambhājī was confirmed in the sovereignty of the territory held by him, he was also to occupy forts and posts upto Tungabhadrā and his position was recognised as that of a subordinate ally of the Sātārā Rājā. The agreement put an end to a long standing feud².

Defeat of Senapati Dabhade. Another domestic dispute convulsed the young Marāṭhā State at this period. It was the revolt of <code>Senāpatī</code> Dābhāḍe. The province of Gujarāt had been marked out as the sphere of operations for the <code>Senāpatī</code> and for over two decades his subordinates were exploiting the region. Pilājī Gāikvāḍ and Kaṇṭhājī Kadam Bāṇḍe among them had by 1725 broken down the imperial rule and secured the <code>Cauth</code> of Gujarāt.

From 1726 the Peśvä's troops began invading the province. Sarbuland Khān, the Governor of Gujarāt concluded a treaty with the Peśvā in February 1727 granting him Cauth and Sardeśmukhi of the province on condition that the latter would take it upon himself to expel other disturbers of peace, a clause mainly directed against Pilājī Gāikvād and Bāṇḍe. These two chiefs defeated and drove out Udājī Pavār from Gujarāt who had invaded on behalf of the Peśvā. But in 1729 December a large army of that Peśvā under his brother Cimājī marched into Gujarāt, expelled Bāṇḍe and Gāikvād sacked Peṭlād, Dholkā and other rich towns of Gujarāt and forced the Moghal Governor to renew the agreement of Cauth concluded by him two years back and pay the revenues of Gujarāt to the Peśvā or his agents³.

The agreement was clearly an infringement of the Senāpatī's claims over Gujarāt. The Peśvā appeared to be claiming a superior authority over other chiefs and subordinate them to his dictation. This was

Main authorities are Thorle Sāhū Mahārāj Yāñce Caritra by Chitnis and Hadiqat-ul-ālam by Mir Ālam; also S. P. D. IX, XXII and XXX.

² Kavyetihās Sangraha Patren Yādi, 1930 Ed., Nos. 1820.

⁸ S. P. D. Vol. XV, pp. 82-85, Sāhū's Rozniśi 105.

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Peśva Baji Rav I. Defeat of

Senapati

Dābhāde,

resented by the Senapati and by all those whose interests the new agreement affected. The Senapati became a centre of revolt and round him gathered the disaffected elements-Pilaji Gaikvad, Kanthāji Kadam Bānde, Udāji Pavār, Kānhoji Bhosle and others. The party counted on being supported at Court by the Pratinidhi

At this stage of the dispute the Sendpati committed a tactical blunder that lost him sympathy and support of the Court and placed him in the position of a renegade against constituted authority. Apprehending that he may not get justice from the monarch he entered into secret negotiations with the Nizām to invoke his aid. The Nizam readily welcomed the opportunity of weakening his opponents, sent encouraging replies to the Senapati and assumed a threatening tone towards the Peśvā's agents1.

The report of these intrigues reached the Peśvā. Before the disaffected elements could formulate their plan of action and effect a junction with the Nizām, the Peśvā entered Gujarāt at the head of a picked force, renewed the engagements with the Subhedar concluded last year and then advanced upon Baroda held by Pilājī Gāikvād. Trimbak Rāv Dābhāde hastened to meet the challenge, marched into Gujarāt at the head of ten thousand troops, was joined by Bhil and Koli levies and by a detachment of the Nizām. The two forces met at Dabhai on 1st April 1731, and the superior leadership of the Peśvā won the day. Trimbak Rāv Dābhāde fell on the battle-field and his force was dispersed. The Nizām's attempt to exploit differences in the Maratha Court had once more been baffled and his intrigues defeated. Gujarat was restored to the Senapati on whose behalf the Gaikvads worked and brought the Province under Maratha control by 1737.

The battle of Dabhai and Bājī Rāv's victory forms a landmark in the history of the Peśvās. It left the Peśvā without any serious rival at home and "with all but nominal control of the Maratha Sovereignty". Nizām-ul-mulk thought it convenient to come to terms with the Peśvā by concluding an agreement in August 1731, by which 'the former was to be at liberty to gratify his ambitions in the south, while the Peśvā obtained a free hand in the north?.

From domestic problems we must now turn our attention to bigger Maratha Expansion problems of foreign policy and expansion of Maratha power in Hindustan. The Marathas had crossed into Malva and raided it as far as Ujjain and Siroñj in 1703 in the days of Aurangzeb as a reply to the Moghal offensive against their homeland. These raids had been repeated with great boldness in the second decade of the 18th century and Nemājī Šinde, Kānhojī Bhosle, Khande Rāv Dābhāde,

in Hindustan.

¹ S. P. D. Vol. X, pp. 59-73.

² Siyāh-ul-Mu ākherin, p. 235 (Panini Ed.), Elphinstone, p. 887, See also S. P. D. Vol. XXX 90, 91, and B. I. S. M. Q. 1946, pp. 11-12.

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Cimnaji Damodar and other Maratha chieftains had fought the imperial Subhedars with varying fortunes. Maratha pressure on Maratha Power. Malva was growing and the Marathas desired recognition of their position in the treaty of 1719. This the Moghal Darbar would not Peśva Baji Rav I grant and it became necessary for the new Peśva to wrest by arms Maratha Expansion what his father could not obtain by negotiations. Khandes and Māļvā were specially assigned to the Peśvā as his field of operations for levying Government dues, and Peśva's troops began to move in this quarter every year. The Peśvā invaded Malva in person in February 1723 and again in 1724 May, collected Cauth and met the Nizam on both the occasions. Home affairs kept him away for the next three years, but his subordinates raided south Malva and laid several places under contribution.

> All this while the situation at the imperial capital was fast deteriorating. Aurangzeb's successors were feeble minded persons unfit to rule over his vast empire. They loved comfort, indulged in vice and left the administration to their ministers. A scramble for power ensued among the nobility, each individual and each party fighting for his selfish ends. Distracted by intrigues, divided by parties the Moghal Government fell into neglect, the defence of distant provinces were left uncared for the army lost discipline and descended into a mere rabble. While the Marathas were attacking Målvå and Gujaråt the imperial court occupied itself in night revels and excursions to gardens.

Battle of Amihera (29 November 1728).

About the end of 1728 two big Maratha armies invaded Central India. The first under the Peśva's brother Cimaji Appa entered Mālvā in November by the Māndū Ghāt and surprising the subhedār Giridhar Bahādūr in his camp at the border town of Amihera, defeated him on 29th November. The Subhedar with several of his commanders was slain, his standard and equipage fell into Marāthā hands and his force destroyed. It was a complete victory for Cimājī. The brave defence put up by the subhedar's son at Ujjain against Maratha onslaught held up the enemy's advance for some time but could not save the province. The mountain passes into Malva were lost to the Marathas; the flood-gates were thrown open and the tidal waters now rushed in and within a decade Malva passed into the hands of the Marāthās.1

Conquests in Bundelkhand

While Cimājī Āppā was reducing Mālvā the Peśvā entered Bundelkhand at the head of another large army. His help had been invoked by Rājā Chatrasāl, hard-pressed by Muhammad Khān Bangaş,

¹ This and the subsequent discussion of Maratha expansion in Hindustan, is a summary of chapters VII to XIII of my work Peśvā Baji Rāv I & Marāthā Expansion. These are based on Peśvā Daftar Selections particularly XIII-XV, XXII and XXX, and Jatpur Akhabars (MSS.). The Pesva's letters printed in appendix of Brahmendra Svamice Caritra are also very valuable. Other sources are indicated in my work. See also Hingne Daftar Vol. I, pp. 3-7.

Governor of Allahabad. The Bundelas joined the Marathas and invested the subhedar in his encampment near Jaitpur. Reduced to great straits Muhammad Khan Bangas invited reinforcements from Allāhābād and from Delhi. His son Qāyum Khān tried to send relief but was defeated. The imperial Court immersed in its rounds of Peśva Baji Rav I. pleasures had no time to attend to the demands of its Governors. Bangas retired from Bundelkhänd leaving the Bundelas masters in their home. The grateful Chatrasal rewarded his benefactor with a jägir in his principality. The Marāthās thus obtained another foot-hold from which to mount their offensive against the Moghal empire.

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Conquests in

Bundelkhand

Progress in

Mālvā and

Bundelkhand.

Rājā Jai Singh of Amber and Muhammad Khān Bangas who held between them the Governorship of Mālvā alternately from 1728 to 1737, tried appeasement and war in turn but neither policy proved successful. Bangas governed the province from 1730 to 1732 chasing the Marathas from place to place but found his resources altogether inadequate to throw them out. Rājā Jai Singh who succeeded Bangas in the Governorship was the ruler of the important principality of Jaipur, a friend of Khān-i-Daurān, Mir Baksi, and wielded considerable influence in the Moghal Court. A man of culture and refinement he advocated the policy of winning the Marāthās over to the imperial cause by making them large concessions and satisfying their legitimate demands. Aware of the decay creeping over the Moghal empire the Rajput prince entertained secret ambitions of enlarging his kingdom of Amber so as to include in the rich province of Malva. For this it was necessary to persuade the Rajput nobility to accept his leadership and conciliate the Marathas. But diplomacy rarely succeeds unless backed by force and the Rajput was too sensual and pleasure-loving to exert himself in the field. The Rajput princes refused to unite under the Kachva banner and nothing short of the Subhedari of Malva would satisfy the Pesca. Jai Singh purchased peace by sharing with the Marathas the large sums sent to him from Delhi for the defence of his charge.

From 1732 the Marāṭhā offensive took the form of a two-pronged drive. One army under Sinde and Holkar would pour into western Māļvā by way of Gujarāt while another taking a north- easterly route would enter Bundelkhand and with their Bundelā allies ravage the country as far north as Gyālior and Gohad. In 1733 Savāi Jai Singh was surrounded near Mandsaur and extricated himself by paying six lakhs as ransom. In 1734 April Bundi was assaulted and Jai Singh's nominee was driven out; a force that had advanced to Sironi under Muzaffar Khān was invested and escaped with difficulty.

Two large armies marched against the Marathas in the cold season of 1734-1735. Vazir Qamruddin Khān came up against Pilājī Jādhav in February 1735 near Narvar, but found himself in great distress by the constant attacks of the light Maratha horse. He sought refuge

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Progress in Māļvā and Bundelkhand.

in the fort of Orcha and had to bribe the Marathas with five lakks of rupees before they retired. The second army under the Mir Bakhşi Khān Daurān advanced by way of Jaipur and entered Māļvā through the Mukundrā pass. While encamped at Rāmpurā Peśva Baji Rav I Ranoji Sinde and Malharji Holkar surrounded it and cut off its supplies. Lifting the blockade the Maratha Commanders passed the enemy's rear and invaded Rajputana. This sudden irruption of the enemy caused dismay in Moghal ranks, and their Rajput allies insisted on going back to save their homes. Khān Daurān's army retired and while he was at Kotāh a meeting was arranged with the Marāthā chieftains on 24th March 1735 at which they agreed to accept twentytwo lakhs as Cauth for Māļvā.

> "The Marāṭhās", says the author of Siyürul-Mutākherin, "continued to extend their ravages and incursions to which they had been encouraged by receiving contributions in order to purchase their forbearance wherever they appeared. When they saw no measures were taken to oppose their movements they recommenced their operations in the next year. At length they assumed absolute dominion of those districts which formerly only paid tribute. By these encroachments the frontier of the empire retrograded while theirs advanced. By the supineness of the Emperor they now occupied the territories as far as Gvalior and approached the vicinity of Akbarābād (Āgrā)".1

Attempts at Conciliation.

Having succeeded in levying Cauth and Sardeśmukhi in Māļvā Bājī Rāv now applied through Savāi Jai Singh for their formal cession by the Emperor. He also requested similar grants for Gujarāt. The growing encroachments of the Marathas had given rise to serious misgivings at the imperial Court. Was Rājā Jai Singh, his enemies openly asked, in league with his co-religionists and encouraging their aggressions or was he incompetent to deal with them? When the Peśvä's demands for tribute from Mālvā and Gujarāt became known at the Court the Turani Moghals declared themselves decidedly against such a disgraceful compromise. The party clamoured for the removal of Rājā Jai Singh and for placing the defence of the province in more competent and trustworthy hands. The advocacy of Khān Daurān, a friend of the Rājā and leader of the Hindustāni party, could not disprove facts of Maratha aggression. There were reports of the Emperor's dissatisfaction with Jai Singh's conduct of affairs. The Rājā felt that his position was seriously assailed and invited the Peśvā to a personal meeting at which he hoped to evolve a formula satisfactory to both parties and yet keep the subhedari of Mālvā to himself.

The Peśvā left Poonā in November 1735 at the head of large force. His march in Hindustan created quite a stir at the Courts of foreign rulers. There were wild conjectures about his real intentions and

¹ Siyar-ul-Mutakherin, p. 242 (Panini Ed.).

the *Peśvā* added not a little to the confusion by making an appeal to all Hindu rulers to gather under his banner. About the beginning of February he arrived at Udaipūr and met the Rānā in a formal *Darbār*. Agents began to arrive from Jai Singh and from the imperial Court carrying drafts of agreement which would prove acceptable.

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Expansion of Maratha Power. Shahu.

Peśvă Bājī Rāv I.

Attempts as
Conciliation

On 4th March 1736 in an atmosphere of great cordiality took place a meeting between the Brāhmin Minister of Sāhū Rājā and the Rajput Prince and the prospects of peace seemed very fair. Jai Singh's proposals amounted to the Peśvā declaring himself a servant of the Crown and in exchange getting his demands conceded.

The Emperor was prepared to bestow Cauth and Sardeśmukhi for the province of Māļvā, an assignment of thirteen lakhs of rupees on the revenue of districts south of the Cambal and grant an authority to the Peśvā to levy tribute from the Rajput States from Bundi on the west to Bhadavār on the east. The concessions excited the Peśvā's cupidity and called forth fresh demands: he went on raising his claims till at last he demanded:—

- (i) The Subhā of Māļvā inclusive of the tributary States, to be granted in jāgir to the Peśvā and he be appointed Governor of the province.
- (#) The Rohilla Chiefs of Bhopal and Bhilsa to be ejected from the province and their jagirs to be made over to the Peśva.
- (iii) The forts Māṇḍavgaḍ, Dhār and Rāisin (commanding the passes in Māļvā from the south) to be ceded to the Peśvā.
- (iv) The territory up to the Cambal to be granted to the $Pesv\bar{a}$ in $j\bar{a}g\bar{u}r$.
- (v) An assignment of fifty lakhs of rupees on the revenues of Bengal to relieve the *Peśvā's* debts.
- (vi) The cession of the holy places of Allāhābād, Banāras, Mathurā and Gayā.
- (vii) The cession of the Sardespāṇdeship of the Deccan and lastly came the demand for another jāgīr of fifty lakhs of rupees in the Subhā of the Deccan.

From the modest demands for cession of Cauth and Sardeśmukhi of Māļvā and war indemnity to meet his debts the Peśvā had gone on to ask for the virtual control of Māļvā, Bundelkhand, Bengal and the Deccan. This almost took away the breath of the imperial court and it decided to fight. To gain time just then it procrastinated and spun out negotiations till the end of the campaigning season obliged the Peśvā to retire.

¹ S.P.D. XV, pp. 93-94 and Grant Duff, I, pp. 431-434 (1912 Ed.). Vf 3792—5a

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Peśvă Báji Ráv I.

When the next campaigning season opened the *Peśvā* marched into Hindustān at the head of fifty thousand troops. Bhopāl and Bhilsā the only islands of opposition held by Rohillā chieftains in the province of Mālvā were reduced and the *Peśvā* then struck in at north-eastern direction and attacked the Jāt $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ of Bhadavār.

Sudden Attack on Delhi.

Having laid Malva and Bundelkhand under contribution the Maratha army stood poised on the Cambal hardly seventy miles from Agrā. The advance of the enemy so near the imperial capital constituted a menace of the first magnitude and roused the Court into feverish activity. Large armies were equipped and put into the field under the command of Vazir Qamruddin Khan and the Mir Bakhsi Khān Daurān. Royal letters were sent to provincial Governors, Moghal Chiefs and Rajput princes to rush to the defence of the capital and movements of troops and their concentration in the Delhi Agra area were reported from all sides. This it was necessary to prevent and create a diversion and a strong detachment under Malhārjī Holkar entered the Doab. Holkar crossed the Yamunā at Kālpī and moving swiftly plundered Itimādpūr and Firozābād opposite Agrā. At Jalesar, however, he was surprised by Sāādāt Khan, Governor of Oudh and repulsed with losses. The Peśva's attempt to distract the enemy and prevent his concentration had failed. Sāādāt Khān wrote to the Emperor glowing accounts of his victory, boasted of his soon being able to drive the Marathas beyond the Cambal and advised the Emperor to break off negotiations with the Peśvā.

The Petva's vakil Dhondo Govind who was in the camp of the Mir Bakhsi communicated Säädät Khān's account of his success and the violent reaction it had produced at the Court. The Peśvā was determined "to give a lie to the wild boast and tell the Emperor that he was still in Hindustan and to show him flames and Marathas at the gates of his capital". While the Moghal chiefs were celebrating Sāādāt Khān's recent victory the Peśvā making a wide detour through the Jat and Mevat country on the west passed the enemy's rear and arrived in the vicinity of the capital on 29th March 1737. Leaving Barāpulā and the Kālikā temple (near Okhlā) to his right the Peśvā moved his camp to the Kuth Minar and then to the plain where now stands New Delhi. On arriving near the Capital the Peśvā changed his mind of sacking the city; he knew that the Emperor and Khan Dauran were favourably disposed towards his demands but that the Moghal party was opposing the cessions. He sent letters of friendly professions to the Emperor, invited fresh proposals and to save the city from molestation moved in the direction of the Jhil tank. As the Peśod's army was changing grounds the next day the move was misunderstood as retreat and the defenders sallied out to attack the enemy. The Peśvā lured the Moghal force beyond the protection of its artillery and then enveloping it completely routed it. On 31st March learning of the approach of enemy troops the Peśva disappeared as suddenly as he had arrived before the capital. He hoped to draw the Moghal armies into the arid hills of the Mevat country but the enemy refused to take the bait. Wearied by marching and countermarching the Moghal Commanders retired to their mansions in the capital. By his clever strategy the Peśvā had Peśvā Baji Rāv I. outmanoeuvered his opponents and completely immobilised them. The Turāni or Moghal party which opposed Marāthā ambitions was discredited in the councils of the Empire and the influence of the Hindustani leader, Khan-i-Dauran, the Advocate of the peace policy, once more became supreme1.

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Nizām-ul-mulk, though he had agreed to give the Peśnā a free hand in Hindustan, watched his extraordinary progress beyond the Narmadā with the greatest anxiety. He thought that the Peśvā's new entanglements would reduce the latter's resources and allow himself greater freedom. Events however belied the Nizām's expectations. The weakness of the empire revealed itself more and more glaringly as the Marāṭhā-Moghal struggle developed and Moghal arms suffered reverses after reverses. Instead of being checked and driven back the Peśca reached the very gates of Delhi and threatened to subvert the empire itself. The Nizam could no longer remain an idle spectator while the bulwarks of the empire were crashing round him. The news of the Peśvā trying to obtain greater control over his subhā of the Deccan and rivet further chains on his authority was most disquieting. The Nizām decided to make common cause with the imperialist Government to save it and save himself thereby.

The Battle of Bhopāl.

The Moghal Court having realized its weakness in opposing Maratha encroachments invited Nizam-ul-mulk to its aid and suspended peace talks. On his arrival in Delhi in June old jealousies and suspicions were set aside. Muhammad Sāh showered on him favours, gave him the best residence in the capital, and restored to him the government of Malva and Gujarat in the name of his son on the condition that he would drive the Marathas beyond the Narmada2. At the head of an army of thirty-five thousand men and a fine park of artillery the Nizām left the capital to seek and if possible destroy the enemy. He marched southward through Bundelkhand where he was joined by Sāādāt Khān's troops and also those of the Rajput and Bundelā chiefs (of Orchā, Datiā, Narvār and several other Chieftains) till his force swelled to seventy-thousand. About the middle of December he arrived at Bhopal. His strategy was to catch the Maratha force between two pincers, to crush it between the imperial army under his personal command and another striking from the south under his son Nasir Jang.

Peśva's letter to his brother in appendix of Br, Ch. No. 27.

⁹ S.P.D. Vol. XV, p. 83.

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Peśvă Băji Rāv I.

The Battle of
Bhopal.

But the Peśvā refused to act according to the enemy dispositions. Placing a strong detachment under his brother on the Tapi to prevent succour going to the Navāb from the Deccan he invaded Māļva at the head of eighty thousand horse and came up with the Nizām at Bhopal. The Nizam surrounding himself with his artillery waited for the Marāthās to attack him. He had not taken sufficient care to protect his line of communications with Delhi and Hyderābād and soon found himself completely isolated and invested in the town of Bhopal. The grain supply in his camp soon gave out and men and animals famished for want of food. Two detachments that tried to carry relief to the beleaguered army one from Sah Jahanpur and the other from Burhanpur were cut up. The Nizam's attempt to break out and escape under cover of his powerful guns was foiled by the Marāthā horse hovering round and galling the Moghal army with showers of rockets and match-lock fire. Unable to hold out any longer the Nizām begged for terms and on 7th January 1738 at Durāhā Sarāi1 signed the convention promising to grant to the Peśva the whole of Malva, the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Narmada and the Cambal, to obtain a confirmation of it from the Emperor and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of fifty lakhs of rupees for war expenses2.

The victory of Bhopāl marks the zenith of the Peśvā's triumphant career. Nizām-ul-mulk who was opposing the grant of cauth and Sardeśmukhi of Māļvā had been forced to concede the entire province and recognise Peśva's claims upto the Cambal. The Peśva accomplished the conquest which he had set before himself since he came to the Peśvāship. Creating powerful armies out of divergent elements of Marāthā siledārs he invaded Hindustān, brought to grief one imperial army after another sent against him, acquired immense territory till the Marāthā outposts reached the southern banks of the Cambal and the Yamuna. The disaster of Amihera first opened the eyes of the imperial Government to this menace from the south. But the measures it adopted to fight were feeble, half-hearted and lacked in consistency. The friendship of Rājā Jai Singh enabled the Marāthās to plant their power firmly in Mālvā. The later attempts of the Moghal Government to oust the Marathas failed on account of the pusillanimity of its leaders and want of energy in its administration. The defeat of the confederate armies at Bhopal by the Peśvā established the supremacy of Marāthā arms in Hindustān and announced the birth of a new imperial power.

The Nizām failed to keep his promise of getting the convention ratified with in his life-time. But no new subhedār was sent from Delhi and the province remained in Marāṭhā hands. Sinde and

Durāhā is about 20 miles S. W. of Bhopāl. Sardesai is obviously incorrect when he says Durāhā is 64 miles north of Siroñj,

² The best authority for the campaign is the Peśva's letters to his brother in *Brumhendra Svāmi's Caritra*, Appendix Nos. 33-36. Grant Duff has used them but his chronology of events is wrong.

Holkar set up their headquarters at Ujjain and Indore and shared the revenue with the Peśva. The invasion of Nadir Sah next year convulsed the Moghal empire and hastened its decay. The Emperor became a shadow figure exercising little direct authority beyond the provinces of Agra and Delhi.

CHAPTER 8. Expansion of Maratha Power. SHAHU.

Peśva Baji Rav I. The Battle of Bhopāļ.

The upheaval at Delhi mystified the Peśvā. The revolution threatened to destroy the hegemony acquired by Marāṭhā arms in the imperial councils. If Nadir Sah were to stay in India and found a new dynasty subverting the Moghal line, Maratha supremacy would be gone and their new conquests would be imperilled. Baji Rav recognised the seriousness of the threat and talked of uniting Indian powers against the foreign aggressor. But before he could recall his forces from the siege of Bassein the Persian conqueror had turned his back on India and was returning to his country enjoining on all Indian rulers to render allegiance to the Moghal Emperor and obey his commands.

While Marāthā power was expanding in Hindustan the home front Conquests on the was not neglected. Large part of Marāthā territory on the western Sea-board was in foreign hands. The Siddis of Janjīrā had long thwarted Sivaji's attempts to reduce their island castle and annihilate their power. The Portuguese clung to the coastal strip in north Konkan. Aurangzeb had transferred his conquests in Konkan to the Siddi Chiefs of Janjira and put them in possession of important fort of Rayagad, Mahad, Dabhol, Ratnagiri, etc. The Siddis had also seized Revas and Thal near Kolābā from which they harassed Maratha shipping in Panvel creek. The Siddi's power from Janjira as centre spread in a fan-like fashion right up to the western ghāts and covered the entire modern district of Kolābā with the exception of Pen and Alibag. His possessions thus included Rayagad, capital of the great Sivājī and a place of sanctity to the Marāṭhās which their racial pride and national honour would not allow them to tolerate in alien hands.

West Coast.

These political considerations for expelling the Siddi were aggravated by a personal quarrel. Brahmendra Svāmī, a religious mendicant, was much respected in the Peśva's family and shown very high regard in the Maratha Court. He had built a lovely shrine dedicated to Siva at Paraśurām near Cipļup. Siddi Sāāt, the Siddi Commandant of the nearby fort of Afijapvel, taking offence with the Svāmī made a sudden raid on the temple on Mahāśiyarātri day in 1727 and levelled it down. The Svāmī's rage knew no bounds, he rained curses on the Siddi, left Konkan and settled at Dhāvadśī near Sātārā preaching a crusade against the Siddi defiler of his shrine.

Känhoji Angre to whom the west coast districts had been assigned as his sphere, was lukewarm towards the adventure. He died in 1729 and his son Sekhoji was won over the project of reducing the CHAPTER §.

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Peśvā Bāji Rāv I.

Conquests on the West Coast.

Siddī power. A political revolution occurred at Janjīrā in 1733; the Siddī Chief Siddi Rasul Khān died in February 1733 and his eldest son and successor was murdered by other claimants to the Command. The son of the murdered Abdullah fled to the Marathas for protection and asked their help in gaining the Navābship. A powerful Siddi Chief who was in command of the fleet and was perhaps a partisan of Abdullāh agreed to transfer his allegiance and come over to the Maratha side on promise of substantial reward. Though it was the height of summer and end of the campaigning season, two forces one under the Peśvā and Fateh Singh Bhosle and the other under the Pratinidhi were immediately ordered to march to [anjira and seize the place in favour of the Maratha nominee. The Pesoa descended into Konkan and arrived before the island castle on 2 May 1733. The suddenness of the approach took the enemy unawares. Rājpurī and Khokrī surrendered without resistance, as also the Siddī fleet lying in the port. Sekhoji walked over to the Marathas and with him the Peśvā sat down to direct the siege of the castle. The rebels. fled to the castle and closed its gates before the Marathas could get in.

Janjīrā was girdled by the sea all round though not far from the mainland. An attacking force without adequate support of a fleet and heavy artillery was helpless before it. Bājī Rāv looked to Sekhojī Angre to provide naval support for his enterprise. But owing partly to the lateness of the season and partly to the jealousy Angre felt at the intrusion of the King's forces in his field, his ships were slow in supporting the *Peśvā's* action. Sekhoji occupied himself with the attack on Siddi's places like Revas, Thal, etc., in his territory. In the meanwhile the Siddi chiefs had appealed successfully to the English at Bombay and Capt. Mac Neale arrived on the scene with a powerful squadron and the attack on Janjīrā had to be abandoned.

Srinivās Rāv Pratinidhī who had been sent into south Konkan bribed the killedār of Rāyagad and occupied the fort on 8th Junc. But his further operations were thwarted by intrigues. So strong was the jealousy between the Peśvā and the Pratinidhī that they began to work at cross-purposes with each other making further progress in the expedition impossible. The Peśvā tired of sitting before Jañjīrā without hope of reducing the place, advised the Darbār to accept the terms offered through the English. Truce was declared and on 1st December Abdul Rahmān the Peśvā's nominee was seated on the Masnad. Bājī Rāv abandoned the siege and marched away from Rājpurī.

The results of the campaign were not unsubstantial. The Siddi was driven back to the sea: the Siddi's territory dwindled to the rock islands of Jañjīrā, Underi and Añjanvel and Gowalkot in the south The Marāthās became masters of his land possessions. Rāygad, the capital of the great Sivājī was recovered as also Caul and Thal and

Revas. Siddi Saat of Anjanvel continued to give trouble for some time but he was finally overcome in April 1736 and a final treaty was concluded ratifying the truce arrangements and establishing double government in the eleven mahals formerly owned by the Siddi. The Siddi's power declined and the Siddi became in all but Peśva Baji Rav t. name a tributary of the Maratha State.

Another remarkable success won by the Peśvä's arms in Konkan was the defeat of the Portuguese and acquisition of their Province of the North comprising the island of Salsette and the coastal strip covered by Bassein and its dependencies. The Portuguese had seized these parts of the Marāthā country two hundred years ago and made Bassein the capital of their province and raised mighty fortifications round it. Bassein lay with a fertile tract; its equable climate, administrative importance and commercial prosperity drew to it many rich Portuguese families from Goa and the entire territory came to be looked on as a valued possession of the Portuguese empire in the east.

In the eighteenth century however, Portuguese power was on the decline. The command of the sea had passed to the Dutch and the English and the Portuguese clung to their outposts in India with difficulty. But they had not the wisdom to understand their unstable position; they had few friends among country powers and they made their subject people their worst enemies by their harsh and intolerant treatment. The inquisition was active in Goa and Bassein from 1550 persecuting all those who did not conform to the Christian doctrine or dared to worship publicly in their own way. Those who could, fled the country and settled in the neighbouring districts. But there were many who could not and clung to their hearths and homes in the hope that deliverance would come from their compatriots beyond the borders. As soon as Maratha rule was established in Kalyan (1719) the popular discontent found expression. The Hindu leaders invited the Peśva to deliver them from foreign yoke and restore their religious liberties. The Portuguese aroused by the danger threatening them began to put Salsette and Bassein in a proper state of defence and ordered the local people to contribute money and labour. A cry went up among the local people and in desperation they invoked the Peśvā to take possession of the country offering him their whole-heared co-operation in the enterprise.

Portuguese activities in Konkan were also running counter to the interests of the Peśva. In the domestic dispute of the Angre family the Portuguese supported Sambhājī Angre who was flouting the Peśvā and became particularly obnoxious to him. Probing attacks on Portuguese territory had started since 1723. Their safety against these and the intrigues of their Hindu subjects now lay in the new

CHAPTER S. Expansion of Maratha Power. SHAHU Conquests on the West Coast. Conquest of Salsette and

Bassoin.

CHAPTER 8. Expansion of Maratha Power. SHAHU.

Conquest of Salsette and Bassein.

fortifications that were going up and these the Portuguese pressed with vigour. The attack on Bassein could no longer be delayed and in March 1737 a strong force under the Peśva's brother Cimaji Appà prepared to strike at the Portuguese possessions and collected Peśva Baji Rav I in secrecy at Kalyan.

> The terrain of Salsette and Bassein is peculiar; the narrow coastal strip is cut up in many places by channels made inland by the sea and the rivers flowing out. This is not a country for large-scale movements of cavalry. Knowledge of fords and their control therefore becomes an important factor of military tactics in this area. The Peśvā's contacts with the local population of Sālsette and Bassein and the secret information obtained from them of the geography of the country and the strength of their posts proved very useful in this respect. On the night of 26th March at low tide an advanced detachment of Marāthā horse surprised the patrol at Thāṇā ford, attacked the St. Jeronimo tower and secured the passage into the island. The next day the entire force poured in with its equipment and stores. The surprise was complete. The Governor frightened out of his wits left the island on 27th March and the main fort of Thana surrendered without much fighting. Detachments sent out soon reduced the remaining fortified places Belāpūr, Parsik, Marol and only Bandra and Varsova held out against the attack. While the main army was attacking Salsette another force, 2200 strong, rapidly marched on Bassein through hilly country. The same strategy had been planned here, but failed on account of the extra precautions taken by the enemy. Means had to be devised to besiege and assault the formidable fortress of Bassein. Outlying posts were seized, but the embattled walls of the fortress guarded by the sea on three sides and open only to the north stood frowning on the besiegers. Three attacks to escalade the walls made during the rains were beaten back with heavy losses. As the fair season opened the Portuguese received reinforcements and attacked Marathas in the open country cutting up their detachments at Māhim and Dhārāvī. In the November of 1738 they even tried to recover Thana and sent a large expedition which however, failed disastrously. The Portuguese Commander Pedro De Mello was killed on the spot and his ships fled back.

> The Marathas now going over to the offensive collected a formidable force for the final assault on the enemy's stronghold. Another force invaded Goa and cut off supplies going to Bassein. The defenders were reduced to great straits; they melted even church plate to purchase ammunition from Bombay, but would not talk of surrender. Maratha artillery roared night and day pounding the fortress and thus leaving the enemy no time to recover his breath. Mines were run to the walls and exploded on 2nd May. A general assault followed and after two days of heavy fighting Bassein capitulated on 5th May 1739 and the garrison marched out. Bassein fell never to rise again.

The conquest of Bassein was long cherished by the Marathas as a matter of national pride and its transfer to the English was stoutly resisted in the first Maratha war. The gains to the Marathas by the Maratha Barrets Barrets campaign were the conquest of practically the entire province of the North of the Portuguese possession twenty-two leagues in length Peśva Baji Rav I. from Varsova to Daman with their four chief ports, three hundred and forty villages and a revenue of 2,50,000 rupees. They acquired, besides Bassein eight cities, twenty fortresses, the famous island of Salsette. Daman and Diu however escaped the fate of Bassein.

CHAPTER Maratha Power. SHAHU, Conquest of Salsette and Bassein,





सत्यमेव जयते

CHAPTER 4* EXPANSION OF MARATHA POWER (1741—1761)

Expansion of

Maratha Power.
BALAJI BAJI RAV
Early successes

in the north

BAJI RAV DIED IN APRIL 1740 AND WAS SUCCEEDED in the Peśväship by his son Bālājī then twenty years old. The Chief Minister, by now, ruled in the Rājā's name the central region of Mahārāṣṭra, north Konkan recently wrested from the Portuguese and levied cauth on Khāndeś, Māļvā, Bundelkhand and territories beyond. He commanded the largest army in the Marāṭhā State and his resources were very great. This gave the Peśvā family a preponderance in the Rājā's council and therefore the succession of the son to his father's post was never in doubt. The story of the opposition of Raghujī Bhosle and Bābujī Nāik to the succession of Bāļājī Rāv first accepted by Grant Duff¹ and implicitly followed by later writers on the authority of Bakhars, appears to be an attempt made by the Peśvā's protagonists to defend his attack on the Nāgpūr Chief three years later and has little basis in fact.

The succession of Bāļāji Bāji Rāv marked no ostensible change in policy. The new Peśvā indicated that he would follow his father's expansionist policies in all respects and expressed his desire2 to maintain cordial relations with Rajput princes who had facilitated Maratha entry into Malva and their subsequent successes in Hindustan. The Nizām's humiliating defeat at Bhopāl (1738) had brought the whole of Mālvā under Marāthā control, but the imperial grants which would put the seal of authority on the transfer had been delayed. Young Bāļājī, therefore, within four months of his investiture marched into Hindustan to renew friendly contacts with the Rajput Chiefs and undo the mischief created by the Nizām during his three years' stay in the imperial capital. The Nizām's influence at Delhi, however, was on the wane and the old man, powerless for mischief any more, was hard put to hold his own against his son in the Deccan. He was coming south to meet the threat of Nasir Jang's revolt and his position looked almost hopeless. The Peśca was anxious to obtain the wizard's good-will for his northern projects and instead of exploiting the situation of a civil strife in

³ Hingne Daftar, Vol. I, pp. 15-19.

This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe,

¹ Grant Duff, Vol. II, pp. 3-4 (1912 Ed.);

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the family of his neighbour, he went out of his way to call on the Navāb at Edalābād (on the Purņā) on 17th January 1741 and assure him of his support to quell the revolt. The friendly assurances caused dismay in the ranks of the rebels and helped the Nizām to overcome his son without difficulty.

The Peśvā marched northward levying Cauth on his new conquests and arrived at Dholpūr on 12th May. Here he met Savāi Jai Singh and concluded with him a pact for mutual aid. Both parties swore loyalty to the imperial throne; Jai Singh presented the Peśvā a sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees to meet his expenses and promised to obtain for him imperial sanads for the subhedāri of Māļvā. The Peśvā on his side agreed to present himself before the Emperor, prevent other Marāthā chieftains from crossing the Narmadā and raiding imperial territory and send four thousand troops for the imperial service¹. Jai Singh's negotiations were approved and the grants for Māļvā were issued in September. The whole of the province now passed into Marāthā possession. The Peśvā's chiefs put their seals to the treaty later in 1743.

The Peśvā however was not satisfied with the Subhedāri of merely one province. As expressed in one of his famous declarations² he desired the golden river from the north flow southward to enrich the regions of Mahārāṣṭra, to utilise the resources of the empire to make his country strong and rich. Next year he again appeared in Bundelkhand and sent envoys to claim cauth for Āgrā, Allāhābād, Pāṭnā and Bengāl. The imperial court afraid to refuse the Peśvā, called on him to fulfil the promise of protecting imperial domains from the disturbances caused by Raghujī Bhosle's invasion of Bengāl and involved him in a dispute with that chief. The Bengāl episode is narrated in greater detail later and need not detain us here.

In 1744 there was again trouble in Bundelkhand. The Bundelā chiefs were not very happy about the growing demands of the *Peśvā* and rose all over. Two years back they had with great audacity attacked a Marāṭhā revenue collector and put him to death. The terrible retribution this called on them did not prevent these chiefs from revolting once more. Military posts at Jhānsī and Sāgar were permanently established in this rugged region and put under able Commanders. Bhilsā was recovered from the *Navāb* of Bhopāl in March 1745 and Jaipūr, the storm-centre of Bundelā disaffection, was stormed in 1746 May.

In 1748 the Peśvā visited Hindustan for the last time. Abdālī had invaded Puñjāb and there was rift among Peśvā's chiefs about the policy to be followed in respect of Jaipūr succession. The Peśvā visited Delhi and then entered Jaipūr territory to bring about a settle ment in the dispute of Jai Sing's sons. The expedition was barren of results.

¹ S.P.D., Vol. XV, p. 97;

² Rajwade Vol. VI, p. 267.

The province of Bengal requires our attention now. This rich province in Moghal times comprised Bengal proper, Bihar and Orissa and had so far fortunately escaped the welter of anarchy and misrule that had engulfed the rest of the empire. Mursid Quli Khan had ruled the province wisely till his death in 1727 and after him his son Sujā Khān till 1739. With Sujā Khān's death in 1739 the peace of Bengal was disturbed and the revolt and usurpation of Alivardi Khān, the deputy governor of Bihār brought the Marāthās on the scene. Alivardi led an army from Pāṭaṇā into Bengāl, defeated the successor of Sujā Khān and by heavy bribes to the imperial court obtained its consent to his own appointment as Governor of the province. The followers of the family of the old Navāb however refused to acknowledge the title of the usurper. They challenged his authority and invited the neighbouring Maratha chief, Raghuji Bhosle, to their aid. Thus started the Bengal incursions of the Marāthās which dried up the resources of the province and brought Moghal authority in the eastern region to the lowest level and made Bengal a fruitful field of conquest.

Bengāl lay contiguous to the territory of Raghujī Bhosle who had established himself in Berār and Gondvan (modern Madhya Pradeś) and in the general scheme of Marāthā expansion, was marked as the Bhosle's field of conquest. Raghujī could with little difficulty send his horse into Orissā or pour them into the plains of Bihār through the jungle-paths of Chattisgad. The local populace was altogether docile and the army which sustained the usurper's power was composed of mercenary Afghān soldiery which was disloyal and ready enough to sell itself to the highest bidder. The family of Murśid Qulī Khān was bitterly opposing the new Navāb's rule and the Bhosle's advent into Bengāl promised early results.

But Raghujī had counted without the opposition of the *Peśvā*. He was a typical Marāṭhā, a dashing soldier and a skilful leader of cavalry. His resources compared to that of the *Navāb* of Beṅgāl were meagre, but the general situation favoured the Bhosle. The Marāṭhā also had an overweening pride in his own prowess; he failed to recognise the political change that had come over the Marāṭhā State and affected to ignore the *Peśvā*'s supreme authority. He claimed equal rank with the *Peśvā* and only succeeded in inviting the latter's hostility. The differences of the two Marāṭhā chieftains were cleverly played upon by the Moghal Court and the *Subhedār*, and the province of Beṅgāl which looked like a ripe fruit ready for the plucking, slipped out of Marāṭhā hands to be swallowed by the Ēast India Company.

The first revolt against Alivardi Khān occurred in Orissā. Rustum Jang, the deputy Governor of the Province and son-in-law of deceased Sujā Khān refused to acknowledge the authority of the regicide and declared his own independence (1741). He was however routed by the Navāb's troops and fled southward. Here he obtained the

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aid of Raghuji Bhosle, and marching back with a small Marāthā detachment, reoccupied Cuttack, but was again defeated and fell back on Nāgpūr with his Marāthā allies (December 1741).

Raghuji Bhosle by this time had returned from Karnātak. His resounding successes in that region had greatly added to his strength and raised his prestige at the Maratha Court. He immediately plunged into the Bengal adventure. In April 1742 a strong force under Bhosle's Divan, Bhaskar Ram, advanced swiftly into Bengal through Pacet and entered the Bardvan district. Alivardi Khan in an effort to save his capital threw himself across the invader's path, was promptly surrounded and barely escaped with his life. The whole of Bengal West of the Ganga passed into Maratha hands; Mursidābād, the Navāb's capital, was raided on 6th May and Hughli, Bengāl's chief port, was seized in July. The Marāthās spread over the country demanding tribute wherever they went. A lurid picture of Marāthā atrocities during the period of occupation is drawn by the Bengali poet Gangaram in Maharastra Puran. The picture is obviously painted in deep shades and has done grave injustice to Marāthā character.

Bhāskar Rām made Kaṭvā his headquarters and in the security provided by the swollen rivers and by his light horse, was celebrating Durgā Pūjā, the national festival of Bengāl, in September. On the 27th of that month in the early hours of the morning while the Marāthā camp was resting after the night's festivities, it was surprised by the Navāh's troops. Bhāskar Rām who was for some time apprehending danger, immediately broke up his camp and abandoning his equipage and property beat a hasty retreat towards the forests of Chattisgad. His detachments also vacated Bardvān, Hughli, Hijli and other places. Near Medinipūr he made an attempt to hold up his pursuers, but failing, withdrew to Nāgpūr. Bhosle's first attempt to levy cauth on Bengāl and bringing the province under Marāthā influence ended rather ingloriously (December 1742).

Raghujī Bhosle immediately fitted another force and personally led it into Bengāl. The new Peśvā was campaigning in Bundelkhand and was known to be negotiating with the Moghal Darbār for the cauth of Bengāl. Raghujī was ill at ease and was anxious to know the Peśvā's intentions. He met the latter at Gayā but the Brahmin minister was too deep for the forthright Marāṭhā and refused to divulge his plans. On the Bhosle's return to his camp at Kaṭvā the Peśvā advanced into Bengāl and met Alivardi Khān at Plāssey. Here they agreed that the Navāb should pay Śāhū Rājā the cauth for the province through the Peśvā's agency besides 22 lakhs of rupees to the Peśvā himself for his expenses. In return the Peśvā stipulated that he would settle with Raghujī and not allow him to disturb the peace of the province. He then immediately started in pursuit of the Bhosle. Raghujī broke up his camp at Kaṭvā and hastily retired in the direction of Nāgpūr. The Peśvā however by rapid movements

overtook the Bhosle's rearguard at one of the passes near Pācet and captured his camp equipage. The $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ had succeeded in humbling his rival but unwittingly gave a lease of life to the tottering rule of the Moghal $Subhed\bar{a}r$.

Raghujī now realised the hopelessness of succeeding in Bengāl in face of the *Peśvā*'s hostility. He met the *Peśvā* at the *Rājā*'s Court and came to an understanding with him obtaining for himself the untrammelled lease of the eastern province (31 Aug. 1743). There was a show of burying the hatchet but both parties remained suspicious and continued scheming against one another.

In 1744 February a fresh force under Bhāskar Rām took the field and entered Bengāl by way of Orissā and Medinipūr. Bhāskar Rām this year was in a grim mood and struck out in a determined manner. Alivardi Khān was at his wits' end to meet this fierce onslaught. His submission to the *Peśvā's* demands had brought him little comfort. The three years' continuous fighting had exhausted his treasury and drid up his revenues; the large armies raised by him were in arrears and therefore sullen. The *Navāb* was in a desperate mood; finding himself unable to oppose the Marāṭhās in the field he invited Bhāskar Rām and his colleagues to a conference to discuss peace terms and had them all murdered as they were entering the tent (31 March 1744). Treachery succeeded where arms could not and the Marāṭhā army threatening Bengāl melted away giving the *Navāb* a breathing respite.

But Raghujī Bhosle would not allow Alivardi Khān's base treachery to pass unavenged. There were serious mutinies in the Navāb's army and as soon as Raghujī heard of them he crossed into Orissā (March 1745) occupied Cuttack and then advanced into Bihār. A heavy indemnity of three crores of rupees was demanded for the murder of Marāṭhā generals. Alivardi contrived to beguile the Marāṭhā until he had suppressed the mutinies. Fighting was then resumed and Murśidābād was raided by Marāṭhā light troops on 21 December 1745. Four days later the Navāb succeeded in coming up with the main Marāṭhā army near Kaṭvā and dispersed it with his cannon. Fighting went on intermittently till the end of the campaigning season.

There were again serious disturbances in the Navāb's army from 1746-1748. The Paṭhāṇ chieftains who formed the backbone of his military strength, revolted one after another and made Alivardi's rule precarious. The Navāb however showed great steadiness and courage in fighting and overcoming the rebels. The Peśvā in the meanwhile had renewed his attempts to obtain the cauth of Bengāl for himself and put the Bhosle on the alert. The result was Raghujī was unable to take advantage of the Navāb's difficulties. Orissā however remained with him and from Cuttack as his base he made annual incursions into Bengāl by way of Medinipūr. The Navāb built a cantonment at this place and posted himself there for over a year to prevent the Marāṭhās breaking into Bengāl. In

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Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV Conquest of Bengāl 1749 he led a fresh army into Orissā and recovered Cuttack from the Bhosle's agent. But no sooner was his back turned than the Marāthās returned and drove out the Moghal garrison and occupied the province. The fact was Orissā was too distant to be defended from Murśidābād with an active enemy striding across the route. The province itself was too poor to maintain a big garrison and the Bengāl treasury had been depleted by constant warfare. Weary with age and privations of war Alivardi Khān concluded a treaty with Raghujī Bhosle conceding him the surplus revenue from Orissā and 12 lakhs of rupees as cauth for the rest of Bengāl. The Bhosle on his part agreed not to molest the peace of Bengāl.

Raghujī Bhosle thus obtained a firm foothold in the eastern region and Bengāl passed into the orbit of Marāṭhā influence. The Marāṭhās however could not exploit their advantage to the full. The *Peśvā's* jealousy of Raghujī never abated and the atmosphere of suspicion had a dampening effect on Bhosle's activities. Raghujī died in 1755 and his successors had neither his abilities nor his courage. The English rose in power defeating Alivardi's successor in 1757 and the *cauth* of Bengāl ceased to be paid from 1761¹.

Rajputānā.

The ruler of Jaipur was the leader of the Hindustani party at the Moghal Darbar and friendship with him had so far formed one of the cardinal points of policy pursued by the Marāṭhās in Hindustan. Savāi Jai Singh who ruled Jaipūr from 1699 to 1743 had come to occupy a unique position in the Indian political world. As the leader of the Hindustani party he dominated the Moghal Councils with the aid of his Marāthā allies. He had convinced the puppet monarch at Delhi that the best way to treat with the Marāṭhās and stop their inroads was to appease them by making the Peśvā the subhedār of Mālvā and granting him cauth over the imperial domain. As a servant of the Crown, Jai Singh had argued, the Peśvā was bound to keep peace and prevent other Maratha chieftains from disturbing it. A settlement on these lines had not only facilitated Marāṭhā entry into Hindustan but also assured that the opposition to Marāṭhā expansion would be local. Thus with Savāi Jai Singh's help Bājī Rāv had come to possess Māļvā, obtained a footing in Bundelkhand and was collecting tribute as far north as Agra and Allahabad.

On the death of his father Bāļājī visited Jai Singh in 1741 and promising to pursue the same friendly policy, obtained the formal grants for Māļvā. Savāi Jai Singh died in 1743. The Moghal power had already declined and with the removal of the veteran Jai Singh the Rajputs became leaderless. A wise and firm leadership at this stage would not only have strengthened the Marāṭhā-Rajput alliance but could have transformed the Rajputs into the staunchest supporters

¹ For original material in Marāṭhī see *Purandare Daftar* I, 150, 152 and Rajwade III, pp. 208, 217, 220, 222 & VI, pp. 144-146,170, S.P.D. Vol. XX. pp. 21-50. The details of the cpisode are very ably narrated by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in 'Fall of the Mughal Empire' Vol. I pp. 67-180. Sejwalkar's article in the Deccan College Bulletin, Vol. II, pp. 360-382 is useful,

of the Marāṭhā objective of *Hindu pad-pādśāhī* or revival of Hindu power. The new *Peśvā* however could not provide this type of leadership; his shifting and grasping policy in Rajputānā ended the traditional Marāṭhā-Rajput alliance and alienated the Rajputs from the Marāṭhās.

CHAPTER 4.

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. Rajputānā.

Isvari Singh, the elder son of Savāi Jai Singh, on coming to the Gādī promised his younger brother Mādho Singh an appanage of 24 lakhs of rupees. Mādho Singh being born of a Udaipūr princess would not be satisfied with this. He contested the succession with his brother and demanded the partition of the Jaipur principality. With the aid of Udaipūr troops he invaded Jaipūr. Iśvari Singh who had secured the help of Sinde and Holkar easily beat off the attack and repudiated the agreement. At this stage Madho Singh succeeded in winning over Malhar Rav Holkar by heavy bribes and renewed the contest. At the battle of Rājmahāl in March 1747 the allies were once more defeated and Madho Singh's levies were completely routed. Both parties sent their agents to the Peśvā. Sinde had already protested against breach of the plighted word, but Holkar's persistent pleading of Mādho Singh's cause and the latter's promises of considerable cessions to the Peśvā made the Peśvā shift his ground and he advised his generals to support Mādho Singh and press Isvari Singh to cede him 24 lakhs worth of territory. He argued that thus both the princes would be satisfied and Marāthā interests would be served.

In May 1748 the *Peśvā* entered Jaipūr State with a formidable army. Iśvari Singh assumed a very submissive tone and sent his envoys to treat with him. The latter's demands rose very high. He pressed for a partition of the Jaipūr Kingdom and demanded a war indemnity of fifty lakhs of rupees. When Iśvari Singh pleaded his inability to satisfy these demands his territory was invaded by Holkar's troops, and Iśvari Singh after some protracted fighting agreed to cede to Mādho Singh five *paragaṇās*. Malhār Rāv Holkar was appeased with a heavy bribe and promises of indemnity.

The tribute promised by Iśvari Singh was never received. The Rajput prince had neither his father's intelligence nor his bravery His dispute with his brother was draining his treasury. The gathering misfortunes unbalanced the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$'s already weak mind. He now surrounded himself with low domestics and sycophants and removed his capable ministers from office. When therefore a fresh Marāṭhā army invaded Jaipūr at the end of 1750 for demanding arrears no courtier would come forward to meet the infuriated Marāṭhā leaders and treat with them. In a mood of despondency the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ swallowed poison and to ensure that it may not fail caused a cobra to bite him. The Marāṭhā army arrived before Jaipūr next day when the city lay lifeless before them. Soon it became known that Iśvari Singh out of sheer desperation had put an end to his life and was beyond the reach of his tormentors.

Expansion of Maratha Power. Balaji Baji Rav. Rajputānā, Holkar and Sinde now invited their protege Mādho Singh to Jaipūr and seated him on the Gādī. They would not rest content now with arrears and a war indemnity. They demanded cession of one fourth of Jaipūr territory. The horrible death of their prince had already embittered the Raiputs against the Marāṭhās and the latter's desire to profit by their misfortunes infuriated them. Mādho Singh no longer desired Marāṭhā protection and was anxious to shake off his erstwhile friends. His secret schemes of killing the Marāṭhā leaders with poisoned food did not succeed, but the populace rose against the invaders and in a riot in the city three thousand Deccanis were massacred. A truce was patched up by which the Marāṭhās were promised compensation for the lives lost and property plundered and also obtained orders on bankers for ransom.

The *Peśvā's* rapacity had cost him the friendship of the Rajputs and estranged them from the Marāṭhā cause. The results of the estrangement were to show themselves with greater intensity in the decade to follow.

War against the Nizām.

From 1748 A. D. affairs in the Deccan engrossed the attention of the Peśvā to the exclusion of those of Hindustan. The great Nizāmul-mulk passed away in May 1748. After his last retirement from Delhi the Navāb had very wisely avoided contest with the Peśvā and confined his attention to the organization of his authority in the Karnāṭak. In the scheme of Marāṭhā expansion the southern region had been assigned to Fateh Singh Bhosle and Bāpujī Nāik and other smaller chieftains and their incapacity and indolence had prevented the conquest of this region and its integration with the Marāthā Svarāj. A number of polygārs, petty rājās and navāls dotted the Karnāṭak. In 1743 Nizām-ul-mulk had invaded this region, put his own authority as overlord on a firm footing and had ejected the Marāṭhās from Tricinopoly. After that, playing on the mutual jealousies of the Marāthā feudatories he had effectively barred their progress southward. Thus though the treaty of 1719 had granted the Marāthās overlordship over the Deccan and recognised their right of levying cauth and Sardeśmukhi over the six provinces of the subhā, the strong personality of the Nizām had prevented the proper realization of the engagement and the Marāṭhās continued to nibble away at the Nizām's territory. The great Moghal diplomat passed away in 1748 and thereafter his state became the scene of a protracted fratricidal war. This was too great an opportunity to be missed by the Peśvā to assert the treaty rights and out of his attempts to do so arose the war which, with short interludes of peace, lasted over a decade.

The issue was complicated by two factors; one was the death of Sāhū Rājā in December 1749 and the efforts of the ladies of his family, Sakvār Bāi and Tārā Bāī, to seize power and oust the

Peśvā from supreme authority; the other was the intervention of the French in Deccan politics. Sāhū Rājā had become a figure-head while he was yet living and by a deed of authority signed on his death-bed confirmed the Peśvā in his supreme position. There was a great amount of dissatisfaction against the usurpation, and Sakvar Bāī and Tārā Bāī both hoped to rally the disaffected elements on their side and rule in the name of the successor of Sāhū Rājā. Sakvār Bāi's scheme did not succeed and the lady burnt herself on the funeral pyre of her husband. Tārā Bāī, widow of Rājārām, secured the succession of her grandson. But Rām Rājā proved a broken reed. Called from obscurity to the Marāṭhā throne, he from the beginning, leaned heavily on the Peśvā and in consequence invited the wrath of his grandmother. The Chief Marāṭhā feudatories—the Kolhāpūr Rājā, Raghujī Bhosle of Nāgpūr and others to whom Tārā Bāi looked for support refused to be drawn in a contest with the Peśvā and Damājī Gaikvad who raised the standard of revolt, was promptly defeated and imprisoned within a year and a half of Sāhū Rājā's death.

The *Peśvā* had mastered the storm, defeated his rivals at home and was free to deal with the situation arising out of the *Nizām's* death.

On the death of the Nizām his second son Nāsir Jang who possessed some ability and had obtained experience of administration and fighting in Karnāţak succeeded to the Navābship. Nizām-ul-mulk's daughter's son Muzaffar Jang, now challenged his uncle's authority and through the mediation of Canda Saheb obtained French support for his scheme. Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicerry, saw in the confused situation of the Deccan the possibility of establishing a French dominion in India and readily fell in with the scheme of Candā Sāheb and Muzaffar Jang. The allies with a small French contingent pushed on to Ambur and defeated the Nizām's Governor of Karnāṭak in August 1749. Nāsir Jang then marched in person to meet the challenge and for a time Muzaffar Jang's cause appeared hopeless. But Dupleix by his clever diplomacy sowed dissensions among the enemy's ranks; at the battle of Arcot in December 1750 Nāsir Jang's army was scattered to the four winds and the Navāb himself was killed. Muzaffar Jang lost no time in marching to Hyderabad taking with him a French force under the command of M. Bussy. But he was not destined to see the capital of the Deccan. He was killed in a scuffle with the Navāb of Kaḍappā and the Deccan army found itself without a chief. Bussy showed great determination and skill in dealing with the situation. He immediately raised Salābat Jang, the younger brother of Nāsir Jang, to the Navābship and restored order in the army. The discipline of the French force, the effectiveness of its fire-power and the conspicuous ability of its Commander raised the prestige of the French at the Navāb's Court and the French became a power to be counted with in Deccan politics.

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Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV.

War against the Nizām,

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. War against the Nizām Bussy's first hurdle before he could entrench himself at Hyderābād was the large Marāṭhā army that had moved into the Rāicūr Doāb under the Peśvā. Circumstances however favoured the Frenchman. Reports of the revolt of Damājī Gāikvāḍ reached the Peśvā while he was on the banks of the Kṛṣṇā, which made him anxious to return to Sātārā. When therefore Salābat Jang under Bussy's advice offered to pay the Peśvā seventeen lakhs of rupees as cauth the latter closed with the overtures and marched back with the utmost expedition (March 1751).

The small tribute of seventeen lakhs of which only two had been paid in cash and the rest in promises, was a mere flea-bite when the Peśvā was planning the dismemberment of the entire dominion of the Nizām. War was again resumed in 1751 November. The Nizām's opposition under Bussy's influence had stiffened; the payment of the balance of the tribute of the last year had been put off and the new Divān Raghunāth Dās had started subtle intrigues at Sātārā to eject the Peśvā. A treasure of five lakhs sent from Delhi for the Peśvā's use, was seized by the Nizām's officials and detained at Aurangābād. In the meanwhile the *Peśvā* had succeeded in persuading Gāzi-ud-din, the Nizām's eldest son, to claim his father's patrimony and contest the Naväbship for which he promised him his aid. In return he only asked for the recognition of the treaty of 1719 and cession of the districts of Aurangabad and Burhanpur. Gazi-ud-din, with Nasir Jang and Muzaffar Jang removed from the scene, readily fell in with the scheme and started for the Deccan. The Peśvā concentrated his troops on his northern frontier near Ahmadnagar to be able to join his nominee and prepared to seize by force the districts of Burhānpūr and Aurangābād.

For Bussy this was a critical situation. To prevent a junction of Salābat's enemies he planned a bold strategy. Instead of vainly pursuing the light Marāthā horse he proposed a direct march on Poonā. Moving by way of Ahmadnagar the Moghals engaged the Marāṭhās near Pārner on 20th November (1751). On the next day during the lunar eclipse while the Peśvā was busy with rituals, Bussy's infantry advanced under cover of darkness, surprised the Peśvä's camp on the Kukdi river and plundered his equipage including gold and silver utensils used by him at the time of worship. Though the casualties in the battle of Kukdi were slight, the defeat was a blow to Maratha prestige and immensely increased French reputation. The Moghal troops advanced devastating Rānjangānv, Talegānv, Dhamdherc but suffered a reverse near Koreganv on 27th November. On 20th December another engagement was fought near Rāñjangānv Sāndas. Reports also arrived that Raghujī Bhosle's troops had crossed into Berar and seized a number of posts. These setbacks and mutinous condition in the Moghal army abated Bussy's ardour to advance on Poona. The Muslim officers in the Moghal army had become jealous of the growing influence of the Frenchman. Gāziud-din was reported to have started on his southern trek. Bussy became solicitous to come to terms with the $Peśv\bar{a}$ and Salābat acting on his advice accepted the propositions in favour of peace and a treaty was concluded on 7th January 1752 at Singve near Rāhurī ceding the $Peśv\bar{a}$, Jāgir worth four lakhs of rupees¹.

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The Peśvā could not rest satisfied with a treaty which deprived him of his main objective. He had been duped by Salābat's Divān and humiliated by his French force. He now awaited the arrival in the Deccan of Sinde and Holkar with the new claimant Gāzi-ud-din. The Peśvā's intrigues were bearing fruit; the native troops of Salābat Jang were on the point of mutiny and in an affray killed his Divān Raghunāth Dās in April 1752. The French were losing ground in the Karnātak and in September Gāzi-ud-din arrived at Aurangābād, and in return for aid promised to cede to the Peśvā the districts of Aurangābād and Burhānpūr. The Peśvā's forces were joined by those of Sindes and Holkars and the partisans of Gāzi-ud-din and the stage was set for an attack on Salābat Jang and his French allies. But just then Gāzi-ud-din came to a sudden end. He was poisoned by a widow of the late Nizām-ul-mulk and died on 16th October 1752. The Peśvā's plans once more went awry.

The concentration of huge Marāṭhā forces at Aurangābād, however, overawed Salābat Jang. Gāzi-ud-din as the eldest son of the Nizām had the prescriptive right to succeed and his challenge had caused serious dissensions among the Muslim nobility. Salābat Jang on the advice of Bussy wisely proposed to yield to the Peśvā the districts of Aurangābād and Burhānpūr and avoid hostilities. A treaty was concluded at Bhālkī on 3rd November 1752 which advanced the Marāṭhā frontier from Junnar to the banks of the Tāpī in the Khāndeś. The forts in the districts however were retained by the Moghals though Trimbak, Dhoḍap and five other forts were seized by the Marāṭhās in 1751.

From Bhālkī the *Peśvā* marched into the Karnāṭak. Sripat Rāv *Pratinidhi* had already suggested the conquest and consolidation of Marāṭhā rule in Karnāṭak. But this had been delayed by the incompetence of Marāṭhā leaders in this region. As most of the Karnāṭak troops were now involved in the struggle between the French and the English raging round Tricinopoly, the region was denuded of troops. The *Peśvā* marched upto Srirangpaṭṭam calling on the petty *Rāṭās* and *polygārs* to pay *cauth*. The forts of Dhārvāḍ and Hole Honnur were occupied and the *Peśvā* returned to Pooṇā about the beginning of the monsoon in 1753.

¹ The account of the campaign given by Kincaid and Parasnis drawn from Malleson's 'French in India' is all wrong and needs to be scrapped up. I have used the more reliable original correspondence in Vol. I of Rajwade's 'Marāṭhyāñcyā Itihāsācī Sādhane'. No. 372 of Purandare Daṭtar, Vol. I, gives valuable details of fighting.

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. War against the Nizam. Pressure in Karnāṭak was kept mounting for the next five years. In 1756 a great combination of the Karnāṭak Navābs and Murār Rāv Ghorpaḍe was broken at Sāvanur and half of the Sāvanur State comprising the modern Dhārvāḍ and Belgāńv districts was acquired. In 1757 January Mysore was invaded, its capital Śriraṅgpaṭṭam was besieged and shelled, and fourteen districts were obtained in lieu of tribute. In the September of the same year Hoskoṭ, Śirā, Bangalore were reclaimed and the Navābs of Kaḍappā and Kurnool were defeated by Balvant Rāv Mahendaļe. The Marāṭha frontier now advanced to the Tuṅgabhadrā and Mysore and Arcoṭ acknowledged the Peśvā's suzerainty.

Bussy during the interval had to face serious intrigues at the Nizām's Court. At the beginning of 1753 he fell seriously ill and for change of air went to Masulipaṭam leaving his force in charge of his deputy. Salābat's Divān, Sayyad Laṣkar Khān, who professed himself a friend of the Peśvā, and was highly anti-French, demoralised the small French contingent in all possible ways and dispersed it in small detachments on revenue duties. Bussy on his return in the autumn of 1756 defeated the intrigues of the Sayyad, and restored order in his force. To enable him to make regular payments to his troops he obtained on lease from the Nizām the province of Northern sarkārs. This rendered Bussy's force independent of the vagaries of the Hyderābād Court.

But the French were hated by the Muslim nobility at the Hyderābād Court and constant conspiracies were woven to undermine Bussy's influence and deprive him of power. The Peśvā was privy to all these intrigues and secretly encouraged the parties concerned. In 1756 after the battle of Sāvanur Navāb Salābat Jaṅg was led to believe that Bussy had received large sums from Murār Rāv Ghorpaḍe for interceding in his behalf and dismissed him from service for his dishonest conduct. Bussy saw through the game of his enemies, quietly retired to Hyderābād and held his ground forcing the Nizām to reinstate him in power.

But the seven years' war (1756-63) had started in Europe and French influence was on the wane. There were troubles in Northern Sarkārs and when the French Commander went away to quell them, fresh plots began to be formed against him. Sāh Navāz Khān, the Nizām's Divān, decided to wrest authority from the weak Salābat Jaṅg and put it into the capable hands of his brother Nizām Alī. The Peśvā watched the conspiracy with the greatest interest and was promised a Jāgir of twenty-five lakhs of rupees by Basālat Jaṅg, another brother of the Navāb, who had now become the Divāṇ. Nizām Ali was the Governor of Berār; collecting a strong force he arrived at Auraṅgābād, declared his loyalty to his brother and stoutly opposed any cessions to the Marāṭhās. In consequence a Marāṭhā army entered the Nizām's district of Auraṅgābād at the end of November 1757. Large reinforcements under Rāmcandra Jādhav

were moving from Bhālkī to join Salābat Jang at Aurangābād and had reached Sindkhed. Dattājī Sinde marched to Sindkhed and invested Jādhav's force. Nizām Alī with his trained battalions under Ibrāhim Khān Gārdi hastened to the support of the beleaguered force. When however the besieged tried to break out they were fiercely attacked by Sinde (Dec. 12-16) and overpowered. Nizām Alī then sued for peace and concluded a treaty granting to the *Peśvā* territory worth twenty five lakhs of rupees and the fort of Naļdurg¹.

Bussy against whom the intrigues of Sāh Navāz and Nizām Alī had been directed had kept aloof at Hyderābād. He now arrived at Aurangābād and to put an end to the plots, demanded his own Kārbhārī Haidar Jang to be appointed Divān. This proposal would have put all powers into the hands of the French Commander. The enraged Nizām Alī invited Haidar Jang to a personal meeting and murdered him. He then flew to Burhānpūr and in the tumult that followed Sāh Navāz Khān was killed. The Peśvā used the occasion for seizing Sivneri the birth place of Sivājī.

Bussy was again the master of the situation. He made Basālat Jang the Divān of the Nizām and proposed to govern through him. But while Bussy was struggling to save Salābat Jang the English had fought and won Plāssey and conquered Bengāl De Lally, the new French Governor anxious to concentrate his troops for an attack on Madrās recalled Bussy and on 21st July 1758 the Frenchman who had bolstered up the Nizām's power left Hyderābād forever leaving a clear field for the Peśvā.

Immediately on Bussy's departure Nizām Alī, Salābat Jang's brother, returned to power and refused to carry out the terms of the treaty concluded only a year ago. He also refused to become the Peśvā's subordinate ally. The Peśvā therefore prepared for war and in 1759 November seized the strong fort of Ahmadnagar. This act led to an open rupture between the two powers. Early in December 1759 the war began in earnest. Sadāśiv Rāv Bhāu the Peśva's cousin, brought to the field forty thousand cavalry, five thousand infantry trained under Ibrāhim Gārdī and a fine pack of artillery. The Moghals were attacked near Udgir on 3rd February 1760 and routed. Nizām Alī now surrendered to the Peśvā territory worth sixty lakhs of Rupees and the great forts of Asirgad, Daulatābād, Bijāpūr and Burhānpūr. The power of the Nizām was completely broken and the Peśvā confidently expected to make the rest of the Nīzām's country part of his dominion within two or three years. The districts of Khāndes', Nāśik, Ahmadnagar, Solāpūr and Bijāpūr formed the new addition to his already extensive Government².

CHAPTER 4.

Expansion of Maratha Power. Balaji Baji Rav War against the Nizām

¹ Rajwade I pp. 73-118 and III pp. 491-500,

² The account of these transactions is based on S.P.D. I and 25 and letters in Rajwade Vol. I, Nos. 165 and 166 are an epitome of the entire episode.

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. Delhi Affairs.

While the Peśvā was reducing the Deccan, a crisis was brewing in Hindustan. The death of the Moghal Emperor, Muhammad Sāh, in 1748 marked a further stage in the disintegration of the already decaying Moghal empire. The Deccan, Gujarāt, Māļvā, Bundelkhand and Bengal had passed outside the orbit of the empire within the life-time of the emperor; the Rajputs gave but nominal allegiance to the shadow figure at Delhi; the subhedars of Oudh and Allāhābād were assuming independent authority and the frontier province of the Puñjāb, on the death of its able governor Zakāriyā Khān in 1745, became the scene of anarchy and misrule. The state of affairs was too tempting not to excite the cupidity of India's north-western neighbour, Afghanistan. Ahmad Sah Abdali, the ablest general of Nädir Säh had recently consolidated his hold over this region and he now thought of emulating the example of his late master. He invaded the Puñjāb in the early months of 1748. marched up to Lahore and obtained from that capital immense wealth and military stores. Despite a reverse at the battle of Mānpūr in March 1748, Ahmad Sāh renewed his advance next year and in February 1750 obtained from the subhedar the revenues of the four districts of West Punjāb-Siālkot, Pasrur, Gujarāt and Aurangābād - formerly ceded to Nādir Sāh. In 1752 Abdālī again invaded the Puñjāb on the pretext that the tribute promised to him had fallen into arrears, seized the Subhās of Lāhore and Multān and sent an envoy to Delhi to get the agreement ratified. Ahmad Sāh who had succeeded his father in 1748, was a dull-witted raw youth of 22 whose education in war and administration had been totally neglected. He pursued pleasure, leaving the administration of state affairs to his Vazir Safdar Jang and to his Superintendent of harem, Javid Khān. The government became weak and degraded and the emperor never inquired about the realm, the soldiery or the treasury. lavid Khān was a low born upstart actuated by a vulgar greed of wealth and Safdar Jang, the Vazir, had neither the wisdom of a diplomat nor the political foresight of a great leader. The Moghal Court altogether lacked any stability or steadying influence. When Ahmad Sāh Abdālī threatened to march on the capital the frightened monarch immediately set his seal to the cession of West Puñjāb to the Afghan. At the same time he asked his Vazir to take measures to meet the Afghan menace.

The Afghān advance was a greater threat to the ambitious schemes of the *Peśvā* than to the security of the insecure empire. The *Peśvā's* father, the great Bājī Rāv had talked of establishing a Hindu dominion in India and had steadily worked towards his objective. The friendship of Savāi Jai Singh and Khān Daurān had facilitated Marāṭhā progress beyond the Narmadā and had secured them powerful allies at the imperial Court. Bāļājī Rāv had avowed his intention of following in his father's footsteps. The leaders of

the Hindustani party whom Bājī Rāv had befriended were all dead and Nizām-ul-mulk and Qamruddin Khān had once more established the ascendancy of the anti-Marāṭhā Turānī faction at the Moghal court. By the mishandling of the succession dispute of the Jaipūr State the friendship of the Kachvās House had changed into hatred for the Marāṭhās and contempt for their mercenary attitude. Marāṭhā position in Hindustan was deteriorating and the Afghān now threatened the entire fabric of the Marāṭhā scheme of things. The Peśvā's moves and countermoves in the decade from 1750 to 1760 have to be judged against this political background.

The Marāṭhā intervention in the succession dispute of Jaipūr has been narrated up to 1750 December. After patching up a treaty with Mādho Singh, Jayāppā Sinde and Malhār Rāv Holkar advanced into the Doab against the Rohillas at the invitation of Safdar Jang. The Rohillas had entrenched themselves in the upper Doab between Delhi and Oudh and had become a thorn in the side of the Vazir Their lawless and turbulent habits fitted with the times and they were defying imperial authority and ravaging the Vazir's territory. The incursions of their compatriot, Ahmad Sah Abdali, had made them audacious; they advanced into the Navāb Vazir's province, killed his deputy Naval Rai and routed the Vazir when he advanced against them (13 September 1750, battle of Rām Catauni). The Navāb Vazir then obtained the aid of the Marāthās and in a campaign that lasted about a year chased the Rohillas out of his Subhā. In the close-fought battles of Aligad (20 March 1751) and of Fatehgad (17 April 1751), the Marāthā forces covered themselves with glory breaking the Rohilla opposition and scattering it to four winds. Fighting was resumed after the monsoon and the Pathans were once more repulsed and retreated to the Tarāi jungles. Here the jungle fever and constant attacks of the Marathas decimated their ranks.

While the campaign against the Rohillas was in the concluding stages, news arrived of the advance of the Abdali in the Punjab followed by frantic messages from the emperor to bring the Marathas to oppose the Afghan threat. The Navab then concluded a defence pact with the Maratha captains Sinde and Holkar (April 1752). The defence of the empire against external foes and internal enemics was entrusted to the Peśvā. For his armed support the Pcśvä was to receive fifty lakhs of rupees in cash out of which thirty lakhs was the price for keeping the Abdali out. The cauth of the Puñjāb and Sind was likewise ceded to the Peśvā for military expenses. He was to be appointed subhedar of Agra and Aimer and entitled to the remuneration of the posts. The pact thus put the entire resources of the empire at the disposal of the Peśvā in return for which he pledged himself to meet aggression at any point. The Marāṭhā objective of establishing suzerainty over the whole Indian continent seemed to have realized itself.

CHAPTER 4.

Expansion of Maratha Power. Balaji Baji Rav. Delhi Affairs.

Expansion of Maratha Power, BALAJI BAJI RAV, Delhi Affairs, The situation however was not as simple as it appeared on a superficial view. The empire for the defence of which the $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ had pledged himself was a shadow of its former glory. It had no resources, no army, and was riven by internecine disputes. The Abdālī was sitting astride the frontier province and menaced the safety of the empire. The situation demanded constant pressure of force and a continuity of policy. If the $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ was to interpose successfully, he had to make up his mind about his friends at the Court and then support them unflinchingly.

The defence pact of 1752 put heavy responsibilities on the *Peśvā*. He could levy *cauth* on the Puñjāb and Sind only by ejecting the Abdālī garrison and exercise his authority at Āgrā and Ajmer by subduing the refractory Jāts and Rajputs*.

On arriving near Delhi, Sinde and Holkar found they could not obtain the promised subsidy and started plundering the country round the capital for their provisions. A great terror hung over the capital. Malhār Rāv Holkar then entered into negotiations with Javid Khān and in return for Rs. thirty lakhs to be paid by Gāzi-ud-din, the new nominee for the Subhedār of the Deccan, agreed to retire. Safdar Jang who had invited the Marāṭhā chiefs had been completely overruled and his authority flouted and Holkar had unwittingly become the instrument for his discomfiture.

Sinde and Holkar retired to the Deccan in May 1752 leaving a small contingent at Delhi for the protection of the Emperor. The position of the Navāb Vazir deteriorated after the departure of the Marāṭhā force. He became unpopular with the Emperor and was dismissed from his post on 13 May 1753. The Peśvā's Vakil at Delhi joined the enemies of the Vazir who was driven out of the capital in November. The revolution at Delhi threw the sole authority into the hands of Imād-ul-mulk or Gāzi-ud-din II, a boy of eighteen and the Peśvā on the advice of his Vakil at Delhi decided to leave the initiative to this young villain and support him in all his iniquitous dealings.

At the outbreak of the civil war between the Emperor and Safdar Jang, the former had sent an appeal for help to the *Peśvā*. His *Vakil* at the capital had also written to him to despatch a strong force northward to watch the situation. In response to the appeal the *Peśvā* sent a considerable force under the nominal command of his brother Raghunāth Rāv then aged 17. Jayāppā Sinde and Malhār Rāv Hoļkar accompanied Rāghobā and the army crossed the Narmadā in September 1753, entered Rajputānā by way of Mukundrā pass, levied tribute on the Rajput states and then entering Jaipūr territory secured arrears from Mādho Singh and other chieftains. The emperor's war with Safdar Jang had ended

^{*} The pact did not become a scrap as remarked by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his 'Fall of the Mughal Empire' Vol. II, and accepted by Sardesai. It remained quite a live document as contended by Shejwalkar. See S.P.D. XXI 53, 55.

by this time, but during its last phases Ahmad Sah had developed intense dislike for his new Bakhsi, the over bearing Imad-ul mulk and both sides now courted the favour of the Marāṭhā chiefs Ahmad Sāh wrote to Rāghobā to dissociate from Imād-ul-mulk and follow the advice of his Vazir. But Imad had guessed properly the weakness of the Marāṭhās. He bribed Holkar and lured his nominal chief by wild promises of rich rewards. He visited the Marāthā chiefs in their camp and persuaded them to punish Suraj Mal Jāt for supporting the ex-vazir's cause. Raghunāth demanded from Suraj Mal a tribute of two crores of rupees. Jāt pleaded his inability to pay this huge sum and shut himself up in the fort of Kumbher. Rāghobā laid siege to the place but in the absence of heavy guns could make no effect on the place. Holkar's son Khanderav who had gone to a battery in a state of drunkenness was killed and the father vowed terrible vengeance against the Jat. Malhar Rav asked Imad to send him artillery from Delhi, but this the Emperor disallowed acting on the advice of his Vazir Sam Sām-ud-daulā. On the contrary he left Delhi and marched southward to organize a confederacy against Imad and the Marāṭhās. Hardly had he arrived at Sikandarābād when news arrived of the Marāthās having concluded peace with the Jāt Rājā (17 May) and of their marching to Delhi. Ahmad Sah immediately abandoned his camp and fled to the capital. A column of the light Marāthā horse which had obtained information of the Emperor's movements made rapid marches and surrounded the camp on the night of 26th May. Everything was in a utter state of confusion and terror. The Royal family fell into the hands of the Marāthās as also the military stores and camp equipage. Malhar Rav Holkar visited the royal prisoners the next day, comforted them and restored order. With Imad he then proceeded to the capital and was followed by the main army under Raghunāth Rāv. On 1st June (1754) Ahmad Sāh was deposed and made way for another puppet Alamgir II. Imad-ul-mulk became the new vazir and promised his Marāthā masters eighty-two lakhs of rupees as the price for putting him in power. Another revolution had been effected at Delhi making the Marāthās the supreme arbiters of the empire. But they had been unable to carry with them either the general good-will or obtain co-operation of any influential party at the court. Their only ally was an upstart young lad of the most unscrupulous and ferocious nature. Never were great designs attempted with more despicable means.

Raghunāth Rāv next set himself to realize the tribute promised by the new vazir. This proved an impossible task and even after five months stay at the capital only about ten lakhs of rupees came into Marāthā hands¹. In December Raghunāth Rāv marched away to Gad Mukteśvar, settled contributions from the Rohillās

CHAPTER 4.

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. Delhi Affairs.

Expansion of Maratha Power. BALAJI BAJI RAV. Delhi Affairs and then moved into Rajputānā. He arrived at Puşkar on 3rd March (1755), followed by Malhar Rav Holkar levying tribute from the Gujar and Balue landlords of Ravari and Pataudi. All the while the Peśvā was urging his chiefs to screw out more and more money from the new conquests and relieve him of his debts. Raghunāth Rāv offered to go to the relief of Jayāppā Sinde who was then besieging Bijay Singh in Nāgore, but was informed it was not necessary. Rāghobā then visited Gvālior recently seized from the Jāt chief of Gohad and returned to Poonā in August 1755. His two years campaigning and his unholy alliance with Imad-ul-mulk had brought on humiliation on the royal family and alienated Muslim sympathies from the Peśva's cause. His unsuccessful attack on the Jat Raja at Kumbher exposed the weakness of Marāṭhā army and the Sinde's interference in the succession dispute of Mārvāḍ further embittered the Rajputs against the Marāṭhās. The recovery of the lost provinces of Puñjāb and Kābul was never so much as mentioned and the grand army allowed itself to be made an engine of oppression plundering defenceless villages and levying tribute on petty chieftains. The respect for the Marāthā name became a thing of the past and they came to be detested everywhere for their rapacity.

Sinde's campaign against Mārvad did not progress according to expectations Bijay Singh's cause was popular with his compatriots and Maratha intervention in behalf of the incompetent Ram Singh rallied the Marvadis to the Jodhpur standard. However the first round of the struggle went in favour of the Marathas. Since advanced into Märväd after the siege of Kumbher, captured Mertä on 15th August and advanced on Nagore 70 miles north of Merta. The Peśvā did not want Sinde's force to be entangled in a protracted struggle with the brave Rathods while more lucrative undertakings waited for it at Delhi. He advised Jayappa to patch up a treaty with Bijay Singh and go to Hindustan to help him cure the debt malady that was eating into his vitals like consump-But Jayappa was obsessed with the idea of winning Marvad for Rām Singh and would not listen to his master's advice. Ajmer was captured on 21st February 1755 and Jhalore where the hereditary hoards of the Jodhpur Rājā were deposited, was occupied. Jodhpur was invested and Sinde felt confident of concluding the campaign successfully. Bijay Singh however fought back stubbornly at Nagore, and driven to the last extremity by the privations suffered by his army, had Jayappa murdered in his camp (24 July 1755). The crime however, did not benefit Bijay Singh Sinde's brother Dattājī acted with vigour. While keeping his grip on Nagore he defeated reinforcements coming to the relief of the Rathod chief. The Peśva sent succour and the Rathod found themselves outnumbered and altogether helpless. Bijay Singh agreed to pay a fine of fifty lakhs of rupees and surrender half his kingdom to his cousin, besides ceding Ajmer and the surrounding district to Sinde in full sovereignly and in February 1756 the protracted contest came to an end.

Rāghobā had reached Pooṇā in August 1755 and Sinde followed him next April. Imad-ul-mulk found himself in sole command at Delhi untrammelled by his adversaries or his supporters. He now directed his exuberant energies to the conquest of the Punjab. BALAH BAH RAV. Mughlani Begum, the widow of Mir Mannu, had, after the death of her husband in 1753, become the virtual ruler of the province and by her wild pranks had made the province a scene of anarchy and disorder and the Afghan captains of her army were scheming and plotting against her. On the invitation of the Begum to aid her, Imad entered the province, seized the Begum and appointed his own nominee at the head of the province.

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Imad's triumph however proved short-lived. He had roused the wrath of the Afghan chief without the means of meeting his challenge. A force from Peśävar wrested Lähore from the Vazir's deputy in October and this was followed by the Afghan King in person in November demanding satisfaction for the unprovoked attack on his authority. Ahmad Sah arrived at Lahore on 20th December and appeared before Delhi on 23rd January (1757). He demanded two crores of rupees as indemnity, the hand of the Emperor's daughter, and all the territory west of Sarhind as the condition of his going back. The Emperor and his Vazir powerless to fight and powerless to raise the ransom, sent piteous messages making abject surrender and pleading their inability to meet the demand. Early on 28th January the city was surrounded and Abdālī entered the walls ordering a general spoliation of the Moghal capital. None was spared: Muslims and Hindus, rich and poor, were subjected to all kinds of inhuman torture to make them divulge their secret hoards and deliver them to the conqueror. Mansions of Moghal noblemen were dug up for treasure. Many took poison being unable to meet the extortionate demands and many died of wounds inflicted on them by the Afghan soldiery. Then the Sah marched southwards plundering the villages and slaying the inhabitants. Mathurā and Bṛndāban, two places of great sanctity to the Hindus and containing many temples were put to the sword and thousands of inhabitants were massacred. Idols were broken and temples set on fire. Gokul was bravely defended by the Nāga Sanyāsis and then the invader beat back a hasty retreat on account of outbreak of cholera epidemic in his camp. Ahmad Sah carried away with him 12 crores of rupees in treasure and also claimed virgin tribute from the imperial Zenānā. His soldiers were likewise gorged with booty. -

The Peśva's main army had returned to the Deccan in August 1755 followed by Sinde in April 1756. The small contingent of Antājī Māņkeśvar could make little impression on the Pathān hordes and had retreated fighting. Govind Ballal, Naro Sankar and other revenue collectors safely kept south of the Cambal. A fresh army despatched by the Peśvā under his brother Rāghobā a tribute levying expedition arrived at Indore in February 1757 but

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was held up for want of funds. Rāghobā had no definite views and no plans. Holkar on whom the young Commander relied loved procrastination and delay. Envoys from Bijay Singh of Mārvād BALLAJI BAJI RAV arrived in the camp suggesting annulment of last year's settlement and undoing Sinde's work of the last year. Two months were spent in settling the Jaipur tribute and all this while the army lived on the country. Rāghobā with one eye glued to the north-west for news of the Abdali was pressing for Sinde's despatch to Hindustan. At the end of May the Maratha vanguard entered the Doab and recovered their posts, Etāvā, Sukohābād, Sikandarābād, Meerut from the agents of the Delhi Court acting under Najib Khān's instructions, Imād-ul-Mulk now joined his old friends and with Raghoba marched towards Delhi in the first week of August and began the investment of the capital.

> Delhi was then held by Najib Khan Rohilla who had risen high in the estimation of the Afghan King during his last incursion and at the time of retreat he had been left in supreme command at the capital. The Rohilla had always shown himself as the right hand man of the Abdali and had acted as his right-hand man. He represented the rallying point of all the elements at Delhi that were disaffected towards the Marāṭhās and his destruction suggested itself as the first objective of the new Maratha offensive. And yet when the Rohilla was surrounded and had little chance of escaping Malhar Rav Holkar came forward to intercede in his behalf and obtain him a pardon for his misdeeds. Najib Khān was allowed to depart with his troops and property. Rāghobā entered the capital with Imad-ul-Mulk while Najib went to his jagir and kept constantly inviting the Abdali to expel the Marathas from Delhi.

> At Delhi a new treaty as hollow as the earlier one was concluded by the Peśvä's representative with the Vazir by which the Peśvā was to receive one-half of the revenues of the entire empire consisting of 22 Subhās. The Marāṭhā army then re-entered the Doāb; while Rāghobā took a dip in the holy Gangā at Gad-Muktesvar his troops ranged over the northern Doāb seizing Rohillā outposts and levying tribute from Najib Khān's jāgir. The Yamunā was recrossed near Karnāl in January 1758 and Rāghobā then commenced his invasion of the Puñiab.

> At the time of his retirement from Hindustan Ahmad Sah had appointed his own son Taimur Sāh as Viceroy of Puñjāb and left with him an army of 10,000 Pathan soldiers under the command of Jahan Khan, one of his ablest soldiers. But the province which had become the scene of rapine and misrule over a long period was not going to be quelled into obedience by a small force of ten thousand. Mughlani Begum who had been cheated of the Subhedārī was ever creating trouble and Adinā Beg the Subhedar of Jalandar Doab, refused to bend his knee before the new viceroy. In the Sikhs they both found a useful instrument

to overturn the Pathan rule. The Sikhs rose in rebellion on all sides and Adina Beg who had nominally accepted Pathan suzerainty entered into active co-operation with the rebels and defeated the Pathān troops sent against him. Fearing retaliation from the BALAJI BAJI RAV. Abdālī the Beg opened negotiation with the Marāthā Commander camping at Delhi and called him to his aid. The prospects of expelling the Abdali power from the Punjab and adding the frontier province to the Maratha empire was too tempting to be brushed aside. Sarhind where Ahmad Sāh had posted Abdul Samad Khān was reduced with the greatest ease by the combined Marāthā -Sikh army which then marched on Lähore. Taimur Sah would not think of defence. His father was in trouble in Khorasan and no relief could be expected from that quarter. Taimur abandoned the city on 10th April. Next day the Maratha vanguard entered and pressed the pursuit of the flying army. They attacked the Pathans 36 miles north-west of Lahore and dispersed them, Taimur escaping with difficulty with only his Durrani clansmen. The deep flowing Cinab stopped further pursuit.

There was wild exultation in Mahārāstra over the conquest of the Puñiāb. Rāghobā in a tone of vaingloriousness spoke of extending his conquests to Kābul and Kandahār, former parts of the Moghal empire. The Marāṭhā horse had reached the bank of the Indus and quenched its thirst in its waters. The Maratha dream of extending Hindu dominion over the whole of India appeared to have fulfilled itself. But Marāthā position in the Punjāb was essentially weak. The occupation of the province based on Delhi where there was little support for the Maratha cause was tactically a blunder. Marāthā detachments scattered over the Punjāb, the **Doāb** and Agrā had no strong base from which to draw sustenance. The Rajputs were hostile and the Jat zamindars defied Maratha armies from behind their forts. Ahmad Sāh Abdālī looked on the province of the Punjab as a necessary adjunct to his barren Kingdom of Kābul and the seizure of the province was a direct challenge to him to defend his Indian conquests. A war of retaliation by the Pathan conqueror backed by the war-like tribes of the Northwest frontier was inevitable. Only a well-equipped army strongly placed in the Puñjab could meet the challenge and hold down the turbulent people.

Such an army was not forthcoming. Rāghobā remained at Lähore for a month and then accompanied by Malhar Rav Holkar marched back placing all authority in the hands of Adina Beg who promised an annual tribute of 75 lakhs of rupees for the province. Rāghobā reached Delhi in June and moving through Rajputānā and Māļvā arrived at Poonā in September 1758. Dattājī Sinde with his nephew was now despatched to the north. He was asked to deal firmly with Vazir Gāzi-ud-din who was backward in the matter of payment of subsidy, break Najib Khān Rohilla's power, reduce Puñjāb to order and then march eastward to levy tribute on Bihār and Bengāl. Employment of large forces both in Deccan

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and in Hindustan had piled the Peśvā's debts: Rāghobā's expeditions had been financially failures and Sinde had been specially asked to take a strong line in the levy of tribute and send the BALAJI BAJI RAV. Peśvā at least a crore of rupees.

> Sinde's army under Jankoji reached Rajputānā in the middle of 1758. It operated there for about four months raising tribute from Mārvad, Jaipūr, Kotā, Sāhpurā and other Rajput principalities. At the behest of Raghunath Rav who was going south and of the Peśvā, Sinde turned towards Delhi. Dattājī Sinde in the meanwhile joined his nephew and the two arrived near the capital on 26 December. The vazir was called upon to pay the arrears and after the city had been invested for some time an agreement was reached as to the amount to be paid and on 1st February Dattājī commenced his march towards the Punjab. He reached Machivara on the eastern bank of the Sutlej and there Adina Beg's son came and paid him a part of the tribute for the province. On his advice Sābājī Sinde was posted at Lāhore with ten thousand horse and Dattājī turned back to deal with the hostile Najib Khān and effect a conquest of Bihar and Bengal.

> Najib Khān's hostility to the Marāthās and his active sympathy for the Afghan King was well-known. He was the centre of disaffection and every Marāthā chief including the incompetent Raghunāth Rāv had pointed out the imperative need of crushing the Rohilla and reduce him to impotence. Yet Dattaji felt he could keep the Rohilla in his hands, make use of him for the invasion of the eastern province and then destroy him at leisure. He called him to a conference, but when Naiib refused to fall in with the Marāṭhā plan, proceeded to attack him. The Rohillā took post at Sukratāl, a defensible position on the Gangā and defied Sinde's force for about six months. He secretly organised a conspiracy of the Pathān chiefs of Rohilkhand, made friendly overtures to Sujā-ud-daula and invited Abdālī to Delhi to drive away the Marathas.

> Abdalī did not need any inducement. The expulsion of his son by the Marathas had enraged Ahmad Sah and he was determined to settle issues with the Marāthās - He made huge preparations, crossed the Indus in the autumn of 1759 and struck his first blow at Lähore. Säbäji Sinde withdrew hastily but several detachments dispersed throughout the Puñjāb were taken by surprise and suffered heavy losses. Five hundred troopers stripped of all their clothing arrived in Sinde's camp on 23rd November and Sinde knew that a great disaster had befallen his army in the Pañjāb. He immediately beat a hasty retreat and fell back on Delhi. In the meanwhile Abdālī advanced to Sarhind on 27th November, brushed aside a Marāthā column that barred his way and crossed the Yamunā and joined Najib Khān. The Rohilla chiefs now joined the Pathān King and on 10th January the entire army began crossing the Yamunā at the Barāri ghāt ten miles north of Delhi, Dattājī had posted pickets all along the river fords; when reports

reached him of the enemy crossing he rushed to the scene and in an attempt to drive back the enemy was himself shot down. The death of the Commander caused panic in Sinde's army which dispersed in the greatest disorder.

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Sinde's dispersed force was joined by Malhar Rav Holkar near Kotputli. The two attempted to wear out the Pathan by their guerilla tactics, but Abdālī was too wary a foe to be intimidated by the futile tactics of Holkar. He surprised him near Sikandarābād on 4th March and routed his troops.

The news of the calamities reached the *Peśvā* at Ahmadnagar where he was celebrating the great victory of Udgir. Sinde's death and the rout of the armies of Sinde and Holkar had shown the futility of the usual guerilla tactics against the hardy Pathans of the hills, had wiped out all the Peśva's gain in the north and set at nought his grandiose scheme of bringing the whole of the continent under the Bhagva-Zenda. The Peśva realized that the Abdālī was too serious a menace to be treated lightly. After a week's deliberation at Patdur it was decided that Sadasiv Rav. the Peśva's cousin, who had shown himself more resolute and more businesslike, should command the new army and oppose the Abdali with new tactics and artillery adopted from the French. From Patdur Sadaśiv Rav Bhau and the Peśva's son Viśvas Rav, set out on 16th March 1760 with Balvant Rav Mehendale, Samser Bahādūr, Vitthal Sivdev Vincurkar, Nānā Purandare and Damājī Gāikvād, twenty-two thousand picked cavalry and eight thousand disciplined infantry and a strong corps of artillery under Ibrāhim Khan Gardi. Bhau reached Gvalior on 2nd June. About 18th June Malhar Rav Holkar saw him and he soon brought Surai Mal lat to discuss with the Bhau the plans for the conduct of the campaign. Holkar and the Jat stuck to the old style of warfare with the friendly Jat Country as the base from which the enemy was to be harassed. But the Bhau had more faith in his artillery and he brushed aside the counsel of Holkar as one arising out of defeat and despair. Bhau had planned to attack Abdali in the upper Doāb and drive a wedge between Delhi and Oudh. But this was foiled by the heavy rains that started that year, brought on floods and cut Delhi off from the Doab. About 14 July the Bhau arrived at Agra and on 2nd August stormed Delhi. The easy success of the Marathas caused consternation among enemy ranks and some of the Muslim chieftains opened negotiations with the Bhau. But Najib Khān Rohillā was steadfast in his aim and he would not allow Abdālī Sāh to negotiate peace unless the Marāthās were punished.

Both sides were well balanced and to avoid the arbitration of arms Sujā made certain proposals. Bhāu not only entertained them but expressed his willingness to appoint Sujā Vazir at Delhi if he agreed to abandon the Abdālī's party. This gave offence to Suraj Mal Jāṭ who had already suggested to be put in possession of the capital and on the next day the Jāṭ conṭingent left the

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Marāṭhā camp. The Rajputs were sitting on the fence and refused to be drawn in the struggle. The Bhāu was thus left without a friend in Hindustan.

The big Marāṭhā army had advanced far beyond its base and was finding it difficult to obtain provisions. As the river Yamunā was in spate no early decision of arms could be obtained and Bhāu thought of advancing to Kuñjpurā, a half way house between Sarhind and Koil where the Sāh was encamping and cutting off the Sāh's line of communications. He marched north, Kuñjpurā was occupied on 16th October and the Bhāu then moved to Kurukṣetra to call in Alā Singh Jāṭ and raise the Sikhs.

But before his plans had matured Abdālī crossed the Yamunā at Bāgpat and set astride the Bhāu's communications southward. The Marāṭhā Commander entrenched himself at Pānipat and ordered his subordinates in the Doāb to harass the enemy's rear and prevent supplies reaching him. Here the Abdālī's light cavalry proved itself far superior to the Marāṭhās. They seized one by one the Marāṭhā outposts in the Doāb, made it impossible for Marāṭhā foragers to move out and destroyed Govind Pant Bundelā's detachment on 17 December 1760. The Bhāu's food supply was exhausted, his horses and gun — cattle were dying of hunger in hundreds and no succour could be expected from any quarter. Life became intolerable in the Marāṭhā camp and it was then decided to move out and attack the enemy. Battle was joined on 14th January; though the Marāṭhās fought well, the cool-headed leadership of Ahmad Sāh Abdālī won the day. The entire Marāṭhā army was destroyed only a few thousands escaping. All the artillery and camp equipage fell in the enemy's hands.

The battle of Pānipat was a turning point in the fortunes of the Marāṭhās and the consequences of the defeat were far-reaching. It stemmed Marāṭhā advance in Hindustan; the Puñjāb, Bengāl and Bihār were permanently lost to the Marāṭhās. The disaster killed the Peśvā and brought on the scene Raghunāth Rāv, the most infamous character in Marāṭhā history.

CHAPTER 5*

MARATHA POWER

(1761 - 1818)

CHAPTER 5.

Maratha Power (1761—1818).

Peshva Madhav Rav.

The battle of Panipat is the great dividing line of Marāṭhā history. "Never was a defeat more complete", writes Elphinstone, "and never was there a calamity that diffused so much consternation. Grief and despondency spread over the whole Marāṭhā people: all felt the destruction of the army as a death-blow to their national greatness". "Most disastrous of all was the blow to the prestige of the Peśvā, the one unifying influence in Marāṭhā Government. The weakened power of the Peśvā paved the way to English interference in Marāṭhā affairs. Pānipat in other words was the prelude to Assaye and Kirkee."

The consequence of the disaster did not lie concealed from friends or foes alike. For the grand army that Bhāu led against the Abdālī the Deccan had been denuded of all its best troops. What remained behind were second-line troops and country militia. When the grand army was annihilated Marāṭhā domination in the north was no longer tenable. The northern potentates refused to respect their Marāṭhā masters. The Jāṭs, the Rajputs, the Bundelās, the Rohillās revolted against Marāṭhā rule, seized their outposts and drove out Marāṭhā garrisons. Najib-ud-daulā marched on Delhi, took over the administration in his hands; the Rajputs talked of driving the Marāṭhās south of the Narmadā. Marāṭhā dominion in the north became aflame with revolts of petty rulers, risings of local militias and disturbances of hill tribes and the next few years witnessed the shrinkage of Marāṭhā frontiers and withdrawing of their rule south of the Cambal.²

Bāļājī Rāv was aware of these coming consequences. Reports of revolts in Bundelkhand and Māļvā had already reached him. He likewise knew that his southern neighbours were watching the struggle in Hindustan with no friendly eye and when therefore the

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

¹ Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, p. 425.

Marāthyāńcyā Itihāsāci Sādhane, (Rajwade), I, 285, 288, 293, 297-99; S. P. D., vol. XXIX, pp. 5-50.

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Maratha Power (1761–1818).

PESHVA

MADHAV RAV.

Nizām Ali's

attack on

Poonā.

news of the disaster at Pānipat reached him, the blow dazed him and broke his heart. From Māļvā he returned to his capital and died mourning for his son and cousin.

Bāļājī Rāv was succeeded in the Peścāship by his second son, Mādhav Rāv¹ a young boy of sixteen years. The Peśvā's brother, Raghunath Rav was now the sole elderly survivor in the family. Void of all qualities of leadership except boundless ambition, mean and selfish, this man of weak and vacillating mind posed now as the saviour of the Maratha cause and tried to seize all authority in his hands. But few around the court had faith in his abilities and everybody suspected his intentions. The Peśva's mother, Gopika Bai, a masterful lady resented that her son should be ignored in the conduct of administration and urged him to take his rightful place. When these family dissensions came to be known, the Nizām's Court decided to profit by them. Nizām Ali, brother of Salābat Jang, who had attained a predominant position at Hyderābād, occupied the Răicūr Doāb ceded to the Peśvā last year and marched upon Poona desolating the country and destroying Hindu temples in his line of march. The Peśvā called to his aid his chiefs and halted the enemy's advance near Uruli within less than one day's march of Poonā. Nizām Ali was surrounded and some of his subordinates went over to the Marathas. Raghunath Ray who guided the affairs of his young nephew, came to terms with the Nizām by handing over to him territory yielding an annual revenue of twenty-seven lakhs (Jan. 1762). It was suspected that the gesture was meant to win Nizām Ali's friendship in a future contest with the nephew.

Battle of Rākṣasbhuvan.

In the course of the year Mādhay Rāy decided to assert his rights. The uncle and the nephew disagreed violently in their march southward after Nizām Ali's discomfiture. Rāghobā in resentment resigned his office as regent and retired to Poona. He then came out with a demand for a separate jāgir worth ten lakhs of rupees and five important fortresses. When this was opposed Raghoba withdrew to the neighbourhood of Nāśik, called together his partisans and prepared for war, secretly obtaining the support of Janoji Bhosle and Nizām Ali. The two opposing armies fought a series of actions between 7th and 12th November and Madhay Ray despairing of successful resistance, gave himself up into his uncle's power. Nizām Ali was generously rewarded with a territory yielding an annual revenue of Rs. fifty lakhs including the fort of Daulatābād for the aid given to Rāghobā. The terms of the treaty were, however never implemented. The Peśva's partisans were removed from office and Raghoba returned to the regency with Sakhārām Bāpū as his Divān. But he was not destined to remain

¹ The main source for the career of Mādhav Rāv Feśvā is Aithāsik Lekha Saṅgraha, vols. 1-4, edited by Khare. These should be supplemented by Selection from Peśvā Daftar, vols. 19, 29, 37, and 38 and Persian Calendars, vols. 1-4, Marāṭhyāñeyā Itihāsāci Sādhane, Ed., Rajwade, vols. 1, 12, 13, 14, Hingņe Daftar and vol. 1, Purandare Daftar.

in power for long. In the attempt to reward his partisans, Rāghobā incurred the enmity of the Patvardhans, the Pratinidhi and other Marāthā chieftains. The Nizām whose appetite had been whetted by easy gains of his earlier alliance decided again to fish in troubled waters. His Divān Vitthal Sundar invited the disgruntled Marāthā element to join his master the Nizām and with this formidable accession he denounced the former treaties and gave out his intention of subverting the Peśva's regency by that of Janoji Bhosle; he peremptorily called on the Peśvā to deliver all territory east of the Bhimā and accept his advisers in the ministry. The Nizām sacked Poonā in May 1763. The Nizām's interference in Marāthā affairs temporarily closed the rift between uncle and nephew. Acting on the advice of Malhar Ray Holkar, a Maratha army rayaged the Nizām's territory while, Marāthā diplomacy lured back his new Marāthā allies. As the Moghal army was crossing the Godāvarī in its march towards Aurangabad, it was attacked and decisively defeated at Rākṣasbhuvan (10th August 1763). Young Mādhav Rav was chiefly instrumental in securing this signal victory and the result was that he soon took the reins of administration in his hands and retained them for the next nine years of his career. Nizām Ali threw the blames of his late errors on Vitthal Sundar and implored pardon. He gave up his vaunted claims, confirmed cessions made at Udgir in 1760 and added to them territory worth twenty-two lakhs. The treaty remained in operation for the next thirty-two years. The brilliant victory won by the Peścā went a long way in restoring Marāthā prestige.

The next problem the Peśvā had to grapple with was the advance of Haidar Ali of Mysore in the south Marāṭhā country. Haidar to start with was a petty officer in Mysorc infantry. But his organizing capacity, his military discipline, his daring and his genius for intrigue brought him to the notice of Nanjraj, the Mysore Commander, and in 1755 he became the governor of Dindigal. In 1759 he actively opposed Marāthā advance in Mysore and wrested back the territory ceded a year earlier. By 1761 Haidar Ali became the head of the administration and seized supreme authority. As Marāthā power waned, Haider Ali's grew in proportion. He occupied old Marāṭhā territory in Karnāṭak, forced the Navābs and Hindu chieftains to pay him tribute, and conquered the kingdoms of Gooty and Bednore; in 1763 Marāthā districts north of the Tungabhadrā were overrun, Dhārvār was captured and Haidar now menaced the entire Marāṭhā country south of the Kṛṣṇā. There was no choice for the Peśvā but to fight back this threat on his southern frontier. Haidar Ali however was too powerful a foe to be checked by the Peśvā's subordinate feudatories and for the next eight years the Peśva's entire resources were directed to reduce if not exterminate Haidar's power. The fighting became bitter on account of the novel method pursued by the Mysore ruler. He knew that his small force was no match for the numerous Maratha horse and he would not venture out in the open. Sheltering behind the woods in the western ghats, his infantry sallied forth at night to surprise

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Maratha Power (1761–1818), PESHVA MADHAV RAV Nizām Ali's attack on Poona Battle of Rākṣasbhuvan.

Haidar-Marāṭhā contest.

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contest

the enemy. Mādhav Rāv Peśvā met Haidar's wiles with great skill and tenacity and wore him out. While one Marāṭhā force would keep Haidar Ali immobilized, another would devastate the country, stop supplies reaching the enemy's camp and thus force him out of his wooded defences. At the end of eight years cam-Haidar-Marāthā paigning Haidar had lost half his kingdom and held the remaining half in fee to the *Peśvā*.

> The first Haidar-Marāthā campaign lasted from April 1764 to March 1765. Dhārvār was besieged and there was severe fighting at Rattehallī, Jadi Anavadi and Bednore in which Haidar was decisively beaten. He agreed to pay a tribute of thirty-two lakhs, restored to Murar Rav Ghorpade the fortress of Gooty and the surrounding districts and gave up all claims on Sāvanūr.

> The offensive against Haidar Ali was resumed towards the close of 1766. A strong army invaded Haidar's north-eastern districts. took Sirā, Hoskot and Madgiri and forced him to surrender all previous Marāthā conquests in Karnātak. But immediately the Peśvā's back was turned, Haidar resumed the territory he had granted by treaty, intrigued with the Peśvā's domestic rivals and withheld the amount of the tribute due from him. The next two years the Peśvā spent in settling with his uncle and Jānojī Bhosle, but he again invaded Mysore in 1770, laid waste Haidar's northwestern territory and advanced as far as Bangalore. Haidar clung to the forest belt of the western ghats, contending himself with destroying stray Marāṭhā detachments. The Marāṭhā army overran Guramkonda and Kolar districts and succeeded in reducing Bhairavdurg, Nandidurg, Kolār, Mulbagal and Nijgal. But the *Peśvā* could not press operations on account of failing health. In the next season Trimbak Ray Pethe who had taken the Peśva's place kept an army in the Mysore plains, surprised Haidar Ali at Cinkurali or Moti Talav (near Srirangpattam) and dispersed his force to four winds taking all its artillery and equipment, Peace was not concluded till 1772 July, the intervening period being marked with minor operations of devastating character. Haidar at last agreed to surrender all Sivājī's former conquests in Karnātak (Sirā, Hoskot, Balapur and Kolar) as also Guramkonda and to pay fifty lakhs in indemnity. Mysore was reduced to half its overgrown size. But on account of the death of the Peśvā in November and the commotions that followed these gains proved only temporary and Haidar was on the march once more.

North Indian politics.

We must now turn to affairs at Delhi. The defeat at Panipat left the Marathas in total eclipse in that quarter for some time. But no other power stepped in to assume the imperial role. Abdall who could have easily done so, limited his views to the possession of the Puñjāb and even this he could not retain long on account of Sikh opposition. The mounting Sikh pressure also made the situation of Najib Khān, Abdālī's nominee at Delhi, insecure. The lats-the peasantry of the Agra province-under their able rulers

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Sural Mal and Javahir Singh extended their rule as far north as Delhi and left Najib in control of only a small tract round the capital. The English in the meanwhile had won the battle of Plassey and Buxar, obtained the Divani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissā and with Sujā-ud-daulā as their subordinate ally, their frontiers now marched along the east bank of the Gangā. Mādho Singh of Jaipur organized a Rajput confederacy against the Marāthās and attempted to oust them from Mālvā, but after his defeat at Māngrol (1762) he relapsed into his usual somnolence. An expedition under Raghunāth Rāv sent in 1766 could achieve little for want of energy in the leader and discipline among his troops and failed even to curb the Rāṇā of Gohād. In 1769, after having reduced his domestic enemies to submission the Peśvā thought of rectifying Marāthā position in the North. He despatched his forces to Hindustan under Rāmcandra Ganeś and Visājī Kṛṣṇa who were later joined by Mahādji Sinde and Tukojī Hoļkar. These chiefs were asked to call to account the Jats, the Rohillas and others who had seized Marāthā conquests in Hindustan, restore the Emperor to his ancestral throne and regulate the imperial affairs in his name. In a great battle fought at Govardhan on 5th April 1770, the Jat king was defeated and his districts across the Yamuna were overrun. Najib Khān who was playing his usual game of duplicity tried to form a Jat-Rohilla alliance but his plans were discovered. Peace was granted to the Jat Rājā (September 1770) on his surrender of Maratha districts in the Doab and on agreeing to pay sixty-five lakhs of rupees for arrears of tribute. The army then attacked the Rohilla chiefs. The districts of Etava, Sukohabad and Kanoj were ravaged and the fort of Etava was seized. Hafiz Rahmat and Ahmad Khān Bangas then submitted and made peace (January 1771). सत्यमेव जयत

> Return of Sahā Ālam to capital.

In the meanwhile Najib Khān, the arch-enemy of the Marāṭhās, died on 31 October 1770 and it was decided to push towards the main objective of the campaign. Delhi was stormed in February 1771 and Sāh Ālam who had remained in exile for twelve years returned to the capital under Marāṭhā protection (Jan. 1772). The Marāṭhās then resumed the offensive against the Rohillā country. Timely death saved Najib from vengeance but others could not escape so lightly. His son Zabeṭā Khān was called upon to pay the customary nazarāṇā on succession and settle the accounts of the crown-lands held by him. On his refusal the Marāṭhā army headed by the Emperor marched into Rohilkhaṇḍ dispersed Zabeṭā Khān's levies in a great battle at Candi Ghāṭ. Najibābād the fortress which Najib had built for depositing his treasure, was razed to the ground. The Marāṭhā forces then spread all over the country exacting tribute from places large and small.

The Marāṭhā chiefs had the satisfaction of avenging their defeat at Pānipat and wiping out the disgrace of the disaster. But further operations were marred by serious differences among them. Sinde CHAPTER 5.

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and Holkar held divergent views on practically every issue and Rāmcandraa Ganeś was unable to decide between them. He was recalled by the Peśvā and Visājī Kṛṣṇa took his place. The English and Sujā-ud-daulā began inciting the Emperor and other Hindustani chiefs not to yield to Maratha demands. The Peśvā's health was failing and he was in no frame of mind to watch his subordinates and direct their activities. Sinde and Holkar who had differed violently on every detail of policy, would not consent to act together. Sinde parted company and marched away to Jaipur. Visājī Kṛṣṇa and Tukoji Holkar sent minatory messages to Sujā-uddaula for his perfidious conduct in the late negotiations and threatened to invade his country. Sujā, relying on English support, refused to knuckle under the threats and forced the Marāthās to give up the struggle. The Peśvā's Government distracted at home could not sustain its army in the north and Visājī Kṛṣṇa retired to the Deccan in 1774. The flood waters of Marāthā invasion subsided leaving the banks high and dry.

Death of Mādhav Rāv and consequences,

Peścā Mādhav Rāv died on 18th November 1772. A man of fine character he had a high conception of his duties as a ruler and did much to protect the weak against the strong, exterminate corruption in the State and hold the rule of the law. Under his resolute leadership Marāthā power showed considerable buoyancy. His entire career was spent in resisting the encroachments of the Nizām and of Haidar Ali and quelling the revolt of his uncle and he had little time to attend in person to the affairs of Hindustan. His authority over the great feudatories suffered a steady decline in consequence. These chieftains assumed a degree of independence in their dealings and followed policies which often were in marked divergence to those of the central government. Had the young Peśvä lived longer he might have succeeded in subduing his chiefs to their former dependence, but his premature death removed the possibility of restraining the growing disruption

Anglo-Maratha Conflict. This disunion in Marāthā politics becomes all the more glaring in the period from 1772 to 1802. After 1772, the most important event was the murder of Peśva Nārāyan Rāv who had succeeded Mādhav Rāv and the first Anglo-Marāṭhā conflict arising out of it. Mādhav Rāv on his death-bed made an appeal to his uncle to avoid family dissensions and be reconciled to his young nephew Nārāyan Rāv. But the appeal fell on deaf ears. Age had not withered Rāghobā's keenness about the Peśvāship and the harsh treatment meted out to him by the new Peśvā was not calculated to make him submissive. A conspiracy was formed by Rāghobā's partisans to release their patron from his confinement in the Peśvā's palace and put him on the Gādī. On 30th August (1773), the infantry Guards (Cārdis) surrounded the palace demanding their arrears, broke into the Peśvā's chamber and cut him

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up as he was imploring his uncle to save his life. Raghoba was privy to the secret design of seizing his nephew but denied complicity in his murder. The horrid act was however universally detested and roused against him popular resentment which expressed itself in the formation of the League of the Bārbhāis. The chief men at the Peśva's Court, Sakharam Bapu Bokil, Trimbak Rav Pethe, Nana Phadnis and others banded themselves into a confederacy to frustrate Rāghobā's ambition. By the end of the year the plot was ripe and the confederates raised the standard of revolt declaring Raghoba a murderer and usurper and calling upon all to withhold co-operation from him. Răghobă soon became a fugitive and in a desperate moment turned to the English of Bombay for armed aid to recover his Peśvāship. The Bombay Government, happy at the idea of extending its territory and of subordinating the Marāthā power to its own, immediately acceded, sent its own army to beat ministerial opposition and reinstate its ally in authority. Thus began the first Anglo-Marāthā War which was fought with bitterness on both sides and which strained the resources of both. It is not necessary to follow in detail the fortunes of the struggle as the same have been described in another chapter of this book. The Maratha State emerged from the struggle bruised but not broken and the treaty of Salbye concluded in May 1782, gave it a respite of twenty years to put its own house in order.

CHANGE IN MARATHA CONSTITUTION.

For the Marathas the permanent results of the war were anything but favourable. The eight years' warfare drained the Peśva's treasury as never before. The huge debts incurred by the ministry for war expenses threatened the Poona Court with bankruptcy. The minority of the Peśvā and the difficulties that surrounded him on all sides encouraged the feudatories to affect greater freedom. They began managing their lagirs as independent states owing but nominal allegiance to the Peśvā. Sinde, Holkar, Bhosle, Gāikyād though parts of an organic structure became in practice separate entities and each began to drift as he thought best. The disaster of Panipat administered the first serious blow to the Peśva's unifying authority. Rāghobā's rivalry for the Peśvāship, his revolt, the consequent civil war developing in the Anglo-Maratha Conflict hastened the process of dissolution. After 1782, though the Peśva's ceremonial precedence over his feudatories continued as before, he had little control over their internal affairs. His authority came to be limited to the provinces, directly held by him. The feudatories carried out his mandate or defied them as it suited their interests. The feudal tendency among the Marathas that had raised its head after Sivāji's death gathered momentum making the structure weak and vulnerable.

The Council of the Bārbhāis which at the beginning was formed to carry on the struggle against the usurper also underwent a change. Some of the members died in the interval of war, some

NANA-MAHADJI DIFFERENCES, CHAPTER 5.

Maratha Power (1761—1818). NANA-MAHADJI DIFFERENCES. went over to the enemy and some who faltered found themselves behind iron bars. Nānā Phadņis alone remained steadfast in his loyalty and his objective; with great patience, diplomatic skill and organizing capacity he had won the war and in the minority of the Peśvā came to occupy the first position in the Marāthā State. The war likewise brought to the forefront Mahādjī Sinde and enhanced his reputation as a great military leader. He had retired to Hindustan in the beginning of 1781, with the army, successfully fought back the British advance into Mālvā and concluded the treaty of Salbye which placed him in the position of a mediator between the Maratha State and the East India Company and added to his prestige. The policies of the Marāthā State came to be determined by Nana Phadnis in the south and Sinde in the North, both patriotic and firm in their loyalty to a common master. but working practically independent of each other. Both realized that the English were now their rivals for the sovereignty of India and their efforts must be directed to resist British aggression. Nānā's plan for this was to reduce the great Marāthā feudatories to a rigid subordination to the power of the Peśvā and then bring the neighbouring powers of Hyderābād and Mysore into a subsidiary alliance with the Maratha State to make a united stand against British advance. His attention was always rivetted on Poonā and the home country.1

Sinde's mind worked in a different way. He had witnessed the advance of the English from Calcutta to Kanoj within less than a quarter of a century. They were rushing in to fill the vacuum caused by the Marāthā eclipse at Pānipat. Mahādjī felt that unless the English were halted, they would obtain control over Delhi affairs and endanger the entire fabric of Marāṭhā power. North India as the centre of political gravity was to him more important than Deccan and he refused to subscribe to Nana's views and play a subordinate role to the Poona minister. The new army organized by him under the command of De Boigne enabled him to take control of imperial affairs and made him the executive head of Hindustan. His new army was distrusted and his imperial designs instead of being looked as fulfilment of Marāṭhā objective, were viewed with alarm by the Poona Ministry. They saw in them nothing but Sinde's attempt at self-aggrandisement.2 His rapid and growing successes in Hindustan roused Nānā's jealousy; the decade following the treaty of Sālbye is thus marked by a factious spirit between the two Marāthā leaders which unconsciously damaged Marāthā power and prestige.

RECOVERY IN DECCAN.

The tide of British invasion had been turned back, but in the interregnum of the war large parts of Marāṭhā territory had been seized by the neighbouring states of Hyderābād and Mysore. Nānā Phaḍṇis

¹ Poonā Residency Correspondence Series, vol. II, pp. 167-68.

² P. R. C. Series, vol. I, p. 374; P. R. C., vol. II, pp. 340-347.

now turned his diplomatic talents to the recovery of these districts. The Mysore ruler was the stronger of the two of the troublesome neighbours. He claimed these districts as the price of joining the alliance against the British and was incensed with the double dealing of the Maratha State when it concluded the treaty of Salbye without his acquiescence and he defied article 9 in the treaty which attempted to coerce him into peace. Haidar Ali died in December 1782, but his son Tipū Sultān pursued hostilities against the British with a degree of success and in 1784, March concluded peace at Mangalore, without Marāṭhā intervention. His success in war and diplomacy made Tipu look on the Marathas with great contempt and he thirsted to punish them for their treachery. When he found a Maratha army advancing against him under Haripant Phadke, he ravaged the Raicur Doab. Tipu's warlike activities and threats drew the Governments of Poona and Hyderabad closer. Nana Phadnis met the Nizām at Yādgir on 6th May 17841 and decided to prosecute joint measures against Mysore. Tipū's reaction to the pact was swift and decisive. He called on the Nizām to acknowledge himself as his vassal and cede to him the district of Bijāpūr. Nargund and Kittur, two Hindu states which enjoyed the special protection of the Peśva were overrun, the families of the chiefs were taken into captivity and treated with great harshness. Nana's hands were forced and a Marāthā army took the field against Tipū (March 1786). Badāmī and Gajendragad were reduced, but Tipū severely handled Haripant Phadke and the Patvardhans in several engagements and exposed the weakness of the Maratha army and its outworn tactics. He captured Adoni from the Nizām by a swift stroke and then turning upon Sāvanur reduced it in the teeth of strongest Marāṭhā

Tipū's fears proved but too true. Lord Cornwallis, who had arrived in India in 1786 to take charge of Company's affairs, had declared his intentions of eschewing all schemes of conquest or entanglements with native rulers. But Tipū's restless ambition, his embassies to Constantinople and Paris in 1787, his military activities confirmed the English in their attitude of vigilant suspicion. The British Residents at Hyderābād and Pooṇā were instructed to start negotiations for an alliance directed against Tipū. Nānā Phadṇis after much deliberation joined the alliance in the hope that the two antagonists (Tipū and the British), would exhaust themselves in mutual destruction and that the Marāthās would become

opposition. He seduced Tukoji Holkar and other Marāṭhā Chiefs with large bribes and Nānā was glad to end hostilities in 1787, when Tipū agreed to pay arrears of tribute and cede Badāmī, Nargund and Kittur. A British Resident had arrived in the Peśva's Court and the British army was being put in a state of preparedness. Tipū suspected the English becoming more friendly with the Marāṭhās and to avoid isolation granted the Pooṇā Court favourable terms.

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¹ For the treaty, see P. R. C., vol. IV, Appendix I.

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RECOVERY IN DECCAN

arbiters of future negotiations.\(^1\) Two Marāthā forces, one under Haripant Phadke and another under Parasurām Bhāu Patvardhan, cooperated and contributed materially to the success of the operations. Tipū was brought to bay before Srirangpattam in March 1792. Half of his kingdom was partitioned among the allies and a large indemnity was levied on him. But the outcome of the campaign was far from what the Poonā minister anticipated. The Marāthās instead of being arbiters came to occupy a secondary place and lost the initiative to the British.\(^2\)

SHINDE'S REGENCY.³

While Nana Phadnis was consolidating Maratha power in the Deccan, Mahādjī Sinde was following a similar course in Hindustan. Since the ratifications of the treaty of Salbye he had secured considerable advantages. Gvālior and Gohād had surrendered and as a result several of the minor chiefs returned to their allegiance as Marāthā tributaries. Sinde, while prosecuting these objects was watching the confusions and contentions in the imperial territory. Mirzā Najaf who held the regency after Marāthā departure from Delhi in 1773, died in 1782 and the Emperor's affairs fell in a state of utmost disorder. Sah Alam himself was an amiable person, but altogether weak and incapable of conducting his own affairs or of restraining his subordinates. The four lieutenants of Mirzā Najaf Khān quarrelled violently among themselves about the executive authority. Mirzā Safi and Afrāsiyāb were murdered by their rivals and the King invited Sinde to undertake the regency of his house and regulate his affairs. Major Brown, the Governor-General's special envoy, was in Delhi, since the end of 1783, plotting against the Marāthās and "working desperately to revive Hastings' abandoned plan of turning the Emperor into an English puppet", and Sinde by refusing would have played into the hands of his enemies. He therefore, met the Emperor on 15th November (1784), and assuming the robes of his new office, became the power behind the imperial throne.

But Sinde's new office was not a bed of roses. The king was a cipher; his kingdom was parcelled out among a number of turbulent Moghal chiefs who owned but a nominal allegiance to the throne; the Sikhs were ravaging imperial domains on the north; the Rajput princes had for years ceased to pay any tribute. The first task of the new Vazir was to reduce these refractory chiefs to obedience and for this he needed a large army and vast resources. Nānā Phadnis, though he always pressed on Sinde the necessity of getting control of imperial affairs, could never spare funds for the schemes, he advocated. Mahādjī perforce turned to raise money

¹ P. R. C., II, pp. 202, 222; P. R. C., III, Intro., p. vi and p. 511.

² P. R. C., vol. p. 341, Shore's reflections on the political state of India.

³ For this subject primary sources are Mahadji Sindhia's Hist. Paper, edited by Sardesai, Poona Res. Correspondence, Series, Vol. I; also Persian Records of Maratha History, vol. I, Ed. Jadunath Sarkar.

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from his new acquisitions. He called on the Moghal feudatory chieftains to account for their holdings, dispossessed not a few of them and imposed heavy fines on the rest. The Rajput princes who had for years paid not a pie into the imperial treasury, were asked to pay the arrears of their tribute and of the Marāṭhā Cauth. These heavy demands and the hatred, the Moghal and Rajput chiefs felt for the Marāṭhās, incited them to revolt and united them in a grand conspiracy against Sinde. The ten years of Sinde's Regency at Delhi thus became a long drawn story of war punctuated by short interludes of peace.

The war with Rajput princes began in 1786, when Jaipur declined to pay tribute demanded of her. In 1787, Sinde invaded Rajputānā personally but suffered a heavy reverse at Lalsot by the defection of his Hindustani battalions. Everything presaged total ruin and a second Pānipat for the Marāṭhā army when the day was saved by the cool intrepidity of the leader. With great skill Mahādjī Sinde withdrew the remnant of his army to Dig and later southward to the Cambal. Here Sinde once more regrouped his forces, led them to battle and defeated the Moghal chiefs near Agra. He was once more the master of Delhi, receiving overtures of abject surrender from the Rajput Chiefs. He looked to a period of tranquillity in which to consolidate the gains of his victory. But the jealousy of Tukoji Holkar, ostensibly despatched by the Poona ministry to support Sinde's authority, but in reality to weaken it, encouraged Sinde's enemies; the embers of war once more flared up and Sinde's new army formed by De Boigne had to take field against the Rajputs. The Jaipur force was disposed of at Patan (June 1790), and that of Jodhpur at Mertā (September 1790). Mahādjī then marched to the Deccan in 1792 to settle issues with the Poona ministers. In his absence Holkar openly conspired with his enemies but was decisively beaten at Läkheri in 1793, by Sinde's forces.

Sinde arrived in the Deccan in June 1792. Wildest rumours and conjectures were affoat about his intentions in visiting the home country after an absence of twelve years. He was now the highest functionary of the Emperor and was at the head of a powerful army and it was felt that he would claim the same position at Poonā as he held at Delhi. The Poonā minister apprehending a contest went to the length of asking military aid from the English which of course the Governor-General declined.¹ Sinde's armies were winning victories over his enemies but the intrigues of Ali Bahādūr and Tukojī Holkar and a host of other minions of Nānā Phadnis were nullifying their effects and Sinde wanted a clear mandate from the *Peśvā* about his authority in Hindustan². But the *Peśvā* himself was under strict surveillance of the minister and almost a prisoner in his palace.

SHINDE'S TRIUMPH AT POONA

¹ P. R. C., vol. II, pp. 229-230.

² Ibid., p. 233.

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TRIUMPH AT POONA.

Before he could exercise his independent judgement he had to be liberated from ministerial thraldom. Mahādjī arrived in Poonā on 12th June; ten days later at a great ceremonial darbar he delivered to the Peśva the titles and honours brought for him from the Emperor and the farman prohibiting cow-slaughter throughout India.1 formal functions were a prelude to an intimate intercourse that developed between the Peśvā and the Maratha warrior. Sinde's frank manner, open speech and cordiality were in marked contrast to the reserve and coldness of Nānā Phadnis and young Mādhav Rāv came to cultivate a liking for the soldierly Maratha. Nana Phadnis felt jealous of the growing influence of Sinde and talked of retiring. There were charges and counter-charges and hot debates and Sinde exposed in open Darbar the high handedness of the minister in conducting the administration, his failure to understand popular grievances and the general atmosphere of suspicion prevailing in Poonā.2 At last after the action of Lakheri had put the seal of victory on Sinde's armies, the Poonā minister could no longer hold out against him and yielded almost on all points. 'His accounts were signed by the Peśvā acknowledging a balance of five crores of rupees; as ready cash, could not be obtained from the Poona ministry, Sinde accepted a transfer of the Peśva's share of the conquests in Hindustan. It was also agreed that Sinde should have the sole management of affairs in that quarter and the Peśva's Government should furnish him with such troops as he may require for his future operations'3

Sinde did not live long to enjoy the fruits of his victory. He died of a malignant fever on 12th February 1794 and was succeeded by his nephew Daulat Rāv, who was then about 14 years old. The circumstances of his having ended his career in Poonā for some time brought his Government completely within the influence of the paramount power and Nānā Phaḍnis used the occasion to exact long standing demands from the Nizām.

Sinde's achievements were hailed by his contemporaries as great victories and as fulfilling the long standing Marāṭhā ambition of dominating the Indian scene. It was one of the cherished objectives of Marāṭhā policy to obtain control over affairs at Delhi by exercising the executive authority of the Emperor. Bājī Rāv in 1736 and his son Bāļājī in 1752 agreed to defend the Empire against aggression on the same condition. In 1771, the Marāṭhās had once more turned their face towards Delhi and had restored the capital to the fugitive monarch. But before they could settle down they had to abandon the venture and retire to Pooṇā. Mahādjī became the Viceregent in 1784 and successfully maintained that position against heavy odds, thus fulfilling the principal objective of Marāṭhā policy

¹ P. R. C., vol. II, p. 240.

² Ibid., pp. 253-254, 258, 261-263, 275-292.

⁸ Ibid., p. 300.

pursued over half a century. But it is doubtful if his successes brought stability to the Marāṭhā power or increased its security. The Moghal nobility remained sullenly hostile; the Rajput chiefs were completely alienated. If Nănā Phadnis had co-operated with Sinde, things might have shaped differently.

Mahādjī owed his success in a large degree to the adoption of the European military system in which he was aided by a very competent French soldier Count De Boigne. The new system demonstrated its superiority over the indigenous method of fighting in a hundred clashes since the French routed the Navāb of Arcot at Ambur, in 1749. The dazzling successes of Dupleix and Bussy against overwhelming odds made native rulers fall for the new method of warfare. Trained armies under European officers became the craze of the day. The brilliant success of Bussy in 1751, of Hartley and Goddard in the Anglo-Marāthā conflict and of Tipū Sultān in 1756 brought home to the Marathas the ineffectiveness of the forays of their light cavalry. The Marāṭhā horse was powerless against compact armies or walled posts equipped with artillery. When other powers were employing trained battalions as the hardening core of their armies, it was inevitable for the Marāṭhās to follow suit. Mahādjī Sinde at the time of shouldering imperial responsibilities, made up his mind to adopt the new system and introduced radical changes in his army. In De Boigne he found a Commander of 'superior knowledge, varied experience and lofty character'. De Boigne raised for Sinde three brigades between 1784-1792, equipped them with modern arms cast in the foundries at Agra and Aligad and won a series of remarkable successes. Unfortunately the common Maratha soldier showed little inclination to take to the new method of warfare and large numbers of Hindustan soldiers came to be recruited for Sinde's 'Campoos'. The Maratha officers likewise were too ignorant to lead the battalions and the new army developed the fatal weakness of being recruited from foreign elements and commanded by foreign adventurers. It is dangerous for a country to depend on foreigners for its defence. For the European soldier in native armies the only attachment to service was the fortune he made out of it. When these battalions therefore faced the British army in 1803, they were destroyed quickly and there was nothing left for the chiefs except capitulation.1

Though few of his contemporaries realized it, the death of Mahādjī Sinde was the beginning of the dissolution of the Maratha confederacy. This was concealed from common view by the signal victory won by Marāthā arms over the Nizām at Khardā in March 1795—the last occasion when all Marāṭhā Chiefs acted in concert under the Peśvā's authority.

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SHINDE'S TRIUMPH AT POONA. EUROPEAN

MILITARY System,

MARATHA TRIUMPH-BATTLE OF KHARDA.

¹ For a fuller discussion, see 'Fall of the Mughal Empire', vol. IV, pp. 102-116.

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MARATHA TRIUMPH—
BATTLE OF KHARDA

Unlike that of the Marāṭhās the Nizām's authority was never rooted in the soil. Since its foundation in 1724, it was in competition with that of the Marathas and had been reduced to a position of subordination in the course of half a century. Large parts of the Deccan Subhā had been surrendered to the Peśvā and over the remaining lay the perpetual spectre of Marāṭhā Cauth and Sardeśmukhi. The Nizām however took advantage of the civil war in the Marāṭhā State, since 1774 and withheld Marāṭhā tribute. Even after the conclusion of peace in 1782, the Poona Court did not dare press for arrears of its claims for fear of losing the Nizām's friendship against the menacing advance of Tipū Sultān. Tipū's power was however broken in 1792 and half his kingdom was partitioned among the allies. The amity that had marked for a time the relations between the two neighbouring powers of Poonā and Hyderābād disappeared with the disappearance of the menace endangering their existence. The dormant claims of the Poona Court were again revived and brought forward for accommodation.

The Nizām in the meanwhile had come to lean heavily on the. British and in his expectation of drawing on their support in the last resort he defied Maratha claims with impunity. At the time of ceding Guntoor district in 1788 and again in 1790, when joining the alliance against Tipu, he had shown himself anxious for the Company's protection. At the end of the Mysore war in 1792, before the allied armies parted at Bangalore, there were talks of perpetuating the alliance and thereby securing their defence against the faithless Tipu. These talks gave rise to the much discussed but abortive treaty of guarantee. The Nizām saw in the guarantee treaty the opportunity of saving his independence from the Marāṭhās as well. The Pooṇā Government was however, alarmed at the growing friendliness between the English, its rival and the Nizām, its tributary and dependent, whose councils, it had influenced over a long period and who had now turned to another direction for guidance. It looked on the proposed engagement as "a shield held between it and its dependent the Nizām" and peremptorily rejected it.1

The protracted discussion of the guarantee proposals was not the only occasion when the Nizām's designs were exposed. They were disclosed on many others. Sinde's visit to Pooṇā in 1792, offered the Nizām one such occasion to embarrass the Pooṇā authorities and flout their long standing claims. It was felt that the serious differences of Sinde with Nānā Phadṇis were beyond adjustment and would lead to cleavage and revolution and the Nizām's minister Āzam-ul-Umrā decided to handle it as a lever for his own ends. He entered into secret correspondence with Sinde, bribed him with money to fan his rivalry with the Pooṇā ministry and in support of his designs began a threatening move in the direction of Pooṇā. Sinde made a dupe of

¹ For dissensions of the Treaty of Guarantee. See P. R. C., vol. IV, pp. 1-72.

Azam-ul-Umrā and nothing came out of this move. Nānā Phadṇis thought that the time for an amicable settlement was past and pressed the *Nizām* with his demands about long standing arrears.

About this time occurred the death of Mahādjī Sinde, which temporarily placed the vast military resources of his Government at the disposal of the Pooṇā minister. Holkar was shaken by his defeat at Lākheri and was completely subservient to Nānā. The Bhosle of Nāgpūr had been estranged by Āzam-ul-Umrā's arrogant behaviour in withholding his share of revenue from Berār. Towards Nānā, Āzam-ul-Umrā had been indiscreet enough to use discourteous language unbecoming in a minister. Ṭipū had nothing but contempt for the minister who had cemented friendship with his sworn enemy the English and he now watched his ruin with jubilation.

The Nizām to the last hoped for British intervention and would not think of accommodating his differences with the Marāthās. Sir John Shore, who was then at the head of the Company's affairs refused to depart from justice and good faith and give assistance'. He understood that the revival of its old claims was the thin end of the wedge by which the Poona Government sought to dominate the Nizām's Councils which would react unfavourably on the amity existing between the Nizām and the Company. To have countenanced openly the Nizām's rejection of the Poona demands would have meant declaration of hostilities with the Maratha confederacy, and to this length the Governor-General was not prepared to go at a time when the confederacy appeared almost irresistible and when Tipū smarting under his defeat was nursing thoughts of revenge. He also could not afford to forget the alarming situation in Europe where England was involved in a mighty struggle with revolutionary France, which precluded any hope of getting substantial reinforcements from home. The Nizām was a weakling and offered little advantage to Company as an ally. Thus circumstanced, the Governor-General was unwilling to risk an immediate war in anticipation of future dangers likely to result from Marāthā aggrandisement at the cost of the Nizām. He chose to follow the policy of strict non-intervention and advised the Nizām to liquidate Marāthā demands by a fair accommodation. The Governor-General pertinently observed, "When we reflect on the vices and imbecility of the Nizām's administration, the impossibility of directing his politics without usurping his government and the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such interference, when we consider the difficulty of making any effectual impression on the Marāthā State by our forces, the comparative facility with which they might injure us, the magnitude of their resources and exertions, as well as the number of troops, both native and European, which would be required to oppose the united efforts of the Marathas and

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MARATHA
TRIUMPHBATTLE OF
KHARDA.

Tipū, and the inevitable ruin of a long protracted war—the inducement to support the *Nizūm* at the hazard of such impending circumstances ought to be much stronger than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of his power.¹

The Peśvā went into tents after the Dasarā on 26th December 1794. He gathered round his standard for the last time almost all the principal feudatories of the empire. The two armies drew near each other in the vicinity of Khardā, when the Nizām committed a tactical blunder. In seeking to march his army to the protection of the fort of Parendā, he made a flanking movement in face of the enemy's advance. His right flank was attacked by the Marāthā horse under Paraśurām Bhāu and Sinde's battalions on 11th March. Instead of keeping his ground, the Nizām in a moment of weakness retired to the fort of Khardā for shelter. This act proved his undoing. Scared by the cannonade of Sinde's guns, his troops fled away under cover of darkness of the night. The next morning the Marāthā army besieged the fort, which was insignificant and ill-equipped to stand a siege. After protracted negotiations, the Nizām made an abject surrender and submitted to a humiliating peace.

Nothing could have been more advantageous to the Marāthās than the treaty signed on 10th April 1795. It confirmed the demands of the Poonā Court, secured to it territory worth 33 lakhs of rupees annually, and promised it three crores in indemnity. The Minister who was the main cause of the hostility was likewise delivered to the Marāthā Government.²

DEATH OF SAVAI MADHAV RAV AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

The victory of Khardā proved 'a dead sea fruit' as the terms of the treaty were never fulfilled by the Nizām and the Marāthā empire was soon convulsed by internal troubles arising from the death of Savāi Mādhav Rāv. The young Peśvā was a delicate youth brought up under strict tutelage of the minister. He was now twenty-one years of age, yet was denied any share in the administration. He chafed at the restraints placed on him and entered into correspondence with Raghobā's sons, his only surviving kith and kin but held as prisoner at Junnar. This was intercepted by the minister who upbraided his young ward for the folly of communicating with his enemies. The young Peśvā felt deeply mortified at the reproof given him, developed a melancholy temper and in a mood of despondency threw himself down the balcony of his palace on 25th October; two days later he died.

¹ Appendix in "Our Faithful Ally the Nizām", by Hastings Fraser.

² An amount of literature exists about the Khardā campaign. There are ballads, and Bakhars, dispatches in Marāṭhī in Vol. VII of Rajwade and Vol. IX of Khare. The best material will be found in Vol. IV and II of 'Pooṇā Residency Correspondence Series'.

Death is always tragic, but nothing could compare with the tragedy that now overcame the Marāṭhā empire. Nānā Phadnis had piloted the state for over two decades, had gathered all powers of the Peśvāship in his own hands as the guardian of a minor; with the death of the Peśvā his custodianship and with it the regency came to an end. By irony of fate the rightful successor to the Masnad was Bāji Râv, son of Raghunāth Rāv, the sworn enemy of the minister and his succession Nana now tried to prevent by all the means of which he was master. He was foiled in this by popular sentiment which favoured the cause of Bājī Rāv, by the superior, intrigues of the young man and by the hostility of Sinde's Senvi minister whom Nana was unwise enough to provoke. But Nana refused to acknowledge defeat and quit the scene; he insisted on clinging to the post when no longer wanted and in the resulting contest dragged down not only his own reputation for wisdom and sanity but the splendid fabric of the Marāthā State of which he was the last architect. In his attempt to retain his position he was involved in a maze of intrigues and conspiracies which created disorder and anarchy all over Mahārāṣṭra and amidst the rivalry of contending parties and clash of arms the British stepped in and put an end to Marāthā independence.1

Aware of the repugnance of Rāghobā's son towards him and the consequent annihilation of his powers in the event of the latter's succession, the minister toyed with the idea of adoption of a collateral member of the Peśvā's family by the widow of the dead Peśvā and ruling in his name. But the move was not popular and despite the great reputation of the minister, could gather few adherents to support it. A number of infants were brought from Konkan but none apparently was approved. In the meanwhile Bājī Rav from Junnar had contacted the British Resident and Daulat Rav Sinde and was soliciting their aid for his succession. The British Resident could not commit himself, but Sinde offered his support on condition of his receiving one crore of rupees in cash and a iagir worth Rupees twenty-five lakhs. The agreement soon reached the ears of Nānā; rather than allow Bājī Rāv to fall into the hands of Daulat Rav, he decided on his release himself. He despatched Paraśurām Bhāu to bring him to Pooṇā, waited on him on his arrival and both agreed to forget past enmities and carry on the administration in mutual trust.

The *Peśvā*, however, had clearly gone back on his agreement with Sinde and Sinde's ministers were incensed at Nānā's attempt to defeat their scheme of controlling the *Peśvāship*. Bāļobā 'Tātyā now induced his master to march to Pooṇā to control the affairs there. Nānā knew his inability to oppose Sinde's trained battalions and was alarmed for his own safety. Though assured by Sinde's ministers that he would be safe provided the promised subsidy were paid and

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Maratha Power (1761-1818). DEATH OF SAVAI MADHAV RAV AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. territory ceded, Nānā left the capital on 21st March (1796) and by way of Sātārā, Wāi and Rāyagaḍ fled to Mahāḍ. Three days after the Minister's flight Sinde arrived at Pooṇā and asked Bājī Rāv to fulfil his promise. Bājī Rāv had neither the will nor the means to do so. He tried to wriggle out of the agreement by pointing Sinde's failure to keep his side of the obligations and his own inability to meet any monetary demands in his present condition. To punish Bājī Rāv for his treachery Sinde's ministers now proposed to set aside his claims in favour of his brother Cimṇājī Āppā. They won over Paraśurām Bhāu to their plan, imprisoned Bājī Rāv and declared Cimṇājī Āppā Peśvā, taking care to make his claims superior by having him adopted by the widow of Savāi Mādhav Rāv.

Nana returns to Power.

Cimṇājī Āppā's Pcśvāship was not destined to last long. It was after all a compromise effected by secondaries in the contest for supremacy. Paraśurām Bhāu was unable to meet Sinde's demand for the large subsidy of a crore of rupees and the only person Sinde's Divan could think of squeezing for money was beyond his reach weaving deep-laid plots to effect a come back. The recent revolution at Poona brought the two aggrieved parties closer and soon a secret intercourse developed between Nānā and Bājī Rāv. The latter conveyed to the minister friendly assurances of his support in all his schemes to oust Bālobā Tātyā from government in his favour. Nānā needed no further encouragement to exertions; he now set every engine at work. From his temporary abode at Mahäd he sent emissaries to Tukoji Holkar, Raghujī Bhosle, Kolhāpūr Rājā, the English at Bombay, the Nizām and even Tipū Sultān to assist him with troops for setting up Bājī Rāv as Peśvā. Phadke and other partisans were asked to organize the Mankaris and foment trouble at the capital. Tukoji Holkar's power and influence were already at the minister's disposal. Nānā's treasure began to flow freely and everybody that could be of use was promised whatever he demanded. Bhosle was to receive Rs. 15,00,000 in cash and the district of Gadha-Mandla; the Kolhapur Rājā was given a subsidy of 2 lakhs and asked to seize Cikodi (Manoli district) and whatever other territory belonging to the Patvardhans and thus distract Paraśurām Bhāu. The Nizām whom Sinde was threatening with hostilities, readily listened to Nānā's proposal. All the claims on the Nizām won at Khardā, were cancelled in return for his aid. The English were promised adequate remuneration in territory and specie for adopting Bājī Rāv's cause and for assistance to be granted. Unfortunately for Nānā, Sir John Shore, the noninterventionist Governor General was at the head of the Company's affairs and he warned his subordinates against engaging in the contest and Nānā's agents had to content themselves with spreading rumours of the huge armaments that were preparing at Calcutta, Lucknow and Bombay in support of the minister.

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NANA RETURNS

TO POWER.

Nānā's chief triumph, however, lay in seducing Daulat Rāv Sinde to his side in the contest. Through the Brāhmin opponents of Bāļobā Pāgnis, he led the young Sinde to believe that he was being financially ruined by the Senvi minister and that he was courting disaster in opposing Nānā Phadņis whose cause had been espoused by powerful elements at home and abroad. Nana likewise conveyed to Sinde that he could accommodate him with a crore of rupees to meet his military needs, a jāgār worth ten lakhs of rupees and the fort of Ahmadnagar on condition that he would 'place Baloba in confinement, declare for Bājī Rāv and return with his army to Hindustan.' Bālobā little suspecting the fickleness and imbecility of his master remained ignorant of the plot in agitation. On the night of 26th October, he was seized with his colleagues and placed under guard. Nānā Phadņis returned to Pooņā on 12th November and resumed his office a fortnight later. On 5th December Bājī Rāv, who had been released from Sinde's confinement, was duly invested with the Peśvāship. "The vigour of the minister's judgment, the fertility of his expedients, the extent of his influence and the combination of the instruments which he called into action surprised all India and from his European contemporaries procured him the name of 'the Marāthā Machiavelli '.1

> NANA IMPRISONED,

The master stroke of the minister, however, proved barren of results and all his accumulated treasure was expended in search of fancied security. Nānā had worked miracles in 1774, but the generation of veteran patriots had now passed away giving place to selfish intriguers and their villainous underlings. The misfortunes which had united Nānā Phadņis and Bājī Rāv had no sooner disappeared than their old hatred and jealousies revived. The demonstration of Nānā's influence and the net work of his diplomacy frightened Bājī Rāv and before he would accept him as his minister he secured himself by a secret pact with Daulat Rav Sinde, never to abandon his cause, thus rendering ineffectual all the minister's attempts to persuade Sinde to withdraw to Hindustan. Nana's return to the ministry as later events were to prove, was no longer restoration to his old authority, but a ceaseless struggle of the old veteran against acts of wanton cruelty, extortion and moral degradation of the Peśvā and his accomplice against himself, his partisans, and against all that was honourable and respectable in Marāthā tradition.

Bājī Rāv from the beginning was determined to frustrate the minister's attempt to exercise his old authority. In preference to *Huzrāt* troops that usually guarded the *Peśvā's* palace he posted

¹ History of the Mahrattas by J. G. Grant Duff, vol. III, pp. 135-136. Duff was an employee of the British Residency and his later chapters are informative and reliable. He largely draws on the correspondence of Malet and Pahmer and other Residencies for his narrative. This requires to be supplemented by material in Marāṭhī.

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round his palace Sinde's guards. Nānā in self-defence engaged Arab soldiers. The Peśvā refused to ratify the recent agreements concluded by the minister with the Bhosle and the Nizām, unless modified. He surrounded himself with the surviving members of his father's party, lavished gifts on low favourites and plunged in a life of sensuous gaiety. It did not matter if the treasury was empty; the Peśvā fleeced the Paṭvardhans and their followers and levied all kinds of taxes on the populace of the capital, one of them being Santos Paṭṭi or contribution of congratulations on Bājī Rāv's accession¹. It was impossible for the minister to conduct administration and master and servant distrusting each other refused to meet in open court and moved under heavy escort.

Men of sanity and goodwill detested the new $Pe\acute{s}v \vec{a}$'s ways. Nānā remonstrated with Amṛt Rāv on "the irregularity and levity of the conduct of Bājī Rāv who instead of attending to affairs of the State dissipated his time and property among dancers, singers and menial servants from which course he urged Amṛt Rāv to reclaim him." Amṛt Rāv proposed to take a more active part in the administration which the suspicious $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ looked on as another insidious attempt on the part of the minister to subvert his authority.

The dispute over Holkar's succession was another jarring note between the Peśvā and the minister. Tukoji Holkar, Nānā's staunch supporter died on 15th August, (1797), but a few months before his death he had obtained the assent of the Peśvā and the minister to the succession of his eldest son, Kāśī Rāv. Kāśī Rāv was a half witted cripple and the other three sons of Tukojī refused to submit to the decision and started trouble in their jāgīr and were supposed to have obtained the support of Nānā. Against his brothers Kaśī Rāv invited the aid of Daulat Rāv Sinde. The Sinde's ministry welcomed the opportunity of subordinating the Holkar house and ending its rivalry in Hindustan. On 14th September a detachment of Sinde's corps attacked Malhār Rāv Holkar's camp at Bhāmburḍā, dispersed his force and killed the chief. A great odium fell on Sinde and the Peśvā for the death of the chief which added to their irritation against the minister.³

But the chief cause of friction was money. Daulat Rāv Sinde had been promised huge subsidies both by the minister and the *Peśvā* for promoting the latter's cause; he had received no small amounts (about fifty lakhs) from the minister from time to time.⁴ But his household and huge military ate up all and he clamoured for more. Sinde now pressed the *Peśvā* for two crores of ruppes that was to be the price of his aid. His demands on the *Peśvā*'s Government

¹ P. R. C., vol. VI, pp. 6-7, 21,

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

³ P. R. C., vol. VI, pp. 44-48.

⁴ Aitihasik Lekha Sangraha, vol. X, pp. 4110, 4118, 4120.

went on increasing; in addition to the payment of the balance due by the recent engagement he asked for cancellation of all the Peśva's former claims on the Sinde's chiefship and withdrawal of Ali Bahädūr from Hindustan.1 Bājī Rāv was without wealth or influence and suggested that only the old minister was obstructing the fulfilment of the engagements and standing between Sinde and his promised reward. The two now decided to apprehend Nānā Phadnis and make him disgorge his riches. To lure him to a personal meeting one of Sinde's European officers pledged his word; on 31st December (1797), Nana Phadnis went to Sinde's camp to return a formal visit of ceremony when he was seized with Abā Selukar, Bajābā Sirolkar, Dādā Gadre and several other persons of distinction who had accompanied him. Nānā's guard of about a thousand that waited outside was attacked and dispersed. Sarje Rāv Ghātge sent troops in the town to plunder the houses of Nana and his followers. Nana's Arab guards resisted and there was fighting. "The city of Poona was like a town taken by storm; all night and the ensuing day there was firing, uproar, plunder and bloodshed.".2

The arrest of Nānā Phadnis was the signal for the spoliation of his party. A few of his adherents had accompanied the minister to Sindes camp and were detained there. Baba Phadke, Naropant Cakradev, Trimbak Rav Paracure and the rest were invited by the Peśvā to his palace on business and told that they could gain liberty only by payment of huge fines. Several lakhs were collected in this way but Sinde's hunger was insatiable. In February he married the beautiful daughter of Sarje Rav Chatge with ostentious display; the marriage expense and the clamours of his army for arrears could be satisfied only with money. He now pressed the Peśvā for the promised subsidy of two crores. Nana Phadnis who was in Sinde's custody refused to yield to threats and divulge his secret hoards. The Peśvā had not the means of satisfying Sinde's needs and he now suggested that it might be raised by contribution on the capital. Sinde's father-in-law, Sarje Rav was put in charge of the nefarious business. A veritable reign of terror was let loose on the capital. Making Nānā's residence his head-quarters, Ghātge seized merchants, bankers, money-lenders, in fact whomsoever he suspected of wealth, tortured them and made them disgorge their wealth: several died on the rack and several committed suicide.3

Sarje Rav was a ruffian and his insolence and cruelty made him insupportable and unpopular with the Peśvā and his advisers. On the advice of his brother Amrt Rāv, Bājī Rāv called Daulat Rāv Sinde for a meeting, taxed him with encouraging the inhumanity and contumacy of his servant and asked him to retire to Hindustan. Having rid himself of the minister, Bājī Rāv was now equally CHAPTER 5.

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> NANA IMPRISONED,

P. R. C., Vol. XI, p. 66.
 P. R. C., Vol. VI, pp. 84-87, 91-95, 99-111.

³ P. R. C., Vol. VI, pp. 125-129, 136-138, 153-158; Khare, Vol. X, pp. 5374-5390.

Maratha Power (1761-1818). NANA IMPRISONED. BAYS WAR AND LIBERATION OF NANA PHADNIS. anxious to liberate himself from the thraldom of Sinde. He entered into negotiations with the $Niz\bar{a}m$ for obtaining his aid against Sinde. Sinde retaliated by sending his troops in the town to arrest the $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ and his advisers. The attempt however failed and Sinde had fresh difficulties to face.

The widows of Mahādjī Sinde had been promised ample provision by Daulat Rav on his succession, but had been neglected. In 1797 they came to Poonā to seek redress but met with personal indignities at the hands of Sinde's new Divan Sarje Rav Ghatge. The cause of the ladies was popular with the Senvi chiefs of Sinde's army; they had been disgusted at the elevation of Sarje Rav and now threw in their lot with the ladies. Sarje Rav made one or two unsuccessful attempts to disperse the insurgents, but they found shelter with the Peśvā's brother, Amṛt Rāv and continued to gather strength. The spirit of dissatisfaction spread in Sinde's army. Lakhbā Dādā declared in favour of the ladies and set Sinde's authority to defiance. Daulat Rav had one resource left to intimidate Băjī Rāv and that was to release Nānā Phadnis. Accordingly Nānā was enlarged from Ahmadnagar fort on July 15th, and brought to Poonā. The minister declared he had no inclination 'to return to the administration of government unless the contending views and interests by which the State was nearly ruined could be completely conciliated. The Peśvā and Sinde had involved their affairs in much confusion and distress and his object was to reconcile them and rescue both from impending ruin'. In the distracted state of affairs the Peśvā perceived that the experience and influence of Nānā Phadnis was essential to the return of order and tranquillity in the state. He feigned sorrow at the late unhappy happenings, pleaded his innocence and asked the aged minister once more to accept office and save his government from ruin. Nana refused to be deceived by the duplicity of Bājī Rāv but at last consented to assume administration.

The great minister lived for a year and a half but had little control over either domestic or foreign affairs. The Chatrapati of Sătără and his brother Catur Singh made a bid for their freedom and were fighting Raste's troops sent against them. The troops of Kolhapur Raja invaded the territory of the Patvardhans, plundered and razed Tāsgānv to ground and laid Karnātak under contribution. They defeated the Patvardhan troops at Pattankudī in September 1799 and killed Parasurām Bhāu. The insurgents who had joined the Bais and Sinde troops ravaged the country from the Kṛṣṇā to the Godavari. In Malva Yasvant Rav Holkar was laying the country waste and in the north the struggle between Lakhba Dada and Ambājī Ingle brought Marāthā authority in contempt. A general atmosphere of anarchy and misrule prevailed in the Marāthā country which now swarmed with horsemen and great devastations were committed. Life and property became insecure and it was obvious that things were heading towards a crisis.

Khare, Vol. X, 5391-5400.

Maratha Power

(1761-1818).

DEATH OF

NANA PHADNIS.

Amidst these calamitous circumstances Nānā Phadnis died on 13th March 1800 and "with him departed all wisdom and moderation of the Marāthā Government". A great patriot and a diplomat he had succeeded in keeping the English at bay for over a quarter of a century. His last years were clouded by selfish intrigues and low cunning of his adversaries. "His power and influence were founded in his opposition to Raghoba. They were subsequently supported, consolidated and augmented by his having for a series of years the control of the State as Regent under a tractable minor Peśvā. In the conduct of this important and arduous trust for a series of years Nānā displayed considerable talents of a civil and financial nature, exerted with regularity, firmness and consistency, and qualified with great prudence and moderation. But Nana did not pretend to executive military talents and relied chiefly on his civil authority and address to control the army, which with his command of the treasures and resources of the state and the authority and influence of the Peśvāship, gave him till Savāi Mādhav Rav's death in October 1795, an effectual control not only over the toilitary immediately dependent on the Peśvā but also over the great members of the Empire.".1 It is said that in subverting the right of Bājī Rāv to the Peśvāship, so as to keep power in his own hands he committed one blunder which had fatal consequences for himself and for the state. But it is difficult to undertand how, circumscribed as he was, he could have avoided that. His statesmanship was of a limited type; being too much steeped in conservatism and the old feudalistic order he refused to look at changes that were taking place round him and lacked the imagination to build a progressive state. With his death disappeared the last link connecting the Marāṭhā Empire with its great warriors and statesmen. The field was left to two incompetent youths, Bājī Rāv and Daulat Rāv who were no match for the British diplomats and soldiers.

The death of Nānā Phadņis released Bājī Rāv and Daulat Rāv Sinde from all restraint. Within less than two months of event Sinde had his Senvi Kārbhāris imprisoned on the charge of being in league with the Bāis and plotting against him. Sarje Rāv Ghātge became Sinde's prime minister and on his advice Bālobā Pāgnis and his brother Dhondibā were sent into captivity at Ahmadnagar, Mcrciful death on 1 November 1800 saved the old minister from further indignities. His brother Dhondibā and some of his adherents, Tulājī Sinde, Mānāji Vāble, Yasvant Rāv Vāgle were blown off from a cannon, while Nārāyan Rāv Baksi, son of the veteran Jivbā Dādā, was destroyed by rockets tied round his body. Bālobā was suspected of intriguing with Nānā's partisans for putting Amrt Rav in authority and reducing Bajī Rav to a cipher and for Sinde's removal to Hindustan.2 After the destruction of the Senvi ministers, Nānā's remaining friends and adherents came in for a similar treatment. On the pretext of discussing with them

YASVANT RAV HOLKAR CHALLENGES SHINDE,

¹ P.R.C., Vol. VI, p. 112.

² Aithihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol. XII, pp. 6462-6476, 6486.

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YASHVANT RAV HOLKAR CHALLENGES SHINDE, the adoption of a son by Nānā's widow, Nāropant Cakradev, Bājābā Siroļkar, Rāghopant Goḍbole and others were invited to the *Peśvā's* palace, accused of treasonable practices, seized and sent to different forts. The Arab soldiery who were in the employ of these officers rose in revolt and fighting broke out in the heart of the capital. After considerable bloodshed the Arabs were pacified and agreed to retire on payment of the arrears. Amṛt Rāv in whose name the conspiracy was supposed to have been contrived was pensioned off and withdrew to Bassein. The extensive and fertile jāgīr of the Paṭvardhan was transferred to Sarje Rāv Ghāṭge and Sinde's troops moved southward to take possession plundering and devastating the country from Miraj to Bijāpur.¹

Sinde's control over the *Peścā* was now complete and he demanded twenty-five lakhs of rupees in cash and new *jāgīr* being the price for the recent *coup*. Bājī Rāv was at his wits' end to satisfy Sinde's ever growing demands. He proposed an alliance with the British to free himself from the designs of Sarje Rāv Ghātge. Sinde's affairs in Hindustan however soon reached a critical stage and Bājī Rāv called off the negotiations to the great disappointment of the Governor General.²

Yaśvant Rāv Holkar had fied to Nāgpūr after Sinde's attack on Malhār Rāv's camp in September 1797. From Nāgpūr he escaped into Khāndeś and was joined by the old servants of the Holkar family. He seized the family treasure at Maheśvar, raised a considerable body of troops and devastated Sinde's territories in Mālvā. The Sinde's ladies and Lakhbā Dādā made common cause with Holkar who now threatened the total subjugation of Sinde's dominion in Hindustan. Matters having come to such a critical stage, Daulat Rāv Sinde left Pooṇā in November 1800 having extorted bills for forty-seven lakhs of rupees from the *Peśvā.*³

In the summer of 1801 there was heavy fighting round the fords of the Narmadā where Yaśvant Rāv Hoļkar won a number of brilliant victories and pillaged Sinde's capital Ujjain. By October Sinde's entire army had crossed over and inflicted a crushing defeat on Holkar at Indore. Sinde however instead of following the victory offered terms of peace which were rejected and Holkar resolved to carry the war into the Deccan. In this he was encouraged 'by the consideration that the power of the Pooṇā Government had grown extremely weak and would fall an easy prey to his attack. If he could strike successfully at Pooṇā and constitute himself the real custodian of the *Peśvā's* authority, he would give a rude

Poona Residency Correspondence Series, Vol. VI, pp. 569, 579-581, 586; Aitihasik Lekha Sangraha, Vol. XII, pp. 6504, 6510-6515, 6521-6531, 6674, 6715-6718.

² P.R.C., Vol. VI, pp. 583-591.

³ Aitihūsik Lekha Sangraha, Vol. XII, p. 6829, 6834, 6837-6838.

shock to Sinde's prestige and power in the south and correspondingly increase his own. He appears also to have received secret incitement from the old *Mutsaddies* of Pooṇā headed by Amṛt Rāv. To avenge the death of his brother Viṭhojī was the ostensible reason given out by him for coming southward.

After Sinde's departure Bājī Rāv instead of conciliating parties showed a spirit of revenge towards families suspected of disloyalty either towards his father or himself. 'To distress and pillage all such of them as fell into his hands was a favourite object of his policy.' The Sarañjāms of Phadke and Citnis were sequestered. Rāste and his two sons, Hirojī Pataņkar, Dādā Gadre, Nānā's brother-in-law Vaisampāyan, Bhikājī Pant Dāmle, Moro Āthavale, to mention only a few names, were arrested on some pretext or other. The insecurity and oppression bred a general disaffection against the Peśva's rule and expressed itself in sporadic risings all over the country. Whoever could command a few horse took to pillage. More serious were the revolts of Jivājī Yaśvant in Khāndes and Vithojī Holkar in Solāpūr district. Vithojī after dispersal of Holkar's troops in 1797, fled in the direction of Pandharpur and took to a roving life. He soon gathered round himself a considerable following, was joined by Yaśvant Rāv Rāmkṛṣṇa and Kṛṣṇa Rāv Modi two of Sinde's disaffected officers. Bājī Rāv sent against them Balkṛṣṇa Gaṅgādhar Bavanpage but he too joined the rebels. They declared themselves servants of the Peśvā's brother Amrt Rāv, occupied posts and levied contributions in his name. This made them the particular objects of the Peśva's deep indignation. In March 1801 the rebels were defeated near the Man river. Vithoji Holkar was captured by Bapu Gokhale and sent to Poonā. Bājī Rāv wished to make an example of him so as to deter the partisans of Amrt Rav from further attempts. Vithoji was given 200 strokes and then tied to the foot of an elephant and dragged round in the palace court yard.

Bājī Rāv by this barbarous execution sealed his own fate. Viţhojī Holkar was no ordinary rebel. He belonged to one of the leading families in the Marāṭhā state and the humiliation heaped on that family roused against the Peśvā, general execration. Yaśvant Rāv Holkar 'vowed vengeance on those whom he considered his brother's murderers. He arrived in the Deccan in June, brushed aside a force sent against him at Dhond and arrived near Pooṇā on 23rd October. He had been followed by a force despatched by Sinde under Sadāśiv Bhāu Bhāskar. Some feeble attempts at negotiations were made but could not succeed on account of Holkar's exorbitant demands and the mortal fear entertained of him by the Peśvā. The issue was joined on 25th October. Holkar's bravery and dashing leadership carried the day. The joint army of Sinde and the Peśvā was annihilated and the Peśvā fled to the British for protection.

CHAPTER 5.

Maratha Power (1761-1818).

Yashvant Rav Holkar challenges Shinde,

Bājī Rāv and East India Company by F. C. Gupta.

Maratha Power (1761–1818). THE GREAT BETRAYAL. Treaty of Bassein.

Bājī Rāv's authority as Peśvā was rooted in Sinde's military power and when that was temporarily annihilated the Peśvā was in a panic. His own military strength was contemptible; his perfidious conduct and treachery towards most of his military chieftains had alienated them from him, excited a general feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction towards his government and left the Peśvā friendless. Holkar's troops and *Pendhāris* barred his escape route to the north to join Sinde. In sudden fright, Bājī Rāv fled to Mahād in Konkan and from thence sailed to Bassein in a ship provided by the British Resident at Bankot. At Bassein on 31st December 1802, he concluded an engagement with the Company's Government accepting British aid for his restoration. The Company agreed to furnish the Peśvā, a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular Native Infantry with the usual proportion of field pieces and European artillerymen attached and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, to be stationed permanently within Peśvā's territory. For its support the Peśvā surrendered to the Company, territory yielding an annual revenue of 26 lakhs of rupees. The Company obtained control over the Peśva's foreign relations and was to act as arbitrator in his disputes with the Nizām and Gaikvād. The Peśvā agreed to take no Europeans into his service without the leave of the British Government. It was obvious henceforward British bayonets were to maintain the Peśvā in his power, secure him against domestic as well as foreign rivals and exercise a strict control over his affairs. His independence was a matter of the past. In search of fancied security and in the hope of clinging to his authority, Bājī Rāv had betrayed his trust and sold himself and his people into subjugation.

For the Company's Government the treaty of Bassein was not a pact hastily concluded to aid the Peśvā in his distress; it was a culmination of a policy steadily pursued over more than quarter of a century of bringing native rulers under British sovereignty. The policy of non-interference in the affairs of Indian powers had served its day and had been swept aside by Lord Wellesley who came to India as Governor General in 1798. He was out and out an imperialist and had made up his mind to bring the entire continent under British domination. He saw that Great Britain could no longer play any but the dominant part in India. Within a year of his arrival he crushed Tipu's power, persuaded the effete Nizām to accept British suzerainty and then turned to the Marathas in the name of the security and tranquillity of British dominion in India. He offered defensive alliance to all the Maratha chiefs. Suspicious of British advances they had refused to consider them. "But the present crisis of affairs in the Maratha State afforded the Governor General the most favourable opportunity for the complete establishment of the interests of the British power in the Marāthā empire.".1

¹ Martin, Wellesley's Despatches, vol. III, p. 6.

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(1761-1818).

THE GREAT

BETRAYAL, Treaty of

Bassein.

The war that followed arose out of the unwillingness of the Marāṭhā chiefs to recognize the treaty which dissolved their union. They felt they had been outwitted by the English and brought to the verge of ruin by the Peśva's folly. Holkar, after Bājī Rāv's departure from Poona attempted to set up a new regime with the help of Amrt Rav and his partisans, but in view of the impending march of British troops his cause could get few adherents and he retired to Khāndes, in March 1803. Daulat Rāv Sinde who had in the beginning welcomed British intervention soon became disillusioned when he discovered that "the re-establishment of the Peśvā in the Government of Poona under the exclusive protection of the British power deprived him of every hope of ever regaining the control that he exercised before. Sinde and Bhosle opened frantic negotiations with Holkar to sink their differences and offer a united front to the English to rescue the Peśvā from his British friends. But even in the hour of danger the Marāṭhā chiefs could not forget their mutual animosities. The war that was forced on the chiefs found them unprepared and disunited. In a swift campaign that lasted less than four months, the armies of Sinde and Bhosle were defeated at Assaye, Adganv and Cavilgad; at the same time Sinde's northern command was shattered at Agrā and Lāsvari. By the treaties concluded in December 1803, at Devganv and Surji Anjangānv, Bhosle and Sinde concluded peace, abandoning large parts of their conquests in Hindustan and the Deccan and accepting the dissolution of the confederacy.

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The first few years of post-war Peśvāship were marked by the greatest cordiality between the Peśvā and the English. Released from the irksome tutelage of Nānā Phadņis as well as the dreaded rivalry of his powerful feudatories the Peśvā was free to follow his inclination in the arrangement of his affairs. He selected men after his own heart for office in government and gave himself up entirely to a life of vicious pleasure alternated by religious observances. The British Resident at Poonā took care to see that he did not involve himself in foreign intrigues and was kept in good humour and the presence of the Subsidiary force hastened the restoration of tranquillity in the Peśvä's dominion. The Peśvā expressed his gratitude to the English declaring, "I know you both (the Marāṭhās and the English), I have tried you both and I speak from what I feel. Those men with turbans who were my servants sought my ruin. You who wear hats and are foreigners, saved me from destruction and gave me back my throne. While they were here I was insulted and oppressed. Now that you are here, I am in repose and I do as I please. They took from their master crores of rupees and still asked for more. You have spent crores of rupees for a friend and demand nothing in return" 1 Col. Close who continued at the Residency till 1809, very tactfully avoided unpleasant discussions and was

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BAJI RAV AND EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Settlement with $(1812)_{\cdot}$

helped in this by the non-interference policy of Marlow and Minto which desired no further entanglements with Native Courts.

But decisions on unpleasant topics could not be postponed indefinitely. When the Peśvā signed the treaty of Bassein in 1802 he little understood its real significance: he did not know that his restoration to the Peśvāship did not bring him back his old authority over his feudatories. He fondly imagined that the English force Southern Jagirdars subsidised by him would help him crush his refractory subjects and give him complete sovereignty over them. From the signing of that treaty the Peśvā had urged the use of the Subsidiary force to put an end to the troubles created by the Southern Jāgirdars, by destroying their levies and confiscating their sarañjāms. The Southern lāgirdārs, the Patvardhans, the Rāstes, the Pratinidhi, the Desāis of Kittur, were all Nānā's partisans and were the special objects of the Peśvā's hatred. For years they carried on chronic warfare among themselves, seized Government lands and defied the Peśvä's officers in Karnāṭak. The Peśvā looked to his British allies for help to break the power of these Jāgirdārs and resume their grants.

> An attempt to bring about a settlement with Jāgirdārs was made by Arthur Wellesley in 1803, but was not pursued during the pendency of war with Holkar and the subsequent inroads of the Pendhāris in the Deccan. In 1811, Elphinstone came to the Poonā embassy and felt that these Chiefs should be brought under control because in their unsettled state they were always a thorn in the side in time of war. But he refused to fall in with the Peśva's plan. He would not countenance the aggression of the Peśvā over the Jāgirdārs; while bringing the feudatories to obedience by the treaty of Pandharpur, concluded in 1812, he extended to them British guarantee of protection.1 This pledge of security by the Resident to the Jāgirdārs came as a painful surprise to the Peśvā. It made a mockery of his authority over his subjects. It was not so much their allegiance that he desired as their destruction. The arbitration effected by the Resident was altogether distasteful to the Peśvā and embittered his mind. He took a strong dislike to his erstwhile friends. This was the first serious rift between the Peśvā and the English.

Mission of Gangādhar Sastri (1814).

The settlement with the Southern Jāgirdārs was followed by the another episode which again emphasised the serious differences between the Peśvā and English. This was the mission of Gangādhar Sāstrī to Pooņā. The Peśvā had long standing claims on the Gāikvād and had repeatedly asked the British Government for a settlement.2 The Gaikvad's Government was in utmost confusion

¹ Poonā Residency Correspondence Series, vol. XII, pp. 80-110, 150-156,

² P. R. C., vol. XI, pp. 275-293.

and it was not until 1814 that an envoy could be deputed to discuss the claims. Gangādhar Sāstrī arrived in Poonā in the beginning of It was soon discovered that the Sastri had authority to discuss only the financial aspect of the dispute with the Peśvā which the Poonā Court professed to treat as a subordinate issue.1 The Peśca wanted to utilise the opportunity offered by the Sastri's mission for asserting his paramount authority over the Gāikvād. This the British would not accept. Negotiations dragged on fruitlessly Mission of Gangafor months in the absence of common ground. The Peśvā was encouraged in his recalcitrant attitude by his low associates, chief among whom was Trimbakjī Dengle. The Sāstrī's refusal to agree with the Peśva's view cost him his life. He was foully murdered in the Vitthal temple at Pandharpur on 20th July 18152.

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Maratha Power (1761-1818).

Baji Rav AND East India dhar Sāstrī (1814).

> Arrest of Trimbakji Dengle.

Pešvā prepares for war.

The news of the murder of the Sastri, a Brahmin and a foreign envoy, caused great consternation. Elphinstone immediately demanded punishment of the authors and instigators of the crime. He asked the Peśvā to confine Trimbakjī, who, he declared, was condemned by the universal voice of his subjects. After much protracted negotiations the Peśvā yielded. But the arrest of Trimbakji and his imprisonment in the Thana fort in no way settled affairs. The seizure of his favourite minister was looked on by the Peśvā as his own disgrace. At the same time the Governor General conveyed to the Peśvā a message telling him that his authority was restricted to his independent possessions and no longer extended over the former feudatory Marāṭhā States and his British allies did not propose to restore the old order of things.3 This the Peśvā felt as a deliberate insult added to grievous injury and his thoughts turned to revenge and retaliation which he now pursued secrecy and duplicity peculiar to his nature.

The first stage in the act was the release of Trimbakji Dengle. Bājī Rāv entreated the Resident to set free his minister and spoke of sending a vakil to the Governor General to effect his release. The Nepāl War was not progressing according to plan; and the temporary reverses of English troops were much exaggerated in Native Courts and were received with great jubilation. Secret plans and schemes for throwing off the English yoke began to be discussed. The Resident unaware of these rumblings, was reporting to Calcutta that all was quiet at Poonā and that the Peśvā was in a chastened mood and had changed his ways. His complacency was soon to be rudely shaken.

Trimbakjī Dengle managed to effect his escape from Thana Fort on 12th September 1816. Money for the purpose appears to have

² Ibid., pp. 375-77.

¹ P. R. C., Vol. XI, pp. 343-348, 369-372,

³ P. R. C., vol. XIII, pp. 16-17.

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Baji Rav AND East India Company. Peśvä prepares for war been supplied by the *Peśvā* through a relative of the Dengle. The story of the escape is too well-known to detain us here. The song recorded by Bishop Habar aptly represents popular sentiment:—

"There are five and fifty coursers there, And four and fifty men; When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed, the Deccan thrives again."

Trimbakjī fled to his native place Nimbgānv in Nāśik district and when pursued, disappeared into the Mahādev hills, south-east of Pooṇā. By the end of February 1817, the British Resident had definite information that Trimbakjī had collected 3000 horse and 3000 infantry including the Rāmośis of the region in the neighbourhood of Phalṭaṇ and that he was in communication with the Peśvā. A week later he was informed of money being sent to Trimbakjī from Paṇḍharpur and of men enlisting under his colours. All the accounts brought in by the Brāhmin spies and Harkārās to the Residency tended to prove Trimbakjī's preparations for insurrection. And yet the Peśvā when asked to explain, denied the existence of the insurrection and the Peśvā's detachment sent against the insurgents quietly sat down in the midst of the insurgent's tract and reported that there were no rebels.\footname{1}

Elphinstone was convinced that the $Peśv\bar{a}$ was privy to the conspiracy and favoured its progress. He also received reports from Berār and Khāndeś, of troops assembling for Trimbakjī under the immediate directions of the $Peśv\bar{a}$'s officers, of forts being repaired, of the $Peśv\bar{a}$ having started intrigues at the Courts of Sinde and Hoļkar and of his remitting money to Hindustan. The Resident sent repeated messages of remonstrance to the $Peśv\bar{a}$ only to be met with a total denial of facts. On 7th March (1817), a final warning was delivered that unless the $Peśv\bar{a}$ took measures to seize Timbakjī's family and adherents and disperse the insurgents he would be involved in a dispute with the British Government, the fatal consequences of which could not be foreseen.²

The $Peśv\bar{a}$ was however not to be deterred from the course he was determined to follow. Throughout the month of March his hostile preparations continued. His principal chiefs were directed to levy troops, the hill forts were provisioned, treasure and jewels were sent out of Pooṇā and the $Peśv\bar{a}$ was reported to be intriguing with other Native Courts. The Resident had no doubt now that the $Peśv\bar{a}$ was engaged in a deliberate conspiracy to stir up a war against the British Government. He informed the Governor General, that the $Peśv\bar{a}$ was never to be trusted again and that stern measures should be taken without loss of time to crush his power and deprive him

¹ P. R. C., vol. XIII, pp. 81-126.

² Forest, Official Writings, p. 168.

of the means of harming the Company, should it at any time be engaged in hostilities elsewhere in India. Elphinstone made the necessary military dispositions and waited for orders from Calcutta.

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(1761-1818).

BAJI RAV
AND
EAST INDIA
COMPANY.
Treaty of
Poonā.

The Subsidiary force under the Commanding Officer, General Smith, arrived at Poona on the 6th of May; about the same time Elphinstone learnt from a private source that the Governor General had approved of his suggestion of dealing sternly with the *Peśvā*, but that owing to disturbances in Orissa, his dak had been delayed on the way. On the next day an ultimatum was delivered to the Peśvā, insisting on the immediate surrender of Trimbakji Dengle within the period of one month. For obtaining solid proof of the Peśva's sincerity, Elphinstone demanded to be put in immediate possession of three hill-forts, Sinhgad, Purandar and Rayagad. On the 8th morning the city was surrounded and the Peśvā then submitted and delivered the forts to the Resident. A proclamation offering reward for the seizure of Trimbakji or for giving information leading to his seizure, was issued under the Peśvā's signature. His adherents were named in the proclamation and their possessions were confiscated. The Governor General's orders were received on 10th May and in conformity with them a new treaty was concluded on 13th June. It declared Trimbakji as the murderer of Gangādhar Sāstrī and the Peśvā promised to arrest him and deliver him to the English. The dissolution in form and substance of the Marāthā confederacy was recognised by the Peśvā and he agreed to recall his agents from foreign Courts including those of the former Marāthā feudatories. He made fresh cessions worth thirty-four lakhs of rupees to the British Government for maintaining additional troops at his cost and abandoned all claims over territories beyond the Narmadā,2

forced to pay an enormous price for the Company's alliance which had humiliated him and made a mockery of his Peśvāship. When he met Malcolm at Māhulī in August next he talked to him with an air of injured innocence, but at the same time pursuing his preparations against the English. The native powers had become restive at the rapidly increasing aggressions of the British and they now looked to the Peśvā to head the war against them. The Peśvā's military advisers, among whom Bāpū Gokhale now occupied the chief post, counselled him to lie low and wait till the break-up of the monsoon, use the interval for perfecting negotiations with Sinde, Holkar and Bhosle, and the Pendhāri chieftains and then rise simultaneously against the British. They pinned their hope to the traditional Marāthā warfare, of the Marāthā horse ravaging the country all round and making it impossible for the enemy to obtain provisions.

These preparations could not be concealed from the Resident and

The treaty of Poonā was a heavy blow to the *Peśvā*. He had been

Third Marāthā War,

¹ P. R. C., vol. XIII, pp. 159-166.

² G. G.'s Instructions, 7th April and 17th May 1817.

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Marāṭhā Power (1761—1818).

Baji Rav And East India Company, Third Marâthā War, he called back the Subsidiary force that had been sent northward to co-operate with Hislop in his operations against the *Peṇḍhāris*. The *Peśvā* could no longer delay the attack. His army under Bāpū Gokhale burnt the Residency and attacked the small force under Col. Burr on November, 5th, 1817, on the plains extending from the Caturśringī hill but was repulsed. The Third Marāṭhā War had begun.

The issue of the war was never in doubt. The Governor General had prepared a vast army to put an end to the Pendhari menace and this army took the field immediately after the end of the rainy season. The principal Pendhāri leader, Amir Khān, came to an understanding with the English and Daulat Rav Sinde, cowering before English bayonets, entered into fresh treaty relations with Company on the same day that the battle of Kirkee was fought in the Deccan. Holkar State was in utmost confusion and his army was destroyed in the battle of Mahidpūr. Appā Sāheb Bhosle was defeated in the battle of Sitābuldī. Thus the friends to whom the Peśvā looked for support proved broken reeds. His own army consisting of raw levies of Maratha horse and mercenary Arab soldiers was no match for the disciplined and well-equipped English force under Smith. At the battle of Astī (February, 1818), Bāpū Gokhale was killed and the English captured the Rājā of Sātārā and his family; from now on they posed as fighting on behalf of the successor of the Great Sivājī and a number of Jāgirdārs left the Peśvā's standard. Bājī Rāv became a fugitive and nobody seemed willing to offer him shelter. At last he surrendered to Malcolm on 3rd June 1818, at Mhow near Indore and set on his journey to Bithur near Kanpur where he lived as a pensioner of the Company for thirty years and died in 1851.

The Governor-General had made up his mind to abolish the *Peśvā-ship* and place his territory under direct British administration. The line of the Peśvā became extinct and Marāṭhā country came to form a part of British dominion in India.

CHAPTER 6*

THE MARATHAS AND THE ENGLISH

THE ENGLISH CAME TO INDIA AS TRADERS. The profits of the eastern trade were enormous and had always attracted the more adventurous people of Europe. For about a hundred years after the opening of The Marathas and the sea-route to India, Portugal enjoyed absolute monopoly of this trade, but since the beginning of the 17th century their prosperity was on the decline. The rising maritime powers of Holland and Great Britain dealt severe blows to the naval supremacy of Portugal and challenged its monopoly of Asiatic commerce. The Dutch concentrated on the spice islands and the seizure of Malacca in 1641, signalised their triumph over the Portuguese in that region. They also squeezed the English out of the Malay Archipelago and in a way were responsible for turning the attention of the English to the mainland of India.

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The victories of Capt. Best (1612) and Capt, Downton (1614) over Portuguese fleets off the mouth of Tapi river cleared the way for the English for opening of trade with India. A farman obtained from Emperor Jehängir in 1613, gave them permission to establish a factory at Surat and with it secured them 'the only key to open all the rich and best trade of the Indies'. The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe (1615-1618), made excellent impression at the Moghal court and soon subordinate agencies sprang up at Ahmadābād, Burhānpūr, Ajmer and Agra. The story of the progress of the East India Company in the 17th century and the establishment of factories clustering round Bombay, Madras and Calcutta has been told earlier. The rivalry of the East India Company with the Marāthās in the 18th century for supremacy in India forms the theme of this chapter.

The Marathas and the English were not strangers when they met in the political arena at the opening of the century. The English were essentially traders seeking concessions from native rulers for

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

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exchanging their merchandise. They had faithfully followed the advice of their first ambassador in India. "Let this be received as a rule that if you will profit, seek it at sea, and in quiet trade; for without controversy it is an error to affect garrisions and land wars in India". In pursuance of this advice the English had confined themselves to trade and had set up a number of factories along the West Coast and in the interior. If they watched political events in the country they watched them for the safety and security of their business.

From 1650, the English factors witnessed the rise of the Marāṭhās under the leadership of Sivājī. The hardy mountaineers and peasants dwelling in the Western corner of India defied the power first of the Ādilśāhī Sultanate and later of the Moghal empire and the English followed their progress with considerable interest. What the Marāṭhās thought of these foreign traders it is difficult to surmise. They treated them with suspicion, but showed little curiosity to know about their country, their way of life or their form of Government. For their navies, they had respect, but on land held them as altogether despicable.

SHIVAJI AND THE ENGLISH.

The earliest political contact between the Marāṭhās and the English occurred in January 1660, when Sivāji's troops came upto Rājāpūr in pursuit of three junks of Afzal Khān in which Afzal's agent had fled there with his master's property, on the capture of Dabhol by the enemy. The English prevented the seizure of these boats and the goods contained in them. A year later in retaliation for the aid given by the English to Siddi Johar at the siege of fort Panhāļā, Šivājī surprised Rājāpūr and plundered the English factory carrying away with him as prisoners the four factors, Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor and Philip Gyffard. The factors were released in March 1663, but apparently no compensation was paid to the English in spite of protracted negotiations. In 1664 and 1670 Sivājī marched on Surat and stripped the city of its fabulous wealth. Though the entire populace suffered at the hands of the invaders, the English defended their factory and warehouse, and were left unmolested. In the years following when Sivājī attacked Kārvār and Hubli, the English factors had to contribute their share of the fine levied on the towns.

Sivājī's revolt in the Deccan and the disturbance caused by it hampered trade and were therefore distasteful to the English merchants. But their trading interests on the mainland, the vioinity of the island of Bombay—their chief seat of authority on the west coast—to the Marāṭhā country and its dependence on it for food and fuel, slowly but inevitably drew the English in the vortex of Marāṭhā politics.

¹ The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, ed. by W. Foster (Hakluyat Society), vol. II, p. 344.

The rise of the Maratha State claiming to unite the country of Mahārāṣṭra under its rule was a threat to the security of foreign The Marathas and settlements on the west coast. The Siddi and the Portuguese who held between them most of the Konkan littoral were naturally hostile to the new power. The English though they yet avowed no territorial ambitions, looked askance at the irruption of this novel element. They always made a merit of their being traders with no inclination to take part in the struggle that waged round them.

The Siddi's stronghold of Janjira lay only 45 miles from Bombay, the seat of the English settlement on the west coast. He found Bombay a convenient point from which to descend on the mainland, sack and burn villages, seize Sivājī's subjects and capture his shipping in the Pen river. The geographical position of the Siddi State marked its ruler as the natural enemy of the Marāṭhās and his atrocities and barbarous treatment of Marāṭhā prisoners inflamed Marāṭhā temper. The Siddi however was a tough fighter; his long experience of sea-faring, his powerful navy, his possession of the island castle of Janjira and his connection with the Moghal Court, balked Sivājī of his prey. The Marāthā ruler and his successors greatly desired English aid to bring the Siddi to his knees, which the English with large stakes in the Moghal country could ill afford to grant; at the same time they were anxious to appease and keep fair with the Maratha ruler. In 1674, at the time of Raja's coronation they sent an embassy under Henry Oxenden to congratulate him and conclude a treaty to trade in his country. After a fruitless attempt on the part of Sivāji's ministers to engage the English in a treaty of alliance against the Siddi, a commercial treaty granting them facilities to trade in the Raja's dominions was signed. This treaty governed the relations between the Marāthās and the English for over half a century.

treaty of Rayagad though hailed as very advantageous to both parties, did not lull mutual suspicions. Within two years of its ratification the Bombay Council was complaining that 'so long as that pirate and universal robber lives, that hath no regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be no security in any trade in his country.".1 The occupation of the island of Khanderi, lying at the mouth of Bombay harbour, by Śivājī in 1679, brought about a collision. When Sivājī found that the English would not or could not restrain the Siddi from entering the Panvel creek and molesting his territory, he sent his marines to occupy the island of Khanderi (Kenry) which commands the entry into the harbour of Bombay,

The English became apprehensive that 'Sivāji's designs could not be otherwise than to have check on the whole trade of Bombay and adjacent parts keeping there always a fleet of small brigantines to cruise up and down'.2 The Deputy Governor of Bombay

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¹ F. R., Surat, vol. 89, pp. 69-70.

² F. R., Bombay, vol. 8, p. 28.

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Dr. Fryer who then passed through Bombay has left in his journal the popular impression of the episode. He observes, "amongst these wars, and rumours of wars, we quietly lay down our Arms and leave Seva Gi and Syddy alone to contend for our stony piece of ground on Henry Kenry; how much to our Honour or Reproach may be gathered from the language daily cast in our Teeth. 'Why vaunt your Nation? What Victories have you achieved? What has your sword done? Who ever felt your power? What do you possess? everyone runs you down; you can scarce keep Bombain, which you got not by your Valour, but compact; And will you pretend to be Men of War or cope with our Princes? It's fitter for you to live on Merchandise and submit to us.".

The period following Śivājī's demise, till the end of the century was one of peace between the Marāṭhās and the English. The warfare between the Moghal and the Marāṭhās was quickened in 1681 by the arrival in the Deccan of Aurangzeb himself and engrossed the entire energies of the Marāṭhā nation. The coastal districts were overrun by Moghal armies and the Siddi was once more put in charge of places he had lost to Śivājī before. He now became very active and attacked Marāṭhā shipping in Bombay waters. Sambhājī's protest against his sheltering in the harbour went unheeded. The nascent Marāṭhā navy was swept off the sea.

Rise of Kanhoji Angre, At the end of the century however there was a turn of fortune. Kānhojī Āngre by his daring and enterprise raised himself to the position of Admiral of the Marāthā fleet (1698) and claimed tribute from all vessels sailing along the west coast. Āngre's activities formed a part of the general struggle of the Marāthā people against Moghal conquest of their homeland. The chief objective to which his policy was directed was to recover Marāthā territory occupied by the Siddi and other foreign powers. The Western seas were to be Marāthā waters and all who visited ports established in them, were to be taught to respect Marāthā sovereignty and secure his permission for trading in those waters by buying his passes. Whatever power refused to conform to his orders would do it at the peril of bringing on its merchantmen his strong hand. His claim was challenged by the Siddi as well as the European powers, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English, who on account of important

¹ John Fryer, A new account of the East Indies and Persia, vol. 3, pp. 163-165.

trading interests on the Malbar coast, found such a demand most galling and injurious to their commerce. They preferred to look on Angre as a pirate, as an enemy of peaceful commerce and made The Marathas and light of his high-sounding demands. Confident of their superiority at sea with their large ocean-sailing vessels and with their greater fire-power the Europeans refused to submit to Angre's claims and preferred to fight out the issue. Angre's fleet though inferior in weight and number, could always seek the shelter of forts which lined the coast. So long as his rear remained secure, Angre could laugh at the efforts of his enemies to destroy his naval power. A state of perpetual warfare, punctuated by short periods of peace, therefore, existed on the coast between the Maratha Admiral and his neighbours.

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RISE OF Kanhoti ANCRE.

The English at Bombay watched Angre's activities with great anxiety. Small ships belonging to the country merchants plying between Bombay and Cochin were seized by him and hardly any shipping could pass or repass Bombay. In 1699 they expressed their fears "of Sevajees and Sanganians grown strong and impudent so that scare any boats can pass to and from the island without convoyes.".1 The Bombay Consultation, dated 6 February 1699 reports "the Subhedar of Kanhoji Angre having agreed to the release of two Bombay merchants and requesting salt boats to visit his country.".2 In the fighting that broke out between the Siddi and Angre at the end of 1700 the Siddi accused the English with supplying the Sevajees with ammunition.³ In 1702 a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen on board fell in Kanhoji's hands. A year later his galivats were worrying the fishermen of In September of that year the English seized a grab Worlee.4 sailing under Angre's colour as "Conajee Angre and his people were at sundry times committing many injurious and piratical actions on the inhabitants of this island". In 1704 November Kanhoji Angre boldly rode into the bay of Bombay and anchoring his vessels at the mouth of the Pen river threatened to starve the island. Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that "he could not be permitted searching, molesting or seizing vessels without breach of the existing friendship.".5 Angre returned a defiant answer saying that "The Sevajees had done many services for the English that never kept their word with him;..... that they lived now by their sword and would seize what boats or other vessels belonging either to the Mogulls vessels from any of his ports or Mallabarr, excepting such as had Conajee Angre's passports; the English being at liberty acting as they please.".6

¹ O. C. vol. 55, No. 6642.

² F. R., Bombay, vol. 5, p. 8.

⁸ O. C., vol. 56, No. 7506.

⁴ F. R., Bombay, vol. 5, p. 9.

⁵ Bombay Public Proceedings, vol. 2, pp. 15, 17, 21.

⁶ Ibid., p. 30.

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Surat letters to the Directors, of the period, are full of lament for losses suffered by them at hands of Angre. In February 1707 Kānhojī captured the Company's Machva cruising off the Māhim river. In the same year the Bombay frigate was blown up in an encounter with his ships. In 1710, a Dutch sloop of war was captured and the Godolphin narrowly escaped the same fate. In 1711 the Directors were told that Angre could take any ship except the largest ones: "along the coast from Surat to Dabul he takes all private merchant vessels he meets". The next year he captured the Governor of Bombay's armed Yacht and the Anne Kārvār and attacked the Somers and the Grantham East Indiamen.

While thus at war with his maritime neighbours Kānhojī Āngre as a partisan of Tārā Bāi, found himself involved in civil war. On the advice of Bālājī Viśvanāth he soon came to an understanding with Śāhū and was confirmed in the command of the fleet, was put in charge of several forts in Konkan and promised support in the contest with the Siddi.²

Kānhojī about this time also made up his differences with the English. In February 1718 he agreed that "in future English ships should be free from molestation, that no ships of any nation coming into Bombay harbour should be interfered with between Māhim and Kennery (Khānderi), that English merchants should have liberty of trade in Āngre's ports on payment of the usual dues and that Āngre should be responsible for any damages done in future by the ships belonging to his Marāṭhā superiors. In return the Governor engaged to give passes only to ships belonging to the subjects of the English nation and to allow Āngre's people full facilities in Bombay.".3

The treaty concluded with the English proved but a temporary truce. The town of Bombay was then unwalled and the factory had no marine to protect its interests. The island was in a declining posture when Charles Boone arrived as Governor at the end of 1713. With his arrival the settlement began to show great activity in equipping its fighting marine. Within two years it had built and equipped a fleet—consisting of "nineteen frigates, grabs, ketches, gallivats and rowing galleys, carrying two hundred and twenty guns besides a bomb-vessel and a fireship". This naturally alarmed Kānhojī and when he found the English engaged in war with the Sounda Rājā he recommenced attacks on Bombay shipping.

The immediate cause of hostilities was the capture of their merchantmen, *The Success*, the *Robert* and the *Otter* by Angre. Angre contended that these vessels belonged to foreign merchants

¹ Malbar Pirates, by Biddulph, pp. 77, 78.

² Treaties, Agreements and Sanads, edited by Mawjee and Parasnis, p. 197. ⁸ Bombay Public Consultations Range, ecc XLI, No. 4, (Consultation, 12th February 1713).

and though laden with the goods of the Company could claim no exemption from his passes. The English retaliated by the seizure of one of Angre's Sibar that visited Mahim and attack on his coastal The Marathas and towns. War was formally declared on 17 June 1718.

On the close of the monsoon on 2nd November a formidable expedition consisting of two East Indiamen, the Victoria frigate, Revenge and Defiance grabs, the Fame galley, Hunter Ketch and fifty gallivats sailed against the island of Khānderi. Boone led the expedition in person in the Addison. Two more ships the Morrice and Stanhope joined the expedition a week later. A distant cannonade having produced little effect it was decided to take the fort by assault. Two attempts at landing were made on 6th and 7th November but both failed, the landing party was driven to the water and many were drowned. The fleet then proceeded to Kolābā, threw in a few shots and then sailed southward to do what damage it could to Angre's forts and ships. They found a grab at Vijaydurg but the fire vessel of the fleet was blown up by a shot from the enemy before she could board the grab. Going to Kārvār they came across Angre's fleet and took four of their prizes but the grabs got away. On the return voyage the fleet once more looked into Vijaydurg creek, found none of Angre's fighting vessels, cast in a few cowhorns setting fire to some houses and then resumed its voyage to Bombay (December 1718).1

Attempts were made about this time by Sähü Rājā to intervene and stop the fighting. The terms proposed by the English were not acceptable and the treaty was not ratified. In consequence another expedition consisting of nine vessels and several fishing boats for landing troops and a strong detachment of troops was sent against Vijaydurg (Gheriä) in September of 1720 under Walter Brown. Angre's fleet retired up the river and the cannonading had little effect on the fort. After burning a few boats the English commander retired.2 The Government of Bombay celebrated this as a victory and fired salutes, but Angre affirmed it was an inglorious defeat and demonstrated the little regard in which he held the enemy's threats he attacked the English ship Charlotte (April 1720) and carried her into Gheriã.8

Angre's career was unchecked. He continued to defy the efforts of the Portuguese and the English to bring him to book. However common danger made the two European rivals forget their old animosities and join hands in an alliance to destroy their enemy. A treaty providing for a joint attack on Kolābā was concluded on 20th August 1721.

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¹ The failure of the expedition against Khanderi is attributed to the treachery of Rāmā Kāmat, a Hindu inhabitant of Bombay. More correctly, it should be attributed to a Portuguese renegade Manuel de Castro: see Downing's History of the Indian Wars, Introduction, p. xvi and pp. 35-39.

² Bombay Abstracts, vol. I, p. 376 and the Bombay Gazetteer, vol. xxvi, Part I, p. 152; History of the Indian Navy by Low, vol. I, p. 100. 3 Ibid.

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The arrival of a royal squadron in Bombay in September (1721) under Commodore Mathews further added to the strength of the allies. On 29th November the expedition sailed from Bombay and joined the Portuguese force at Caul. Alibāg was bombarded on the 12th December and two days later an assault was made on the fort. No breach had been made and the walls were twenty feet high. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses, the Portuguese showing little spirit. The Viceroy of Goā being taken ill retired to his ship and the Portuguese contingent broke as soon as they saw the enemy advancing. Commodore Mathews watching the rout flew into a rage and roughly handled the Portuguese Captain. Peśvā Bājī Rāv and Pilājī Jādhav on behalf of Sāhū Rājā arrived at the head of six thousand cavalry, seized the field guns and ammunition of the enemy and threatened to wipe out his entire force.

The entry of Sāhū in the war immediately turned the scales against the allies. The Portuguese were not prepared to antagonise the entire Marāṭhā nation and as soon as the Peśvā offered to mediate in the dispute, they accepted his mediation. The insolent behaviour of the English Commodore towards the Portuguese Viceroy and General was not calculated to restore amity among the allies. The Portuguese accepted the liberal terms offered to them by the Peśvā in the name of Śāhū Rājā (9th January 1722) and the English withdrew to Bombay. The alliance that had been heralded with so much eclât broke up without achieving anything.¹

The war with the English continued with pauses at intervals. When pressed in other quarters Angre would wave the olive branch and express willingness to make peace. When the pressure eased, his ships would be once more active. In 1723 Angre was engaged in hostilities with the Savant of Vadī and was threatened by the Dutch. He offered to diesuss peace terms with William Phipps, the new Governor of Bombay. Phipps haughtily turned down the proposal charging Angre with piracy; before he could hear of any terms he asked the Maratha Commander to renounce war and as proof of his sincerity demanded immediate release of prisoners. This called forth Kanhoji's ire, he replied that "it little behoved merchants to say that his government was supported by violence, insults and piracies; for the great Sivājī founded his kingdom by making war against four kings; and that he himself was but his humble disciple; that he was ever willing to favour the merchants trading according to the laws of his country", and offered to release the English prisoners if his men imprisoned by the English were set at liberty.2 Though the negotiations did not bring peace an exchange of prisoners was effected in 1725. Kānhojī's last act of hostility against the English was the seizure of the Company's galley King William in 1728. He died on 4th July 1729.

² Forest, Home Series, vol. II, pp. 37-41.

¹ Downing, History of the Indian Wars, pp. 53-57 and F. N., on p. 56; Biddulph, Malabār Pirates, pp. 174-180.

The death of Kanhoji Angre forms a turning point in Anglo-Marāthā relations which were all along marked with the greatest acerbity on both sides. Angre's restless energy, resourcefulness and the English. daring had brought the Maratha Navy to a high pitch of efficiency and developed it into a powerful striking force. His authority was supreme in Konkan and his exclusive writ ran in that region. Though his rivals affected to speak of him as a "Corsair", they saw in him the representative of Marāthā authority, the symbol of a mighty nation that appeared to be destined to take the place of the Moghal. If they dreaded his ships, they dreaded more the might of the Marāṭhā state that stood behind them.

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DEATH OF Kanhoji ÂNGRE.

DISPUTES IN

ĀNGRE'S FAMILY.

Känhoji's death brought about a change in the situation and resulted in new alignments. The Angre family was riven with disputes. Kānhojī's immediate successor Sekhojī, the most capable and sanest among his sons, died within a short period of his appointment (1733 August). His remaining family, Sambhājī, Mānājī, and Tulājī and others, were all self-willed obstinate youths who quarrelled violently among themselves and invited outside intervention. The intemperate behaviour of Sambhājī Āngre towards the King and his powerful Peśvā, the grasping and domineering attitude of the latter with his subtle intrigues brought about the downfall of the Angre family and with it the ruin of the Marāthā navy and gave the English the opportunity to deliver its first deadly blow against Marāthā power.

Sambhājī Āngre succeeded to the Admiralty in 1733, September. A very capable man, he was rough of speech and rough of manners. Mānājī soon fell foul with him and opened negotiations with the Portuguese and the English to support his claim against his brother. The English naturally welcomed the opportunity of weakening the Angre and despatched Capt. Inchbird to Caul (December 1784), to encourage Mānājī in his evil designs. It was very advantageous to them to keep up the dissensions between the brothers and thereby divide their force; they therefore authorised their agent to offer Mānājī money and military stores and instructed him "to spirit up Mānājī to carry on his resentments against his brother.".1

Mānājī Āngre's agents also met Peśvā Bājī Rāv, whom Sambhājī had greatly offended by his recalcitrance. The Peśvā saw in the family discord an opportunity to humiliate his opponent, reduce the Angre power and make it subservient to his authority. He decided that the fleet and territories of Kānhojī Angre should be divided between his protege Mānāji and Sambhāji; that Mānāji should hold independent charge of Kolābā² and Sambhājī that of Suvarnadurg. The arrangement ousted Sambhājī permanently from his northern posses-

¹ Kāvyetihās Sangraha Patre Yādī, 23(1930, Ed.), S. P. D. III, 112 and xxxiii, 147, 159, 165, 245, 264, 274, 437. Also Public Dept Diary, vol. VII. consultations, dated 22nd November 1734 and December.

² Rajwade-Marāthyāñcyā Itihāsāci Sādhane, II, pp. 71-72.

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sions and confined him to the barren tract of the Ratnāgiri district. Sambhājī retained his father's title of Sarkhel, but it no longer stood for the principal command of the navy. Sambhājī naturally resented this decision and was never reconciled to the partition.¹ As the more daring and active among the brothers his removal from the vicinity of Bombay, gave satisfaction to the English. They had all these years meekly submitted to the insults of Āṅgre and were now happy at the turn of events. They accepted Mānājī as lesser of the two evils and readily assisted him to keep the feud alive. The Peśvā had humbled not only the pride of the Āṅgre house but had the Āṅgre's fief in his grip. A new English-Peśvā-Mānājī axis was established to curb Sambhājī Āṅgre and keep him away from Kolābā. This friendly understanding was the note of the next two decades and lasted till Āṅgre's power was completely overthrown in 1756.

With the conquest of Sālsette and Bassein by Cimājī Āppā in 1739, the $Pe\acute{s}v\bar{a}$ and the English became near neighbours and found it necessary to know each other intimately and cultivate a closer understanding. They despatched two embassies, one to Sāhū $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ at Sātārā and the other to Cimājī Āppā at Bassein, to acquaint themselves with the aims and working of the Marāṭhā Court and assess the strength of their new neighbour.²

EMBASSIES OF GORDON AND INCHHIRD.

The first embassy was headed by Capt. Gordon. The object of the embassy as Capt. Gordon's letter of instructions informed him, was to gain information and insight into the Government interests and designs of the Marāṭhā Court. The envoy was to obtain knowledge of the state of Šāhū Rājā's Government and to discover who were Bājī Rāv's enemies at the Court and how much they were to be depended on. "It will not be amiss," the Board writes, "if you see a proper occasion and opening to instill a jealousy of his ambition and growing power by the accession of his conquests". Gordon left Bombay on the 12th May 1739 and arrived in Sāhū Rājā's camp near Miraj on 1st June. He found the atmosphere at the Court not unfriendly and the Rājā willing to do the English good offices; but his good offices counted for little as the Peśvā was all powerful and made small account of the Rājā. Gordon was not able to discover the real intentions of Bājī Rāv, but the general view was that he had no designs of molesting Bombay as it was esteemed useful for advancing the prosperity of his new acquisitions.

Capt. Inchbird's embassy to Cimājī Āppā was much more successful. Inchbird's mission was meant to disarm Marāthā jealousy for having aided the Siddi and the Portuguese in their late wars against

¹ Br. Ch. 326-328 and Rajwade, III, 272, 278.

² The accounts of the two embassies are given by Forrest in *The Selections* from the Letters, Despatches and other State papers, Maratha Series, vol. I, Part I, pp. 67-84.

the Marathas, to discourage any demand for tribute and yet to impress the Maratha General with the sincere desire of the English The Marathas and to cultivate a good understanding with their new neighbours. Inchbird spoke to the Marāṭhā Council of the importance of encouraging foreign trade to make their country prosperous. succeeded in arranging the terms of a treaty, dated 12th July 1739 which was ratified at Bombay. It was not the first engagement of its kind as alleged by Forrest and Aitchison, but marks a land-mark in Anglo-Marāṭhā relations. It regulated trade between Bombay and the Maratha Country and navigation of the Mahim River. By it the Peśvā conceded to the English free trade in his dominions.1

A year after the conclusion of the treaty, Peśvā Bājī Rāv died. He was succeeded by his eldest son Bāļājī Bājī Rāv more commonly called Nānā Sāheb. The policy of his father on the west coast remained unchanged. The new Peśva's servants in Konkan pursued their master's interests with great vehemence and continued to squeeze Āngres-Mānājī, Sambhājī and their successors-out of their land possessions, contributing materially to the success of the English navy at sea over their rival. The position of the Angres grew more and more precarious. In spite of the exhortations of the great Sivājī that the navy should meet its upkeep from the central exchequer and not depend on its earnings at sea for its sustenance,2 it was driven to a course of indiscriminate plunder by its necessities. Sāhū unable to aid the fleet with money, had shown wisdom in accepting the advice of his Minister Bāļājī Viśvanāth to sustain the fleet by marking Konkan as Angre's sphere of influence and giving him a free rein in that field. The advent of *Peśvā's* power in the Angre's field—the domineering views of Bājī Rāv and his son and the failure of the Angre brothers in coming to an understanding among themselves and their neighbours, upset the arrangement, isolated the naval command and dried up the resources of the Maratha fleet. The destruction of Angre's navy in 1756, was not a sudden catastrophe but the culmination of the policy initiated and worked out by the Peśvā since 1735.

In the discussion over the Portuguese treaty, Cimājī Āppā conveyed to the English envoy that "both the Angres were pirates, robbers, senseless impolitic fellows". Inchbird agreed, saying "they were past all cure and it was labour in vain to reclaim them". Cimaji told the envoy that "if the English were ready to act in cooperation with a Marāṭhā force to destroy the pirate next season he would himself come down, and join the English in taking all Ängre's forts and country." 3 The treaty ending the war with the Portuguese contained an article which provided for joint action for destroying the Äṅgre.

CHAPTER 6.

the English. EMBASSIES OF GORDON AND INCHBIRD.

ANGLO PESHVA AMITY.

¹ Forrest, Maratha Series, Ed. by Forrest, pp. 71-74, Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, ed. by Aitchison, vol. II, pp. 9-13, (1931, Ed.).

² Adnyāpatra, p. 34 (1826, Ed.).

⁸ Pub. Dept. Diary, XIII, pp. 330-339.

CHAPTER 6.

The Marathas and the English.

ANGLO-PESVA

AMITY.

In 1740 March, Sambhājī Āngre suddenly appeared before Kolābā, landed troops and with little opposition "seized all the ports and strong places in consequence of secret understanding with Mānāji's officers, only Kolābā and one small out-fort holding out for Mānāji". Sambhājī sent a message to his brother that he was visiting Alibāg to pay respects to his father's samādhi. The prospect of Sambhājī establishing himself at Kolābā and obliging the Company to increase their Marine force (the expense of which is already intolerant) to secure the navigation of the coast" was altogether unpalatable to the Bombay Council. They immediately despatched relief to Mānājī under Captain Inchbird and anxiously watched the issue of the contest. In the meanwhile a large force under Cimājī Āppā also arrived at Kolābā to support Mānājī in the struggle. Caught between two fires Sambhājī Āngre had little chance of escaping. He was fortunately aided out of the impasse by Mānāji himself who to his dismay found his ally and patron occupying his forts of Karañjā, Elephantā, Pālī Mirgad and making himself free with his territory round these strongholds. Sambhājī, surrendering the places seized by him, quickly slipped away and repaired to the Rājā's court to lodge a complaint against the Peśva's high handed action. Nothing apparently came out of the visit, Sambhājī returning a disappointed man.1

The Kolābā incident served to cement further the union between the English and the Marāṭhās (the Peśvā), " Acting on Capt. Inchbird's report that the Marāṭhās were too jealous of Sambhājī's power and so many hostilities had already past between them, that they were bent to reducing him and would attack him as soon as a proper season would allow of their entering upon the action and were very pressing to gain a declaration of the Company's intention", the Bombay Council decided "that it could not do better than embrace the Maratha (the Peśva's) party and assist them in any expedition against him, so far as its forces would permit. By such a step it felt it would contribute to the humbling of a resolute bold enemy and also benefit by such events as their enmity might present it." 2 Cimājī Āppā who had conducted these negotiations died in December 1740, and Sambhāji's annual incursions remained unchecked. He seized the Resolution returning to Bombay from Surat and caused quite a panic. He died a year later on 12th January 1742.

Tulaji Äncre

Mānājī Āṅgre ended with becoming a satellite of the *Peśvā*. Tuļājī his half-brother and successor to Sambhājī Āṅgre's title, fleet and the barren kingdom of South Koṅkaṇ—suffered worse fate. Tuļājī was active and brave but haughty and altogether lacking in political foresight. His reckless courage and daring seamanship proved his

¹ Br. Ch. 56, Pub. Dept. Diary, XIII, B. 218-238, 253-260.

² Pub. Dept. Diary, XIII, B. pp. 305-306.

undoing. Claiming that he was a servant of the Crown he looked on himself as a peer of the Peśvā and refused to bend his knee before the latter. The *Peśvā* had usurped the authority of the crown; his hostility placed Tulaji in the position of a rebel against the State. The Sarkhel while feigning allegiance to the puppet monarch at Sātārā, followed a line of action dictated by his personal needs and selfish interests. To subsist his army he entered into a war with the Savant of Vada at the end of 1746 and gained successes in the initial stages. But in 1748, the Savant with the Peśva's aid defeated him with heavy loss at Kuḍāļ, and drove him out.1 A third raid by Tuļājī about 1750, was also successfully beaten back. His attempt against the chiefs of Viśalgad and Bavda met with a similar fate.2 To keep alive his fleet he raided Malabar ports and preyed on merchant shipping. His activities on land and at sea made him repugnant to all his neighbours-Marāṭhā chiefs of Viśālgaḍ, Bāvḍā, Kolhāpūr and Vādī and the foreign maritime powers-the English, the Portuguese and the Dutch. The Peśvā in his capacity as the head of the State and the supreme law-giver, took it upon himself to champion the cause of the smaller chieftains and entered into alliance with the English 'to subdue and demolish Tulaji Angre'.

The Marathas and the English. Tulaji Angre.

CHAPTER 6.

Tulājī Āṅgre was not unaware of the clouds gathering over his head. In October 1754, he sent his agents to the Bombay Council with a proposal for accommodating their long standing differences. The terms he offered were liberal enough to be acceptable. But the English would hear none of it. They flatly refused to recognise Āṅgre's right to issue passes for their trading vessels, insisted on the restoration of all the ships seized by him and called on him to send them men of consequence to treat of peace.³ The reply clearly indicated that the English were in no mood to accommodate and Āṅgre could expect no quarter from them.

The Peśvā by 1754, had made himself master of the Konkan with the exception of the coastline. If Angre would not go before him as a suppliant, would not respect his flag, there was no place for him in the Marāṭhā confederacy. With the Peśvā and Rāmajī Mahādev, his Subhedār of Sālsette, destruction of Āngre and his navy became an obsession. All the objections and fears of the English, Rāmajī Pant overcame by his arguments and by making them large concessions.⁴ On 19th March 1755, was concluded the agreement for

¹ S. P. D., XXIV. Nos. 86, 101, 98, 103, 99, 110, 115, 30, 113, 41, XXXIV, 34, Count of Alorna's report, pp. 203-206; History of Savantvadī, Ratnāgiri Gazetteer, 1880, p. 441.

² S. P. D. XXIV, 20 25, Pant Pratinidhi Bakhar in Bhārat Varṣa, Vol. I, p. 56; Gode Family Bakhar and Battle of Mudagad, J. U. B., Vol. V, Part IV, Gode Family Bakhar and Battle of Mudagad, J. U. B., vol. V, Part IV, Sāhū Roznisī, 225-229, 236 and 240.

⁸ Pub. Dept. Diary, Volume 27 (1754), pp. 309-315.

⁴ S. P. D., XIL, 115.

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TULAJI ANGRE.

making a joint assault on Angre's strongholds. The English squadron sailed out of Bombay under Commodore James and at Caul was joined by the Marāthā fleet. On 29th, they arrived before Suvarndurg and opening a terrific bombardment carried the place on 4th April. The lateness of the season held up operations for another year. Gheria and Vijayadurg were assaulted by the fleet under Admiral Watson on 11th February 1756. A chance shell fell among Angre's fleet which had been drawn up in the river and set on fire the Restoration grab. It spread to other ships and before long the whole of Angre's fleet was on fire and was completely burnt out. At night the Admiral landed his troops to get between the town and the Marāthā camp. About four in the afternoon of the 13th, the attack was renewed and the garrison flung out the flag of truce. The English troops marched in, took possession of the place and hoisted their flag. The destruction of Angre's power was complete. His entire fleet, which had been the terror of the coast for half a century, had gone up in a blaze. Angre became a prisoner in his enemy's hands, was sent to Poona and remained in custody till his death in 1786. The fort of Vijayadurg was plundered of all its accumulated treasure by the English and handed over to the Peśvā six months later after tedious negotiations. The Peśvā crushed his rival on the coast but in doing so lost the navy.

GROWING ANGLO-MARATHA TENSION

The extermination of Tulājī Āngre closed the chapter of Anglo-Marāthā friendship. Though a new treaty concluded in the October of 1756, gave exclusive commercial advantages to the British in addition to a few villages round about Bānkot or Fort Victoria, the English could not be persuaded to accede to the Peśvā's request for help in his Karnātak and Hindustan projects. The all-round expansion of Marāthā power was viewed by the British with greatest anxiety and if they did not pursue active measures to prevent it, they refused to be a party to it. The relations between the Peśvā and the English became less and less cordial. The acquisition of Surat by the English in 1759 and their support of the Siddi of Jañjirā in his struggle against the Peśvā's navy so infuriated the Poonā Government that it refused to transact business with the mission sent to Poonā under Price in the August of 1759.1

A year and half after the visit of the mission a terrible disaster overtook the *Peśvā* in Hindustan. At the battle of Pānipat in 1761, the *Peśvā*'s main army led by his cousin and his son was annihilated by the Afghān marauder Ahmad Sāh Abdālī aided by Najib Khān Rohillā and other Indian Muslim chieftains. Marāṭhā power in Northern India was destroyed and Marāṭhā prestige received a fatal blow. The defeat at Pānipat was followed by the death of Bāļājī Rāv *Peśvā* and the outbreak of civil war between his minor son Mādhav Rāv and his brother Rāghobā. The *Peśvā*'s neighbours became restless and seized large parts of his dominions.

¹ Forrest, Marāthā Series, Vol. I, pp. 125-138.

While Marāṭhā affairs were thus in a declining posture the fortunes of the East India Company were on the ascendant. The end of the The Marathas and Anglo-French struggle in January 1761, had left the British without a foreign rival on the Indian continent. Their victory over the Growing Anglo-Navāb of Bengal (1757) and subsequent revolutions engineered by them had put the richest Indian province at their command and provided them with a convenient base from which to march to the heart of Hindustan. From a trading concern the Company had risen to the position of a first-rate power and was now competing with the Marathas for the political leadership of India. Nothing could have suited their ambitious views better than to see their opponents weakened by losses and riven by civil war. Growing coolness marked the next phase of Anglo-Maratha relations which lasted from 1756 to 1774.

The difficulties of Poonā Government encouraged ambitious views in the Bombay Council. When envoys arrived at Bombay from Rāghobā during the monsoon of 1761, the Bombay Council welcomed the mission as giving them an opportunity for acquiring the islands of Salsette and Bassein, "not so much for advantages expected from revenue, as advanced positions necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay". Rāghobā offered to make cessions in Gujarāt for British aid in arms, but as Sālsette did not find a place in the cessions the talks ended inconclusively.

Mādhav Rāv Peśvā during his short regime showed wonderful resourcefulness and under his leadership the Marathas recovered By 1767, the embers of civil war laid low, the Nizām was humbled and professed friendship; Jānojī Bhosle who had been a source of great trouble was brought to book and made to disgorge his ill-gotten gains; above all Haidar Ali the most active enemy of the Marathas was soundly beaten in several campaigns and abandoned much of the territory seized by him and agreed to pay a tribute of 33 lakhs of rupees. The President of the Bombay Council writing in November 1767 "lamented the growing power of the Marāṭhās and felt that nothing should be left undone to check it as much as possible". An embassy was sent to Poona under Thomas Mostyn to learn the designs and sound the disposition of the Maratha Court and persuade it to join the English against Haider Ali. Mostyn soon discovered that there was little possibility of the Marāthās making common cause with Haidar Ali and did not press for a closer alliance.

The embassy sent its agent, Charles Brome, to Rāghobā at Nāśik to discover what advantages he was prepared to make to the English. Rāghobā expressed his resentment that his nephew did not leave him any share in the administration but had no definite proposals to offer.1

CHAPTER 6. the English. MARATHA

TENSION.

¹ op. cit., pp. 140-176.

CHAPTER 6.

The Marathas and the English.

GROWING ANGLO-MARATHA

TENSION.

Mostyn once more visited Poonă in 1772, September under instructions of the Home authorities "to negotiate for certain advantages for the settlement in the Malabar and also for the cession of the island and peninsula of Salsette and Bassein which added so much to the security and value of Bombay and penetrate Marāṭhā designs which might affect the Company's possessions in Bengal or Carnatic.". The period of Mostyn's third embassy lasted till the December of 1774 and was full of momentous events at Poona-the death of Mādhav Rāv Peśvā, murder of Nārāyan Rāv and the revolutions in the Poona Government. Mostyn's reports convinced his masters that the time had come to strike the blow for the possession of Salsette and that the seizure of the island amidst the confusion that reigned at the Marāṭhā capital, would pass unnoticed. An expedition under General Gordon and Superintendent Watson suddenly appeared before Thana, assaulted the fort and occupied the island on 23rd December 1774. Rumours of a Portuguese fleet threatening Sälsette was given as the excuse for the English attack.

The seizure of Sālsette was an act of wanton aggression and formed one of the causes of Anglo-Marāṭhā hostilities that ensued in the year following. But the main reason for the outbreak was Rāghobā's invitation to the Bombay Council to support his claim to the Peśvāship against the Bārbhāis or the council of Pooṇā ministers. Rāghobā was neither a diplomat nor a soldier and never popular at Pooṇā Court. The defeat of Pāṇipat and the consequent death of Bāļājī Rāv Peśvā had dragged this small man from obscurity and put him in a position of command. As the sole surviving elderly member of the Peśvā's house he looked upon himself as the guardian of his young nephews and in that capacity proposed to keep the reins of administration in his hands. This was resented and led to friction and open war between the uncle and the nephew.

AFFAIRS AT THE MARATHA COURT. Mādhav Rāv Peśvā died in November 1772 and was succeeded by his younger brother Nārāyan Rāv. Differences soon appeared between the new Peśvā and his uncle and led to the murder of the latter by the adherents of Rāghobā. Rāghobā now became the Peśvā. Though he denied complicity in the crime his action in rewarding the ring-leaders and putting them in positions of trust belied Rāghobā's words and combined with his general unpopularity, to draw on him the odium of the entire Marāthā Darbār and Marāthā people. The repulsion felt for the perpetrator of such a heinous crime took the form of a plot to oust him from the Peśvāship and run it in the name of a son of Nārāyan Rāv, natural born or adopted. Rāghobā's old friend and chief adviser Sakhārām Bāpū, inspired the main idea and took the lead in the formation of the league of the Bārbhāis. Marāṭhā chieftains were informed by letters of Rāghobā having been

dismissed from the Peśvāship and of the Council of ministers having taken over the administration in the name of the widow of the

The Marathas and murdered Peśvā.1

the English. AFFAIRS AT THE MARATHA COURT.

CHAPTER 6.

Large desertion in his army and the reports of the plot brought by his spies roused Rāghobā to the danger that was threatening him. He had gone to Karnāṭak to deal with Haidar Ali's aggressions. But the danger at home now required his attention. Patching up a treaty with Haidar Ali he turned towards Poonā. At Kāsegānv near Pandharpur on 26th March 1774, he defeated an army of the ministerial party led by Trimbak Rāv Peṭhe. Other armies barred his path to Poonā. Rāghobā broke his ground and fled northward to seek support from Sinde and Holkar.

The birth of a male child to the widow of Nārāyan Rāv Peśvā, who was pregnant at the time of her husband's death, in April 1774, put an end to Rāghobā's hopes of ever regaining the Peśvāship. Sinde whom he had approached (May 1774), to mediate in the dispute suggested that Rāghobā should receive a jāgīr worth ten lakhs of rupees and two forts, that he should be helped to pay off his troops to enable him to dismiss them and that the two ministers, Sakhārām Bāpū and Nānā Phadnis, should come to Burhānpūr to discuss further details in a personal meeting. The ministers agreed and moved towards Burhānpūr in November. Rāghobā was not prepared to accept any compromise that left him no share in the administration. His talks with the ministerial party convinced him he could expect no further concessions from them. On 10th December, he bolted and fled towards Gujarāt, where he was joined by Govind Rāv Gāikvād.

Negotiations for Military aid had been opened with the English at Surat by Rāghobā's agents quite a year back; a draft treaty making large concessions to them in Gujarāt had been drawn up in September 1774. With Haripant Phadke threatening to encircle him in Gujarāt, Rāghobā renewed his solicitations. He was defeated on 17th February 1775 in the battle of Māhī (near Arras), and fled by way of Cambay and Bhavnagar to Surat. On 6th March, was concluded the treaty by which the English agreed to support his cause with a force of 2500 troops with a due proportion of artillery. Rāghobā among other things agreed to cede to the Company in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and other islands adjacent to Bombay, Jambusar and Olpād pargaņās in Gujarāt and the Peśvā's share of revenue of Ankaleśvar. For the expenses of the troops he was to pay a lakh and a half of rupees monthly and by way of security deposited with the Company jewellery worth six lakhs.2

FIRST ANGLO-MARATHA WAR.

¹ S. P. D., V, pp. 12, 20, 24, 26, etc.

² Forrest, Marāṭhā Series, I, pp. 211-215. The first Marāṭhā war can be followed in detail in Forrests's Selections Maratha Series and Khare's Attihāsik Lekha Sangraha, vol. VII and Historical papers on Mahādjī Sinde.

CHAPTER 6. the English. FIRST ANGLO-Maratha War,

The Bombay Council as remarked previously was anxious to emulate the example of Bengal and Madras to obtain political The Marathas and ascendancy at Poona and make the presidency pay its way by means of increased revenue. But its plans were very badly laid, the means adopted proved quite inadequate for the ends in view and Marāthā resistance proved far more stubborn than what had been imagined from English experience in Bengal and Karnāṭak.

> Colonel Keating who had arrived at Surat about the end of February at the head of the British detachment, joined Rāghobā on the conclusion of the treaty of Surat and both sailed to Cambay for the purpose of forming a junction with Raghoba's defeated army that had fallen back on Kapadvañj. The season had advanced and Rāghobā wanted to remain in Gujarāt during the monsoon. The British were however anxious to push south in the direction of Poona at once. The march of the confederate army southward challenged and impeded at every stage by the forces under the command of Haripant Phadke. Several inconclusive actions were fought of which the battle of Arras, claimed as a victory by the British, cost them two hundred and twenty men of whom eighty-six were Europeans and eleven of them officers. The allies could make little progress after the battle and went into cantonment at Dabhoi for the rainy season.

TREATY OF PURANDAR.

While both parties were preparing for renewal of hostilities after the rains the Supreme Government in Calcutta intervened disapproving in strongest terms the policy and measures of the Bombay Council in supporting Rāghobā. They declared the war as "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust". "You have imposed on yourself", they wrote, "the charge of conquering the whole Maratha empire for a man who appears incapable of affording you any effectual assistance in it.".1 They sent Col. Upton to Purandar near Poona to negotiate a treaty with the ministers and put an end to hostilities. Upton was in Maratha camp for three months and concluded an agreement on 1st March 1776, which dissolved the British alliance with Rāghobā, Provided for the retention of Salsette by them, secured them Broach and the surrounding territory and promised a subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees for the expenditure incurred on the troops. Rāghobā was to disband his troops and reside at Kopargany on the Godavari; expenditure of his household to the amount of ten lakhs was guaranteed.2

The treaty of Purandar was in no way dishonourable to either party. For the Marathas the chief gain was the dissolution of the British alliance with Raghoba. Once the English abandoned his Rāghobā would be isolated and cease to be the source of

¹ op. cit., p. 238.

² op. ctt., pp. 277-280.

infinite trouble that he had proved so far. The English had gained their main objective-Salsette and the islands adjacent to Bombaywhich they had always held as of great strategic value. If both The Marathas and parties had been sincere in their professions peace would have followed the conclusion of the treaty. But in Raghoba the Bombay Council had found a pliable instrument to increase their influence in the Marāṭhā Court. To surrender him to the ministerial party and abandon their recent gains in territory worth twenty-lakhs of rupees was for the Bombay Council too bitter a pill to swallow. Despatches received from the Court of Directors about this time encouraged the Council in its recalcitrant attitude. Instead of abandoning Rāghobā's cause it sheltered him first at Surat and then at Bombay, allowed his troops to remain in the city of Surat, afforded asylum to the partisans of the imposter of Sadāśiv Rāv Bhāu and secret encouragement to intrigues at Poonā. The Poonā ministers retaliated by refusing to fulfil their part of the treaty. They declined payment of the twelve lakhs that had been stipulated, nor would they surrender any territory near Broach. As counterpoise to the British they pretended to entertain seriously proposals presented to them by a Frenchman Mons de St. Lubin on behalf of his Government,

England's colonies in America were at this time in revolt against the mother country. France looked on this as an excellent opportunity of retaliating for the injuries suffered during the seven years war and freely gave her assistance to the colonists. The appearance of a French agent at Poona greatly alarmed the Supreme Government at Calcutta and it readily fell in with the views of the Bombay Council to support the cause of Raghoba; setting aside the treaty of Purandar a force was despatched from Bengal and another march upon Poonā in support of Rāghobā was sanctioned.

Elated at the success of its views the Bombay Council immediately fitted an expedition to take Rāghobā to Poonā. It would not wait for the Bengal detachment to arrive in the Deccan. Reports of dissensions among the Poona ministers and the appearance of a party supposed to favour Raghoba's cause hastened its preparations. An army consisting of five hundred Europeans, three thousand sepoys and three hundred gun lascars attended by Raghoba and a party of irregular horse set out on the road to Poonā on 25th November 1778. By 20th December the force had ascended the Bhor Ghāt, but saw no sign of Marāṭhā allies that were to join Rāghobā. By painful marches it pushed forward to Taleganv in another three weeks. This however proved the limit.

"The hopes which the Bombay Council had formed of a general rising in favour of Räghobā were grievously disappointed. The scheme of pushing into the heart of the Maratha empire, the British discovered was a difficult one to accomplish.". Nānā Phadnis with Mahādjī's aid had put down the faction that had invited Rāghobā to

CHAPTER 6.

the English. TREATY OF PURANDAR.

RENEWAL OF Hostilities— BRITISH DEFEAT AT VADGAON.

CHAPTER 6.

the English. RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES-British Defeat AT VADGAON,

Poonā and impeded the progress of the English army with fifty thousand seasoned troops. The small British force was sniped at on The Marathas and its march and cut off from its rear. When it reached the village of Taleganv it found the place completely reduced to ashes. The English Commander realising his mistake attempted withdrawal. But retreat was now too late and no longer practicable. On 17th January 1779 was signed the convention of Vadganv, by which the English Commander accepted to surrender Rāghobā, abandon Sālsette and all territory acquired since 1772 and countermand the march of the Bengal Detachment. The convention was to be later ratified by the Bombay Government.

> The convention of Vadgānv was at once repudiated by the Bombay Government and the Supreme Government supported their action. The Bombay Council realized its mistake in underrating the strength of the Marāṭhā empire and the need of retrieving its mistake immediately if further disaster was to be avoided. But its army had returned defeated, its treasury was exhausted, its credit gone and its reputation tarnished. The Council's hope lay in obtaining reinforcements from Bengal. Fortunately for it Col. Goddard who had replaced Leslie in command of the Bengal Detachment in October 1778, received information of the disaster that had befallen the Bombay force while he lay encamped at Burhanpur (30th January 1779) and pushing with all possible haste, reached Surat on 26th February. Rāghobā who had surrendered at Vadgānv and was being escorted to Jhansi eluded his guard and reached Surat in June. Bengal also sent other detachments to strike at the north-east corner of Mālvā and create a powerful diversion in favour of Goddard.

OUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH.

Nănă Phadnis who had now become the sole authority in the Poonā Government prepared to meet the situation. He formed a grand coalition of almost all Indian powers against the British. The native princes, the Nizām, Haidar Āli, the Navāb of Oudh and others all had become painfully alive to the aggressive designs of the British and the Nizām mooted the idea of a general alliance against them. Nănă Phadnis immediately accepted the idea and by large cessions in Karnāṭak to Haidar Ali won him over to the design. While the Marāṭhās would engage the English in the Western part of the peninsula, Haidar Ali was to attack the English in South Karnāṭak, the Nizām was to send an army to the Northern Sarkārs and the Bhosle of Nāgpūr to invade Bengal. In the end though the Nizām remained supine and Bhosle was bribed into inactivity, the Marāṭhās and Haider Ali waged war so bitterly as to bring the British to the verge of ruin.

Goddard made a half-hearted attempt to end hostilities on the basis of the treaty of Purandar with an additional stipulation for the exclusion of the French from Marāthā dominions. Nānā Phadņis insisted on the fulfilment of the Vadganv engagement and surrender

¹ Hist, Papers of Mahādjī Sinde, pp. 83, 92-96.

of Rāghobā and war was renewed at the end of the year. To make the war pay for itself Fateh Singh Găikvād was lured into an alliance (26th January 1780) on condition of ceding to the Company his districts south of the Tapī and aiding the British with three thousand horses. Pabhoi surrendered on 20th January and Ahmadābād was captured on 15th February after severe fighting. Sinde and Holkar had by now arrived in Gujarāt and Goddard turned southward to meet them. The superiority of the British in artillery prevented close engagements; the Marāthā horse, hovered round the enemy's camp hanging on his flanks, cutting off his supplies and attackig his lines of communications. Goddard was not prepared for this war of attrition and tried to surprise the Maratha camp under cover of night twice (3 April and 19 April) but the results were indecisive. The Bombay Government which was impatient for results recalled the Bombay Detachment and heavy fighting took place in Konkan. Kalyān, Pārsik, Belāpūr, were seized by Capt. Campbell in May. Malanggad was threatened. An attempt made by Nānā Phadnis to recover Kalyan was foiled by Capt. Hartley.

As soon as the rains ceased Goddard arrived at Bombay and marched his troops to the siege of Bassein. The fort was assulted on 11th December and on the next day a force under Rāmcandra Ganeś that attempted relief was defeated by Hartley. Pressed to force a decision Goddard attempted a march on Poonā. His advance guard reached Khaṇḍāļā on 8th February (1781) and Goddard himself followed it with the main force. Nānā Phaḍṇis showed no inclination to yield to the threat and treat with the English; a large army took up a menacing position in the Māvaļ hills and another pouring through other Konkan passes began to harass Goddard's supply columns. To avoid another Vadgānv, Goddard hastily retired at the end of April suffering heavy losses in men and stores.

The diversion created by Hastings in the north-east corner of Sinde's possessions succeeded but partially. Mahādjī Sinde withdrew from Gujarat to Ujjain for the defence of his dominion, but was too late to save Gvalior which was carried by a brilliant night escalade on 3rd August 1780. This fortress was of great strategic value and its loss naturally dismayed Mahādjī Sinde. The Rāṇā of Gohād and the Bundelā chief of Narvar joined the British and negotiations were opened with other Jāṭ and Rajput princes to join the British standard. Another and a still larger force under Col. Camac invaded Malva and with the aid of its allies advanced by way of Sipri to Sironj. Its further progress was halted here and Camac finding himself in a difficult corner, decided to fall back. The retreat was marked with daily losses and Camac's force stood in danger of being cut off. On the night of 24th March however, Camac surprised Sinde's camp and took away his main standard and a number of guns. Col. Muir now joined Camac with reinforcements and took the command. No further advantage could be obtained by the

CHAPTER 6.

The Marathas and the English.

QUADRUPLE
ALLIANCE
AGAINST
THE BRITISE.

CHAPTER 6.

The Marathas and the English.
TREATY OF SALBYE,

British; they were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sinde's camp which continued to hover round. Fighting ceased as the north Indian summer advanced.

Both parties were now weary of the war. Haidar Ali who had invaded Karnātak carried everything before him and appeared at the gates of Madrās. The English troops sent to oppose him were surrounded and almost annihilated. A French squadron under Suffren appeared on the Coromandel coast. Distracted by difficulties Hastings appealed to Sinde to make peace. A truce was concluded by Col. Muir on 13th October 1781 and the final treaty was signed at Sālbye on 17th May 1782.

The treaty of Sālbye consisted of seventeen articles; the main articles provided for the withdrawal of British support to Rāghobā and restoration of all British conquests in Gujarāt and Mālvā subsequent to the treaty of Purandar; Haidar Ali was to restore the territories he had taken from the British; all Europeans, except the English and the Portuguese, were to be excluded from the Marāṭhā dominions. Sinde was given Broach and he stood guarantee for the due fulfilment of the terms of the treaty.

The treaty of Sālbye was indeed a triumph for the diplomatic genius of Nānā Phadnis. The British object of putting their nominee on the *Peśvāship* and gaining control of Marāṭhā politics was frustrated. Marāṭhās at this period as Lyall puts it, "proved too strong and too well united to be shaken or overawed by such forces as the British could despatch against them.". Lt. Col. Luard when he writes in the Cambridge History "that the treaty established the dominance of the British as controlling factor in Indian Politics" is anticipating events.

INTERLUDE OF UNEASY PEACE.

The twenty years following the conclusion of the treaty of Salbye formed an interlude of uneasy peace. The Court of Directors declared in a pontifical manner "that they were completely satisfied with the possessions they already had and would engage in no war for the purpose of further acquisition and that they would never depart from that principle either in the condition then obtaining of the native powers or in any future revolutions amongst them. They allowed it to be known that peace was their primary object and that they would refrain from all interference in the contentions which might arise among the native princes unless called for by the stipulations of any existing treaty or by a threat of French interference.³ These were admirable sentiments and perhaps the Directors were sincere in their professions. But with the bitter experience of British diplomacy and of the activities of the Company's servants on the scene of action the native princes of India, least of all the Marāṭhā Government, could bring themselves to believe in the pacific disposition of the Company.

¹ Aitchison, Treaties, etc., vol. VII, pp. 39-43.

² Lyall, Sir Alfred, British Dominion in India, p. 191.

Poona Residency Correspondence Series, vol. II, p. 13.

Lord Cornwallis' refusal to aid the Poona Government against Tipu Sultān in 1786 caused much heartburning and led to coolness between The Marathas and the two Governments. The Governor General's unwillingness, however, to take advantage of Sinde's difficulties in his war with the Rajputs in 1787 and the strict neutral policy that he followed in the UNEASY PEACE. crisis of his affairs next year went a long way to improve mutual relations. In 1790 the Poona Government entered into an alliance with the British to reduce Tipu's overgrown power. The remarks of Malet reflect correctly if somewhat uncharitably Marāthā attitude in this war. "The grand object of our allies (the Marathas) is to reap as much benefit as possible from the war and to stimulate Tipū's and our exertions to the exhaustion of our mutual force so that they may become the arbiter of future negotiations.". At the conclusion of the peace, however, the statesmanship of Lord Cornwallis did not fail to take care to see that "British enemies were crippled without making their friends formidable.".

"The Peśvā is our rival in power" remarks Malet in another place? and British diplomacy was cleverly directed to spread disaffection towards the Marathas among neighbouring princes, encourage mutual jealousies among the members of Maratha Confederacy and thus undermine Maratha power. The strength of the confederacy united under Nānā Phadnis appeared irresistible to the Governor General in 1794 and deterred him from supporting the Nizām in his arrogant assumption of independence and rejection of Marāthā claims on him. The result was the triumph of Marāthā arms at Khardā and the reduction of the Nizām to the position of a subordinate.

The fact of the matter was that so long as the two great Marāthā leaders, Mahādjī Sinde and Nānā Phadnis lived and wielded authority, the Marāthā Empire had a semblance of unity and pursued a common vigorous policy which kept its enemies in awe. But after the death of Mahādjī Sinde in 1794 and that of Savāi Mādhav Rāv in 1795 the Marāthā State became a house divided against itself. Bājī Rāv Raghunāth who succeeded to the *Peśvāship* in 1796, had imbibed such violent hatred for the minister who had sent his father into exile that he could never bring himself to trust him or feel himself safe while the Minister lived. Bājī Rāv intrigued and plotted to ruin Nānā Phadnis and his partisans with the support of Daulat Rav Sinde (Mahādjī's successor). Sinde's trained battalions brought the new Peśvā success in the initial stages of the contest. Nānā Phadnis was seized, thrown into prison and died in March 1800. But soon there was violent reaction against the imbecile conduct of the two unworthy chiefs. The Minister's partisans received unexpected aid from Yesvant Rāv Holkar who rose against Daulat Rāv's tyranny and his interference in Holkar's succession. In the battle of Hadapsar fought on 25th October 1802, the joint armies of the Peśvā and Sinde were routed, the Peśvā fled from Poonā and there were prospects that Nānā's partisans headed by Yeśvant Rāv Holkar would gain control at Poonā.

CHAPTER 6.

the English. INTERLUDE OF

> OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR AMONG MARATHAS.

¹ F. R. C., vol. III, p. vi, 168,

² P. R. C., vol. II, p. 118.

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> TREATY OF BASSEIN AND AFTER.

Circumstances however shaped differently. The British now intervened and intervened much more effectively than in 1775. Lord The Marathas and Wellesley who had come to India as Governor-General abandoned the policy of neutrality and was determined to make British authority supreme in India. He had already crushed Tipū Sultān of Mysore and forced the Nizām, the Navāhs of Oudh and Arcot into subordinate alliances with the Company. He had offered the subsidiary treaty to the Peśvā four years back and now when the Peśvā turned to him for aid it was readily granted. On 31st December 1802 was concluded the treaty of Bassein. The Peśvā was to receive a subsidiary force of six battalions and to cede to the Company for their maintenance districts yielding twenty-six lakhs of rupees. He bound himself not to engage in hostilities, nor even to negotiate with other States without the permission of the British Government, and that Government was also to arbitrate his claims upon the Nizām and the Gāikvād. British troops reinstated the Peśvā in his capital in May 1803.

> The treaty of Bassein was the most disgraceful compact the Marathas ever concluded. It degraded the *Peśva* to the position of a vassal of the Company. It broke up for ever the Marāthā confederacy which though loose and jarring, had a living sense of unity and a genuine national sentiment behind it. The treaty gave the British control of the Peśvā's country and resources. It ended once for all the contest for the sovereignty fought between the Marāthās and the British. As Sidney Owen remarks "while previously to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein there existed a British Empire in India the treaty by its direct and indirect operation, gave the Company the Empire of India".

> The Peśvā's action in signing the treaty and inviting the British for his protection shocked his friends much more than it surprised his enemies. Sinde, Bhosle, Holkar and other Maratha leaders would not tolerate the surrender of national independence by the idiotic Peścā. They prepared to sink their differences and make a common cause to resist the British threat. Wellesley's diplomacy however succeeded in keeping alive the rift between Sinde and Holkar. In two swift campaigns very skilfully organized the armies of Sinde and Holkar were defeated and dispersed and the Maratha confederacy ceased to exist. The Maratha chiefs were left in a sullen mood but were helpless Their attempt to revive the conagainst the tide of the new forces. federacy was effectively defeated by Hastings fifteen years later when the Peśvā was sent into exile, his kingdom annexed and Sinde and Holkar accepted the position of tributary princes.

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Origin and Rise.

BHOSLES OF NAGPUR

THE BHOSLE FAMILY IS COUNTED AMONG THE ROYAL OR KSATRIYA CLANS of the Marāthās. The Bhosle house to which Chatrapati Sivāji, the founder of Marāṭhā Kingdom belonged, hailed from Verul near Daulatābād. The Bhosles of Nāgpūr are known as Hinganikar as one of their ancestors who was probably a contemporary of Mālojī, the grandfather of Chatrapati Sivājī, rehabilitated the village Beradī near Hinganī in the present district of Poona. The two brothers Mudhojī and Rupājī of Hinganī-Berādī were contemporaries of Sahājī Bhosle, the father of Sivājī. Like Chatrapati Bhosle house, the Nagpur Bhosle family too, considers that it descended from the Sisodiā Rajputs of Udaipūr. It is quite possible that some Kṣatriya clans of the Rajputs came down, to the Marāthā country from the north during the long ascendancy of the Muslims. Nevertheless, it is a historical fact that there were Ksatriya families in the Marāthā country like the Rastrakūtas, the Calukyas and the Yadavas, who had no relationship with the Rajputs of the north.

The family tree in the bakhar of the Bhosles of Nāgpūr denotes ancestors who were common to this house and also to the Bhosle house of the Chatrapatis. The Bhosles of Nāgpūr and the Chatrapati's house belonged to the same Kṣatriya clan. However, there is no independent historical evidence to establish common ancestry between the two families in the few generations preceding Chatrapati Sivājī. The account in the bakhar of the Bhosles of Nāgpūr, therefore, has to be taken with a grain of salt.

In the biography of Chatrapati Sambhājī by Malhār Rāmrāv Citnis it is stated that after the death of Sivājī his obsequies were performed by Sābājī Bhosle, as Sambhājī, the eldest son, was in confinement on the fort of Panhāļā. But James Grant Duff in his 'A History of the Marāṭhās', Vol. I, p. 243, says that Sivājī's funeral rites were performed by one 'Shahjee Bhonslay' (Sahājī Bhosle). There is no unanimity among contemporary writers about the person performing Sivājī's funeral rites.

[•] This Chapter is contributed by Prof. B. K. Apte, Nagpur University, Nagpur.

CHAPTER 7. Bhosles of Nagpur.

If, however, Sābājī Bhosle performed the obsequies there is every possibility that this Bhosle, the ancestor of the famous Raghuji Bhosle of Nagpur was a known blood relation of the Chatrapatis. At the Origin and Rise time of Sāhū Chatrapati's home-coming when Tarābāi and her partisans purposely cast doubt about \$āhū being the grandson of Sivājī, it was Parasojī of the Nāgpūr Bhosle house who dined with Sāhū and dispelled the doubt. Then again during the last years of Sāhū's reign it was strongly rumoured that he would select an heir to the gadi of Satara from the Bhosles of Nagpur as he had no son. Later, the English offered to seat one of the Bhosle's of Nagpur on the gadi of Satara. All these events indicate the possibility of a common ancestor of the Bhosles of Sātārā and Nāgpūr though direct historical evidence is not yet forthcoming to establish the fact.

> The two Bhosle brothers, Mudhojī and Rupājī were contemporaries of Sahājī Bhosle and were noted roving soldiers.1 Rupājī, it seems was residing at Bham in the district of Yavatmal, where he had a jāgīr². He was childless. Of the sons of Mudhojī, Parasoū and Sābājī stayed with their uncle at Bhām and served in the army of Chatrapati Sivājī.

Parasoji BHOSLE

Parasojī seems to have gained some distinction by his inroads into the territories of Berar and Gondavana during the reign of Sivājī. He exacted tribute from these regions. After Sambhājī's death when Rājārām succeeded to the throne of the Chatrapati, Parasojī rendered him valuable help. In appreciation of his services Rājārām honoured Parasojī by presenting him robes, jaripatakā and title of 'Senā Sāheb Subhā. Gondavana, Devagad, Canda and Berar from where he had exacted tribute were given to his charge3. Parasojī was the first of the Bhosles of Nāgpūr to have received this honorific title. This grant was made in 1699 A.D.4.

When Sāhū was released by the Moghals, Parasojī was the first of the Marāthā nobles to join him. Parasojī dined with Sāhū in the same dish to dispel the doubt of the latter's royal descent. In 1707, Sāhū conferred on Parasojī the title of 'Senā Sāheb Subhā' and issued a sanad granting him and his successors in perpetuity 'mokāsā' of the following places:-

1. Prānt Ritapūr and Sarkār-Gāvel, Prānt Berār, Prānt Devgad, Cāndā and Gondavana.

¹ NPI., p. 44.

² Ibid., p. 46.

⁸ Mālhār Rāmrāv Citnis Viracita Srimant Chatrapatī Sambhājī Mahārájā Āņi Thorale Rājārām Mahārāja yānci Caritre by K. N. Sane, Third Edition, 1915. p. 51.

⁴ NPI., p. 45.

2. Mahālwise details of Anāgondi¹, Berār, etc.—

	-	
		Mahals.
		46
		37
• •		19
		21
		5
		19
	_	147
	•••	

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur, KANHOJI BHOSLE.

So far, for the grant of 147 mahāls from the six Sarkārs, there is no documentary evidence.2. Parsoji, the first Senā Sāheb Subhā died at Khed at the confluence of the rivers Kṛṣṇā and Veṇṇā in 1709, on his homeward journey from Sātārā.3

Parasojī was succeeded by his son Kānhojī. Chatrapati Sahū granted Kanhoji his hereditary title and also some land at Khed for the maintenance of his father's memorial. Dārvā was taken by Kānhojī and he made Bhām his headquarters.

In the struggle between the Sayyad brothers and Nizām-ul-mulk for the control of the Delhi affairs, the former received the support his relations with of Sāhū. Sāhū sent Bājīrāv Peśvā and Kānhojī Bhosle against the Nizām. In the battle of Bālāpūr fought on 10th August, 1720, the Nizām came out victorious. Many Marāthās lost their lives. In the battle of Sākhar-Khedā, 1724, Kānhojī Bhosle offered to help Mubārij Khān against the Nizām, but Mubārij impudently refused it.

Kānhojī was a religious minded orthodox Marāthā nobleman. It is said that he accepted food prepared by Brāhmins alone. The religious bent of his mind was probably due to his having no son. He performed sacrifices, religious rites and observed fasts so that he should be blessed by God with a son. Kanhoji soon got a son whom he named Rupājī.4.

Kānhojī it seems was hot tempered. He could not carry on well either with the Chatrapati or the Peśvä. When called by the Chatrapati to explain the causes of his failure to pay the dues into the treasury, Kānhojī could neither pay the dues nor explain the accounts. The fact seems to be that he was not prepared to brook control with Sāhū. As the relations worsened, Kānhojī on 23rd August 1725, decamped from Sātārā and hastened to the Nizām for

Kānhojī breaks \$ähū.

² NBB., p. 31, states that these Mahals were granted to Parasoji Bhosle.

Total

¹ The word Anagondi is wrongly read. Anagondi is in Karnatak. The correct reading of the word cannot be ascertained.

Independent evidence in support of this statement is not available.

P. D., Vol. 20, p. 1, "The Early struggle of the Bhosles cannot yet be set down with accuracy, not a single paper relating to Parasoji, the founder of the Nagpur Rajas and first prominent adherent of King Sahu, having been hitherto discovered.

³ NPI., p. 50.

⁴ Ibid., p. 56.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Kanhon Bhosle. asylum. The *Nizām*, however, did not back Kānhojī as Śāhū reminded him that such an act was against the treaty entered into between them. When all attempts at rapprochement failed, Śāhū set Raghujī Bhosle against Kānhojī. Raghujī had been asking Kānhojī, his uncle, for his share in the ancestral jāgīr. This had naturally strained the relations between the nephew and the uncle. *Chatrapati* Sāhū in setting the nephew against the uncle exploited the family feud to his own advantage.

After making the necessary preparations Raghujī marched in 1728 from Sātārā against his uncle. Sāhū granted him the *mokāsā* of Devur near Wāi. For this grant the Bhosles of Nāgpūr were also styled as the *Rājās* of Devur. Raghujī received the robes of *Senā Sāheb Subhā*, *sanads* for Berār and Goṇḍavana, and the right to extend the levy of *cauthāi* to Chaṭtisgad, Patna, Allahabad and Makasudābād (Bengāl)

Raghujī entered Berār via Aurangābād. Near Jālnā Samser Bahāddar Atole objected to Raghuji's taking the army through his territory as the old route passed through Nanded and Asti. Raghuji avoided an encounter with Atole and encamped at Balapur after crossing the Lakhanvādā ghāṭs. From Bāļāpūr Raghujī sent his armed men all over the Berar and collected tributes. Sujäyat Khan Pathän of Akolā serving under the Navābs of Ellicpūr was easily defeated by Raghuji and his territory subjugated. Thus, after establishing his rule over a greater part of Berār, Raghujī proceeded towards Bhām, the headquarters of his uncle in A.D. 1730. The small fortress at Bhām was besieged by Raghuji's army. He was joined by his other uncle Rānojī. Finding himself in a difficult situation, Kānhojī escaped from Bhām and ran for safety towards Māhūr. He was hotly chased by Raghuji and Ranoji and overtaken near Mandar (Van). In the skirmish that took place, Kānhojī was defeated and taken a prisoner. Kānhojī, the second Senā Sāheb Subhā, spent the remaining part of his life as a prisoner at Sātārā. At one time Kānhojī was an enterprising officer of Śāhū. He made some conquests in Gondavana and led an incursion into Katak, laying the foundation of Marāthā expansion eastward. His proposals that he should be allowed to maintain 200 horses, and Akolā and Bāļāpūr in Pāyā Ghāṭ should be restored to him, were not accepted. All was lost, once he lost the favour of Sahū.2 The end of Kanhoji's political career in about 1730 A.D., opened up for Raghujī new opportunities in Berār, Nāgpur and the region beyond, to the east.

RAGHUJI BHOSLE, By suppressing the recalcitrant Kānhojī, Raghujī gained the favour of *Chatrapati* Sāhū. As already observed, Sāhū conferred on him the title of *Seṇa Sāheb Subh*ā and the right to collect *cauthāi* from Berār,

¹ NPI., pp. 58-64.

² Grant Duff, A History of The Marathas, Vol. I, p. 424.

Goṇḍavana, Chattisgad, Allāhābād, Makasudābād (Bengāl) and Pātnā. According to Grant Duff on the occasion of granting the rights Raghujī gave a bond which stated¹:—

- 1. That he would maintain a body of 5,000 horse for the service of the State;
- 2. Pay an annual sum of Rs. 9 lacs;
- 3. Pay half of the tribute, prizes, property and other contributions excluding the ghāsdānā;
- 4. Raise 10,000 horse when required, and accompany the *Peśvā* or proceed to any place he might be ordered.

These terms of the bond are important in determining Chatrapati—Raghujī and Peśvā—Raghujī relations.

Details of Raghujī's early lift are not available. It seems that shortly after his birth his father Bimbājī died and he was brought up by his mother Kāśibāī and grandmother Bayābāī at Pāṇḍavavāḍī near Wāi (District Sātārā). The child, it is said, was born by the grace of one Rāmājipant Kolhaṭkar, a pious devotee of Rāma and was therefore named Raghujī. There seems to be much truth in this story. Raghujī was a devotee of God Rāma though the family deity was Mahādev. He installed the new idol of Rāma at Rāmṭek and was responsible for reviving the religious importance of this ancient place. In his letter-head he incorporated the word 'Sitā-kāntā' meaning, the Lord of Sīta in honour of his favourite God Rāma.

When Raghujī attained manhood he served in the army of his uncle Rānojī. Later he was with his other uncle Kānhojī at Bhām. Raghujī did not fare well with Kānhojī and entered the services of Cānd Sultān of Devagad. For some time he was also with the Navāb of Ellicpūr.² Finally Raghujī decided to serve Chatrapati Šāhū at Sātārā. During his stay there he was asked to accompany Fatesingh Bhosle to the Karnāṭak where he distinguished himself as a capable soldier. When Raghujī's qualities as a soldier and leader of men came to the notice of Sāhū, he appointed him against the disobedient Kānhojī.

In the early part of his career Raghujī appears to have been a freelance soldier, shifting his loyalty from his uncle to the weak Gond rājās. This was rather the time-honoured expedient resorted to by many an ambitious soldier. Raghujī was not slow to grasp the political situation prevailing in the area from the distant Karnāṭak to Gondavana and finally threw his lot with Sāhū, who was by then a well-settled *Chatrapati*. This was indeed a wise decision which benefited Raghujī as also the Marāthā expansion.

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Raghuji Bhosle.

¹ Grant Duff, A History of The Marathas, Vol. I, page 424.

² N. P. I., p. 69,

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Bhosles of Nagpur. RAGHUJI BHOSLE. After consolidating his position at Bhām in Berār, Raghujī turned his attention to the Gond Kingdoms of Devagad, Gada-Maṇdlā, Cāndā and Chattisgad. Internal dissensions in these kingdoms and their wars with other States were the occasions availed of by Raghujī for establishing his sway over them. In 1739-1740, Raghujī was sent to Karnāṭak by Sāhū. Raghujī distinguished himself in this expedition. Returning from Karnāṭak he made the necessary arrangement for the invasion of Bengal and dispatched a large army under the command of his General Bhāskarpant. Bengal invasion engaged Raghujī's attention for ten years, from 1741 to 1751 A.D. The net gain was the province of Orissā. It was during these years that the historic dispute between Raghujī Bhosle and Bālājī Peśvā arose when their interest in the east clashed. Thus, broadly the chronological sequence of Raghujī's major exploits is—

Securing Berär by defeating his uncle Kānhojī; Extending his sway over the Gond Kingdoms; Karnāṭak expedition; and Incursions into Bengal.

Raghuji and the Gond kingdoms.

Devagad: Raghujī for sometime had sought service with Cand Sultān of Devagad after quitting his uncle Kānhoji at Bhām with whom he had quarrelled. The details of Raghuji's service with Cand Sultan are not available from the known source-material. Când Sultăn died in about 1738. His illegitimate son, Wali Sāh killed Mir Bahāddar, the legitimate son of Cand Sultan. Rānī Ratan Kuvar, the widow of Cand asked for Raghujis help as her two other sons Akbar and Burhān were minors. Raghujī at once proceeded from Bham and defeated Wali Sah's generals at Patansavangi. He next conquered Pavani to the south of Bhandara on the river Waingangā. This was a strategic post. Raghuji appointed his own officer Tulojīrāmpant, The fort of Bhanore or modern Bhandara was Raghuji's next target of attack. Wali Sah, from Devagad hurriedly dispatched an army under his divan Raghunathsing to relieve the pressure on Bhandara fort. Raghuji was camping at Sirasghat on the Wainganga. He split his army into two divisions stationing them at Sonbardi and Giroli. A select army under Raghujī Karāṇḍe was sent to face the enemy with the instruction that it should take to its heels at a suitable time and lure Raghunathsing between the two Maratha divisions. Raghunathsing's army was entrapped, routed and drowned into the Wainganga. He himself was taken a prisoner in a wounded state and honourably sent back to Devagad with a view to capturing Wali Sah by treachery. The fort of Bhandara was besieged. Its killedar resisted bravely for about 22 days but was finally forced to deliver it to the enemy.

Raghujī next marched to Devagad. Wali Sāh was advised by his divān Raghunāthsing to go out of the fort. This was preplanned. In a skirmish outside the fort Wali was defeated and arrested.

Rāṇī Ratan Kuvar considered Raghujī as her third son and gave him the third part of her kingdom. She paid him rupees ten lacs for war expenses. In 1737, the Rani granted Raghuji a sanad of her onethird kingdom bestowed upon him.

The sanad states that the fort of Pavani along with Bāļāpūr, paragaṇā Multāi with Cikhali and 156 villages under the said paragaṇā, the whole of paragaṇā Marud, were granted to Raghujī and his successors in perpetuity.1 The Rani also agreed that she would not enter into a treaty with any other power without the knowledge of Raghuji. With the possession of these parts of Devagad, Raghujī shifted his headquarters from Bhām to Nāgpūr. By 1748, the divān Raghunāthsing attempted to break off his relations with Raghuji. The latter, therefore, brought Akbar and Burhan to Nagpur under his direct protection and care.2 Eventually their kingdoms came to be managed by Raghuji and the Gond house of Devagad shaded into insignificance.

According to the account given in the bakhar (NBB), Raghuji secured a fresh sanad from Sāhū in 1738 A.D., bestowing upon him the right to collect cauthāi and mokasā of Lucknow, Makasudābād (Bengal), Bidar, Bitiā, Bundelkhaṇḍ, Allāhābād. Hājipūr, Pāṭṇā and Devagaḍ, Gaḍha, Bhavargaḍ and Cāndā.³ This very Information given by Wills runs as follows, "while returning from Sātārā, Sāhū Chatrapati bestowed Gondvana jhādi up to Katak free of revenue upon the Senā Sāheb Subhā.4" Gondavana ihādi is the ancient Zādī Maņdalā to the east of the Wardhā river which included Nāgpūr, Bhandārā, Cāndā, etc.

Gadha-Mandlā: It seems that when Bājīrāv was busy fighting with the Nizām at Bhopāl in 1736, Raghujī proceeded as far as Allāhābād and exacted tribute from the Rājā of Gadha-Mandlā. Bājīrāv strongly resented this act. His son Bāļājī invaded Gadha-Maṇḍlā⁵ in 1742, on his way to Bengal. Raghuji who was engaged in his Bengal expedition at this time bitterly complained to Sāhū of Bāļājī's encroachment upon Gadha-Mandla which was his sphere of activity. Along with Bengal, Allāhābād, etc., Gaḍha-Maṇḍlā too was the bone of contention between Raghuji and Bālāji. Both were finally reconciled to one another by Chatrapati Sāhū in 1743 6.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. RAGHUJI BHOSLE. Raghuii and the Cond kingdoms.

¹ NPI., pp. 71-74; also see RMSH., p. 173-As desired by the Rani Ratan Kuvar her "possessions were divided into three equal parts and one of them, namely that containing Gondavana, Pavani, Marud, Multāi and Bārghāt was given to Raghujī, Senā Sāheb" "He then lived in Nāgpūr and Devagad provinces.".

² NPI., p. 74. ³ Ibid., p. 76.

⁴ RMSH., p. 173.
5 NHM., Vol. II, p. 213. Raghujī complained to Sāhū that Bālājī captured his posts Gadha and Mandlā, and ruined his paraganās Sivani and Chapar. The ruler of Mandla burnt himself to death to escape disgrace.

⁶ Ibid., p. 219.

Bhosles of Nagpur. RACHUJI BHOSLE Rughuji and the Gond kingdoms Cāndā: The fate of the Gond rulers of Cāndā was sealed when Devagad and Gadha-Mandlā had come under Raghujī's sway. During the reign of Rāma Sāh, Raghujī invaded Cāndā but finding him a saintly king, Raghujī was so impressed that he left the country unmolested. His successor Nilakaṇṭh Sāh had gained disrepute as a tyrant. To deliver the people of Cāndā from his tyranny Raghujī invaded his country and made him a captive. The successors of Nilkaṇṭh Sāh were granted pension by Raghujī. Among the Gondavana territories of Raghujī, Cāndā was next in importance to Nāgpūr¹.

Raghujī's Karnāṭak expedition,

After the death of Aurangzeb the whole of Karnāṭak was in a state of chaos. The various principalities were trying to extend their territory at the cost of their neighbours. Karnātak, then, roughly included the territory to the south of Kṛṣṇā bound by the Sahyadri and the Eastern Ghāts. Aurangzeb had put Karnātak under the subhās of Bijāpūr and Hyderābād. The sanad of cauthāi granted to Sāhū by Emperor Muhammad Sāh included Hyderābād and Bijāpūr, Karnāṭak in addition to the four other subhās of the Deccan. According to his sanad the tributary states of Tañjore, Tricinopoly and Mysore were also subject to the levy of cauthai. The Nizamul-mulk as the subhedar of the Deccan claimed that all these territories belonged to him. The various navābs of Karnāṭak fought among themselves, the strongest of them trying to assert his authority over others by the simple law of might. The stronger navābs were those of Arcot, Sirā Kadappā, Karnool and Sāvanūr. The principality of Tañjore from the days of Sahājī comprised the paraganās of Bangalore, Hoskot, Kolār, Bālāpūr and Sirā. Its ruler Pratāpsinha, Chatrapati' Śāhū's cousin, was constantly harassed by Canda Saheb, the son-in-law of Dost Ali, the navab of Arcot. Canda Sāheb had usurped the kingdom of Tricinopoly by tempting its Ranī Minakşi to form perpetual friendship with him. With the fall of Tricinopoly he cast his covetous eyes on Tañjore which belonged to Rājā Pratāpsinha. Pratāpsinha appealed to Sāhū for help who dispatched a large force under Fatesingh and Raghuji Bhosle. In April 1740, the Maratha forces attacked Arcot, killed the navab Dost Ali and took his divan Mir Asad, a prisoner in May 1740. With Arcot in their possession Raghuji and Fatesingh laid siege to Tricinopoly, the stronghold of Canda Saheb. Raghuji was joined by Pratāpsinha. Candā Sāheb unable to receive aid from his brother Badā Sāheb of Madurā, delivered the fort to Raghujī on 14th March 1741, the auspicious day of Rāmanavamī. Candā Sāheb and his son Abid Ali were imprisoned by Raghuji and at once sent to Nagpur under the strict supervision of his general Bhāskar Rām. Later, in 1744, Raghuji freed these royal prisoners on payment of a ransom of Rs. 7.75 lacs from the bankers of Sātārā. Nothing is known about the place where Canda Saheb and his son were confined. Raghuji's

¹ NPI., p. 37.

² A History of the Marathas, Vol. I, (1912), by James Grant Duff-p. 368.

leadership and tact in the Karnatak campaign at once enhanced his prestige at the court of Sāhū. Pleased with his exploits Sāhū conferred upon him the mokāsā of Berār and Gondavana up to the fronties of Katak.1

During the war Canda Saheb had sent his treasure and zanānā for safe custody to Dumas, the French Governor of Pondicerry. Raghujī who had an eye on the wealth of the navāb at once reprimanded Dumas for sheltering his enemy. Dumas politely yet firmly refused to surrender the entrusted wealth and women. Raghuji's wrath was wafted away when he was presented a few fine Champagne bottles by Dumas. Raghuji's wife is said to have been highly delighted with this French gift and asked for more. When Sāhū came to know of this he is reported to have remarked that a kingdom was sold for a bottle of wine. Whatever the account of this story, its realistic side must not be lost sight of by historians. Dumas at Pondicerry was well-equipped with men and material. In the extreme hour of difficulty he would have easily escaped into the sea with his wealth and women, and Raghuji's attack would have been rendered ineffective if he had chosen to launch one. Raghuji was not slow to understand the power of the French. Weighing things in mind Raghuji might have preferred an honourable retreat to a futile attack.

Karnātak campaign gave Raghujī eminence at the court of Sātārā and eventually in the Marāthā confederacy. It helped him in giving a status on par with the Peśvās.

Raghuji hurriedly returned to Nägpür as the Bengal affair was vaiting his presence. awaiting his presence.

It was Kānhojī Bhosle who first led an incursion in the territory of Orissā or Katak taking advantage of the chaotic conditions prevailing there. Before he was defeated and sent to Sātārā as a prisoner by Raghujî Bhosle, Chatrapati Sāhū granted Raghujî a sanad of Berar and Gondavana and of the right to collect cauthāi of Chattisgad, Pāṭnā, Allāhābād and Makasudābād (Murśidābād).2 The date of his sanad, 1723 A.D., is obviously incorrect. On this occasion the grant of mokāsā of Devur near Wāi to Raghuji is dated 1731, A.D.3. The sanad, of Chattisgad, etc., up to Mursidābād, therefore, should also be roughly of the same date, i.e., 1730 or 1731 or a year earlier. It is not likely to have been given as early as 1723 A.D. For this sanad of collecting cauthāi from Chattisgad to Mursidabad, Sahu never obtained regular permission from the Moghals. In order to secure the cession of Malva

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BHOSLE. Raghujī's Karnatak expedition.

Raghujī's raids on Bengal.

¹ NHM, Vol. II, pp. 253-257.

² NPI., p. 61.

⁸ Ibid., p. 59.

Bhosles of Nagpur. RACHUJI BHOSLE. Raghuji's raids on Bengal,

under imperial seal Bäjīrāv I endeavoured hard all his life. He forced the Nizām after defeating him at Bhopāl in 1738, to obtain a sanad for Mālvā.1. Actually Mālvā was given to the charge of his son Bālājī as its deputy subhedār by an imperial farmān as late as 1741 A.D.² But Sāhū when he allowed Raghujī Bhosle to extend his sway as far as Bengal and collect cauthai, had not actually obtained a royal farman from Delhi to that effect.

The political condition of Bengal was precarious by about 1740. Bengal, Bihār and Orissā were, then, all under the navāb who resided at Muršidābād. Its able governor Muršid Qulikhān died in 1727. In 1740, his son-in-law Sarfaraz Khan who was the navāb, was killed by an ambitious Turk in his service named Alivardi Khān.³. Alivardi's usurpation was hated by the partisans of the dead navāb. The strong faction at Alivardi's court was headed by an able Persian of Siraz, by name Mir Habib who had risen to the position of deputy navābship of Orissā from very humble beginnings. He had made offers to Raghuji in the Bengal territory if he undertook an invasion. This was a very tempting offer to Raghuji who had been waiting to extend his sphere of influence to the east of Nagpur. Rather he considered the region from Nagpur to Bengal as his special field of activity. His brilliant successes in Karnāţak had strengthened his claim which had the full support of Chatrapati Sāhū who had granted him a sanad to that effect.

When Raghujī was in Karnāṭak Mir Habib had been to Nāgpūr urging Bhäskar Ram to invade Bengal. But Bhaskar Ram waited till his master returned home from the distant Karnāṭak. On his return from Karnāṭak, Raghujī made thorough preparations and sent a force of ten thousand under the able command of Bhāskar Rām. On the auspicious day of Dasarā of 1741, Bhāskar Rām set out for the expedition. He marched through Ramgad plundering Pacet (60 miles or 96.540 km., east of Rañci) on the way to Burdvān. Alivardi Khān camping at Burdvān (15th April 1742) with his slender army, was surprised by the Maratha forces. Bhaskar Ram employed half of his army in looting the area adjacent to Burdvan. The Khan finding himself helpless sent his agents to Bhāskar Rām begging for peace. The negotiations however fell through as Bhāskar Rām demanded rupees ten lacs as peace price. The Khan secretly left Burdvan for Katva, hotly chased by the Marāthās. As it was then the month of May, Bhāskar Rām decided to return to Nagpur to avoid the fury of monsoon. He, however, changed his plan at the prospect of obtaining immense booty from Mursidabad as designed by Mir Habib. Mir Habib with a light Marāthā force fell on Murśidābād and returned to Kāţvā loaded with booty worth two to three crores. Alivardi Khan reached his capital just a day late-7th May-when it had been denuded of its wealth by the Marathas. During the rainy season the Marathas and

¹ NHM., vol. II, p. 159.

Ibid., p. 202.
 NHM., Vol. II, p. 209.

Mir Habib established their sway as far as Calcutta. They took back Orissā. The East India Company dug a ditch round their factory known as the Marāṭhā Ditch.

The Marāṭhā camp at Kaṭvā was busy celebrating the Durgā pujā festival on 18th September 1742. It was attacked on 27th September by Alivardi's forces compelling them to run for safety helter-skelter. Bhāskar Rām escaped towards Pācet. He had to give up the outposts of Burdvān, Hugli and Hijli. Kāṭak was retaken by Alivardi and he returned to Mursidābād on 9th February 1743. Bhāskar Rām informed Raghujī of this discomfiture requesting him to despatch aid immediately. Raghujī however could not send succour to Bhāskar Rām owing to his clash with Bāļājī Bājīrāv Peśvā.

The Peśvā had left Poonā as early as 1741 with a view to putting a stop to Raghujīs activities in Bengal. He consolidated his position in Mālva with the help of Malhārāv Hoļkar, and captured Gaḍha, Maṇḍlā, plundering Sivani and Chapar. Alivardi was terribly afraid on learning these activities of the Peśvā, as he was expecting a joint attack by the Peśvā and Raghujī. The Peśvā, however, offered to help the emperor and Alivardi Khān against Raghujī if he were granted the cauthār right of Māļvā, Bundelkhaṇḍ and Allāhābād. The Emperor readily agreed to this proposal and sent the Peśvā to relieve Alivardi.

On 1st February 1743, the *Peśvā* and his vast army took a bath in the holy waters of the Gangā and the Yamunā at Prayāg. Thence he proceeded to Murśidābād where he had a meeting with Alivardi near Plassey on 30th March 1743. Alivardi agreed to pay the *cauthā*ī of Bengal to Śāhū and rupees twenty-two lacs to Bālājī towards the expenditure of the army. A meeting between Raghujī and Bāļājī earlier could not bring any tangible result.²

The Peśvä's army actually clashed with that of Raghujī in the Bendu pass near Pācet. The rear part of Raghujī's army was attacked and plundered by the Peśvā. From Pācet Raghujī made good for Nāgpūr and the Peśvā too started back for Pooṇā via Gayā.⁸

Chatrapati Sāhū who had known the deep-rooted rivalry between Bālājī and Raghujī called them to Sātārā and brought about a reconciliation which was respected by both the parties. Had the breach been neglected it would have certainly been detrimental to the interest of the Marāṭhā power in India. Raghujī and Bālājī signed an agreement at Sātārā in the presence of the Chatrapati on 31st August 1743. By this, all the territory from Berār to the east reaching Katak, Bengal and Lucknow was assigned to Raghujī, and that

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¹ OUM., p. 11.

² NHM., Vol. II, p. 216.

⁸ Ibid., p. 217.

Bhosles of Nagpur. RAGHUJI BHOSLE, Raghuji's raids on Bengal. to the west of this line including Ajmer, Āgrā, Prayāg and Māļvā to Bāļājī *Peśvā*. None was to interfere with other's sphere.¹.

Freed from the troubles with the Peśvā, the Senā Sāheb Subhā returned to Nāgpūr from Sātārā and sent an expedition into Bengal under Bhāskar Rām with a view to making up the lost ground. Bhaskar Ram left Nagpur early in 1744. Together with Mir Habib he harassed Alivardi Khān pressing him to pay cauthāi. Driven to desperateness Alivardi Khan hatched a plot to kill Bhaskar Ram by deceit. Through his agents he invited Bhāskar Rām for a meeting. It was arranged at Mankura between Amniganj and Katva when both the parties had pledged not to do any mischief by touching the Kurān and Gangā water. Mir Habib had warned Bhāskar of the Khān's evil intention. But the brave and over-confident Bhāskar went to a parley with the Khan accompanied by a few select men. When Bhaskar Rām took a seat in front of the Navāb the latter gave a signal as pre-planned and the hiding Muslim soldiers cut Bhaskar and his comrades to pieces. Twenty-two Maratha chiefs were killed. This tragic event took place on 31st March 1744.2.

Bhāskar Rām's murder was an irreparable loss to Raghujī and he never forgot the treacherous act of the Khān. With a view to punishing the Khān, Raghujī started with fourteen thousand horses, crossed the mountainous tract and putting Sambalpūr to his left reached Orissā in March 1745. Durlabhrām, the new deputy governor of Orrissa who was taken by surprise entered the fort of Bārābati for safety. The fort was besieged by Raghujī, Durlabhrām soon surrendered to Raghujī and found himself a prisoner in his camp, but the siege continued as another officer, Abdul Aziz, offered stiff resistance. Alivardi was unable to send supplies to Abdul Aziz at the approach of the rainy season. Abdul therefore surrendered the fort to Raghujī on 12th May 1745, after bravely defending it for two months. When the siege was on, the Marāṭhās occupied Orissā as far as Midnāpūr and Huglī, and plundered Burdvān.³.

After capturing the fort of Bārābati the Marāthās moved to Burdvān. At the invitation of a number of disgruntled Afghāns, Raghujī marched towards Bihār. An indecisive battle was fought at Mehib Alipur and Alivardi ran towards Muršidābād on 21st December 1745. At Rāmdighi near Katvā, Raghujī received a terrible set-back and left for Nāgpūr in January of 1746. He stationed three thousand Marāthās under Mir Habib on the understanding that he would pay rupees eleven lacs for the use of his army.4.

¹ NHM., Vol. II, p. 219.

² OUM., p. 12.

³ *1bid.*, p. 14.

⁴ OUM., pp. 15, 16.

In order to checkmate the Marāṭhās, Alivardi, sent his men from Murśidābād in November 1746. They inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Marāṭhās aṭ Midnāpūr. The Marāṭhās fled towards Bālāsore through Jaleśvar.¹.

By this time Jānojī Bhosle appeared on the scene. He reached Kaṭak for the rescue of Mir Habib. A stiff battle ensued between Janojī and Alivardi, but as the rains were on, the latter returned to Murśidābād leaving the Marāthās, masters of Orissā, up to Midnāpūr throughout the year 1747. The plundering operations of the Marāṭhās continued unabated. Jānojī returned to Nāgpūr on hearing the news of his mother's death. Mir Habib was at Midnāpūr with a Marāṭhā force to help him. Raghujī sent his son Sābājī for the assistance of Habib.

In 1748 Alivardi reached Bālāsore and despatched his army to drive away the Marāṭhās who were making preparations to plunder the English factory under the command of Nilo Pandit. He in vain tried to search for the force under Habib, who was hiding in the jungles of Katak. He then made a surprise attack on the fort of Bārābati and was finally able to take it in his possession. In June, 1749, Alivardi returned to Bengal.

Mir Habib with the Marāthā force reappeared at Katak. Alivardi had to postpone his attack on the Marāthās as the rains had set in. On his reaching Murśidābād he was taken ill in October, 1749².

From October, 1749 to March, 1751, the Marathas did not allow Alivardi to rest. They harassed him by avoiding an open war when he came out with a large army from Mursidabad. In 1750 when Alivardi was at Midnāpūr the Marāṭhās quickly marched towards Murśidābād plundering all the way. Durlabhrām and Mir Jafar, the officers who were stationed at Midnapur were nervous and unable to check the Maratha inroads. This lingering war was a great drain on Alivardi's resources and men. The territory under him was a house divided against itself. In 1750 Alivardi was a man of 75, physically ailing. As the situation was intolerable his shrewd wife advised him to negotiate with the Marāṭhās.3 Old Alivardi accepted his wife's counsel and deputed Mir Jafar to meet Jānojī and Mir Habib to settle the terms of peace. For more than a couple of years Jānojī was in Orissā4 or Raghujī was busy with the political affairs at Sātārā and Nāgpūr. The treaty was signed in May, 1751:-

- (1) Mir Habib was to be confirmed in the Government of Orissā as the deputy Subhedār of Muršidābād.
- (2) The Navāb was to pay annually 12 lacs of rupees to the Bhosles of Nāgpūr for the cauthai of Bengal and Bihār.

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¹ NHM., Vol. II, p. 224.

² OUM., pp. 16, 17.

³ NHM., Vol. III, p. 402.

⁴ NPI., p. 98.

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- (3) When these amounts were regularly paid, the Bhosles were not to harass the two provinces.
- (4) The district of Kaṭak i.e., the territory up to the river Suvarṇarekhā was to be considered as the possession of the Bhosles.¹.

After a long struggle lasting for nearly ten years, Ragujī was able to establish his right of collecting cauthāī from Bengal and Bihār. The province of Kaṭak as far as Suvarṇarekhā came under his possession. This was the greatest achievement of Raghujī Bhosle crowning his earlier successes.

The Smaller states of Raipūr, Ratanpūr, Bilāspūr and Sambaļpūr of Chattisgaḍ area were conquered by Bhāskar Rām during the first two raids of Bengal. Raghujī's illegitimate son Mohansingh was in charge of these States².

Raghuji's territory included the area from Berār to Kaṭak. The Goṇḍ Kingdoms of Gaḍha-Maṇḍlā, Cāndā or Candrapūr and Devagad were in his possession. Bihār proper was under the dual authority of the Bhosles and the Nizām. Originally the Bhosles were to get from revenue of Berār 25 per cent as cduthāi, 10 per cent as sardeśmukhi and 5 per cent as ghāsdāṇā, the total working at 40 per cent. The remaining 60 per cent of the total revenue of Berār was to go to the Nizām. But later this original treaty seems to have been reversed by which the Bhosles secured 60 per cent of the revenue and the Nizām. the remaining 40 per cent.3.

The strategic forts of Gāvilgad and Narnāļā with the territory attached to them were exclusively under Raghujī's possession. Similarly, the fort of Māṇikdurg in the Māhūr area belonged to him. As already observed the states of Chattisgad were also under his way as important outposts between Nāgpūr and the province of Kaṭak. The acquisition of this vast territory speaks for Raghujī's generalship. He might have lost a few battles but he always won the war. In diplomacy, as understood in his day, he was second to none. By his mounting successes he won the confidence of Chatrapati Sāhū and on critical occasions he was consulted by him. Sāhū, prior to his death had called Raghujī to Sātārā to discuss the matter of succession to the Chatrapati's gādī. Raghujī was related to Sāhū through his wife.

Like Bājīrāv I, Raghujī too was loved by his followers. He had capable and trustworthy persons like Bhāskarpant, Raghujī Karānde, Tuļojīpant, Nārojī Jācaka, Rakhamājī Gaņeś, Kṛṣṇājī Ātole and others.

¹ NHM. vol. II, 224, Dr. B. C. Ray, in his Orissá under Marāthās, p. 20, expresses doubt regarding the exactness of the terms of the treaty. But from the treaty of Devagānv, 1803, it is certain that Kaṭak and Bālāsore were surrendered to the British by the Bhosles. This means that Kaṭak and Bālāsore were with the Bhosles up to 1803, since their conquest.

2 NPI., p. 100.

³ NFL., pp. 48 and 102.

⁴ NPL., pp. 105, 106.

Raghujī and the Peśvās were not always on good terms. The rivalry between the two goes back to the days of Peśvā Bājīrāv I. The spheres of influence of Raghuji and Bājīrāv came into conflict when Bājīrāv secured one-third part of Bundelkhand for the timely help rendered to Chatrasāl against Bangas. When Bājīrāv was fighting with the Nizām at Bhopāl in 1738, Raghujī did not offer him any help in spite of repeated requests. In the agreement between Raghuji and Sāhū, it was clearly stated that the former would accompany the Peśvā in his campaigns. But actually neither Bājīrāv nor his son Bāļājī were able to command the services of Raghujī in their capacity as the Peśvā or Prime Minister. Chatrapati Sāhū too often found it difficult to exercise control when two or more of his high servants were at sixes and sevens. Lack of strong central authority was rather the serious defect from which the Maratha power suffered in the post-Sivaji period.

Raghujī avoided an open clash with Bājīrāv knowing well his ability as also the influence he wielded with the *Chatrapati*. Bājīrāv too acting on the advice of his brother Cimājīāppā settled his difference with Raghuji amicably.¹

The difference between Raghujī and Bāļājī *Peśvā* over the eastern sphere are historic. They were settled by the mildtempered Sāhū, who divided the spheres of activity of the two by granting Raghuji the territory from Nagpur to Katak and to the Peśvā to the west of this line. Raghujī supported Bābujī Nāik who was aspiring for Peśvāship as against Bālājī Bājīrāv. But so long as Sāhū was alive such differences were not allowed to take a serious turn. After Sāhū's death Raghujī respected the Peśvā's authority. He did not join the Peśva's opponents in the Maratha confederacy being convinced that he was the ablest man among the Marāthā's to occupy the Peśvāship. Raghujī knew well when to oppose and when to yield. He was not prepared to allow matters to be carried to the breaking point unnecessarily. In one of his letters to Nānā Peśvā he writes-the Late Srimant Bājīrāv was kind to me. But differences arose when we had a clash with Āvajī Kavade who had entered Berār. All these matters should now be forgotten and I should be treated as your man.2' Bālājī Peśca on learning the death of Raghuji wrote- Raghuji was a respectable nobleman. His death is indeed a matter of great regret. God's will has to be accepted. Of late Raghuji was of much help to us.8.'

Raghujī was a self-made man. He had risen to the status of a first-rate nobleman at the court of Sāhū by the dint of his merit. He therefore regarded that his status was on par with that of the Peśvā for all practical purposes. He disliked that the Peśvā should interfere with his sphere of influence. It may be observed

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¹ NPI., p. 80.

² PD., 20, p. 30.

³ FD., 20, p. 68.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Janoji Bhosle. 1755-1772 that for this mutual jealousy neither the *Peśv*ā nor Raghuji was so much at fault. The defect lay in the weakness of the central authority. In the absence of a strong centre the Marāṭhās were not able to create an effective confederacy which could enforce its authority over all.

Raghujī was mainly responsible for the prosperity of Nāgpūr. He brought along with him a number of Marāṭhā and Brāhmin families from western Mahārāṣṭra who infused new order and life in the administration of Nāgpūr and Berār. Cultivation of Nāgpūr improved under Raghujī. A number of Kunbi or cultivators' families settled in the territory under Raghujī. The credit of settling the weavers or Koṣṭis also goes to Raghujī Bhosle.

Raghujī was a devotee of Rāma. He installed the idol of Rāma at Rāmṭek and revived the importance of this place of epic fame. He made land grants to many other temples and holy places.

The *Jari-Paṭaka* and the saffron coloured flag were the emblems of Raghujī. This great general who extended the Marāṭhā power as far as Kaṭak breathed his last at Nāgpur on the 14th of February 1755.1

Raghujī had four sons, Mudhojī and Bimbājī from the elder wife, and Jānojī and Sābājī from the younger. Jānojī was the eldest among his brothers. It was Raghuji's desire that Jānoji should succeed him and others should get their due shares of his vast territory. However, Mudhoji put his claim for his father's gādi on the plea that he was the son of the eldest wife of Raghujī. By the practice of primojeniture then prevailing, this claim was Jānojī had the support of a number of courtiers inadmissible. like Kṛṣṇājī Govindrāv, the subhedār of Berār; Narahar Ballāl, the subhedar of Nagpur, Sivabhat Sathe, the Subhedar Kaṭak; Raghujī Karāṇḍe, Bimbājī Vañjāļ, Nāroji Jācaka, Sivājī Keśav Ţāļkuṭe, Ānandrāv Vāgh and Kṛṣṇājī Āṭoļe. Mudhoji had the support of Sadāśiv Hari, his divān, Dinkar Vināyak, Sivājī Vināyak and Narasingrāv Bhavāni. The dispute of the two brothers was referred to the Peśva Balaji Bajirav. Both of them were called to Poona. The title of Senasaheb Subha was conferred on Jānojī while the new title of Senādhurandhar was created for Mudhojī. Mudhojī received Candrapūr or Canda and Chattisgad with the former as his seat of administration. Bimbājī was to reside at Chattisgad and Sābājī at Dārvā in Berār.2 The Bhosle brothers agreed to pay to the Peśvā a sum of twenty lacs3 as present on this occasion according to the time-honoured custom. Actually the sanad of Senāsāheb Subhā was issued as late as 1761 by Tārābāī when Mādhavarā I assumed *Peśvāship.*

¹ NPI., p. 103.

² NPI., pp. 115-118.

³ NHM., Vol. II, p. 342.

At this time, Devajipant Corghade was a promising young man who settled the amount of present between Janoji and the Peśvā Bālājī Băjīrāv.

Bhosles of Nagpur. ANOJI BHOSLE, 1755-1772

CHAPTER 7.

Jānojī and Mudhojī fought among themselves when their negotiations were in progress at Poona, and even after their dispute was settled by the Peśvā.

By about 1759, the two brothers tried to settle their differences by resorting to arms. A battle was fought near Rahātgānv in which Mudhoji was forced to retreat. In the treaty that followed, it was decided that Mudhoji should actively participate in the administration and Raghujī Karānde, Trimbakji Rāje (Vāvikar) Bhosle and Pirājī Nimbālkar should act as mediators with a view to avoid any rupture in future. Pirājī Nimbālkar along with his force of six thousand was brought into the service of Jānojī by Divākarpant. Pirājī hailed from western Mahārāṣṭra.1

In 1760, Jānojī and Mudhojī appealed to Sadāśivrāv to settle their dispute. Sadāśivrāv offered to settle it but asked them to run to his help at Udgir in his war against the Nizām. Both the brothers hastened to help Sadāśivrāv but the latter had concluded a treaty with the Nizām before the armies of the Bhosles could be brought into the field.2

Later, Mudhoji was forced to leave the fort of Canda when two of his trusted officers Abājī Bhosle and Gangādharpant turned against him. Janojī taking advantage of this difficulty marched on Canda, but hurriedly left the place being involved in the Peśva-Nizām war, leaving behind Tulojīpant and Majidkhān for the reduction of Canda, fort.3 सत्यमेव जयते

The differences between the two brothers often resulting in an armed clash naturally weakened the power of the Bhosles. Nagpur, after the death of Raghuji, became a hot bed of political intrigues. Many courtiers exploited the family faction to their selfish ends. The two brothers were finally reconciled to each other because Jānojī who was without a son decided to adopt Mudhoji's son as his successor. The credit of this amity, however, goes to the situation rather than to the wisdom of the either brother.

Jānoji Bhosle was a man of vacillating nature. In the conflict between the Peśvā and the Nizām he sided with the latter. But both the Peśvās Bāļājī and Mādhavrāv I proved too strong for him. Raghuji Bhosle when once reconciled with the Peśvā by the efforts of Sāhū remained loyal to him. Jānojī failed to grasp the situation and had to pay heavily for the same in his relations with the Peśvās. At least as a matter of policy for safe-guarding his own territory, he should have maintained friendly relations with the Peśvā.

Jānojī and Peśva Balaji Bājīrāv.

¹ NPL., pp. 126, 127.

² NPI., pp. 128, 129, 8 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

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It was Bāļājī Bājīrāv who brought about a compromise between Jānojī and Mudhojī. Jānojī never cared to pay the Peśvā the sum of the present he had agreed to, when he was invested with the title of Senāsāheb Subhā. Similarly, he was very negligent in the payment of the dues to the central treasury. The Peśvä's efforts to recover the State dues through his agents Vyankat Moreśvar and Trimbakaji Bhosle proved futile.1 In 1757-58, Mudhoji accompanied Raghunathrav in his north Indian expedition. But soon returned back to Berar owing to some differences with him.2

In the Battle of Udgir, Jānojī and Mudhojī went to help Bhāu when the war was practically over. For a short time, when the Bhosle brothers worked in co-operation they helped the Peśvā in his attack on the Nizām at Sindkhed.3 The Bhosle brothers, mainly Jānojī and Mudhojī did not accompany Bhāusāheb to the battle-field of Pānipat. Nor does Bhāu seems to have commanded their service when the Marāṭhās were to engage themselves in a life and death struggle with Ahmad Sah Abdalī. The cordial relations which existed between the Peścās and the Sindes were conspicuous by their absence between the Peśvās and the Bhosles of Nāgpūr.

Jānojī and Mudhojī were with Nānāsāheb Peśvā when he was hastening to help Bhau before the final rout of the Marathas on the battle-field of Pānipat. Jānojī saved the retreating Marāthās from the attacks of the anti-Maratha elements on their homeward journey. He brought the recalcitrant Bundelā Chiefs under control.4

Following their defeat in the Third Battle of Pānipat, the Marāthās were busy putting their own affairs in order. The robes of Peśvāship were granted to Mādhavrāv I. His uncle who was aspiring for the same office was not happy with this arrangement. The Nizām who was smarting under the defeat he had suffered in the Battle of Udgir was eager to fish in the troubled waters at Poona. With a vast army of sixty thousand strong he desecrated the holy places of Toka and Pravarā Sangam and dug up Sinde's palaces at Srigondā for hidden treasure. In December 1761, he camped at Urlikañcan for an attack on Poonā. Raghunāthrāv sent urgent calls to the Marāthā generals for help. Jānojī Bhosle had joined the Peśvā with his army.5 He was present in the Battle of Cambhargonda with a force of seven to eight thousand.6 The Nizām was surrounded by the Marāthā forces and compelled to surrender. Majority of the Marāṭhā nobles felt that this was the long awaited opportunity to exterminate the Nizām. But this could not be brought about because of the easy terms he was given by Raghunāthrāv.

¹ NPI., p. 125.

² NPI., p. 123.

³ NHM., Vol. II, p. 342,

NPI., p. 132.NHM., Vol. II, p. 467.NPI, p. 136.

Raghunāthrāv had given easy terms to the Nizām at Urli with a view to securing his support in his dispute with Mādhavrāv which was expected any moment. Raghunathrav was unwilling to work in co-operation with his young nephew who was the Peśvā. The situation deteriorated fast heading towards a civil war. Raghunāthrāv's partisans had secretly secured the help of the Nizām and Jānojī Bhosle. In this great plot headed by Raghunathrav, it was decided to deprive Mādhavrāv of his Peśvāship and power. Raghunāth was to appoint men of his own choice in high offices. Jānojī Bhosle was lured into the plot by the offer of Chatrapatiship at Sātārā after deposing Rāmrājā. Jānojī and the Nizām met near Kalaburgi (Gulburgā) and agreed to join the plot. From the territory that would be acquired the Nizām was to secure sixty per cent of the total tribute and Jānojī forty per cent. The Peśva's agents Vyankat Moreśvar and Rāmaji Ballāļ tried in vain to dissuade Jānojī and his adviser Divakarpant from joining the plot.

Young Mādhavrāv realising the gravity of the situation boldly surrendered himself to his uncle and put an end to the civil war that was threatening to sap the Marāṭhā power. By this dramatic decision Jānojī's dream of securing Chatrapatiship evaporated.¹

Shortly after the surrender of Mādhavrāv to his uncle, the latter-Raghunāthrāv—started making his own arrangement by distributing offices and titles to his favourites and partisans. For some days in November 1762, the Marāṭhā leaders and diplomats assembled at Alegāńv and discussed all domestic issues.² Unfortunately such meetings could not be had frequently to solve the problems of the Marāṭhā confederacy. Moreover, there was no strong central authority which could force the decisions on all the members taken at such meetings.

They treaty between the Marāṭhās and the Nizām proved to be shortlived. Raghunāthrāv, who was proceeding against Haidar Āli received news that the Nizām and Jānojī Bhosle along with a number of discontented courtiers were busy forming a coalition against him. Jānojī and the Nizām met at Gulburgā on 9th February 1763 and discussed the plan of seizing the Peśvā's lands and sharing the spoils. Among the other Marāṭhās who joined the Nizām were the Paṭvardhans and the Pratinidhis. The Nizām as the head of this unholy alliance sent his demands to the Peśvā stating that all the forts east of the river Bhimā should be delivered unto him, those who had been deprived of their Jāgīrs should receive them back and the Peśvā should settle all State affairs in consultation with the Nizām's divāṇ.³

This challenge nullified the easy terms which Raghunāthrāv had given to the *Nizām* at Urļikāncan. Giving up the march on the territory of Haidar Ali, Raghunāthrāv moved towards Aurangābād.

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. JANOJI BHOSLE, 1755-1772

¹ NHM., Vol. II, p. 472.

² NHM., Vol. II, 472-73.

² Ibid., p. 475.

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Malhārrāv Holkar joined Raghunāthrāv when he was promised an additional Jāgīr of ten lacs. The plan of Raghunāthrāv and Holkar was to lay waste the territory of the Nizām and his partisans. Knowing well that Raghunathrav was a past master in the guerilla warfare, the Nizām decided to attack Poonā on the advice of Jānoji Bhosle. The combined armies of the Nizām and the Bhosles fell upon Poonā in 1763. Gopikābaī sought shelter with her men and jewellery in the fort of Purandar. Heavy tribute was exacted from the people of Poona and the city burnt down. The shrine of Parvati and other temples were desecrated and idols destroyed. Raghujī Karānde, the general of the Bhosle laid waste the region around Sinhgad and Purandar. He looted the Peśva's jewellery at Sasvad and set on fire important State records taken there for safety. To retaliate the sack of Poona, Raghunathrav and his men carried fire and sword in the Nizām's territory. His army sacked parts of Berār. Mahādajī Sinde was ordered to raid Jānojī's territory and he proceeded towards Berär from Ujjain. Raghunāthrāv had written Jānojī reprimanding him of his disloyalty and bringing to his notice how unbecoming it was for him to join the Nizām. At the same time Malhārrāv Holkar was trying to dissuade Janoji to give up the cause of the Nizām through his advisers Divākarpant and Bhavāni Munśi. Jānojī was offered territory worth 31 lacs and was to be confirmed in the Senāsāheb-Subhāship. These direct threats and diplomatic approaches finally won Jānojī to the Peśva's side. He agreed to leave the Nizām at the nick of the moment when the Marathas would lead an attack. The other Marāthā nobles like Bhavānrāv Pratinidhi, Gopāļrāv Patvardhan, Pirājī Nimbāļkar and Gamājī were also persuaded to desert the Nizām on the promise of receiving jāgīrs and restoring lost positions.2 In the Battle of Raksasabhuvan (10th August 1763), the Nizām was routed and forced to surrender. He gave to the Peśvā territory worth 82 lacs. Jānojī gave a banquet to the Peśvā and presented him the guns he had captured in the sack of Poona along with the Nizām. Jānojī and the Peśvā were reconciled temporarily.

Vitthal Sundar the divān of the Nizām who was the brain behind all the ambitious schemes of his master was killed in the Battle of Rākṣasabhuvan.

The young Peśvā Mādhavrāv distinguished himself in the battle. The success of this battle was mainly due to his strategic and tactical movements.

Jānojī and Mādhavrā *Peśvā*. In the Marāṭhā-Nizām struggle which ended in the battle of Rākṣasabhuvan, Jānojī because of his changing policy had displeased both the Nizām and the Pcśvā. He had given up the wise policy

¹ NPI., p. 150.

² Ibid., p. 152.

of his father of supporting the $Peśv\bar{a}$ as the strong man. His policy was devoid of any sound principle. It was guided by the idea of extending one's own territory at the cost of others, including that of the other Marāṭhā potentates. This was rather the common malady from which the entire Marāṭhā power was suffering. Mādhavrāv was determined to correct this defect. With great difficulty he had brought Jānojī into his camp in the life and death struggle with the $Niz\bar{a}m$. The sack of Pooṇā in which Jānojī carried fire and sword was an act which the $Peśv\bar{a}$ was not prepared to forget. In the family dispute between Mādhavrāv and Raghunāthrāv Jānojī always espoused the cause of the latter. Raghunāthrāv in his own way gave easy terms to Jānojī looking upon him as his supporter in his dispute with Mādhavrāv.

Mādhavrāv was waiting for an opportunity to punish Jānojī. Berār was subject to the dual administration of the Bhosles and the Nizām. This naturally created friction between the two on several occasions. In 1765, Moro Dhondajī an officer of the Nizām in Berār was attacked by Jānoji's men. The Nizām's fiasco in the Battle of Rāksasabhuvan was the result of Janoji's treachery. He was keen on seeking revenge upon Janoji for his breach of trust. He therefore appealed to the Peśvā for help when his officer was attacked. The Peśvā at once decided to help the Nizām.1 On 17th October 1765, Mādhavrāv proceeded from Poona and was joined by the Nizām's divān Ruknaud-Daula with a force of seven to eight thousand. The combined forces camped at Edalābād in December 1765. Raghunāthrāv also came with his force to join his nephew. The Nizām started from Hyderābād and camped at Karañjā. His army was well-equipped with artillery. From Edlabad the Peśva's forces went to Balapur and started looting the territory of the Bhosle after dividing themselves into suitable batches. Sums of Rs. 1,75,000 and Rs. 1,70,000, were exacted from Bāļāpūr and Akolā, respectively as tributes. Jānojī and Mudhoji took shelter in the fort of Amner along with their families. Later, they shifted to the stonger fort of Canda. Janoji finding the combined forces too strong for him to overcome sued for peace through the Peśva's envoy Vyankat Moreśvar. The Peśva too had no stomach for the fight. He was satisfied with the punishment he had meted out to the disobedient Janoji. The terms of the treaty were finalised at Kholāpūr near Daryāpūr in 1766. It was decided that the Bhosle should retain territory worth Rs. 8 lacs only, out of the total territory of Rs. 32 lacs, he had received from the Peśvä, in the Battle of Rākṣasabhuvan. Out of the remaining 24 lacs, the Peśvā was to give the Nizām territory worth 15 lacs and was to retain for himself the rest.2 Many differences between the Nizām and Jānojī were settled on this occasion. Following rapprochement Janoji sent his men to help Raghunāthrāv in his north Indian campaign.

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. JANOJI BHOSLE, 1755-1772, Jānoji and Mādhavrāv Peśvā.

¹ NPI., p. 159.

² NPI., p. 165.

Bhosles of Nagpur. JANOJI BHOSLE, 1755-1772, Jānojī and Mādhavrāv Peśvā.

When the negotiations between Mādhavrāv and Jānojī were in progress, the former's agent conveyed him Janoji's contention. Its gist is indicative of the general state of affairs in the Maratha Confederacy. Jānojī was not slow to understand that the dispute between him and the *Peśvā* would only benefit the *Nizām*. But desire for power rendered any satisfactory solution difficult. The letter written to the Peśvā by his agent conveying Jānojī's mind runs as follows: "The Srimant being angry with us (Jānojī) has invaded Berār. I am not guilty of burning Poona. When the Nizām indulged in this act I did not support him. I, however, admit that I did not help in the campaign against Haidar Nāyak. It is after all human to err. But the punishment meted out to me by depriving me of territory worth Rs. 30 lacs is too heavy. That has now been offered to the Nizām. Should the serpent be fed with milk? If I am ordered to attack the Nizām, I would destroy him in no time..... proceed by rapid marches to meet your honour. I should not be let down". Jānojī gave expression to his feelings in these words. But it seems that he did not really repent for what had happened. For, within a couple of years after the treaty of Daryāpūr he once again sided with Raghunāthrāv in his dispute with Mādhavrāv and drew the latter's wrath upon himself.

Mādhavrāv attacks Jānojī and humbles him.

In the quarrel between Mādhavrāv and Raghunāthrāv in 1768, Jānojī decided to support the latter. However, Raghunāthrāv was defeated and arrested before Jānoji's army could join him. Mādhavrāv was determined to teach Jānojī a lesson for violating the treaty of Paryāpūr in which he had agreed to support his cause. Jānojī was apprehensive of a fresh attack by the Peśvā. He, therefore, sent his envoy Cimanajī Rakhamangad Citnis to the Peśva for a talk. The Peśva refused to listen to the envoy and asked Janoji to send Devājīpant to Pooņā, as he considered Devājīpant to be the mischief-maker in the Peśvā-Bhosle altercation. Mādhavrāv arrested Devājīpant and marched on Berār. The Peśvā was accompanied by his generals Gopāļrāv Paţvardhan and Rāmacandra Gaņes Kānade. The Nizām sent a force of eight thousand strong under Rukna-uddaulā and Rāmcandra Jādhav. The Peśvā with the forces of his ally occupied Bhosle's territory to the west of the Wardha river. The relatives of Janoji had taken shelter into the fort of Gavilgad. Jewellery too was removed to this place. Janoji with his forces encamped at Tivasā to the west of Wardhā river, (7-12-1768).

The *Peśvā* did not chase Jānojī. He took the fort of Amner (20-1-1769), and straightway proceeded to Nāgpūr. Nāgpūr was looted and burnt. The burning of Pooṇā by Jānojī was fully avenged. The fort of Bhandārā was besieged and reduced by Rāmacandra Gaṇeś.²

¹ NPI., p. 163.

² NFI., p. 175.

The fort of Candrapur or Canda, the strong-hold of the Bhosles was the next target of attack. The fort was besieged by the *Peśvā's* army. Jānojī who was outside moved from place to place carrying on a running warfare with the Peśva's army. In order to relieve the pressure on the fort of Canda, Janoji spread rumours that he was marching towards Poonā to release Raghunāthrāv from the custody. At the same time Deväjipant who was in the custody of Mādhavrāv managed to receive secret letters from Jānojī stating that when the Peśvā was engaged with the siege of Cāndā, Jānojī should attack Poonā and set Raghunāthrāv free. The letters were intended to be seized by Peśvā's intelligence department. This ruse had its effect. The Peśvā's apprehension of Jānojīs attack on Pooņā was strengthened. When these rumours gained currency Poona was in the grip of consternation as the memory of Jānoji's first invasion was yet fresh. The Peśvā at once decided to raise the siege of Cāndā and sent his men against Jānojī. He sent a letter through Rukna-uddaulā to Jānojī on 3rd March 1769, expressing his desire for peace. Jānojī who was eager to end the war sent his terms and the treaty was finalised on 23rd March 1769, near Kanakpūr. Devājīpant was the principal figure on behalf of the Bhosle in bringing about this treaty.

The following were the terms of the treaty of Kanakpur:-

- (1) Jānojī was granted a jāgīr of 32 lacs in 1763, out of which he was allowed to have only 8 lacs in 1766; Jānojī should now relinquish all claim over the jāgīr.
- (2) The lands of the Bhosles of Akkalkot confiscated by Janoji should be released.
- (3) The Bhosles used to collect ghāsdāṇā from the Aurangābād Subhā belonging to the Peśvā. They should discontinue this practice. The Bhosles likewise should stop collecting ghāsdāṇā from the Nizām's territory. The Bhosles would get their ghāsdānā collections from the Peśvā and the Nizām from their officers. The Bhosles should themselves collect ghāsdānā only if the Nizām's Officers fail to do the same for them.
- (4) The Bhosles should serve the Peśvā with their army when called.
- (5) The Bhosles should make no changes in the strength of their army without the permission of the Peśvā.
- (6) The Bhosles should not shelter rebels and disloyal persons coming from the Peśvā territory.
- (7) The Bhosles should not enter into political negotiations with the Emperor of Delhi, the Navāb of Oudh, the Rohillās, the English and the Nizām without the consent of the Peśvā.

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¹ NPI., p. 179.

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- (8) The Bhosles should pay an annual tribute of Rs. 5 lacs to the *Peśvā* in five instalments.
- (9) The army of the *Peśvā* while passing through the Bhosle's territory would use the old routes.
- (10) The *Peśvā* should not interfere with the domestic affairs of Jānojī so long as he was looking after his relations properly.
- (11) Revā, Mukundpurā, Mahobā, Cārṭhāṇe, Jintur, Sakar-khedā, Mehekar should be given to the *Peśvā* by Jānojī.
- (12) The Bhosle should send his army to Orissā only if it is not required by the *Peśvā*.
- (13) The Peśvā should help the Bhosle with his army in the event of an invasion on the latter's territory.

Mādhavrāv and Jānojī met at Mehekar ceremonially. Parties and presents were exchanged. The *Nizām's divān* Rukna-ud-daulā was also present at Mehekar².

A careful analysis of these terms shows that Mādhavrāv's aim was to bring central control in the Marāṭhā confederacy, which was so necessary for its growth and survival. From the days of Bājīrāv I, the *Peśvās* were struggling hard to assert their authority over the Bhosles of Nāgpūr in their capacity as prime ministers. There was no clear constitutional ruling on this point except the prevailing practice. The Bhosles in their own way considered themselves as the equals of the *Peśvās*. All accepted the overlordship of the *Chatrapati*. But after the death of Sāhū his successors proved to be nonentities. Under the circumstance the *Peśvās* tried to assert their authority over others with a good degree of success up to Mādhavrāv.

During Jānojī's Senā Sāheb-Subhāship Purusottam Divākar alias Devājīpant Corghade of Nārkhed rose into prominence. He secured for Jānojī huge sums of money required for war. In his dealings with Madhavrāv Peśvā, Divākarpant was his chief adviser. Mādhavrāv considered Devājīpant as the Machiavelli at the Nāgpūr Court, He was a full wise man out of the three and a half wise men of the day.³ For some time towards the end of Jānojī's career Divākarpant lost his master's confidence and fell on evil days. But he was always looked upon as the inevitable man on critical occasions because of his keen grasp of events. Very few original papers are available about this diplomat of Nāgpūr. He died in 1781. Among other persons of note of Jānojī's times may be mentioned Bhavānipant Munśī, Bhavānī Kāļo and Gaņeś Sambhājī. Bhavānipant Munśī became Jānojī's counṣellor when Devājīpant fell from his favour. Bhavānī Kāļo rose to the position of the general. For

¹ NPI., pp. 181-183.

² NPI., p. 174.

³ The three and a half wise men were popularly known as Devä, Sakhyä, Vitthal and Nänä. Devä stood for Deväjipant, Sakhyä for Sakhäräm Bäpü Bokil, Vitthal for Vitthal Sundar at the Court of the Nizām and Nānā was the famous Nānā Phadnis,

sometime he was the *subhedār* of Kaṭak. He constructed the temple of Bālājī at Vāsim and installed the image. The last, Ganes Sambhājī too acted as the Subhedār of Kaṭak.¹,

Jānoji Bhosle had no son. He had decided to adopt Raghuji, the eidest son of his brother, Mudhoji. After the treaty of Kanakpür, he was on good terms with Mādhavrāv Peśvā. travelled to Thevur near Poonā, where Mādhavrāv was on his deathbed and secured his consent to Raghuji's adoption. From Thevur he went to the holy places, Paṇḍharpūr and Tulajāpūr. He died at Yeral (Naldurg), on his homeward journey on 16th May 1772, owing to severe stomach-ache. Mudhoji built a monument in honour of Janoji and secured some land from the Peśva for its maintenance.2.

After the death of Janoji the house of Bhosles was plunged into family feud worse than the one that was witnessed at the death of Raghujī I. Prior to his death Jānojī had secured the consent of the Peśva for regularising the adoption of Raghuji II, as he was himself without a son. But the actual adoption ceremony had not been gone through. Neither was the title of Senā Sāheb Subhā conferred on Raghuji II, officially. Exploiting these lapses Sābāji the younger brother of Mudhoji approached Mādhavrāv Peśvā for the grant of Sena Sāheb-Subhāship. As Mudhojī was a partisan of Raghunāthrāv, Mādhavrāv sent the robes of Senā Sāheb-Subhāship for Sābājī with his agent Rāmajī Ballāl Gune. At the same time Daryābāī the widow of Jānojī, joined Sābājī and declared that she was pregnant and would give birth to a posthumous child. This created an embarrassing situation for Mudhoji3. The success of the parties at Nagpur thus depended upon the powerful personality in the family dissensions of the Peśvās at Pooņā. Family disputes for power and position broke out in every Marāthā confederate state. Neither the Bhosles nor the Peścas were an exception to this state of affairs.

As a safety measure Mudhoji sent his family members into the fort of Canda and collected a force of 25,000 strong to face Sabaji. The armies of the two brothers met at Kumbhāri near Akolā in 1773. After a few engagements the two brothers decided to close the fight. It was agreed that Senā Sāheb-Sūbhāship should go to Raghuji II and actual administration should be looked after jointly by Mudhoji and Sābāji.4 The Prabhu brothers Vyankat Kāśī and Lakşman Kāśī were deputed to Pooṇā for securing the robes of Senā Sāheb-Subhāship for Raghuji. At this time Nārāyanrāv was This arrangement proved unsuccessful as the ruling Peśvā. Sābājī was dissatisfied with it. In the rivalry between Nārāyanrāv and Raghunāthrāv, Sābājī took the side of the former while Mudhoji supported the latter. Sābājī sought the aid of the Peśvā and the

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Мирноп BHOSLE.

¹ NPI., pp. 187-193.

 ² Ibid., p. 187.
 3 NPI p. 195.

⁴ NPI p. 197.

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Nizām, and the combined forces laid siege to Ellicpūr as its Navāb was a partisan of Mudhojī. But in 1773, when Nārāyaņrāv Peśvā was murdered, Sābājī's party was considerably weakened and he openly supported the Bārabhāis. Mudhoji's cause was greatly strengthened when Raghunāthrāv assumed power after murdering his nephew. A compromise was brought about between Mudhoji and Sābājī, which in its own way was destined to be short-lived. The Nizām, who had taken the side of Sābājī, drew upon himself the wrath of Raghunāthrāv. The Nizām was attacked and forced to enter into treaty with Raghunāthrāv. With the Bhosles, the Nizām formed the treaty of Sixty-Forty.¹.

The family dispute between Mudhoji and Sābāji was finally set at rest when the latter was killed in the Battle of Pancganv near Nāgpūr on 26th January 1775. In this battle Mudhojī was joined by the Gardi Muhammad Yusuf, one of the murderers of Naravanrāv.2 The Pāńcgānv battle gave Mudhoji a free hand in the political affairs of Nagpūr. Daryābāi and the other partisans of Sābājī quietly surrendered to Mudhojī,3

For some time in 1775, the Bārabhāis instigated Sivāji Bhosle of Amrāvatī to rise against Mudhojī. They promised Senā-Sāheb-Subhāship to Śivājī. This move was deemed necessary by them as their rival Raghunāthrāv had the support of Mudhojī Bhosle. On 6th March 1775, Raghunāthrāv entered into an alliance with the British at Surat in order to oppose the Bārabhāis. The rising of Sivājī Bhosle of Amrāvatī could not assume any serious proportion due to the timely mediation of Divākarpant.4

The fratricidal wars among the Marathas were fully exploited by the English for the expansion of their power. In 1773, when the Poonā court was faced with extraordinary situation following the assassination of Nārāyanrāv, the British forces moved from Bombay and took the fort of Thana. In fact the British had been casting their covetous eyes on the island of Sāṣṭī (Sālsette), since long, for the safety of Bombay. The fort of Thana surrendered on 28th December 1773.5 This was the actual beginning of the First Anglo-Marāṭhā war which terminated in the Treaty of Sālbye in 1782. Raghunāthrāv, in his quarrel with the Bārabhāīs finally embraced the British giving them the long sought opportunity of interfering with the internal affairs of the Marathas. Raghunathrav became a British protege by the Treaty of Surat, (6th March 1775). With a view of curbing the growing ambition of the British and their aggression Nānā Phadņis proposed an anti-British Confederacy consisting of the Peśva's Covernment, the Nizām, Haidar Ali and the Bhosles of Nagpur. At this time the prestige of the British had suffered a set back in the eyes of the Indian powers due to the unscrupulous methods of Warren Hastings. This was rather the

¹ NPI., p. 202.

² NPI., p. 205.

³ NPI., p. 205.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209. ⁵ NHM., Vol. III, p. 43.

opportune time for the Marāṭhās to move against the British as they were engaged in a long war with the French. But the well-conceived quadruple alliance could not be worked out because of the machinations of Warren Hastings. Realising the danger of the alliance proposed by Nānā Phaḍṇis, Hastings restored Gunṭur to the Nizām and detached him from the Confederacy. His next move was the seduction of the Bhosles of Nāgpūr.

According to the plan of Nānā Phadnis, the Bhosles were to attack the English in Bengal, Haidar Ali to proceed against Madrās and the Poona forces to harass the British in Gujarat and Bombay. To execute a part of this joint plan, a large force under Khandoji Bhosle popularly known as Cimanājī marched towards Orissā. Cimanājī was a man of courage and action. He was instructed to invade Bengal for the collection of cauthāi which was in arrears. But at the eleventh hour he was prevented from stepping into Bengal by Raghuji II on the advice of his crafty minister Divakarpant Corghade. Hastings was able to purchase the loyalty of both Khandoji and Divakarpant by bribing them heavily. By the end of 1778, Goddard had secured Mudhoji's permission for the passage of his army through the latter's territory into Gujarāt. Nānā was enraged at this and immediately sent for Raghuji and Divakarpant and secured their support to his four-party alliance.1 But the two never kept their word.

Mudhojī Bholse who was a sworn member of the Confederacy was the first to inform Hastings of Nānā's plan. It was he who prevented Khaṇḍojī Bhosle from invading Bengal. Mudhojī, in all these activities had violated the Treaty of Kanakpūr between Jānoji and Mādhavrāv. It was presumed that he would observe the treaty to which his elder brother Jānojī was a party. But at the critical juncture he cast the previous bindings to the winds and went ahead recklessly allying himself with the British and their protege Raghunāthrāv for selfish gains. The role played by Mudhojī, Raghunāthrāv and their supporters is indicative of the state of affairs prevailing among the ruling Marāṭhā noblemen.

In 1785, Mudhoji had been to Poonā with his army to help Nānā Phadṇis in the war against Tipū Sultān. The battle was fought at Badāmī—1786 in which the Nizām, the Bhosles and the Peśvās jointly defeated Tipū. Cimaṇabāpū distinguished himself in this war. On his homeward journey Mudhojī payed a visit to the holy places in Mahārāṣṭra and returned to Nāgpūr. Mudhojī died at Nāgpūr on 19th May 1788,² after a very active political career of over two decades.

Towards the end of Jānoji's career Divākarpant had fallen from his grace and was imprisoned. His property too was confiscated. Mudhojī who needed his help most released him. Divākarpant was soon restored to his former position and served Mudhojī as his

CHAPTER 7.

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¹ NHM., Vol. III, pp. 97, 98.

² NPI., pp. 213, 214.

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principal Counsellor. Mudhojī was never loyal either to the Bārabhāis or to Nānā Phadnis. Throughout his career he supported Raghunāthrāv. At one time he was prepared to serve as the vassal of Warren Hastings severing his relations with the Peśvā. Divākarpant had to tow the line of his master. But in doing so he could have impressed upon his master as to what was ultimately good for the Marāthā nation as a whole. This naturally required a man of high moral character. It could not be expected of Divākarpant who was enjoying the confidence of Warren Hastings, to rise above self-interest. Divākarpant was bribed by Hastings in order to dissuade the Bhosles from the quadruple alliance of Nānā Phadnis. Thus, 'the full-wise man' out of the noted three and a half-wise men of the Marāthā country, proved to be otherwise in the large national interests.

The title of Senā Śāheb-Subhā was finally conferred on Raghujī in 1775, during the Peśvāship of Savāī Mādhavrāv.¹ Actually he was designated for this title much earlier but sanction for the same could not be had from Pooṇā, because of the strained relations between the Peśvās and the Bhosles. Raghujī assumed power after the death of his father Mudhojī.

Raghuji's relations with Nānā Phadnis were amicable. In the Battle of Kharda, 1795, Raghuji sent his army under Vitthal Ballal Subhedār to help the Peśvā. Vitthal Ballal distinguished himself in this war and was highly honoured by Nānā. Raghuji's gains in this war were substantial. He received territory worth three and a half lacs from the Nizām for the ghāsdānā of the Gangthadī region. The Nizām agreed to pay his arrears to Raghujī amounting to Rs. 29 lacs. It was decided that both should share the revenues of Berar as in the past. New sanads of the territory to the south of the Narmada were granted by the Peśva to Raghuji. sanads of this territory were granted to the Bhosles by Nānāsāheb Peśvā but the officers of the latter had not given the actual possession so far. Raghujī got the possession of Huśangābād, Caurāgad and Bacāi. Raghujī stuck to the party of Nānā Phadņīs even after the tragic end of Savāī Mādhavrāv. In appreciation Nānā gave Raghuji Rs. 5 lacs in cash and the possession of Gadha-Mandla.

The Rājā of Sāgar gave Raghujī a part of his territory for the help he had rendered in the event of an attack by one Amīrkhan. Similarly, the fort of Dhāmoṇī was secured from a petty Rajput Chieftain and Huśaṅgābād from the Navāb of Bhopāl by Raghujī. Thus, by 1800, Raghujī's kingdom was at its zenith. It was the largest of the Marāṭhā states towards the close of the eighteenth century.

¹ NPI., pp. 300-302,

The following account might give some idea of the territory and its revenue under Raghujī II¹:--

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Territory		Revenue	
		Rs.	(in lacs)
1.	Devagad, including Nāgpūr		30
2.	Gaḍha-Maṇḍlā		14
3.	Huśangābād, Sivani-Māļvā, Caurāgad, etc.	. ,	7
4.	Multāi or Multāpī		2
5.	Half the revenue of Berar and of Gavilg	ad,	30
	Narnālā, etc.	• •	
6.	Orissā and the other feudatory states in area.	the	17
7.	Candrapür or Cādā		5
8.		tes	6
	like Bastār, Sambalpūr, Sirgujā, Kanl	car.	
	Kalahandi, Jasāpūr and Gangpūr.	,	
		-	111

These figures of revenue from the different parts of the territory under Raghujī appear to be true. Raghujī, however, was destined to see the decline of the Bhosle house when called upon to face the powerful East India Company.

In 1798, Lord Wellesley came to India as the Governor-General. His objective was to bring the Indian States under 'Subordinate Isolation' by his most potent weapon of 'subsidiary system'. Mysore was the first of the Indian States to be forced to accept the subsidiary alliance. The Nizām was the next to enter it for self-protection. Bājīrāv II in his wars with the Marāṭhā potentates and in particular with Yaśvantrāv Holkar, embraced the subsidiary treaty in 1802. Thereafter the Marāṭhā states one after another sold their freedom for a mess of pottage. Under the circumstances, it was not easy for Raghujī to keep himself out of the iron trap laid by Wellesley. As early as 1799, Mr. Colebrooke was sent to Nāgpūr to persuade Raghujī to enter the subsidiary alliance. He stayed in Nāgpūr for two years but was not successful in bringing Raghujī under the alliance ²

The Treaty of Bassein in 1802, by which Bājīrāv II bartered away his freedom was highly resented by Yaśvantrāv Holkar. Daulatrāv Sinde and Raghujī Bhosle, too, were upset by Bājīrāv's decision. After the Treaty of Bassein Lord Wellesley had been pressing upon Daulatrāv and Raghujī to enter into a similar alliance with the British without delay. It was clear that Wellesley was trying to hold aloof Daulatrāv and Raghujī. Col. Collins was deputed for negotiations with the two chiefs. They evaded a definite reply in order

¹ NPI., p. 310.

² NHM., Vol. III, p. 402.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. RAGHUJI BHOSLE II. to gain time, whereupon, Col. Collins left the Sinde's camp. On 7th August 1803, General Wellesley proclaimed a war against Bhosles and the Sindes, and called upon the general populace to keep itself aloof from the struggle.1

The fort of Ahmadnagar which was equipped with munitions and supplies was attacked by Wellesley. Sinde's European Officers who were bribed and seduced went over to the English. Sinde's Brāhmin keeper of the fort finding the position untenable surrendered the fort on 12th August 1803. The Bhosle's army joined the Sindes near Jālanāpūr and a stiff action took place culminating in the battle of Assai on 24th September. The Marāṭhās fought well but were finally defeated. The loss on the English side was heavy, 663 Europeans and 1,777 Indians were killed in action. Stevenson next captured Burhanpur and Asirgad, the two strongholds of the Sindes. These successes of the English depressed both the Sindes and the Bhosles. On the 6th November Sinde's agent Yasvantrav Ghorpade came to Wellesley's camp to arrange the terms of peace.2

The Bhosles were now singled out by Wellesley and Stevenson advanced against the fort of Gavilgad. The Sindes sent their force to help the Bhosle, violating the truce they had made with the English. The two armies met on the vast plane between Adgany and Sirasoļī. The Marāṭhā guns played havoc among the English army forcing them to flee. But the English Generals collected their forces again and attacked the Marāṭhās. In the last action the Marāṭhās were defeated. The battle of Adganv thus decided the fate of the Marāṭhās on the 29th November 1803. The fort of Gāvilgaḍ fell on 25th December when its keeper Benisingh Rajput died fighting.3

On 17th December Raghujī Bhosle signed a treaty at Devagānv near Ellicpur with the English.

The terms of the treaty of Adganv were as follows:—

- (1) The Bhosle should surrender the territory to the west of the river Wardhā as also the provinces of Kaṭak and Bālāsore. The Bhosles were to retain for themselves the forts of Gavilgad and Narnāļā and the territory under these forts worth Rs. 4 lacs; i.e., the paraganas of Akot, Ādgānv, Badnerā, Bhātkuli and Khātkali.
- (2) Any dispute between the Nizām, the Peśvā and the Bhosle should be settled through the mediation of the English.
- (3) The Bhosles should have no relations with any European Power. The English too should have no relations with either the enemies or relatives of the Bhosles.
- (4) The Bhosles should have no relation with any members of the Marāthā Confederacy.
- (5) Both the parties should have the envoy of the other at their Courts.

¹ NHM., Vol. III, p. 402.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 410, 411, 3 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 412.

(6) The Bhosles should respect the treaties which the English have formed with the former's feudatories lying between Orissa and Chattisgad 1

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Berār was given to the Nizām for the help he rendered to the English. By this treaty the Bhosles practically lost their independent status. The territory under them was now confined to Nāgpūr and the neighbouring area,

The English were successful in keeping Yasvantray Holkar out of the picture in their struggle with the Sindes and the Bhosles. They fully utilised the hostility between Daulatrav and Yaśvantrav. The long cherished dream of the English to secure the coastal strip stretching from Calcutta to Madras was fulfilled.

Daulatrāv Sinde too, signed a treaty with the English at Suraji-Añjangānv on 30th December 1803.

According to the 5th terms of the treaty of Devaganv, Mount Stuart Elphinstone was sent to Nagpur as the British resident. He forced Raghuji to give up his sovereignty over the States to the east of Nagpur. Smarting under the recent defeat he had suffered at Devagānv, Raghujī was trying to reorganise his army and secure news about Yaśvantrāv Holkar's movement so that he might take revenge upon the English if a suitable opportunity permitted such action. But the Resident kept a close watch over Raghuji's movements and desisted him from keeping any contact with Holkar and his men²

With the fall of the Sindes and the Holkars the marauding bands of the Pendharis became the scourge of the restless times. They fell upon the peasants and the citizens and looted their property. Where resistance was offered they indulged in killing and raping. With the fall of their supporters, the Sindes and the Holkars, the cruelties of the Pendhāris became all the more wanton. They have been rightly described as the scavengers of the Marāṭhā army.

One of the leaders of the Pendhāris, Amīrkhan attacked Jubbulpore in about 1809. The local Subhedār of the Bhosles, Jijābā Ghātge tried his best to defend the city but was defeated and forced to take shelter in the fort of Mandla. In order to defend the Narmada region from the Pendhāri inroads Raghujī appointed Viţthal Ballā! Subhedār, Benisingh Jāmdār, Raghunāthrāvbājī Ghātge and Muhammad Amirkhān of Sivanī.

At one time the Pendhāris looted Rāmţek and Bhandārā and appeared in the suburbs of Nāgpūr. The Bhosles' officers Siddik Ali Khān and Māloji Ahirrāv were finally able to force them to retreat.3 It was Lord Hastings who exterminated the Pendhāris by conducting an all out campaign against them.

¹ NPI., p. 344.

² Ibid., pp. 361-362,

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 373-375. ⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 877-78.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. KAGHUJI BHOSLE II.

During the Bhosle-English wars the Navāb of Bhopāl had taken Huśangābād and Sivanī from the Bhosles. In 1807, Raghujī sent his army and captured Cainpurvādī and Cānkigad of the Bhopāl territory. Later he entered into an agreement with the Sindes for a concerted attack on Bhopāl. The two armies besieged Bhopāl fort in 1814. But Raghujī withdrew his forces when the Navāb of Bhopāl asked for British help.1.

Sambalpūr and Pāṭṇā (near Orissā) were granted back to Raghujī in 1806.

After the battle of Adganv the Governor-General was trying to persuade Raghuji to accept the subsidiary alliance. Jenkins, who succeeded Mount Stuart Elphinstone as the resident of Nägpür, once again appealed to Raghuji that he should allow the stationing of the British army at Nāgpūr. But Raghujī skilfully avoided all such appeals. In 1811, when the *Pendharts* burnt some wards of Nagpur city Raghujī asked for British help, but was refused as Raghujī was not willing to enter into the subsidiary alliance.

In 1801-02, on the occasion of the Sinhastha Parvani, Raghujī with the members of his family had been to Dharmapuri on the bank of the Godāvari for a bath.2.

Raghuji's relations with his brother Vyankoji alias Manyābāpū were not happy. Manyābāpū enjoyed the title of Senādhurandhar. He was brave and adventurous. He died at Kāśī in 1811.3

Mr. Colebrooke the great Sanskrt scholar, who was deputed to Nāgpūr as an envoy in 1799, has left a lively description of Raghujī. Raghuji lived in a spacious palace surrounded by gardens. The palace had six quadrangles or cauks each of which had a three storeyed structure. The drawing hall in the palace was well decorated with chandeliers and pictures. The hall which was meant for the Rājā had beautiful carving. The garden around the palace had good roads enclosed by fencing.

Raghujī was not fond of pomposity either in dress or manners. He was sweet-tongued and behaved in a friendly manner even with his subordinates. He was, however, careful in maintaining the decorum and discipline of the darbar. During leisure hours all were entertained by singing and dancing. Raghujī was fond of hunting, so much so that when a tiger was reported in the neighbourhood he often hastened to the place with his party leaving the office work. He, however, never neglected administrative duty. Sridhar Laksman Munśī and Kṛṣṇarāv Citṇis were the most trusted courtiers of Raghujī.

The Dasarā festival during Raghujī's reign was a brilliant spectacle displaying his grandeur and glory.4.

¹ NPI., pp. 377-378.

² Ibid., p. 308.3 NPI., p. 386.

⁴ NPI., pp. 312-14.

Raghujī loved his kith and kin and was extremely fond of children. Bakābāi was his favourite queen. He was pious and devoted to his mother. But Raghujī lacked quick decision and courage. In the war with the English he often left his fighting forces. He was willing to wound yet afraid to strike. In diplomacy he was no match for the contemporary Englishmen with whom he was required to deal.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. Parasoji Bhosle.

Parasoji Bhosle.

After the treaty of Devagānv, Raghujī, it seems, was in financial difficulties. His anxiety for wealth grew with age bringing him into disrepute. He was nicknamed the big baniyā for the methods he used in collecting money. Raghujī who had the good fortune of witnessing the glory of the Bhosle house at its zenith was also destined to see its decline. He died on 22nd March 1816.

Raghujī II was succeeded by his son Parasojī in 1816. Parasoji was paralytic, blind and mentally deranged. His father's efforts to improve him proved fruitless. Bakābāī, Parasojī's step-mother brought him to her palace and took charge of the administration with the help of Dharmājī Bhosle, Nārobā Ciṭṇis and Gajābādādā Gujar. Dharmājī was an illegitimate son of Raghujī and was the custodian of the royal jewellery and treasury.

Next to Parasojī the only other claimant to the Nāgpūr gādi was Āppāsāheb Bhosle. He was a smart young man having support of many courtiers, as Parasojī was practically insane. Rāmcandra Vāgh and Mānbhat were prominent among his chief supporters. They were trying to seduce the partisans of Parasojī. Thus after the death of Raghujī Nāgpūr Court had two factions, one headed by Āppāsāheb and the other led by Bakābāi, Dharmājī and others with Parasojī on the ancestral gādī.

Āppāsāheb had no claim over the gādī as Parasojī was the son of Raghujī. The army was under the command of Dharmājī, Siddik Ali Khān and Gajābādādā. Āppāsāheb impressed upon the courtiers that it was not desirable that Dharmājī, a bastard, should manage the affairs of the Bhosle house. The resident Mr. Jenkins was secretly backing Appāsāheb as he was counting upon him to accept the subsidiary alliance which Raghuji had been carefully avoiding all through his life. When Siddik Ali Khān smelt this his loyalty to Parasoji and Bakabai wavered. He sat on the fence ready to jump to the side of the winning party. Appāsāheb called Dharmājī for meeting on 11th April 1816 and got him arrested. He took possession of the Rājā and his treasury. Without any further loss of time Appāsāheb ceremoniously performed the coronation for Parasojī. He personally held the cauri over Parasoji's head and walked barefooted in the procession taken out in honour of the Rājā. A grand darbār was held in which the Rājā was made to proclaim the appointment of Appäsäheb as his regent. Mr. Jenkins graced the oceasion by his presence, lending stability to Appāsāheb.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. Parasoji BHOSLE.

Dharmājī was murdered on 5-5-18161; Appāsāheb's evil intention of occupying power for himself was thus finally fulfilled. He entered the subsidiary alliance with the English on 28-5-1816, bartering away the independent status of Nagpur which Raghuji II had maintained with great difficulty. The important terms of this alliance were-

- (1) For the protection of Nagpur the English were to maintain six platoons of foot-soldiers and one of cavalry. The king was to pay seven and a half lac of rupees for the maintenance of this force.
- (2) The king was to grant territory worth this amount in case of his failure to pay it.
- (3) The king too was to keep a contingent force of 3,000 soldiers and 2,000 horses at his own expense, to be supervised by the Resident in respect of its pay, discipline, provision, etc.
- (4) All foreign affairs should be conducted only through the English Resident.
- (5) The king should not engage in wars with the friends of the English.2

This alliance was brought about through Appasaheb's envoys Nāgojipant and Nārāyan Panditjī. The former received an annual pension of Rs, fifteen thousand from the English for his successful mediation.

Part of the English subsidiary force moved from Ellicpur to Nagpur under General Dovetone and the rest was stationed at Kalameśvar near Nagpur to strengthen Appasaheb's position. Afraid of the machinations of the rival party Appāsāheb's left the palace and took residence in the Telankhedi Garden.

On the morning of 1-2-1817 Parasoji was found dead in his bed, Äppäsäheb was out of station. It was rumoured that Äppäsäheb managed to throttle Parasoji to death by seducing his body-guards Sādikmānu Bhāldar and Jānu Bansod. The Resident absolved Appāsāheb of the murder charge which was thickly rumoured at this time, but later, when he tried to break the bonds of subsidiary alliance he was conveneintly made the culprit.3.

ÁPPASAHEB BHOSLE.

After Parasoji's death, Appasaheb being the only heir to the Nāgpūr gādī his succession ceremonics were gone through quietly on 21st April 1817. The moment Appasaheb assumed charge of Nagpur he began to feel the weight of British supremacy which he had accepted by the subsidiary alliance. His efforts hereafter were directed to overthrow the British yoke. The Resident suspected that Appāsāheb was in contact with Bājīrāv Peścā and the Sindes. The agents of one of the Pendhäri leaders Cittu were openly honoured in the darbar by presenting dress. As a precautionary measure Col. Adams was asked to move his force to the south of the Narmada to meet any emergency. Similarly, Scott left Rāmţek for Nāgpūr.

¹ NPI., p. 397. ² NPI., P. 399.

³ NPI., pp. 403-404.

It was in this atmosphere that Āppāsāheb decided to receive the robes of $Sen\bar{a}$ $S\bar{a}heb$ - $Subh\bar{a}$, formally, from Bājīrāv $Peśv\bar{a}$. 24th November 1817 was decided as the day for receiving the robes in the $darb\bar{a}r$. Āppāsāheb invited the Resident for this ceremony. But the latter declined it as war had broken out with the $Peśv\bar{a}$ in Pooṇā, and informed Āppāsāheb that he should not receive the honours from the enemy of the British. In spite of this opposition Āppāsāheb received the robes and the title in the $darb\bar{a}r$. This was considered as a breach of the subsidiary treaty by the Resident and a war with \tilde{A} ppāsāheb seemed imminent.

Like Bājīrāv, Āppāsāheb too wanted to free himself from the shackles of the subsidiary treaty. He was helped in this task by Māṇbhaṭ, Rāmcandra Vāgh, Subhedār Nimbāļkar and Nārāyaṇ Nagāre. Āppāsāheb's Arab soldiers occupied a position between the city and Sitābulḍī. He had a total force of 18 thousand men and 26 guns while the English force numbered only 1,800.

Having come to know the movements of the Marāṭhā army, the Resident ordered Lt. Col. Scott to occupy the Sitābulḍī hills. Scott had two battalions of Madrās Native infantry, two companies of Native infantry and three troops of Bengal Cavalry. He was equipped with four six-pounder guns. Strategically the Marāṭhās committed the first blunder in allowing Scott to occupy the hills.

The Rājāś palace was in the present Mahāl area which was protected by the Sukravār darwājā. This was the fort.

The English had taken shelter in the Tulsibag, about the 24th December 1817.

The English residency was situated to the west of the Sitābulḍī Fort, i.e., on the site of the present Nāgpūr Mahāvidyālaya. The English had their treasury to the west of the smaller hill of the two Sitābulḍī hills. The southern hill spreads from east to west and is the bigger one. The smaller one is to the north. The two hills roughly rise above the ground to a height of hundred feet and are separated by the same distance.²

Peace talks were in progress when both the sides were preparing for war simply to gain time. On the evening of 26th November 1817, the Arabs of Āppāsāheb opened fire on the smaller hill. He sent a message to the Resident saying that this had been done against his orders. Āppāsāheb throughout this war was wavering making the position of his loyal supporters like Māṇbhaṭ most awkward. It is possible that the mercenary Arabs might have acted on their own without waiting for the orders of their master but this speaks for Āppāsāheb's lack of leadership. Āppāsāheb, after his defeat, pleaded that his Arabs opened fire on the orders of Māṇbhat.³

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Bhosles of Nagpur. ĀPPASAHEB BHOSLE.

¹ NPI., p. 408.

² NPL., pp. 411-13.

⁸ Ibid., p. 417.

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Bhosles of Nagpur. ĀPPASAHEB BHOSLE. The fire of the Arabs was well replied by the English guns on the hills. Captain Lloyd was in charge of the bigger hill. Captain Sadler was killed by a shot while he was defending the small hill. On the morning of 27th the Bhosle's forces approached the hill. The smaller hill was attacked and occupied. The English were in a confused state. The Arbas were preparing to launch an attack on the bigger hill. The English would have lost the battle but for the brave and spirited attack of Captain Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald's determined onslaught pushed the Marāthās back and they broke in all directions. This infused new spirit in the English soldiers who were drooping from fatigue. A combined attack of the cavalry and infantry finally won the day for the English.¹

It was Māṇbhaṭ and his Arbas who really fought well bringing victory within easy reach for the Marāṭhās.² But lack of concerted action and Āppāsāheb's vacillation were mainly responsible for the defeat of the Marṭāhās. Āppāsāheb in order to save himself pleaded to the Resident that all was done by Māṇbhaṭ without his orders. Bakābāi too towed his line. Thus, in war, Apāsāheb proved to be a coward and in defeat acted most disgracefully. Māṇbhaṭ, Rāmcandra Vāgh, Gaṇpatrāv Subhedār and their supporters were against any talk of peace. When Doveton was preparing to attack the city, Āppāsāheb walked into the protection of the Resident on 16-12-1817, at about 9 o'clock in the morning.³ The masterless Marāṭhās fought one more battle known as the battle of Sakkardarā, only to lose.⁴ Māṇbhaṭ with his Arabs and North Indian soldiers totalling 5,000, defended the city from behind the fort.

But he was helpless when the Arabs in a divided state of mind were seduced by the English. They left Nägpūr on the 30th when the arrears of their pay were cleared. The Union Jack was hoisted on the old palace of the Bhosles on the same day. Poor Māṇbhaṭ was arrested and later died in prison.⁵

Appāsāheb signed a treaty on 6-1-1818 with the English in which he was bound by terms stricter than those of the subsidiary alliance.

The terms of the treaty were:-

- Āppāsāheb was to surrender the forts of Gāvilgad, Narnāļā and the territory attached to them, along with the states, Sirgujā and Jaspūr.
- 2. The civil and military administrations of Nāgpūr was to be conducted through the Resident.
- Appāsāheb was to stay in Nāgpūr under the supervision of the Resident.

¹ NPI., p. 422.

² Ibid., p. 423.

³ NPI., pp. 428-29.

⁴ Ibid., p. 430.

⁵ NPI., p. 434.

4. Appāsāheb was to pay the arrears of pay of the subsidiary army.

- He was to surrender any fort which might be asked for by the English.
- 6. He should hand over all those who acted against his order in the war
- 7. The Sitābulḍī hills were to be surrendered to the English along with the neighbouring area they might ask for.¹

This sealed the fate of Appāsāheb as also of Nāgpūr once for all. These terms of the treaty were ratified by the Governor General.

With the surrender of Āppāsāheb Bhosle the outlying posts of Jubbulpore, the forts of Sivanī Dhiruḍ (south-east of Nāgpūr), Gāvilgaḍ, Caurāgaḍ, Narnāļā and Maṇḍlā fell to the English without much resistance. The fort of Maṇḍlā which was protected by the river Narmadā offered resistance for sometime. But when its keeper Rāyā Hajārī ran away, the beleaguered force numbering 1,100 surrendered.²

After his surrender, Appasaheb was reinstated on his ancestral gādā and allowed to stay in the palace. For three months things appeared to move smoothly. On 19th February 1818, Bapu Gokhale, the last great general of Bājīrāv fell fighting in the battle of Astā. Bājīrāv lost all hope of regaining his position and took to heels begging for help till his surrender to Malcolm. During his flight he was at Väsim for a while and then camped at Pāndhārkavadā. He was accompanied by Gappatrav Subhedar one of the generals of Appasäheb. It was rumoured that Bājīrāv would be joined by Appasaheb and both would march to Canda which was yet in the hands of its keeper Gangasingh. Jenkin's suspicion that Appasaheb was in correspondence with Bājīrāv was strengthened when a letter from Appāsāheb to Bājīrāv was intercepted by Elphinstone and sent to him.3 He at once arrested Appāsāheb on 15-3-1818. Appāsāheb along with Ramcandra Vagh and Nagopant was sent to Prayag, as his presence in Nagpur was considered dangerous.

The fort of Cāndā fell on 30th May 1818. Its keeper Gaṅgāsiṅgh fought desperately till he fell dead along with his trusted followers.4

On his way to Prayag Appasaheb escaped from the English camp at Raicur on 13-5-1818. Hereafter began the long flight of Appasaheb.

Āppāsāheb took shelter in the Mahādev hills of Madhya Pradeś and was helped by Mohansing Thākūr of Pañemaḍhi and Cain Śāh of Harāi. A few petty Goṇḍ Kings too supported Āppāsāheb in his last days. The English forces under Adams, MacMorin and Scott combed out the Hills and arrested the Goṇḍ leaders. Mohansing

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. ÄPPASAHEA BHOSLE,

¹ NPI., pp. 435-36.

² Ibid., pp. 438-444.

³ NPI., p. 445.

⁴ Ibid., p. 473.

Vf 3792-13

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Bhosles of Nagpur, ĀPPASAHEB BHOSLE,

and Cain Sah were taken into custody. Appasaheb made good for the fort of Asirgad, the gateway of the Deccan, on 1st February 1819. He was escorted by the *Pendhārī* leader Cittu and his followers. Äppäsäheb was received into the fort by Yaśvantrav Lad, its keeper. The fort was yet in the possession of the Sindes. It was admirably suited for defence. The English moved their men and material from Māļvā, Pooņā, Nāgpūr and Hyderābād. Prior to the surrender of the fort on 9th April of 1819, Appasaheb had escaped towards Khairi Ghāt to the north-west of Asirgad and taken shelter with a Brāhmin at Burhānpūr. From there Appāsāheb travelled through the territory of the Sindes, Holkars, Jaipur and Jodhpur begging for asylum and took shelter for sometime with Ranjit Sing. The Rājā of Mandī gave Appāsāheb protection for a short time. Finally Appā sāheb was found with the Rājā of Jodhpūr. The Rājā refused to hand over Appasaheb to the English in keeping with the chivalrous traditions of the Rajputs. In 1829 Appäsäheb's wandering career came to an end and he spent the remaining part of his life as a guest-cum-royal prisoner at the court of Jodhpür. He died in 1840.1

During his luckless days Āppāsāheb desperately moved from court to court begging for help. But he was too late. Had he shown sufficient courage and determination in the battle of Sitābuļḍi the chances of success were brighter. He let down his honest supporters like Māṇbhaṭ and Rāmcandra Vāgh. In expecting aid from Bājīrāv, Āppāsāheb was leaning on a reed. After his confinement at Jodhpūr nobody seems to have been really sorry for the unfortunate Āppāsāheb. In his fight his wife Umābāi supplied him money secretly. His other wife Sāvitribāi who was enjoying a pension at Nāgpūr did not go to him even after she came to know of his stay in Jodhpūr.²

RAGHUJI III,

When Āppāsāheb was arrested the Resident Mr. Jenkins decided to adopt Bājībā, the son of Banubāi, as the successor to the Bhosle gādī. Banubāi was the daughter of Raghujī II. The adoption ceremony was performed on 26-6-1818 and Bājībā was renamed Raghujī III. He was then only ten years old. It was the Resident who took the entire administration into his own hands during the minority of Raghujī III. Bakābāi was to look after the palace affairs. Her ambition to rule may be said to have been fulfilled at least partly. Prior to his retirement the Resident held a grand darbār and read out the terms of the treaty with Raghujī III on 1-2-1826. It was ratified by the Governor General on 13-12-1826.

The terms of the treaty were-

- (1) The terms of this treaty which were not contradictory to the subsidiary alliance of 1816 were accepted by the Rājā.
- (2) The *Rājā* was not to have any relationship with the other Marāthā States. He was to retain the title of *Senā Sāheb-Subhā* but was to relinquish the honours connected with it.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 465.

² NPI., p. 466.

(3) The $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ should give to the English territory worth Rs. 7.5 lacs for the maintenance of the subsidiary force. He was hereafter not required to keep the contingent force as decided previously by the subsidiary alliance of 1816. The English promised to continue the $r\bar{a}j$ in the house of the Bhosles perpetually.

- (4) The rāi was given over to the King as he had come of age.
- (5) Cāndā, Devagad, the territory up the Ghāts, Lāñjī and Chattisgad were to be under the English along with the feudatories of these regions. The $R\ddot{a}j\ddot{a}$ was to receive Rs. 17 lacs from these territories after deducting the expenses. The $R\ddot{a}j\ddot{a}$ was to rule over Nāgpūr and the rest of the territory.
- (6) the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ should act on the advice of the English in respect of the appointment of officials, the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}s$ privy purse and the laws of the territory. The English had the right to inspect the Kings treasury and the accounts of his kingdom.
- (7) In the event of maladministration the English were free to appoint their own officers and manage things.
- (8) The English were free to take over Sitābuldī or any other fort they required,

Mr. Jenkins gave charge of his office to Captain Hamilton on 29-12-1826 and proceeded to Bombay for further journey.

Jenkins deserves praise for the peace and good administration he gave to the Bhosle $r\bar{a}j$ during his ten years' career. He was able to turn the deficit of the kingdom into a surplus treasury. His treatment of the Bhosles was far more considerate than the one meted out to the $Peśv\bar{a}s$ by Malcolm. He could have easily annexed Nāgpūr to the British territory had he meant so.

Jenkins took care to educate Raghuji III. Raghuji was introduced to the Three R.'s and had working knowledge of Persian and Marāṭhī though he had no inclinatation for learning.² In the early part of his royal career Raghujī took keen interest in adminstrative matters but later neglected them. He loved music and dancing and later indulged in gambling to the neglect of his duties. He was addicted to drinking and during his last illness he drank desperately. Apart from these personal vices Raghujī was on the whole a just and good administrator. He was a popular King.

Raghuji was not blessed by progeny though he had in all eight wives. He had one son who died in infancy after whom he probably did not get any issue. He does not seem to have cared for his successor. He probably considered his sonlessness as a blemish and left the question of succession to its own fate. This,

CHAPTER 7.

Bhosles of Nagpur. Ragnuji III,

¹ NPI., pp. 486-88.

² Ibid., p. 482.

Vf 3792-13a

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RACHUJI III

however, proved to be detrimental to the Bhosle House as is borne by facts. Raghujī was not on good terms with Resident Mansel. This might have adversely affected the succession question.

Raghujī had been to Kāśī, Gayā and other holy places on a pilgrimage in 1838. He was accompanied by Captain Fitzgerald with his Madrās contingent. Raghujī died at the age of 47 after a long illness of 25 days on 11th December 1853. His obsequies were performed by his nephew Nānā Ahirarāv and it was decided to adopt his son Yaśavantrāv as the next successor.¹

Annexation of Nagpur,

The question of adoption to the Nāgpūr gādī was discussed thrice prior to the death of Raghujī III. In 1837 the Resident Mr. Cavendish stated that Raghujī III had no right to adopt as his territory had been conquered by the British and given back to him and his sons. In the absence of an heir apparent or a posthumous child, therefore, the Raja's kingdom should escheat or laps to the British. The views of Resident Vilkinson were in favour of Raghujī. In 1840 he opined that Raghujī or after his death his queen had the right to adopt a son as successor to the gada. The case of Nagpur was in no way different from that of Gwalior or Hyderabad. Actually, according to the treaty of 1826, when Mr. Jenkins was the Resident, the British had promised to continue the rāj of the Bhosles in prepetuity. But this term was very conveniently set aside and the Court of Directors in England concurring with the views of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, ordered that "it had been determined on grounds, both of right and policy, to incorporate the State of Nagpur with the British territories.".1 Mr. Mansel, the then Resident, had suggested that Nagpur should be annexed. The fateful decision of the Court of Directors was proclaimed by Lord Dalhousie, and Mr. Mansel was ordered to take charge of Nagpur as the first Commissioner. He started working in this capacity from 13th March 1854.

¹ NPI., pp. 507-508.

The Marathas and the Nizam.

INTRODUCTION,

THE MARATHAS AND THE NIZAM

THE MARATHA-NIZAM RELATIONS MARK THE MOST IMPORTANT PHASE in the history of Mahārāṣṭra during the 18th and 19th centuries. Firstly, because as the subhedar of the Deccan, the founder of the ex-Hyderābād State, Nizām-ul-mulk Asaf Jāh controlled more than 3/4ths of the territory of the present Mahārāṣtra and secondly, because till very recently his successors were the rulers of the five districts of Marāthvādā division covering about one fifth of the State of Mahārāṣṭra. The Nizām family belonged to Central Asia. Khvājāh Abid, the grandfather of Nizām-ul-mulk on his way to Mecca, first came to India in 1654. On his return he joined Aurangzeb who was then engaged in the war of succession. After holding a number of posts under the emperor, he accompanied the latter to the Deccan in 1681 A.D. Khvājāh Abid died in the siege of Golconda in 1687. His son, Sahabuddin, known to history by his titles Gāziuddin and Firoz Jung had also migrated to India in 1670 and had taken up service under Aurangzeb. Like his father, he was also a principal general of Aurangzeb in his war against the Marathas. He outlived Aurangzeb and died towards the end of 1710, when he was the governor of Gujarāth.1

His son was Mir Qamaruddin,² generally known by his various titles, Cinqilic Khān, Asaf Jāh and Nizām-ul-mulk, the founder of

Early Career,

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¹ For the last twenty years of his life Sahābuddin was blind, having lost his eyesight in the epidemic at Bijāpūr, in 1688 A.D.

² Nizām-ul-mulk was born on 14th of Rabiul Akhar, 1082 (August 1671). He was named Qamaruddin by Aurangzeb. He received a mansab of 450 horse when he was six years old. In his boyhood, he received the title of Cinqilic Khān meaning boy swordsman. He was a favoured nebleman of Aurangzeb. He took part in the Moghal siege of Parali in 1700 A.D. In the 45th year of the emperor's reign, he was appointed the governor of Bijāpūr province and put in charge of Talkonkan and Āzamnagar (Belgānv), as faujdār and of Sampagānv as thānedār. In the 49th year of the emperor's reign (H. 1116), he was made the faujdār of Bijāpūr-Kamāṭak. He accompanied Aurangzeb in the siege of Vākinkheḍā. In the war of succession ensuing after the death of Aurangzeb, he did not take any side. When Muāzzam ascended the throne in 1707, under the title of Sāh Ālam Bahādur Sāh, Nizām-ul-mulk was called to the court. He was confirmed in his mansab and appointed the governor of the province of Oudh and faujdār of Lucknow. Shortly after, he retired from service. After the death of Bahādur Sāh, Jahāndār Sāh, the son and successor of Bahādur Sāh, called him to the court, gave him a mansab of 7,000 and the title of Firoz Jung Bahādur.

The Marathas and the Nizam.

EARLY CAREER.

the Nizām dynasty of Hyderābād. At the time of the death of Aurangzeb on 20th February 1707, he was the governor of Bijāpūr. He was disliked by Bahadur Sah for his leadership of the Turani faction in the Moghal court. Historians of this period invariably refer to two principal parties of the nobles at the court, viz., (1) the Moghal or Turani or foreign party which included all adventurers who came from Persia or from beyond the Oxus. The Afghans were also included in this group; and (2) the Hindustani or home-born party which was made up of Muslims born in India, many of them being descendants in the second or third generation of foreign immigrants. The Rajput and lat chiefs attached themselves to this party as also did the official Khatri class of the Punjab.1 During the later part of the reign of Bahādur Śāh (1707-1712), Nizām-ul-mulk led a retired life. After Bahādur Sāh's death and with the enthronement of Farrukhsiyār² and rise to the power of the Sayyad brothers,3 Nizām-ul-mulk was offered the viceroyalty of the Deccan4 which he gladly accepted (February 1713).

Viceroyalty in the Deccan, 1713-1715.

The situation in the Deccan at this time was intriguing. The Marāthās had succeeded in their uphill struggle against the Moghal However, their right of collecting cauth and sardeśmukhi invaders. from the six subhās of the Deccan, viz., Khāndeś, Aurangābād, Berär, Bidar, Bijāpūr and Hyderābād depended partly upon their relationship with the Moghal subhedār and partly upon their capacity to enforce it. The Maratha State was in great disorder. Administration had become loose and the Marāṭhā noblemen who had fought so gallantly with the Moghals for over 25 years were now wavering in their loyalty to the Maratha State. In such a situation, Nizām-ul-mulk assumed the viceroyalty of the Deccan.⁵ The Nizām had been with Aurangzeb throughout his Deccan campaign. He knew the terrain as well as the people who inhabited it. His was a cautious approach to the Marāṭhā problem because he knew the pitfalls which had led Aurangzeb to his discomfiture in his war with the Marāṭhās. He was a past-master in diplomacy. It was against such a redoubtable adversary that the Marathas had to contend. The Nizām was bent upon re-establishing the Moghal supremacy in the Deccan. The Marathas were equally determined to assert their rights. But it was not an easy task. The ascendancy to power of Sāhū6 was not to the liking of his cousin, Sivājī, who had set up a separate State of Kolhāpūr. After Sivājī had been deposed, his

W. Irvine, Later Mughals, I, 272-75.

² Farrukhsiyär ascended the throne on 31st December, 1712.

³ The Sayyad Brothers of Bārhā Abdullāh Khān and Hussain Alī Khān who rose to prominence in 1712, played the role of king makers for the next eight years till their power was overthrown in 1720.

⁴ This was consequent upon the death of Zulfikar Khan, who was till then the Viceroy of the Deccan.

⁵ Māsire Nizāmi of Lala Mansaram, in 18th Century Decean p. 49.

⁶ Sáhū was crowned King, on January 12th, 1708.

step-brother Sambhājī continued his activities against Śāhū. He allied himself with Nizām-ul-mulk. The Nizām tried every means to crub the power of the Marāthās. Later he seduced to his side Sambhājī and Marāthā generals, Candrasen [ādhav¹ and Sultānjī Nimbāļkar. Sāhū and his Peśvā, Bāļājī Viśvanāth tried their best to check the Nizām but without much success. However, in 1715, the Nizām was recalled to Delhi and his place was taken by Hussain Alī Khān,2 the brother of the Moghal Vazir Sayyad Abdullah. He tried to continue the policy of the Nizām and was engaged in a struggle against the Marathas. Hussain Alī Khān was, however, driven to come to a compromise with the Marāṭhās, owing to the intrigues of the emperor against him and the Vazir Sayyad Abdullāh. Sayyad Hussain Alī Khān conceded the demand of Sāhū for cauth, sardeśmukhī and Svarāj.3 A Marāṭhā force accompanied Sayyad Hussain Alī Khān to Delhi and following the downfall of Farrukhsiyār,4 succeeded in securing the sanads of grants for cauth, sardeśmukhi and Svarāj. These grants were acquired in March 1719. The sanads were personally received by the Peśvā. Their acquisition marks a distinct phase in the Moghal-Marāthā relationship. For the first time, the Marathas became the rightful collectors of cauth (dated 3rd March, 1719), and sardeśmukhi (dated 15th March 1719). Recognition was given to the Marāthā State.

CHAPTER 8.

The Marathas and the Nizam Early Career

Acquisition of the Sanads by the Marāthās.

Nizām-ul-mulk was appointed governor of Māļvā in 1719. He left Delhi for Māļvā on 15th March 1719. His relations with the Sayyad brothers deteriorated rapidly. Under these circumscances he refused the invitation of the Sayyad brothers to go to Delhi and instead, marched straightaway to the Deccan. He crossed the Narmadā in May 1720. In the battles of Ratanapūr⁵ and Bāļāpūr⁶ (1720), the Nizām defeated Dilāvar Alī and Ālam Alī Khān, the partisans of Sayyad brothers and assumed full control of the province of the Deccan. After this battle, a meeting took place between Bājīrāv and the Nizām at Cikalṭhāṇā on 4th January 1721.

Eclipse of Sayyad brothers.

¹ On the recommendation of Nizām-ul-mulk, he was made a mansabdār of 7,000 horse and received jahāgir at Bhālkī in the subhā of Bidar.

² Māsire Nizāmī in 18th Century Deccan, p. 55.

³ For details see P.D. 30, 222, Also See Treaties and Agreements, Easted by Mawji and Parasnis, 1914.

⁴ The dethronement of Farrukhsiyār was followed by a reign of terror let loose. After his deposition, he was cruelly killed two months later. The Sayyad brothers put on the throne two young Princes—Rafi-ud-darjāṭ and Rafi-ud-daulā, who together ruled for 9 months. The Sayyad brothers then raised to the throne, Prince Rośan Akhtar, a grandson of Bahādur Sāh, with the title of Muhammad on September 18th, 1719. Muhammad Sāh ruled till his death in April, 1748.

⁵ In this battle Nizām-ul-mulk defeated Dilāvar Alī, a partisan of the Sayyad brothers. The battle was fought in June, 1720. Dilāvar Alī was killed.

⁶ The battle of Bāṭāpūr was fought between Nizām-ul-mulk and Ālam Alī, a nephew of the Sayyad brothers, in August, 1720. In this battle the Marāṭhās took a dominant part on the side of Ālam Alī. Ālam Alī was killed in the battle.

The Marathas and the Nizam. Early Carrer.

The Nizam marches to the Deccan.

It is very difficult to say what transpired at the meeting. It is possible that a chance understanding between the Marāṭhās and the Nizām took place in 1724 and it was decided that the latter should not interfere in the expansionist aims of the former beyond the Narmada and the former should not interfere with the aspirations of the latter in the Deccan. After the downfall of Sayyad brothers, Nizām-ulmulk became the prime minister of the Emperor Muhammad Sāh in 1722.3 He was soon tired of the intrigues and corruption at the Moghal court and returned to the Deccan in 1724. The emperor ordered Mubārizkhān, the deputy viceroy of Hyderābād, to oppose the Nizām. In the battle of Sākharkhedā fought in October 1724,4 Mubārizkhān was defeated and killed. Although the emperor conferred the viceroyalty on the Nizām, yet for all practical purposes the Nizām became independent from 1724. There was no one to oppose the Nizam in the Deccan and the Delhi emperors were too weak to put a check upon their recalcitrant noble.⁵ A new State was thus born.

THE FIRST
SIGNS OF
MARATHA-NIZAM
CONFLICT

The Marāṭhās under the forceful leadership of Bājīrāv, who had become the *Peśvā* in 1720, now aspired to become an all-India power. They were fast obtaining footholds in Gujarāth and Māļvā. The Nizam was not going to be a silent spectator of these turn of events. He was determined to counter the Marāṭhās in every field—political, diplomatic and military. How the Marāṭhās succeeded in reducing the Nizām to the position of a third rate power is the story of 18th century Deccan.

The Nizām in the first instance challenged the rights of the Mārāṭhās (conceded by the 1719 agreement) as represented by Chatrapatī Śāhū by pointing out to the latter that besides Ṣāhū, there was the other claimant viz., Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr and the Nizām as the Moghal viceroy of the Deccan could not allow the

² Hussain Alī Khān was murdered in September, 1720. Sayyad Abdullāh was captured by the imperial forces in November, 1720, and executed on 11th October 1722.

³ He was appointed prime minister in 1722. He left Azduddovlāh Aivaz Khān as his deputy in the Deccan. During his stay in Delhi, Nizām-ul-mulk consolidated his hold over Māļvā and Gujarāth.

⁴ A Persian Chronicle enumerates a letter by Nizām-ul-mulk to Sāhū, which is full of praise for Bājīrāv (Shahamat Panah), Sultānjī (Tahavur Dastagah) and Pilājī (Jaladat Intibah), for their outstanding work in the battle againsf Mubārizkhān. (Māsire Nizāmī in 18th Century Deccan, p. 59).

⁵ After the victory, the emperor bestowed upon the Nizām, the title of Asaf Jāh, perhaps the only wise course of action he could have adopted under the circumstances. The Nizām was also confirmed in the subhedārship of the Deccan, under an imperial farmān which was received on 20th June 1725.

collection of cauth and sardesmukhī by his (Sāhū's) chiefs unless the dispute between the two claimants was resolved. The Nizam had with cunning and diplomacy appropriated unto himself the role of an arbitrator between the States of Sātārā and Kolhāpūr.² Knowing well the weak position of Sambhājī, the Nizām lent his unqualified support to him. He also persuaded the chief, Pratinidhi to oppose Bājīrāv if he assumed a role to the interests of the Nizām. The Marāthā noblemen of the old order advised Sāhū to follow a policy of caution, as otherwise an indiscreet step by an adventurous Peśvā might land the Marāthā State into unsurmountable difficulties. But the stubborn Peśvā convinced Sanu of the correctness of his policy of meeting the Nizām on his own grounds. He outlined the dangers that were involved in the unholy combination of Sambhaj and the Nizam." As a result, Sähü gave up the policy of appeasement. War started in October 1727. It was a long drawn out war. The Nizām wanted to draw the Marāṭhās in the open and annihilate them by the force Marāthās humble of his artillery.4 Bājīrāv avoided an open encounter with the Nizām⁵ and by following guerilla tactics trapped the Nizām at Pālkhed (25th February 1728). Driven to despair by hunger and fearing complete annihilation, the Nizām sued for peace. The Nizām was forced to concede the demands of the Marathas such as cauth and sardeśmukhi. He also agreed to recognise Sāhū as the head of the Marāṭhā State and not to entertain any political relations with Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr. The convention was signed at Mungī Sevganv, on 6th March 1728.6 This convention is important in many According to it the issue, viz., Sāhū's claim to cauth and sardeśmukhi sanuds granted by the Delhi Emperor in 1719, which the Nizām had tried to avoid for about 10 years was finally settled; secondly, the treaty set aside any claim which Sambhājī might have

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The Marathas and the Nizam.

THE FIRST SIGNS OF Maratha-Nizam CONFLICT.

Nizām at Pâlkhed.

¹ In this connection see letter written by Sambhājī to Senāpati Candrasen's agent, Rāyājī Malhar, on 23rd July, 1721 (Raj. 3.559), a letter by Bājīrāv to Săhu expressing doubts about Nizam's intentions, dated 25th November 1725 (S. R. 14, 157); and Sambhāji's letter to Candrasen of February, 1726 [Dalvi's History of Jadhao Family, p. 81].

² He even seduced Cimņājī Dāmodar (Šāhū's Rājādnyā) and offered him Sambhājī's Peśvāship.

³ Sambhājī left Kolhāpūr on 24th September, 1728, and joined hands with Nizâm with whom he was for a period of three years (R. K. 8.94,96). He even toured Poona district in 1727 and granted sanads in his name to local officials. How deep rooted was the plot the Nizām had envisaged for the destruction of Maratha power, is outlined in the letter which the Nizam wrote to Savāi Jaisingh (See text of the letter translated by Sarkar in "Islamic Culture").

⁴ The Nizām in the initial stages carried sword and destruction in the Maratha country near Poona, with the help of his Maratha commanders. It was in 1727, that he alongwith Sambhájí entered Poona district and made Poonā his headquarters for sometime.

⁵ Bājīrāv left Pooņā in September, 1727, and ravaged Berār. But hearing of the Nizam's descent on Poona, he swooped upon Burhanpur and Aurangabad to draw away Nizam-ul-mulk. His tactics proved to be correct,

⁶ For details of the treaty, see P. D. 15, 86-89.

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Marāṭhā-Nizām confrontation at Bhopāļ. had to the Marāṭhā State; and lastly, it brought home to the Nizam that the Marāṭhās were a force to reckon with and that any intransigence on his part would not go unpunished.

The battle of Palkhed and the severe reverses the Nizain had suffered at the hands of the Marāṭhās were not expected to keep the Nizām inactive for a long time. Nor did the Marāthās rest content with adopting a complacent attitude by assuming that there would no longer be any trouble from the Nizām. The Nizām decided to throw his weight in favour of Dābhāde, the Marāthā General, who was now at loggerheads with Bājīrāv Peśvā.¹ The Marāthās also noticed the meeting between the Nizām and Muhammad Khān Bangas, the governor of Māļvā, on March 17th, 1731.2 However, before the forces of the two could join hands, Bājīrāv fell on Dābhāde at Dabhaī and routed the Senāpati's forces on 1st April 1731. The Nizām was once again frustrated. The Marāthās utilised this opportunity to consolidate their hold on Gujarāth. The years that followed witnessed a superficial calm in the Marāṭhā-Nizām relationship. The acquisition of Gujarāth had roused Marāṭhā ambitions of further expansion of their power. They had already obtained a foot-hold in Māļvā which was the gateway to Northern India. This time Mālvā was invaded early in January, 1737. The motives of the Nizäm could best be left to conjecture. A faction in the Moghal court considered it opportune to concede the demands of the Marāthās in respect of these provinces. But the Nizām responded to the call of the anti-Marāthā party at the imperial court for succour³ against the Marāṭhās. It was thus that in 1737, the Nizām marched to the North. In 1738, Bājīrāv once again confronted the Nizām at Bhopāļ. This was the second direct confrontation between the Marāṭhās and the Nizām. The latter proved no match to the tactical superiority of Bājīrāv and found himself besieged at Bhopāļ by the Marāṭhā forces. He had no alternative but to surrender. A formal treaty was signed on 7th January 1738, at Dorāhā Sarāī under which the Nizām undertook to obtain for the Marāthās the province of

¹ When Sāhū came to know of the activities of Trimbakrāv Dābhāḍe in conjunction with the Nizàm, he wrote a strong letter, admonishing him severely (P. D. 17.12).

² The Nizām marched with his army to Gujarāth. He invited Bangas, the governor of Māļvā, to meet him on the Narmadā to form a plan of joint action against the Marāṭhās. But the defeat of Dābhāde broke this combination and the Nizām returned to Deccan (Nizām-ul-mulk Asaf Jāh, I. 196;97, by Yusuf M. Khān; Later Mughals, II, 251, by Irwine). The forces of Nizām numbering over 5,000, took part in the battle of Dabhaī, fought between Bājīrāv and Dābhāde, (Gense and Banaji, The Gaikvāds of Baroda, I. 11).

³ On reaching Delhi he received the viceroyalty of the Provinces of Akbarābād, Āgrā and Māļvā, on the promise that he would render help to the emperor in containing the Marāṭhās (*Tārtkhe Rāhat Afzā* in *Marāṭhe Va Nizām*, p. 20). The Emperor also agreed to appoint the nominees of Nizāmul-mulk to the *subhās* of Allāhābād, Ajmer and Gujarāth.

Māļvā under imperial seal. This was indeed a great triumph for the Marāṭhās. Within a period of 30 years after the death of Aurangzeb, they had seized Gujarāth and Māļvā. The Nizām was humbled.

The Marathas and the Nizam.

THE MARATHA
Arms.

Why then the Marathas, when they had the opportunity to destroy the Nizām first at Pālkhed and then at Bhopāl, did not destroy nim completely? In the first instance, the Maratha resources were not adequate to deal with such an eventuality. The Maratha confederacy was itself divided and any posture by the Marāthās aimed at the complete destruction of the Nizām would have raised against them the entire power and resources of the Moghals which the Marāthās would have found difficult to overcome. Though independent, the Nizām could always count upon the vast resources of the empire. Moreover, in 1727 complete destruction of the Nizām was not the aim of the Marāṭhās.¹ They wanted the Nizām to be reduced to the position of a subordinate ally and the confrontation between the two was occasioned only when the moves of the Nizām conflicted with the aims of the Marāthās. Nizām-ul-mulk had aimed at the complete annihilation of the Maratha power and intended to achieve for himself complete suzerainty over the Deccan.2 These aims were frustrated due to the masterly leadership of Bājīrāv. The wishes of the Nizām are succinctly brought out in what he confided to his associates. Says the Nizām "Some friends suggested to me that I might as well seize the provinces of Bengal, Bihār and Orissā as they were not properly managed, but I refused the idea".3 This shows the aspirations of the Nizām. At one time or other he had possessed himself of Gujarāth, Māļvā, Ajmir and Ägrä.

In April, 1740, Bājīrāv died, soon after inflicting a heavy defeat on Nāsir Jung, the son of Nizām-ul-mulk in January-February of 1740.⁴ The Nizām must have heaved a sigh of relief when he learned of the death of Bājīrāv, who represented the expanding power of the Marāṭhā State, on 28th April 1740.

¹ It is very interesting to note that after the battle of Pālkhed, Śāhū wrote to Bāļīrāv "You must on no account inflict any loss upon Nizām-ul-mulk or injure his susceptibilities. We enjoin this on you as a sacred obligation to the memory of your revered father.".

² Read in this connection the communication addressed by Nizām-ul-mulk to Abdul Nabi Khān, in April, 1730, translated by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in "Islamic Culture".

^{3 18}th Century Deccan.

⁴ Persian chroniclers of Nizām-ul-mulk such as Sayyad Muhammad Alī—Tārikhe Rāhat Afzā, Gulam Ali—Khajānā i Amirā and others give a wrong version of the battle between Nāsir Jung and Bājīrāv, claiming that Bājīrāv was heavily defeated. Grant Duff in his History of the Marāthās, adopts the same line. This view is positively wrong because if Nāsir Jung was a victor, why did he cede Haṇḍia and Khargānv to Bājīrāv? These two districts were handed over to the Marāthās by the treaty of Mungī Sevgānv signed on February 17th, 1740.

The Marathas and the Nizam.

BALAJI BAJIRAV AND NIZAM, 1740-1760

The Marāṭhās lose Tāmilnāḍ to the Nizām.

The death of the Nizām.

The mantle of the leadership of the Marāthā nation now fell upon the shoulders of young Bāļājī Bājīrāv¹, son of Bājīrāv. Taking the young Peśvā to be an amateur in the game of politics, the Nizām grew evasive about the cession of Māļvā promised to the Marāthās. But Bāļājī marched on towards Delhi and by a threatening posture compelled the emperor to agree to the cession of Māļvā2. Marāthās had thus succeeded in checking the territorial ambitions of the Nizām. However, the failure of the Nizām in curbing the northward ambitions of the Marāthās did not prevent him from confronting the Marāṭhās wherever possible. It was when Bāļājī and Raghujī Bhosle of Nāgpūr had come to grips in the North and when no succour was expected that the Nizam descended with a huge force in Tāmiļnād and drove the Marāṭhās out in 1743.8 The Maratha possessions in Tamilnad were thus permanently lost to them.4 It was the last confrontation between the first Nizam and the Marāṭhās. Nizām-ul-mulk died at Burhānpur on 21st May 1748. His age at that time was 77 years. He was perhaps the greatest enemy of the Marathas after Aurangzeb. By every means at his command he had tried to weaken the Maratha power, though without success.

New Phase in Maratha-Nizam Relationship

The death of the first Nizām and, after an year, that of Chatrapatī Śāhū,5 put the Marāṭhā-Nizām relationship in a different context to the changed political situation in the Deccan. With the death of Nizām-ul-mulk, the State of Hyderabad entered a difficult period. At Sātārā, the death of Sāhū resulted in the transfer of the political scene from Sātārā to Pooņā, and the Peśvā, now unhindered by any binding obligations towards the Chatrapati, became free to follow his policies according to his own choice. The second son of the Nizām, Nāsir Jung, succeeded Nizām-ul-mulk as the Nizām and the viceroy of the Deccan. Nizām-ul-mulk had, on the whole, succeeded in maintaining his possessions in the Deccan and the South. Though the Marāthās had many notable achievements to their credit in their confrontation with the Nizām till 1748, the greater part of Mahārāstra was still under the yoke of the Nizāms. A time had now come for the Marathas to carry the expansion of the Maratha power into the Deccan as they had done in Central and Eastern

¹ Bālājī Bājīrāv was invested with the robes of Pesvaship on June 15, 1740.

² The deed granting the *subhā* of Māļvā was ratified on 4th July, 1741, under the emperor's seal and final orders were issued on 7th Sep!ember, 1741.

³ He first took possession of Arcot and appointed his nominee Anvaruddin Khān as its governor. He captured Tricinopoly on 29th August, 1743 from the Marāṭhās (*Parasnis Itihās Sangraha*, Ati. Sthale, Tricinopoli).

⁴ Chatrapati Sivājī had effected the conquest of Tāmiļnād in his campaign of the South, during 1677-78. The Marāṭhās had lost the province in 1698. They had occupied it, under Raghuji Bhosle in 1741.

⁵ Sāhū died on 15th December 1749.

India by the acquisition of Gujarath, Malva and Bundelkhand¹ and by the extension of their activities in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Nāsir Jung, who had succeeded the Nizām, did not survive long. He was killed on December 16th, 1750 in the war against his nephew,2 Muzaffar Jung (son of Nizām-ul-mulk's daughter), who was helped by the French who had now started taking a leading part in the political affairs of the Deccan. Muzaffar Jung also met with the same fate as his maternal uncle when he was killed on 14th February 1751, by the disgruntled Pathans in his army. The French, who now practically controlled the court of Nizām, raised Salābat Jung, the third son of the Nizām, to the throne in 1751 A.D." The fratricidal war that was raging in the Nizām family gave the Marāthās the opportunity they were waiting for. The Peśvā invaded Aurangabad and subsequently marched to meet the Nizam who was returning to his dominions with the French general Bussy.4 The shrewd minister of the Nizām, Rājā Raghunāthdās prevailed upon him to seek compromise with the Marāthās temporarily. The Nizām agreed to pay the ransom demanded by the Peśvā under the terms of the treaty of Pangal signed in April, 1751.5 But no sooner had the Peśvā retired than the Nizām started playing the old game of his father. At the connivance of Tārābāī (wife of Rājārām), who was at Sātārā, a plot to overthrow the Peśvā was contrived by the shrewd minister of the Nizām.6 Both the Nizām and his minister, backed as they were by the disciplined troops under the French, were confident of overthrowing the Peśvā and destroying Maratha power in the Deccan. The Nizām left Aurangābād on 31st October 1751. The Peśvā had already left Poonā on 4th October. The Nizām fought his way to 12 miles from Pooņā when intrigues and lack of supplies brought his army to a halt. The intrigues at the court of the Nizām initiated by Sayyad Laskar Khān who favoured a settlement with the Marāthās forced the Nizīm to fall back7 and hostilities came to an end with the signing of the treaty of Singva Treaty of Singva. on 6th January 1752. This was positively not a favourable settlement from the point of view of the Marathas. Not only that but they had every reason to be apprehensive of the growing strength of the Nizām, backed as he was by the French. The Peśvā was

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Intrigues in the Court of the Nizām.

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¹ For details see Tarikhe Rahat Afza in 18th Century Deccan, pp. 197-98.

² See P. D. 25, 93, 94, 95

⁸ R. K 3.377, A; P. D. 25, 105, 109, 110,

⁴ No formal sanad about the subhā of Gujarāth was issued by the emperor. The Marāthās in fact possessed the whole of Gujarāth. Mālvā was acquired in 1742. For the expansion of Maratha power in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Raghuji Bhosle was mainly responsible.

⁵ It may also be mentioned here that the Peśva likewise hesitated to open hostilities with the Nizam, backed as the Nizam was with the powerful French artillery See R.K. 3.377, 378; N.R. 52; P.D. 25.115, 117, 118, 123.

see R. K. 3.71, 73. Also Purandare Daftar. ⁶ For the activities of Tārābāī. pp. 172, 178.

⁷ For details of the battles see Pur, Daf. 1.372, Pur. Roj. p, 73; R.K. 6,232;

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Marā'hā victory over the Nizām at Bhālkī.

now eager to find a delicate spot in the political armour of the Nizām whereby he could strike a hard bargain.1 The opportunity occurred unexpectedly in the person of Gaziuddin, the eldest son of the late Nizām-ul-mulk.2 He promised to pay the Marāṭhās 50 lakhs of rupees and cede the province of Khandes permanently to the Marathas if the latter would agree to instal him in place of his brother, Salabat Jung, as the viceroy of the Deccan.³ The time was opportune because the scheming prime minister of the Nizām, Rājā Rāmdās, had been murdered by his soldiers on 30th April, 1752. The Marāthās could now, not only succeed in destroying the influence of the French in the court of the Nizām but also be in a position to reduce the Nizām to the status of a subordinate ally. Gaziuddin started his march from Delhi towards the Deccan and it seemed as if circumstances would play into the hands of the Peśvā. But fortune favoured Salābat Jung, as Gāziuddin died of illness shortly after his arrival in the Deccan on 16th October 1752,4 suspected to be from the effects of poisoning. The Marathas, however, would not allow their plans to go waste. They attacked Salābat Jung at Bhālki and forced him to fulfil the promise of the cession of the province of Khandes made out to them by The convention of Bhālki was signed on 24th Novem-Gāziuddin. 1752.5 The affairs at the court of the Nizām were happy. The French had become all very powerful. Sayyad Laskar Khan, the prime minister, was dismissed and his place was taken by Sāh Navāz Khān6 who too resented the growing influence of the French. If not for anything else at least with a view to weaken that influence, he decided to be friendly towards the Marāṭhās. The Nizām co-operated with the Marāṭhās in their campaigns in Karnāṭak in 1756. The Marāṭhās were not happy t the brilliant performance of the French-trained forces in this They wanted to destroy the influence of the French and humble the power of the Nizām. The Peśvā planned a brilliant strategy to entangle the Nizām in the web of family dispute and suggested to him to dismiss Bussy and to free his brothers Nizām Alī, Basālat Jung and Mir Moghal who were in detention.7 The Nizām freed his brothers. They were posted as governors of Berar,

¹ The manoeuvres of the Peśva at this stage are described in R.K. 3.405-421.

 $^{^2}$ P. D. 25-127 states that a farmān was issued by the emperor appointing Gāziuddin to the subhedārī of the Deccan.

³ The Marāthā partisanship has been finely brought out in Kāvye.San. Patre. Yādt. 102, 103, and P.D. 25.144.

⁴ It is said that he was poisoned by some maid servants belonging to Nizām Salābat Jung. Some allege that the mother of Nizām Alī invited him for meals at Aurangābād and poisoned him.

⁵ P. D. 25.144, 147, 149; 26.202.

⁶ He was appointed prime minister in December 1753.

⁷ Tarikhe Rahat Afzā in 18th Century Deccan, p. 209.

Bijāpur and Aurangābād, respectively. Bussy then left for his jāgirs.1 The opportunity for which the Marāṭhās were waiting had arrived. Differences developed between the Nizām Salābat Jung and his prime minister Sah Navāz Khān who invited the Marāthās to invade the Nizām's State.2 He offered the Marāṭhās 30 lakhs of rupees as compensation for the expenses involved in the expedition. The Marathas invaded the territory of Hyderabad with a large army.3 The Nizām was forced to sign the treaty of Sindkhed (1758) involving a cession of territory yielding 25 lakhs of rupees. The compromise was hurriedly effected on the news of Exit of the French, the return of Bussy from the east,4 neither side wanting the French to regain the influence they had lost in the court of the Nizām. Of all the sons of Nizām-ul-mulk, Nizām Alī Khān, the governor of Berar was the most ambitious. Meanwhile, Bussy had returned to Aurangābād. Hyder Jung, a protege of Bussy wanted to destroy Nizām Alī Khān and assert himself at the Nizām's court. But he himself was treacherously murdered on 11th May 1758, at the connivance of Nizām Alī Khān. Though the subsequent events do not concern the Maratha-Nizam relations, it needs to be mentioned here that the murder of Hyder Jung led to the murder of Sah Navaz Khan by the agents of the French. This happened in 1758.5 When the conditions at the court of the Nizām were thus full of dangerous possibilities, the Anglo-French hostilities in Europe led to the recall of Bussy. Nizām Alī Khān, the governor of Berär and the younger son of Nizām-ul-mulk, marched to Hyderabad and became the de facto ruler of Hyderabad, in 1759. With the French out of the picture, the Marathas now decided to The defeat of the thvade the territories of the Nizām. An army of Marāṭhās under Sadā- Nizām at Tāndulja śivrāv Bhāū annihilated the rear guard forces of the Nizām in February 1760, at Tānduļjā.6 The Nizām agreed to a truce and ceded a territory yielding an annual revenue of 60 lakhs of rupees by the treaty of Udgīr.7 This included the forts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatābād and the districts of Solāpūr, Ahmadnagar, Nāśik and Bijāpūr. Two-thirds of the present Mahārāstra now came to be the part of the Marāṭhā Rāj. When the 'Marāṭhās were steadily liquidating the Nizām, the great disaster of Pānipat fell upon them in 1761. It would be no exaggeration to say that the Marathas took long to recover from this terrible shock. This was the opportunity for which the Nizām Salābat Jung and his brother Nizām Alī Khān were eagerly awaiting. The Peśvā Bālājī

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(Udgir)

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¹ R.K. 1.25.

² The details of this could be found in Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha, 1.10.

³ For additional information about this campaign, see R.K. 1.73-119; 11.100.

⁴ Tārikhe Rāhat Afzā in 18th Century Deccan, p. 212.

⁵ All these happenings are graphically described in "Tarikhe Rahat Afzā in 18th Century Deccan", pp. 213-16.

⁶ The details of the Udgir campaign could be found in P.D. I, P.D. XXV. 202.275 R.K. 1.154.165.

⁷ P.D. 25,281.

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PESHVA
MADHAVRAV
AND THE
NIZAM.

Bājīrāv had died of the shock of Pānipat on 23rd June 1761. In the north, the Rajputs, Jats and others had risen against the Marāthās. At this crisis, what was required was a man of strong will power who would regain the lost glory and put down the enemies of the Marāthās. Such a person was Mādhavrāv, the second son of Nānāsāheb, who assumed Peśvāship on July 20th, 1761. But, in the initial years, all authority was wielded by his uncle Raghunāthrāv. When the Nizām marched against Poonā1 in November 1761, Raghunathrav, to gain his support in his future disputes with Mādhavrāv, came to an agreement with him at Uruļi Kāñcan on 5th January, 1762, by offering the Nizām territory worth 27 lakhs of rupees.2 Nizām Alī Khān had nothing to loose but all to gain. He retraced his steps to Hyderabad fully satisfied with the outcome of events. He deposed Salabat Jung, the Nizam, and seized all power. As the Nizam he was to rule in Hyderabad for nearly forty years. The rift between Madhavrav and Raghunāthrāv widened and Raghunāthrāv went over to the Nizām and invited him to attack Madhavrav.4 Forced with the bleak prospects of the destruction of Marāṭhā State, Mādhavrāv surrendered to his uncle⁵ (13th November 1762), who foolishly handed over to the Nizām all the territory acquired from him after the battle of Udgir.6 The Marāṭhā State was now in wilderness. The pressure of Hyder Alī of Mysore was increasing and the wily Nizām with the help of his prime minister Vitthal Sunder was posing a great threat to the Maratha State. He even offered the Chatrapatiship to Janoji Bhosle,7 and marched with a great force against the Marathas. Both the Nizam and the Marāthās devastated each other's territories.8 The Nizām sacked Poonā in April-May, 1763,9 whereas the Marāthās laid waste the Nizām territory from Aurangābād to Hyderābād. On the news

¹ The Nizām in his march desecrated Hindu temples and burnt villages. The sack of Poonā was felt imminent and people started evacuating Poonā. P.D. 38.30, 32, 38, 47, R.K. 1.44, 52.

² P.D. 20.128; R.K. 10.2; Attihāsik Patre, 103.

³ July 1762. Salābat Jung was confined in the fort of Bidar. He was killed at the instance, it is said, of Nizām Alī Khān, on September 9th, 1763.

⁴ Raghunāthrāv fled from Pooņā towards Nāsik on 29th August 1762. He entertained Muhammad Murād Khān, an officer of Nizām-ul-mulk. The state of mind of the people is graphically described in a letter written by Sahāji Bhāpkar to the Peśvā at this time (P.D. 19.2).

⁵ P. D. 19.14; Purandare Daftar, 3.10,73.

⁶ The Nizām met Raghunāthrāv on 24th November 1762, when this deed was executed.

⁷ Aitihāsik Patre 104; P.D. 20.134, 137; 38.78, 79, Aitihāsik Tipņe, 1.32.

The Nizām and Jānojī Bhosle agreed in a meeting on 9th February, 1763, near Gulburgā that 60 per cent, of the new acquisitions as a result of their joint endeavours should go to the former and the remaining 40 per cent, to the latter.

⁸ The graphic details of this running battle are given in Khazana-4-Amira of Bilgrami in 18th Century Deccan, pp. 239-40.

⁹ P.D. 38.102.

¹⁰ P.D. 38.83.

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MADHAVRAV

AND THE

NIZAM.

The battle of

Rāksasbhuvan.

PESHVA

of the sack of Poona, the Marathas hurried towards Poona. On the way, they seduced Basālat Jung, the brother of Nizām Alī Khān, with a promise of raising him to the Nizāmship in place of Nizām Alī Khān. The Nizām now knew that he was caught in a trap. He hurriedly started his retreat towards Aurangabad. On the way, his chief ally Janoji Bhosle left him. While the Nizām was camping at Rākṣasbhuvan on the southern bank of the river Godāvari, the Marāṭhās struck at him on the 10th of August, 1763, and completely routed his forces killing 10,000 of his troops.1 He was hotly chased upto Aurangābād where he was surrounded. It was the same story as that of Palkhed, Bhopal and Udgīr. With no alternative left, the Nizām surrendered to the Marāthās a territory yielding an annual revenue of 80 lakhs of rupees. The treaty was signed on 25th September, 1763.2 His prime minister Vitthal Sunder had been killed in the battle of Raksasbhuvan. His place was now taken over by Ruknuddovlāh³ who was a nominee of the Marathas. The Marathas virtually forced the Nizam to accept a prime minister of their choice. The humiliation of the Nizām at Rākṣasbhuvan completely changed the complexion of Marāṭhā-Nizām relationship. The Nizām no longer remained a menace that he was before. It had taken the Marathas nearly half a century of diplomacy, tact and military manœuvring to reduce the Nizām to a third rate power. From this position he never recovered, even after the destruction of his arch enemies, the Marāthās, at the hands of the English. In the Marāthā-Mysore wars, the Nizām played a secondary role. In 1769, the Peśvä Mādhavrāv decided to punish the recalcitrant Janoji Bhosle for the role he had played in the sack of Poona. In this campaign, the Nizam played a role subsidiary to the Marāthās. The Peśvā Mādhavrāv died on 18th November 1772. His brother and successor Nārāyanrāv was murdered on 30th August, 1773. Raghunāthrāv was a party to the plot Death of Mādhav-A civil war broke out. Raghunāthrāv assumed power and marched rāv and subsequent against the Nizām.4 In the battle fought at Bidar, the forces of the Nizām were defeated.⁵ The Nizām concluded a peace by offering a territory worth 12 lakhs of rupees to the Marathas. But the position of Raghunāthrāv had become shaky at Pooņā. He was deposed by the council of Bārbhāis who declared in favour of the still unborn child of Nārāyaṇrāv. The Nizām backed the Bārbhāis.6 Raghunāthrāv solicited the help of the English, with the result that

confusion.

¹ For details of this battle see Madhāvrāv Roj. 1.343; Aiti. Tip. 3.29; P.D. 38.105-06; Aiti Patre, 105; R.K. 10-21.

² See for details Aiti, Tip. 2.18, 3.29; Mad. Roj., 1.243, K.S.P,Y. 33,492.

⁸ Tarikhe Rahat Afzā in 18th Century Deccan, p. 254. His name was Mir Meosā Khān Bahādur Ih'isam Jung.

⁴ The territory of Nizām was invaded between November 1773 and February 1774. See Tuzuke Asafia in 18th Century Deccan, pp. 281-282.

⁵ The action was fought on 29th November, 1773.

⁶ Tuzuke Asafia has given details about the meeting between the Nizām and Sābājī, Trimbak Māmā, Tāroji Ākade. Cimnājī Paṇdit and others representing the Marathas (3rd March 1774). The Nizam himself undertook a campaign against Raghunāthrāv. 18th Century Deccan, pp. 283-285.

The Marathas and the Nizam.

PESHVA MADHAVRAV AND THE Nizam

the first Anglo-Maratha war broke out which lasted till 1784. In this struggle, the Nizăm maintained a neutral attitude.

After the conclusion of hostilities against the English, the Marāthās and the Nizām marched against their common enemy, Ţipū Sultān of Mysore in 1785.

The Maratha-Nizam campaign against Tipu was indecisive and came to an end with the treaty of Gajendra Gad in 1787. The English now, took a lead and a tripartite alliance against Tipū consisting of the English, the Marāthās and the Nizām, was formed on 1st June 1790. The allies defeated Tipu. The Mysore campaign came to a close in 1792, when Tipu was deprived of half of his possessions.

The Marathas were now free to settle their accounts with the Nizām. The Nizām who had been offered a treaty of guarantee by the English assumed that they would support him in his conflict with the Marāţhās.

The battle of $\,$ The English, however, maintained a strictly neutral attitude Khardā and after throughout the conflict. The Nizām was completely humbled at the battle of Kharda fought on 11th March, 1795. This was the last of the series of battles fought between the Marāthās and the Nizām. The Nizām had to yield a territory worth 35 lakhs of rupees. This covered practically the whole of the present Marāthvādā. The treaty was, however, never implemented. The tragic death of Savāi Mādhavrāv, the Peśvā, in October, 1795, threw the Marāthā State into confusion. Bājīrāv II, the son of Raghunāthrāv, became the Peśvā. In the intrigues which preceded his accession, the Nizām was freed from implementing the treaty. The agreement of Mahāḍ [1796] by which the Nizām received back all that he had lost at Kharḍā was ratified by the Peśvā Bājīrāv.

The Nizām be-

The Nizām, initially suspicious of the English, was driven by comes a vassal of his fear of the Marāthās to accept the subsidiary alliance with the English by the treaty of 1800 A.D. He thus became their The Nizām was guaranteed protection against all the vassal. powers including the Marathas. When in September, 1803, the Sinde and the Bhosle invaded the Nizām's territory, the English went to the latter's help and decisively defeated the Maratha forces at Assaye.² Under the terms of the treaty of Devganv, signed on 17th December 1803, between the Bhosles and the English, the Bhosles were forced to give up all claims on Berar, west of the river Wardha. This province was fully restored to the Nizam. The Sindes were also forced to make territorial concessions to the English under the treaty of Surjī Añjangānv signed on 30th December, 1803 with the English. The territory lying

THE END

¹ R.K. 22-32; Hastings' Frazer, Appendix Q.

² The battle of Assave was fought on 23rd September, 1803.

between the Ajanthā and the Godāvari taken from the Sinde was handed over to the Nizām by the British. In 1818, when the territories of the *Peśvā* were taken over by the British, the Nizām was freed from the obligations of *cauth*. Till 1853, the Nizām continued to hold Berār. In that year, the East India Company took over Berār (in the nature of mortgage) from the Nizām. The province was never returned to him. Even with these losses, the Nizām's State covered an area of more than 82,600 square miles, of which the Marāthī speaking districts covered about 24,050 square miles. This was roughly about one-fifth of the present State of Mahārāṣtra. These districts formed a part of the State of Hyderābād till 1956 A.D. when they finally became a part of the present State of Mahārāṣtra.

The Marathas and the Nizam.
THE END.





सत्यमेव जयते

CHAPTER 9 MARATHA SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Maratha Society and Culture. MARATHA

COUNTRY.

Maharashtra, the Western Part of the Deccan, is the homeland of the Marāthās. It lies between the 16th and 22nd degree of north latitude extending from Daman to Goā on the west; the Satpuḍā range forms its northern boundary; an irregular line joining Cāndā to Goā and passing through Nāndeḍ, Bidār, Solāpūr and Belgānv, marks off the south-east limits of the region.

The establishment of the independent Marāṭhā State and its expansion in the 18th century were responsible in fixing these boundary lines. Grant Duff writing in 1826 remarks, 'Mahārāṣṭra is that space which is bounded on the north by the Sautpoora (Sāṭpuḍā) mountains; and extends from Naundode on the west, along those mountains, to the Wyne Ganga (Waingangā), east of Nagpoor (Nāgpūr). The western bank of that river forms a part of the eastern boundary until it falls into the Wurda ('Wardhā). From the junction of these rivers, it may be traced up the east bank of Wurda to Manikdroog (Māṇikdurg), and thence westward to Mahoor (Māhur). From this last place a waving line may be extended to Goā, whilst on the west it is bounded by the ocean.' Elphinstone practically bears out what Duff has said.

The region is divided in three distinct parts; the Konkan borders on the sea with its fast running rivulets opening into creeks and small ports, its humid climate, its torrential rains, and its rice crop, is divided from the mainland by the massive watershed of the Sahyādri or the Western Ghāts which run parallel to the sea-coast right from Surat down to Goā and beyond a few miles inland. This mountain-range about twenty to twenty-five miles in breadth is the distinctive feature of Mahārāṣtra. It determines the rainfall, the vegetation, the character of the people and has had a decisive influence on their history. The heavily-laden rain-clouds that the south-west monsoons drive before them, burst against this massive wall of granite and inundate the coastal strip, the hilly region and

^{*} This Chapter is contributed by Dr. V. G. Dighe.

¹ Grant Duff, History of the Maharattās (1921 ed.), Vol. I, p. 3.

Maratha Society and Culture. MARATHA COUNTRY, the valleys. A belt of deep forest formerly covered the hills and spread for some distance to the plains. Pressure of advancing agriculture has denuded the plains of forest, but the hills yet remain wooded. All along the hills the summits are frequently crowned at the top by large flat basaltic rocks. These huge blocks of granite, have been transformed into fortresses which look impregnable. In many of them there are springs of good water; a supply can be secured in tanks from the rains from June to October. During the rainy season with cascades tumbling down the hills, with the rivers in spate and valleys inundated, the hill-sides become inaccessible and are completely isolated from the outside world. In fair season the tangle of brushwood and thick forests, and the winding paths in rugged hills make the movements of large troops in the tract difficult, if not impossible. The terrain offers every advantage to the defenders.

The Deś country or the open plateau is the main Marāṭhā country. The valleys of the Godāvari, the Bhimā, the Nirā, the Kṛṣṇā are fertile, but the rest of the country is barren. The main crop is not wheat, but the hardy millet—Jovār or Bāṭrā—which is the staple food of the people.

South of the Satpuḍā, there are four great ranges of hills running west to east extending beyond the ordinary spurs of the Sahyādri mountains. The Cāndore hills passing through Nāśik district extend from Rāhurī to Berār, the Ahmadnagar hills from Junnar to Bhir, the Pooṇā range from Bhor to Indāpūr and the Mahādev hills cover the Sātārā district. The general aspect of Mahārāṣṭra is thus hilly. Though the climate is salubrious, the country on the whole is rugged and rough, the soil is poor and rainfall precarious. The toil of the peasant brings but a moderate reward. There is little scope for the accumulation of wealth.

Under these circumstances no big cities and no thriving marts grew in the region and the forbidding aspect of nature had little attraction for invaders. Though the Muslim conquerors occupied the central plains, the hill-sides and valleys were left to the local chiefs in nominal allegiance to the Sultāns. The niggardly nature and his wild surroundings bred in the Marāṭhā, the virtues of simplicity, manliness, self-reliance, perseverance, courage, a sense of social equality and pride in the dignity of man. It also made him narrow, parochial and selfish.

THE PEOPLE.

What kind of people occupied this tract in the 18th century and made it famous in history? To outsiders the people of Mahārāṣṭra are known by the generic term Mahrattas or Marāṭhās, though in the State itself the term is restricted to the community which follows the agricultural profession and forms the backbone of its society. Though there are divisions of castes and sub-castes, the

differences are not so sharply marked as in other States and the striking feature of the homogeneity has been remarked upon by anthropologists from the days of Risley (1908). The reasons for this homogeneity lie in the racial composition of the people, the rise of the Marāṭhā language and its use by all classes of people, the religious reform movement of the middle ages which attacked Brāhmin orthodoxy, breathed a liberal spirit and made men feel equal, and the prominent part played in the political history of the country by the great peasant community of the Marāṭhās, from which sprang not only Sivājī, the founder of the Marāṭhā State but several other notable families and which in a way moulded the way of lite of the people of the region.

The people of Mahārāṣtra are of mixed origin: the migrating Aryans from the north came in contact with the earlier residents of the region and in the course of centuries came to form the Marātha people. The Āryans came in three waves as is evinced by the Purānic legends of Paraśurām and Agasti; they came much earlier than the Sakas or Scythians who came on the scene much later and who were supposed to be the progenitors of the Marāṭhās. The latest position has been so lucidly stated by Dr. Mrs. Iravati Karve that one cannot do better than summarise her argument.

"Anthropometric data reveals the following facts. The tribals inhabiting the north-west corner of Mahārāstra and the northern mountainous region are in a class by themselves and fall apart from the rest of the population of Mahārāştra. They are short, dolichocephalic with broad flat noses. Among these the Vārli, the Bhils, etc., have very small heads and very broad noses. The Gonds, Govars belong to a slightly different category. The Bhils, Vārlis, Gonds, it is surmised, are the original inhabitants of the country. When a pastoral people cleared the valleys and plains these aborigines retired to the mountainous regions. There are references to Niṣāds and Kirāts in Sanskṛt and Pālī literatures. They seem to be the first colonisers in this country, and belong to the Australoid or the Veddah races. Though these forest tribes are on the border of Mahārāṣṭra, there has been some admixture from them among the rest of the Maratha population. The immigrant people employed the tribals as labour on land and some of them took tribal wives and their mixed progeny formed new castes. The process of mixing continues even now. Almost all castes (Brāhmins, peasants, artisans), in Mahārāṣṭra show a small element of admixture with the tribals."

"The second category is comprised of the Marāṭhā peasantry. A few of them broad-headed are found in the eastern and western region, but the numerous and powerful Marāṭhā peasantry are medium-headed with prominent noses. The Mādhyandin Brāhmins in no way differ from the Marāṭhās."

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"Closely related to this category, but with heads slightly bigger and wider is the third category in the western region. The members of this category now follow professions other than agriculture, but the main stock is Marāṭhā. Mixing with later migrants from the north may be responsible for the slight variations in the physiognomy of the category."

"The Agris, Khaire Kunbis, Manes are very near the tribals. The Mahārs and Māngs come midway between the tribals and the Marāṭhās. Mādhyandin Brāhmins cannot be distinguished from the Marāthās. Rgvedi Deśastha Brāhmins stand midway between the Marāṭhās and the western located group. This leads to the conclusion that the Marāṭhās, most of the Brāhmin castes, the Prabhus bear such close resemblances to each other as to be included in one common category. This class came in lesser or greater contact with the early dolichocephalic tribes and other tribals and gave rise to other castes. Some castes appear to have come from the north in modern times. Caste groups are formed not on the basis of social status but on the principle of geographical distribution. The natural divisions of Mahārāstra are the central plateau, the valley of the Purnā and the Waingangā, the Konkan, Bombay island and the mountainous region. The shape of the head changes as one travels from Bombay to the east. The anthropometric data is clear on the point that the Marathas are racially different from the Rajputs. Wherefrom the Marāṭhā and the kindred Marāṭhā castes came is not clear. The Rajputs are heard of from the seventh century. But much before this the Satavahana kings are reported to be opposing Saka or Scythian invasions. The Sakas entered Mahārāstra from the north through Gujarāt. Their invasions occurred over a long period. The Satavahanas might belong to one of the early waves of invaders. Though they ruled from Paithan on the Godavari, their important inscriptions are found in western Mahārāṣṭra. The words Mahārathi and Mahārathini occurring in their writings, it has been conjectured, refer to the Marāṭhā people. The Marāṭhās had settled in Mahārāṣṭra long before the Rajputs appeared on the stage of history and established their kingdom."1

COLONIZATION
OF THE DECCAN
BY ARYANS.

Taking her cue from Purāṇic legends Dr. Mrs. Karve suggests a much earlier date for the infiltration of northern or Āryan elements in Mahārāṣṭra. According to her the colonization of Mahārāṣṭra by Āryans speaking Sanskṛt or a near related language, occurred in three waves. The legend of the flight of Paraśurām after killing the Haihaya king Kārtavirya of Mahiṣmati into Aparānta is well-known; this story is interpreted as indicating that Āryan colonization of Aparānta or Konkan started about 1700 to 1600 B.C., as Paraśurām was contemporary of Rājā Hariṣcandra whose reign has been

¹ Marāthī Lokānci Samskrti, by Dr. Mrs. Iravati Karve (1951), pp. 153-54.

approximately dated about 1700 B.C., by Pargiter. This wave of colonizers entered Aparanta from the north-eastern corner and developed the Konkani language. This part of the country on account of the broken nature of the ground, its hills reaching the sea, its swift flowing rivers, its forests and its consequent lack of OF THE DECCAN communication, remained undeveloped. Konkanī remained a spoken dialect without its literature receiving permanent form in writing.

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The second wave broke into Vidarbha or modern Berar. The legend of Agasti in the Purāṇas says that the sage crossed the Vindhyas and arrived South. This route has been used by later kings for their southern conquests and brought the conquering hordes right into the valley of the Wainganga river. In this region the northern Aryans came into conflict with the aborigines. The colonizers by keeping constant contact with the north, refused to merge with the forest-dwelling people. If we are to accept the stories of Lopamudra, Damayanti, Rukmiņi, Indumati-all princesses of Vidarbha, wedding princes and heroes of the north, Vidarbha appears to be the spear-head of Aryan civilization expanding to Pargiter fixes the time of these Vidarbha princesses the south. between 1500 B.C. and 1000 B.C., the period of the great war of Mahābhārata. The Aryan rule of Vidarbha attained great eminence and the Vākātakas later on continued the tradition.

The main story of Mahābhārata centres round the rivalry between cousins. It also contains a sequel about the meeting or conflict of two cultures—the Āryān and the Nāga. The Mahābhārata contains several names of Nāga families. Arjuna burnt down the Khāndava toresi of Takşaka. Takşaka retaliated by destroying Parikşit. His son Janmejava to avenge the death of the father, put to death innumerable Naga families. The story is interpreted as a ruthless struggle between the advancing Aryans, a pastoral people who cleared the forests for their agriculture and for their cattle and the forest-dwelling tribes who were forced to retire into inaccessible mountains and valleys. The Baigas, the Gonds, the Kolis of Madhya Prades claim a kinship with the Nagas which lends support to the thesis of Aryan-Naga conflict in the region. Anyhow as ancient literature in Sanskrt or Pālī contains no reference to Dravids Dramils or Tāmils contesting the ground with the expanding Aryans, it is safe to assume that the people who opposed the Aryan advance in Mahārāstra were Nāgas, the ancestors of the hill tribes of the present day.

Khāndeś, the third region to be colonized by the northern people, known as Aśmaka or Mulaka, appears to be an offshoot of Vidarbha. Asınaka had its chief town at Pratisthan; both names appear to be imported from the north. Under the Satavahanas of Pratisthan Asmaka rose in importance, Mahārāṣṭrī was patronized and helped the rise of Marathi. Before the Satavahanas the country, according to Kathā Sarit Sāgar of Somadeva, was ruled over by Nārasinha. The CHAPTER 9.

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popularity of the name of Nārasinha or Nārasayyā in the Deccan, the presence of numerous temples of Nārasinha in this region and the frequent reference to Nārasinha in folk-tales of the Deccan tribals, bear out Somadeva to a certain extent. Was he the last king of the Nāgas? The words Nāg-Narsobā so frequently appearing together in Marāṭhī folk literature, the presence of many townships in Mahārāṣṭra such as Nāgpūr, Nāgoṭhaṇā and the popularity of Nāga worship in Mahārāṣṭra are rather significant.

The Nāga people were probably overcome by people coming from the North on horseback. Sātavāhana or Sālivāhana means those who used sāta or śāla as their transport. Sāli in Mundāri or Nāga language may mean a horse. The retreating Nāgas felt that the conquering hordes derived their superior strength from the horse and called them Sālivāhana. For want of more convincing evidence one can only conjecture that in the course of over a millennium elements from the north arrived in Mahārāṣṭra in trickles, mingled with the aborigines and came to form the Marāṭhā people.

Pargiter's chronology cannot be accepted in the light of the latest research on the subject and dates will have to be advanced by almost half a millennium. Basham remarks that the Āryans entered India in the Second Millennium B.C. (about 1,500 B.C.). It must have taken quite a few centuries for the Āryan tribes to spread to the east and then probe southward. Sir Mortimer Wheeler states the position as under in the latest edition of Oxford History of India. "Although there is no reason to believe that any large Indo-Āryan tribal body ever marched into the peninsula the peaceful penetration of the Deccan by Indo-Āryan emissaries began many centuries before the Christian era. Tradition credits the Vedic Rsi Agastya or a name sake of his with the introduction of Āryan ideas and institutions into the Dravidian South.". Prof. Nilakanta Shastri makes a guess that the Aryanization of the South took place about 1,000 B.C.

The above discussion may give us an idea of the early colonization of Mahārāṣṭra and of the elements that have gone in the making of the Marāṭhā people. The Deccan plateau has been the meeting ground of the Āryans and their successors Yavanas, Sakas, etc., from the north, with the original inhabitants of the land.

How the people came to be called Marāṭhās is a matter of conjecture and the word continues to baffle historians and philologists. The etymology suggested by Molesworth, the first lexicographer of the Marāṭhī language in the 19th Century, that it meant either the great country (Mahā Rāṣṭra) or the country of the Mahārs (Mahār Rāṣṭra) has not found acceptance, as the first explanation is obviously the Sanskritized interpretation of later writers and the second has been rejected on the ground that there are no instances of a country being called after a low caste. The present accepted theory is that it is a compound of Mahā: great and Rāṣṭrika: either a Sanskṛt form of Raṭṭa, the name of the northern tribe or a term applied generally to petty Chiefs ruling in the Deccan.

From ancient literary sources it has been surmised that the Rattas commenced a southward movement from the country of the Kurus north of Indraprastha in Vedic times and entered northern Konkan by way of Rājasthān and Gujarāt. Another body of these Rattas found their way into Vidarbha through Bundelkhand. These bodies were perhaps led by Paraśurām and Agasti. In the period of the Brāhmaņas, the Haihaya tribe colonized western and northern parts of Daksinapatha. The Yadavas likewise moved into Saurastra and Vidarbha. The Rattas of Aparanta crossed the Sahyadri range and established themselves in the valley of the Bhima, while those in Vidarbha, spread to Aśmak (Khāndeś), south of the Sātpuḍā. In the absence of a strong organized government, the Rattas became all powerful and began to exercise royal authority in their petty principalities. In the time of the Sātavāhanas (200 B. C. to 200 A. D.), they had become powerful enough to call themselves Mahārattas and marry their daughters in the royal family They were, as is obvious from the Naneghat and Bedsa inscriptions, at that time wellestablished in central Mahārāstra and the Ghātmāthā of the Sahyādri range.

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After the fall of the Sātavāhana dynasty Mahārāṣṭra was invaded by Indo-Bactrians, Scythians, Abhirs and Mālvas. Some of these invaders remained behind and established themselves in separate colonies. Most of them however merged with the people of the country and became Marāṭhās.

The interregnum between the dissolution of the Sātavāhana power (220 A. D.) and the rise of the Cālukyas (500 A. D.) was a period of comparative anarchy when the Marāṭhās entrenched themselves in their villages and districts. Their later career under Cālukya, Rāṣṭrakūṭa and other dynasties is too well-known to need reference.

The earliest known mention of Marāthās is found in an inscription of about 100 B.C. of the Nāṇeghāṭ leading from the Konkaṇ into the north of the Pooṇā district. The term used here is Mahārathā-graṇikoviro which probably means the hero-leader of Mahārāthās. In the Bedṣā caves in the same locality there is a reference to a queen described as Mahārathini, dated in the first century A.D. Other similar references are found in the Bhājā and Kārlā caves. It is not easy to decide whether the terms Mahāratha and Mahārathini indicate simply great charioteers or residents of Mahārāṣṭra or designate the individuals by their tribal name, the early form of Marāṭhā. Support is lent to the latter interpretation by Rock Edict V of the Mauryan Emperor Aśoka of 245 (B.C.) wherein it is recorded that the emperor despatched Buddhist missionaries to Rāṣṭikas, Peṭeṇikas and Aparāntas. It is known that Peṭeṇikas refers to Paiṭhaṇ on the Godāvari while Aparānta is the old name of northern Konkan.

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Rāṣṭikas therefore indicates some people resident in the Deccan, possibly the Raṭṭas. It is suggested that the Raṭṭas called themselves Mahā Raṭṭas i.e. Mahārathas.¹

The Erāṇ inscription of the 4th Century is perhaps the earliest reference to Mahārāṣṭra.² A century later was read in Sinhalese chronicle the Mahāvanṣa (A. D. 480) of the country of Mahāratha and in A. D. 634, the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang styled the kingdom of the Cālukya dynasty of the Deccan Mo-ho-lo-cha which is the Chinese transliteration of Ma-hā-ra-tha. In the middle of the seventh century, an inscription at Aihole near Badāmī in Bijāpūr district relates how a king of the Cālukya dynasty Pulakeśin II gained the sovereignty of the three Mahārāṣṭras with their 99,000 villages. About 1020 A.D. the Arab geographer Al Biruni mentions Marhāt deś as a country to the south of the Narmadā. Foreign travellers who visited this country from 1,000 A.D. onward always refer to it as the country of the Marāṭhās.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS,

Two distinguishing features marked the organization of Marāthā society and gave it security and stability-religion of the mass of the population of Maharastra and the caste system and the village. Hinduism advanced in the south with the march of the Indo-Āryan civilization, but the movement was slow and many of its concepts though accepted superficially, did not obtain the same hold in this region. The Hindu theory that mankind is divided into four Varnas or group of castes - Brāhmin, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Sudra - was foreign to the people of the Deccan. Though some castes affected to be of Ksatriya origin, the only distinction in society was between Brāhmins, the general mass of the people known as the Marāthās and the untouchable Mahars. The forest dwelling tribes like Bhils, Rāmošis, Kolīs, Vārlīs and Kātkarīs were outside the pale of civilized society. They were literally howers of wood and were not disturbed so long as they confined themselves to the jungle and remained quiescent. Whenever for some reason or other the forest-dwellers raided villages on the border, punitive expeditions were sent against them and they were hunted like wild beasts.

Brāhmins,

The Brāhmins were a priestly class and enjoyed social privileges. Only a small part, however, engaged in religious duties. They studied the Sāstras, acted as temple worshippers, and preached the traditional religion to the masses by reading Purāṇas and by holding religious concourses, popularly known as Kirtans and Bhajans. At these Kirtans would be expounded the philosophy of Hinduism that the world was a mirage and only the Brahman was real and the

¹ R. G. Bhandarkar, Early History of the Deccan (3rd Ed., 1928), p. 18.

² Discovered by Prof. V. V. Mirashi and published in Attihāsik Samktrņa Nibandha of B. I. S. Mandal of Poona, Vol. 5. It says that "Satyanāga Mahārāṣtri raises this pillar to commemorate the memory of the soldiers who died in the field".

realization of the *Brahman* in the self should be the aspiration and endeavour of life. This could be done by study, contemplation, piety, charity and by everybody doing his appointed duty in this life; the exposition was followed by the recitation of a popular story from the *Purāṇas*—like that of Pralhād or of Bhakta Dhruva—to the accompaniment of music. The object was to drive the moral to the listeners—the triumph of good over evil, of the godly over the ungodly. Many of the temple-worshippers would attach themselves to families in the locality, officiate on occasions like birth, marriage and death, read horoscopes, and perform worship for their patrons on specially holy or auspicious days such as *Ekādaśi*, *Sivarātrī* etc.

The class which strictly followed the tenets of the Faith and devoted their lives to the study of divine ordinances was held in esteem, but otherwise there was no special veneration for the Brāhmin character. Many of them had taken to mundane activities and were working as merchants, bankers and soldiers. But the profession in which they excelled was the clerical one. Because of the illiteracy of the general population the secretarial part of the administration at all levels-village, district and the centre-fell into the hands Brāhmins who acted as village accountants and district accountants; they kept records; they were in charge of land measurement and assessment; and they acted as divans to jagirdars and ministers and managed their estates. With the establishment of Svarāj, the Brāhmin clerks and accountants nearest to the king, became ministers of the realm. Sivājī's Peśvā or chief minister, Moropant Pingle, was a Brāhmin; his finance minister, Annajī Datto, was a Brāhmin. Rāmcandra Amātya and Nāro Sankar Saciv who directed the war of independence against Aurangzeb were Brähmins. Bālājī Viśvanāth who founded the family of the Peśvā which later usurped royal authority was a Brāhmin.

There were several sects of Brāhmins in Mahārāṣṭra; the more important were the *Deśastha* from Central Mahārāṣṭra and *Konkanastha* or *Citpāvan* from Konkan. In the early days of the Marāṭhā state, *Deśastha* Brāhmins were in greater prominence in administration, but with the rise of Bālājī Viśvanāth *Peśvā* they lost their pre-eminent position to the *Citpāvanas*.

The Brāhmin was thus an important factor in the population. Though the percentage of Brāhmins to the general population was barely five, the small minority wielded much greater political power than could be warranted by its strength. The Peśvā's court in Pooṇā in its later days came to be known as "Brāhmaṇī Daulat", Brāhmin-dominated state and roused feelings of jealousy among the masses owing to the favoured position of the Brāhmin class.

The next class in importance was the Marāṭhās. The term had a much wider connotation than at present. It included not only

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the peasantry, but the shepherds and cowherds. With the exception of a few prominent families they were looked on Sudras, the fourth class in the society. Col. Tone officer in the Peśvā's army writing in 1798, remarks,1 "the Marāthā holds a very inferior situation in the scale of rank and eminence of Hindu institutions. He is happily free from observances in respect of washing, praying and eating. He can eat all kinds of food with the exception of beef, can dress his meals at all times and at all seasons, can partake of victuals dressed by any caste superior to his own; washing and praying are not indispensable in his order. These advantages point out the Maratha as eminently qualified for a military life. His caste by which he belongs to the labouring population of the country endures him to fatigue and the vicissitudes of weather The Marāthās are the most numerous of the Hindu people, which circumstance promises hopes of success in every military undertaking".

Col. Tone further adds that the Marāṭhā people were closely knit by a certain primeval plainness operating upon the whole people. There was no distinction of sentiment to be seen: the prince and his domestic thought alike and expressed themselves in the same terms. It was not unusual for a great chief warming himself round a fire or conducting his affairs sitting on a plain saddle cloth surrounded by his subordinates. The simplicity of manners of the Marāṭhās, their democratic feeling of equality surprised strangers who had seen servility of conduct of Muslim Courts. The ruler was from a Marāṭhā family; the big confederates Sinde, Bhosle, Gāikvād, the Pavārs, were all Marāṭhās. The Marāṭhā peasantry was the dominant element in the army. Marāṭhās everywhere were Pāṭils of villages and Deśmukhs in districts, or chief landholders. Their total strength was about one-third in the entire population, and besides the Brāhmins, they were a powerful element in the population.

Vaišyas.

The next group was made up of artisans and traders, each organised in separate castes. The artisan plied his trade in the village in the traditional way and served its simple needs. The trader was often a bania from Gujarāt. The carpenter, the smith the copper-smith, the oil-man, the barber, the fisherman were all functional groups and differed little from the general Marāthā community in their religious and social outlook. Each caste had a sort of religious and moral government among itself, conducted by a council of elders. Any breach in the performance of the religious and social rites of the caste brought upon the individual the wrath of the elders. The government in most cases upheld the decision of the elders. In cases of disputes between castes, the matter was referred to the Brahma Sabhā of a holy place like Nāśik, Paiṭhan or Wāi. The general tone of society was conservative and the ruler saw that the traditional way of life was upheld.

¹ W. Tone in Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, Illustrations of some Institutions of the Maratha People.

The last in the social scale, was the Mahar. In the village community, he was assigned such low jobs as scavenging, clearing away dead animals, keeping watch at night and acting as a messenger and guide to government officials and strangers passing through a village.

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Thus, though Marāṭhā society under influence of Brāhmānic culture, had adopted many of its concepts, caste distinctions were not sharp and strict as in the north. The great peasant community, despite its low standing in the social scale, held a dominant position and set the general tone of society.

Writing in 1818, Elphinstone reported to Government "The whole population of the Marhatta (Marāṭhā) country are Marahattas (Marāṭhās), and all have some attachment to their nation and feel some interest in its greatness, but the common people are devoted to husbandry."

Village communities present the next striking feature of Marāthā society of the 18th century. Towns were few and the majority of the people lived in villages. The village was the base on which rested the administrative structure.²

VILLAGE COMMUNITIES

A village in the Deccan is called $g\bar{a}v$; when not a market town, it is known as maujā; when so, it is known as kasbā. Every village was a self-contained unit. It was made up of a cluster of huts of the peasants, of the houses of the village officials and of the village temples. All the surrounding land with the exception of inaccessible mountains was attached to it and was divided into fields and the village commons where the cattle grazed. The boundaries of its lands were defined and encroachments were resisted. The erable land was divided into fields, each field had a name which together with the name of the owner, was entered in the register. The inhabitants were principally cultivators and were either Mirāsdārs or Upris. 8" The Mirāsdār belonged to the village," held his land in heredity and could not be dispossessed of it so long as he continued to pay the rent. He could sell and transfer his fields and had the right to sit in the village council. The Upri was an outsider, a mere tenant-at-will and cultivated the land so long as his lease continued.

Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIII, p. 395.

² Authorities for the following discussion are Selection of Papers from the Records at the India House, Vol. IV, especially Elphinstone's report and the reports of Chaplin, Robertson and other officers: also Poona Gazetteer, (old edition), Vol. II, Chapter 8.

³ The word is derived from Arabic mirăs, mirăsi, mirăsdăr and these from wăris to inherit, mirăsdăr being a holder of hereditary property: Upri means a stranger, a mere renter in opposition to hereditary occupant.

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Besides the cultivators, there also resided in the village the village officials, $P\bar{a}til$, $Kulkarn\bar{i}$, $Caugul\bar{a}$ and the artisans known as $B\bar{a}r\bar{a}$ $Balut\bar{a}^i$. The most useful and legitimate employment of the artisans was that of labouring for the villagers in the several lines of their drafts, but they also held another position as the village staff and attendants on the $P\bar{a}til$ and assistants in the various social and festive ceremonies of the village.

The Sutār or carpenter was at the head of the artisans, his services being most in requisition. He made the villagers' ploughs and repaired their carts, the owners finding the material; for any other work as building a house or making a cart for other than agricultural purposes, he was paid. The Lohār or smith made the hoes of the ploughs and other implements. The Cāmbhār made all leather buckets, halters, whips, ropes and bands for agricultural purposes, the owner finding the leather himself. He also mended the farmer's shoes, though they had to pay him for new ones. He also had to furnish gratuitously the Deśmukh and the Deśpānde of the district and the Pāṭil and Kulkarni of his village with a new pair of shoes each, annually.

The above three were the principal artisans. They possessed several perquisites above the others, among which was the privilege of sowing in every farmer's field a strip of land with ralla, each strip consisting of four furrows. The farmer tilled the land, and the artisans merely brought each his basket of grain which was sown by the farmer and reaped by the recipient when ready.

The Kumbhār or potter supplied the village with earthenware-frying pans, ovens, pitchers, water-pots and jars-according to the casualties and needs of each house-hold, receiving a cake of bread on the supply of fresh article. When the crop was ripening he took a jug and water vessels to each field for those engaged in watching the crops, receiving in turn his nimboor (or ears of corn). The other artisans, Mahārs and the village staff generally claimed their pottery free, but the Kumbhār stipulated for some service in return. He had also to supply any government servant on his arrival at the village with what vessels he might require. He found the several images at festivals receiving in return a little grain.

The Nhāvī shaved all the farmers; to the Mahār he merely lent a razor. He attended at the Pāṭīl's wedding. On the occasion of weddings or festivals in the village it was his duty to convey presents from one party to another.

¹ Balutā derived from Bali a share in the grain of the peasant. Balutā means yearly allowance of grain for service rendered to the community. The detailed description of the artisans is based on 'Village Communities in the Deccan', by N. R. Goodine, 'Bombay Govt. Selection.'. (1852).

The Parit or washerman washed the clothing of the men-folk of the village. He spread white clothes as carpets for passage-over of a wedding party or of some great personage at a festival.

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The Mahār was the village watchman, scout and messenger. He was verily the 'village eye.'. His situation made him acquainted with everybody's affairs, and his evidence was required in every dispute. Should two cultivators quarrel respecting the boundaries of their fields, the Mahār's evidence often decided it. The Mahār's duties were numerous. In large villages they were divided into two or three heads; these were veskars or porters at the village gates; the Khale-veskars or guards of the stack-yards, the gaon-veskars or Mahārs appointed to attend at the cāvdī and the gaon-mahārs or those for general duty of the village. Different Mahār families performed these duties in rotation. In small villages one family guarded the gates, kept an account of persons who came and went, attended to travellers, conveyed government letters and cash. During harvest time he guarded the stack-yard and kept a fire burning at night and made himself generally useful. His remuneration was a government inam, a tithe upon everything grown; presents of bread and other victuals; small imposts of oil, sugar and condiments begged from shopkeepers.

The Māng provided the villagers with ropes and prepared the hides for the Cāmbhār to work, the Gurav looked after the local temples, a Mulāṇā took care of the mosque and tombs; a bard and astrologer were the other concomitants of larger villages.

The fees in kind to the artisans depended very much on the state of the crops and also upon the extent of services performed. Col. Jervis who made inquiries about the percentage of the share the *Balutedārs* claimed from the peasants, was informed that it was as high as twenty-five, which he did not believe. Other sources reveal it as about ten per cent. But there is no doubt that the arrangement added to the burden of the peasantry.

The *Pāṭil* was the first among the cultivators and the chief village officer, the *Caugulā* was his immediate assistant and both were Marāṭhā by caste. The office descended from father to son; when there was no capable person to perform the duties, a near relation was chosen. A succession always required confirmation from government and vacancies caused by disappearance or desertion, were filled by government nomination. The *Pāṭil* held rent-free lands and had several perquisites. His position as a government dignitary and the social predominance and various financial advantages he enjoyed gave him a prestige in the community and the dignity of the post was much valued.

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The person next to the *Pāṭil* was the *Kulkarṇi*, the clerk or registrar who kept the records in respect of the fields, kept the rental accounts and acted as a general writer for the inhabitants. Being perhaps the only literate person, he wielded far greater influence than was warranted by his position. He had rent-free lands and other perquisites only inferior to that of the *Pāṭil*. He was mostly a Brāhmin, some times a *Kāyastha* Prabhu.

The Caugulā and the Mahār made up the village establishment. The Mahār was useful as a village watchman and attended to strangers. His duties have been already enumerated.

The Pāṭil's principal duty was to supervise cultivation and collect government assessment. As the latter depended on the state of the crops, the Pāṭil had to use all the skill and persuasion he was capable of, to make the ryots work harder and better. He induced them to bring as much land under the plough as they could, attracted tenants to take up fallow land, fixed the rent they had to pay, arranged advances for agricultural operations and helped government agents to make correct assessment and realize the rent from the ryots.

He was also in charge of peace and order. Trifling offences he punished himself, redressed wrongs, and intervened to settle the villagers' disputes. The village $C\bar{a}vd\bar{\imath}$ was the place where people with grievances came and related them to him. The $P\bar{a}til$ knew everybody well, and could immediately sense what was wrong and tried to set things right with admonitions to the offender. When disputes took a serious turn and could not be settled by this informal method, he induced the parties to compromise the matter, but if necessary, he called some of the inhabitants best acquainted with the dispute and submitted the case for arbitration. This was called a $Pa\~nc\=ayat$. Crime of a trifling nature was attended to by the $P\bar{a}t\~il$ but serious offences were reported to the district officer.

In addition to his revenue and magisterial duties, the *Pāṭil* was responsible for the defence of the village. He sent for the villagers to sleep at the village $c\bar{a}vd\bar{i}$ and keep watch at the gate when disturbances were reported in the surrounding country. Funds needed to strengthen the village-wall or repair the temples and wells were collected with the help of the village elders and spent under his direction. He was responsible for entertaining government dignitaries, $S\bar{\imath}bandi$, holy men and $Sany\bar{a}sis$ passing through the village. He also sometimes provided the villagers with amusement and recreation by inviting jugglers and tumblers to perform.

For all practical purposes the village managed its affairs, and followed the even tenor of its life almost forgotten by the world outside and undisturbed by upheavals beyond the narrow range of its

interests. Elphinstone thought that "these village communities were an excellent remedy for the defects of a bad government as they saved the people from negligence and served as a sort of barrier against its tyranny and rapacity."

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ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE,

Central

Executive.

The Maratha administration as it developed in the 18th century was a compound of elements borrowed from ancient works on Hindu polity, elements taken over from the Muslim States of the Deccan and modified by the genius of the founder of the Marāṭhā State to suit its special needs and changes that took place when the guiding hand of that great architect was removed. The administrative structure in mediaeval times was a simple one, government activities centering round defence from foreign enemies and security from turbulent elements at home. Defence calls for an efficient army which for its proper functioning needs unity of command. The leader of the hosts who can successfully beat back the enemies, naturally comes to occupy the first place in the State. He becomes the King. For internal security the monarch looked to the support of the aristocracy. This privileged order at the centre formed the King's court and advised him on the conduct of administration. Outside the capital members from the class managed districts on his behalf.

Thus in Maratha polity we find political power resting in the highest executive, the crowned prince. Sivaji directed all the activities of his state and ruled as well as reigned. As his field of activity grew wider, he appointed advisers to assist him-a minister who would look after collection of revenues and audit accounts, another to take charge of relations with neighbouring powers, a third to look after defence, a fourth to look to the records, a fifth to administer justice, a sixth to take charge of ecclesiastical matters and so on. Though the Rājā received advice from the ministers and often accepted their suggestions, the responsibility for formulating policy, unlike that of the British Cabinet, was his; his ministers were his secretaries-his subordinates who carried out his orders. It is wrong to compare the Aşta Pradhān Mandal or the Cabinet of eight Ministers of Sivājī with that of the English Cabinet. The English Cabinet is free in the choice of its decision. While the ministers have a free-hand in the routine administration, the general directive comes from the Prime Minister. The sovereign reigns but does not rule. In Sivaji's Council, no minister possessed over-riding authority. This was left in the land of the sovereign himself.

Sivājī's successors did not possess his tireless energy and came to rely more and more on their councillors. Sambhājī (1680-1689) resigned his authority to his minister Kalaśa, while in the fugitive

¹ Selection of East India Papers, Vol. IV, p. 158.

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Rājārām's time (1689-1700), the exigency of the situation required that the King should give a free hand to his advisers. In his absence in the south, Rāmcandra Amātya and Sankarājī Saciv, directed Marāthā activities on their own initiative. Even at Jiūji, Rājārām resigned himself to the advice of another minister, the Pratinidhi. These ministers lacking the prestige of the King's position, were obliged to purchase the loyalty of their adherents by making appeals to their self-interest, by holding out promises of large rewards, in the shape of fiefs or Jāgūrs, with which the Marāṭhā was already familiar and which the Moghal emperor was bestowing on renegades. Sivājī always insisted on regular payment from his treasury to his officers. But during the protracted war with Aurangzeb, little treasure could be found with which to pay the chiefs and their men. It was found necessary to assign them territories and ask them to fend for themselves.

Feudalization.

In the interregnum from Sambhāji's capture to the home-coming of Sāhū in May 1707, conditions in Mahārāṣṭra were abnormal. The machinery of government as devised by Sivājī broke down. A number of Maratha captains raised forces on their own, led expeditions in Moghal provinces and made collection of revenues from which they reimbursed themselves. Sāhū when he returned home with a handful of body-guards, was called upon to establish his superior claims against local Moghal officers and the protege of his aunt Tārā Bāi and set up his authority over the warlords. At first the patriotic tradition of his grand-father, the bitter memory of the sufferings of his father and the support of Zulfigar Khan, enabled him to hold his own against his rivals. But this initial advantage needed to be buttressed by the personal valour and leadership in a country bristling with arms. Sāhū lacked the commanding talents and energy of his grand-father, and the patriotic tradition could not help him long; he was scarcely able to hold his own against the party of his aunt, when the support of Zulfiqar Khān was gone. Bāļājī Viśvanāth who became Peśvā in 1713, in face of mounting difficulties came to realize that it was no longer possible to adhere to Sivāji's old constitution under which the King, aided by his eight ministers, was the sole ruler of his dominions. The King's position as against the warlords who had made themselves practically independent in several parts of the Deccan, had deteriorated. The only way to save the kingship being submerged and the country being involved in civil war and turmoil, was to accept the chiefs as vassals, with practically free reins in their territory, to acknowledge them as hereditary Jāgirdārs who would bring their armies to the common standard when called upon, but otherwise, would have a free hand in the management of their fiefs. Sahu accepted the advice of his minister, concluded an agreement with Angre on these lines. and gave similar freedom of action to other chiefs. A revolution in feudalizing the Marāthā State began.

Sāhū's stay-at-home policy accelerated the process of feudalization, and the want of capacity in his successors completed it. The chiefs who raised men and money for distant expeditions on their own, could not be expected to be subservient to royal commands and render minute accounts to court officers, when the sovereign himself gave no directive and showed little interest in distant operations. The Peśvā or Chief-Minister who could have saved royal authority from falling into disuse, himself became the leading feudal chief and kept his conquests on the west-coast and in Hindustan to himself. The example set by the Peśvā was copied by other ministers and chiefs. The Pratinidhī, Saciv, Senāpati and other cabinet members though they retained their nominal rank, became transformed into hereditary feudatories and the new warlords that had sprung during the war with Aurangzeb, swelled their ranks.

The old members of the cabinet looked on the *Peśvā* as an usurper and withheld co-operation in his schemes of conquest. The *Peśvā* had to look to able assistants to uphold his authority in distant quarters. These assistants, Sinde, Holkar, Pavār, Jādhav and others in course of time, became transformed into feudal chiefs. The spirit of feudalization came to stay and invaded Marāṭhā administration in all its branches. Even small civil and military posts came to be endowed with *Jāgūrs* and alienated revenues¹.

The feudal organization lacks coherence, suffers from want of unity of command and can never pull its full weight in a crisis. As the sovereign does not deal direct with his subjects, his hold on their allegiance is nominal. The subjects readily follow the immediate chiefs with whom their lives and welfare are tied than the legendary monarch on whom they rarely set their eyes. The freedom the subordinate chiefs enjoy in the management of their Jāgīrs, breeds a spirit of defiance, they affect independence and resent interference from central authority. Should this authority pass into weak hands, the centrifugal tendencies become accelerated and the structure collapses. The Marāṭhā State could not escape this fate of feudal Governments. Its atomisation sapped the foundations and it could not stand the attack of the organized power of the British at the end of the century.

Malcolm's comments are worth repetition. He says, "The constitution of the government and army of the Marhattas (Marāṭhās) was more calculated to destroy than to create an empire. The fabric had no foundation. The chiefs were from the first, almost equal; and as the armies they led, depended principally on success

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¹ According to Elphinstone's calculation out of the total revenue of the Peśvā of Rs. 2,15,00,000, more than half was in the possession of Jāgirdārs. This does not take account of the Jāgirs of the bigger chiefs like Sinde, Holkar, Bhosle and Gāikvāḍ. See Pooṇā Residency Correspondence Service, Vol. XIII, p. 396.

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for pay, the leaders were necessarily invested with powers for the collection of tribute, or revenues, from the provinces into which they were sent. But though a share was claimed by Government, the application of the greater part in the payment of his troops and other expenses, raised the successful general into a ruler of the countries he had conquered. This everywhere produced the same effects, and the public interest was lost sight of in the desire of individuals to promote their own ambition. The early example of the Paishwah's (Peśvā) usurpation was followed almost by all to whom opportunity offered; and this was aided by the form of their village governments having been carried into the state; every office, from that of Paishwah (Peśvä), or prime minister, to the lowest employ became hereditary. This practice, by giving rights, limited patronage and weakened the heads of the empire, among whom divisions early arose. Notwithstanding the military reputation which some of the Paishwahs (Peśvā) added to their other pretensions to supreme authority, all that superior intelligence which their habits and education gave them, was unequal to keep in check the ambition of enterprising chiefs who, intoxicated with success, soon forgot their obligations to the Brāhmin princes by whom they were elevated to command. One part of the policy of the Paishwahs (Peśvā) tended greatly to accelerate the independence of those leaders - the fear of their disturbing the peace of their native country, or consuming, its resources, led to their constant employment in foreign expeditions, where they were subject to little or no control; and to attain the object of keeping a successful general and his adherents at a distance, the superior was satisfied with nominal allegiance "1.

Rise of the Peśvās

For quite some time the revolution was not apparent. The King's authority was bolstered up by his very able Peścas Balaii Viśvanath. Bājī Rāv I and his son Bālājī. The Peśvās, with other ministers, attended the Rājā's court, and when absent on campaigns were represented by their deputies. The king was kept informed of happenings outside and was formally consulted on all matters of importance. But as the Marāthā state expanded the Peśvās showed themselves great leaders of men and far out-stripped other ministers. It was Peśvā Bāļājī Viśvanāth who obtained for his sovereign the sanad of Svarāj, Cauth and Sardeśmukhi and thus legitimatized Rājā Śāhū's position. Then again it was Bālājī's son Bājī Rāv who defeated the great Nizām when the latter challenged the Rājā's authority in 1727. The Senāpati who had started intrigues both against the Rājā and the Peśvā was destroyed in 1731. The neighbouring powers on the west coast were reduced by the Peśva's exertions, who also tore away Malva and Bundelkhand from the imperial grip. No wonder that the grateful Sovereign came to rely more and more on the Peśvā than on other ministers who chose the ease of the capital and kept at home, contenting themselves with giving advice. The result was that the Peśwa who originally was one of the eight ministers, came to occupy the first position in the king's council.

¹ Malcolm, John, A Memoir of Central India, Vol. I (1880, ed.), pp. 60-62.

This was confirmed by $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$ Sāhū himself. On his death-bed he wrote two wills or rescripts. The first says "We order that you should command the forces. The Government of the empire must be carried on. You are to take measures to preserve the kingdom. Our successors will not interfere with your post." The other paper was a solemn injunction to the $R\bar{a}j\bar{a}$'s successors to maintain the $Peśv\bar{a}$ in power.

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Armed with these documents, the *Peśvā* called a meeting of the council and declared that he would also administer the kingdom on behalf of the dead *Rājā's* successor. The successor being an inexperienced youth brought up in humble circumstances, was in no position to oppose the *Peśvā*, and gave his written sanction that the *Peśvā's* authority should be obeyed. The *Pratinidhī*, Raghujī Bhosle, and others who showed themselves recalcitrant, were overawed. Thus from 1750 the supreme authority in the Marāthā Government came to be exercised by the Brāhmin *Peśvā* in the name of the Marāthā Sovereign, who became a shadowy figure, a mere cipher. Though he continued to be publicly honoured and issue ceremonial dresses he had no authority in the conduct of administration and even his household expenses came to be controlled by the Vice-Regent.²

The usurpation of the *Peśvās*, Scott Waring justly remarks "neither attracted observation nor excited surprise. Indeed, the transition was easy, natural and progressive". Its greatest disadvantage according to Rawlinson, was that "it aggravated the centrifugal tendencies of the Marāṭhā State, especially the enmity between the Brāhmaṇ and Marāṭhā, which were at least kept in check while a member of the house of Bhosle actually ruled; after the *Peśvā's* prestige was shaken by the defeat of Pānipat, the disintegration became more and more evident."

The rise of the *Peśvā* not only emphasised the feudalizing process, but also marked the triumph of orthodoxy. The Marāṭhā state was born on the crest of a movement of social and religious reform which had attacked the sacerdotal authority of the Brāhmin and laid stress on social equality. Under its impetus all castes and classes had participated in the work of liberation. Sivājī in his administration emphasised merit and talent wherever he found them. His army consisted of local Marāṭhā peasantry, while Brāhmins, Prabhus and Sārasvats manned his civil establishment. As the *Peśvās* rose in importance the complexion of the services slowly began to change. From the time of Bāļājī Rāv (1740-61) his castemen found favour in clerical as well as military services. The Marāṭhā administration became Brāhmānical and "the Principal offices of government were", according to Malet, "either in the possession of Brāhmins

¹ Kincaid and Parasnis, A History of the Maratha People, p. 455.

² Poonā Residency Correspondence, Vol. XIII, p. 29; Elphinstone here records his view on the Peśva's position.

³ Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, p. 412.

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Rise of the Pesous

or so disposed as to be under their control." Other communities felt neglected by the monopolization of power by Brāhmins, and made them apathetic to the fortunes of the State.

Justice Ranade makes significant observations on this subject. He remarks², "One other general feature, which distinguishes the first period under Sivaji and Sāhū from the period which followed the establishment of Peśvä's power at Pooņā, relates to the fact that while most of the great military commanders in the earlier period were Marhattas (Marāthās) with the notable exception of the Peśvās themselves, the men who rose to the distinction in the latter half of the century were for the most part, Brāhmins...... This infusion of the racial and caste element among the military leaders of the nation had disastrous effects. There were parties within parties, with little chance of a common and active sympathy throughout all the classes, who had been held together with such successful results by Sivājī, Rājārām and Sāhū. The first half of the century was singularly free from these racial and caste jealousies. In the latter half, they had attained such prominence that concert was impossible, and each great leader naturally cared to pursue his own interest to the sacrifice of the common weal. The Brāhmins at this time came to regard themselves as a governing caste with special privileges and exemptions, which were unknown under the system founded by Sivājī, All these distinguishing features of purely sacerdotal or caste ascendency characterised the close of the century, and introduced a demoralisation of which few people have any correct idea. The State ceased to be the ideal protector of all classes, and upholder of equal justice. Rāmdāsa's high ideal of the religion of Maharastra was lowered down to one in keeping with the belief that the State had no higher function than to protect the cow and the Brāhmin, and the usual consequences followed such a decadence of virtue".

Secretariat.

The secretariat known as *Huzur Daftar* was a big establishment consisting of about 200 clerks headed by the *Phadnis* or Chief Secretary. This establishment was in charge of all sorts of accounts. It received and checked accounts of districts and other subordinate offices and drew up estimates and authorized budgets for the ensuing year. Accounts of all alienations of public revenues, whether *Sarañjāms*, *Ināms* or otherwise, of the pay, rights and privileges of the Government and village officers, accounts of the strength and pay of troops and expenses of all civil, military and religious establishments were all submitted to the Secretariat. There were daily registers, abstracts of registers, estimates of revenue and expenditure, abstracts of actual receipts and expense, and based on them, were the authorized budgets for districts. The whole of this were consolidated and exhibited in a comprehensive view in "*Tarjamās*".

¹ Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 342.

² M. G. Ranade, Miscellaneous Writings, Vol. I (ed. by D. C. Wacha), pp. 347-48.

It was really through the district administration that the impact of government was carried to the people at large. Each revenue division called indiscriminately as parganā or prānt was under an officer who, in a large district, was known as Māmlatdār, and in a small one *Kamāvisdār*. The appointment was for a year but cases were not uncommon when the same Māmlatdār continued to hold the charge for twenty-five or even thirty years. In the prosperous days of the Peśvās, the Māmlatdārs were men of honesty and integrity and managed their charge with ability. The Māmlatdār had under him inferior agents for smaller units known as Tarafdars, Karkuns, His district establishment *Saikdārs* whom he nominated himself. consisted of eight members, Divan, Mazumdar, Phadnavis, Potnis, Potedar, Ciţnis, Karkhānis and Sabhāsad — hereditary officers who were directly responsible to government, whose signatures were necessary to all documents and who were bound to give information of all the misdeeds and malpractices of the Māmlatdār. The Māmlatdār's salary was calculated at one per cent, on the revenue of his charge and varied from five to six thousand rupees a year.

The district officer was responsible for every branch of administration, civil and criminal justice, the control of militia and the police, the investigation of social and religious questions, agriculture, and trade. As revenue collector he fixed the assessment of each village in consultation with the $P\bar{a}tils$, collected the revenue, heard and decided complaints against village officers. In his judicial capacity he supervised the administration of justice by giving effect to decisions of $Pa\bar{n}c\bar{a}yats$ or ordering fresh inquiry in case of appeal, apprehending criminals, putting down gang robberies and petty risings. He was also responsible for the general welfare of the district and was expected to attend to popular needs.

In remote provinces such as Khāndeś, Gujarāt or Karnāṭak there was an officer between the $M\bar{a}mlatd\bar{a}r$ and the Government who was called the $Sarsubhed\bar{a}r$. Like the $M\bar{a}mlatd\bar{a}r$ he was responsible for revenue as well as general administration. Both of them were helped in their work by $Siband\bar{a}$ or irregular foot soldiers and a party of horse.

The base of the administrative structure was the village community which has already been described. In the absence of a developed central government village communities throughout the centuries had been left to manage their affairs. Marāṭhā rulers were no innovators and abstained from disturbing the villages in their internal management. The changes that Śivājī effected were in the system of cash payment and direct revenue management. Sivājī perceived that much of the disorder in old times arose as a result of entrusting the collection of revenues to Zamindars of districts and villages. They collected more from ryots and paid less to government, and used their resources and situation to create disturbances and resist the authority of government. Sivājī dispensed with the Zamindār class and appointed paid men as Kamāvisdārs

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and Subhedārs to collect land-revenue direct from the royts. These revenue officers surveyed fields, visited villages and entered into agreements with the Pāṭils about the revenue each village was expected to pay. This beneficial change was continued till almost the end of the Marāṭhā State. It was in the days of the last Peśvā that the farming system was revived with disastrous effect on village communities.

Public Finance.

The chief source of public revenue was land and the ruler had to use all his ingenuity to obtain maximum return without drying up the source. In ancient times Hindu rulers demanded one-sixth of the actual produce which demand was raised in emergencies such as war, coronation, marriage in the royal family, etc. Collections of revenue in kind was possible when kingdoms were small. By the 17th century however the demand had been commuted into money payment, though payment in kind continued in hilly regions and as a means of provisioning forts. Land was measured and assessment related to the quality and the produce of the soil by Akbar's minister, Rājā Todar Mal. Todar Mal's methods were copied in the Deccan by the Nizāmśāhī minister, Malik Ambar (1605-1626 A. D.). His settlement was based on a correct knowledge of the area of the land tilled and of the money value of the crop and the determination to limit the state demand to a small share of the actual value of the crop. He converted his grain demand into fixed cash rates. These conversion rates did not vary with the fluctuations in the price of grain and from their extreme lowness when they were fixed, were very favourable to the ryot. Under Malik Ambar's system arable land was divided into equal areas or bighās and the demand on these areas varied according to the quality of the soil. After this had been determined, arable land was divided into Khālsā or land which yielded revenue to government and inamat or land whose government rental had been alienated through favour or in return for service. After deducting ināmat land, the Khālsā land was entered as containing so much Bāgāyat or garden land and so much Jirāyat or dry land. Malik Ambar is supposed to have fixed the share at less than one-third which had been the usual exaction before his time. The records showed the details of rent-alienated land. Those owned by Vatandārs were known as Dumālā or two-ownered ināms, while those granted to temples and mosques and village servants were wholly inams. The details of rent-aliented land were followed by details of revenue-paying land and of the various cesses levied on the craftsmen, the shop-keepers and village-servants or balutas.

Under the system, though the amount of cesses varied, the bulk of the demand on each village remained constant. There was no reference to waste land and once the rental was fixed, the management of the village was left entirely to the *Pāṭil* with orders that he

¹ For detailed study of the topics, see Baden Powell, Land-system of India, three volumes, East India Papers, Vol. IV, esp., the reports of Elphinstone, Chaplin and Robertson.

was responsible for collecting the amount. The *Pāṭil* thus became the representative of the village with wide powers to exploit waste lands. The holder of the land was likewise responsible to pay his share of the rental to which his land was liable whether he tilled it or not.

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It is said that Malik Ambar's demand on a bighā (4/5 of an acre) came to about 5 annas, which according to prices in 1820, amounted to Rs. 1\frac{3}{4} to Rs. 2. The low rates fixed by Malik Ambar greatly enriched the country. The Pāṭils let out waste lands on favourable terms and thus encouraged cultivation and the country which had been depopulated before, began to show signs of prosperity. Malik Ambar's settlement is known as Tankhā.\(^1\)

Sivājī in his jāgir, succeeded to the Nizām Sāhī rule and continued the Tankhā assessment. The rates were those that obtained before, government taking one-third and leaving two-third to the producer. The settlement was mauzevār, based on the actual state of the crop, the village making good a lump sum. Malik Ambar's survey however, had not been very careful. Sivājī introduced a standard measure of a Kāṭhī or measuring rod. The Kāṭhī was to be five cubits and five fists in length.² Twenty rods square made a bighā and one hundred twenty bighās made a chahur. The unit of measurement being fixed a fresh survey settlement was ordered, and the work was entrusted to Aṇṇājī Datto.

Aṇṇājī Datto fixed the rent at 33 per cent. of the gross produce, but Śivājī afterwards demanded a consolidated rent of 40 per cent. when all the extra taxes and cesses were abolished.³

The rates introduced by Sivājī were revised by his successors. As the 18th century advanced, there was an increased abundance of money, partly caused by the continuous working of American mines, and partly because money was flowing into Mahārāṣṭra as Marāṭhā power expanded and tributes were levied on surrounding states. The effect was a fall in the value of money and consequent reduction in government share of the produce of the land. To make good this loss, fresh cesses were levied from time to time. Ultimately to do away with the irregularities and uncertainties Peśvā Bāļājī Rāv (1740-1761) ordered a new survey and settlement. Lands were measured, classified according to the nature of the soil and the produce they grew, and new rates were levied. For irrigated and garden lands growing sugar-cane and opium they charged rates varying from Rs. 5 to Rs. 6–8 and Rs. 10 per bighā, dry crops were assessed at Re. 1 to Rs. 1–8, per bighā.

¹ According to Baden-Powell, the name *Tunkhā* is derived from the silver coin which was used in lieu of the old copper 'takkā', but the term has become synonymous with a fixed assessment in the lump on a village. Vol. III, p. 205.

² The Kāthī, Chaplin says, was about nine feet in length.

³ Outline of Sivājī's system is given in Sabhāsad Bakhar, pp. 28-29.

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The Peśvā's assessment came to be known as Kamāl standard or the highest possible. This was twice as high as Malik Ambar's settlement, but there was a difference. In levying the village rental the area actually under tillage and not the whole arable area was taken into consideration.

The social framework of an agrarian economy and the production and distribution of wealth are conditioned by land tenures. According to ancient Hindu concepts the individual who cleared unclaimed land and brought it under the plough, became the proprietor paying part of the produce for the protection he enjoyed from the state. The *Mirāsi* tenure of the Deccan is the normal outcome of this concept. It was Malik Ambar who gave a firm and definite shape to this idea by making land private property of the cultivator, attaching to the proprietary right the power of sale and granting other lands as the joint property of the village community.

In the Marāthā country under the Peśvā's Government, there had developed two well-defined tenures: Mirāsi and Upri. The Mirāsi tenure was undoubtedly that of the highest order. The holding descended from father to son, according to the law of inheritance, that of equal partition among the male heirs; the holder's position could not be disturbed except for non-payment of government demand in respect of land, which was fixed and not subject to enhancement. Should the Mirāsdār at any time abandon his lands, he or his heirs were entitled after any lapse of time to reclaim them and this right was not barred by any statute of limitations. The land was saleable and could not be seized for debts. Even if the Mirāsdār failed to pay his assessment, the most government could do was to put pressure on him and his brother mirāsdārs. The tenure gave the holder a right to sit in the village council. Although there is some doubt about the point, the general opinion is that the mirāsdār was liable for the rent of so much of his land which he actually cultivated being exempt from any payment in respect of the uncultivated portion.

Elphinstone who made particular inquiries about tenures in Mahārāṣṭra reported "that a large portion of the ryots were the proprietors of their estates, subject to the payment of a fixed land-tax to government; that their property was hereditary and saleable, that they were never dispossessed when they paid their tax, and that they had for a long period the right to reclaim their estates on paying government dues. All the land which did not belong to the Mirāsdār belonged to government or those to whom government assigned it. The property of the Zamindars in the soil had not been introduced or even heard of, in the Marāṭhā country".

The *Upri* was a tenant-at-will of the government, having no rights except that of temporary cultivation, as provided for by the term of his agreement. He took up from year to year as much land as he

wanted to cultivate and paid assessment proportionate only to the crop which he obtained. His assessment was liable to enhancement.

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The Gat-kul (owner disappeared), Kauli (taken on lease) and Khāsbandi were other tenures which were but variations of the Mirāsi and Upri and need not detain us.

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The position of the *Mirāsdār* looked, in theory, very strong. His lands had been measured out and classified, and the standard demand on them had been fixed. If, however, the rains failed, if the village suffered from war or pestilence or if a family calamity intervened, he could always seek remission. Complaints against over assessment, he could take to the *Huzur*.

All the advantages of the position of the Mirāsdārs arising out of a fixed standard rent for his fields were however rendered ungainful by the practice of the levy of extra cesses. Extra cesses were levied in the name of village expenses, presents in kind to village officers (gānv kharc, sādli-vārid) Old hereditary district officers (Deśmukh and Deśpānde), though defunct, demanded their perquisites in kind; district officers, their clerks, their peons and even the distant courtiers struggled to batten on the labour of ryot.

Other Taxes.

Elphinstone mentions some of the cesses in his report. "Mirās Paţţi, an additional tax levied once in three years on Mirāsdārs, Mhār (Mahār) Mhārkee, a tax on the enāms (ināms) of the Mahārs; Inām Tijāyee, payment by ināmdārs of a third of the revenue from their inām lands; Vihir Hundā, an extra tax on lands watered from wells; Ghar Patti, house-tax levied from all but Brahmin village officers; Dankā, tax for the right to beat a drum on particular religious and other occasions: Kharidi Jinnas (Purveyance), the right to purchase articles at a certain rate generally commuted for money payment; Lagan Takkā, a tax on marriage; Pāt Dām, tax on the remarriage of widows; Mhais Pattee, tax on buffaloes; Bakrā Pattee, a tax on sheep. There were also occasional contributions in kind called Fad Farmais such as bullock's hide, charcoal, hemp, rope, ghee, tup, tel, curds, fowl, etc., which were often commuted for fixed money payment. Other taxes were on traders alone. These were Mohtarfä, a tax on shop-keepers in the village; Balutee, a tax on the twelve village servants; Bazār Baithak, a tax on stalls at fairs; Kumbhār Khan, a tax on earth dug up by the potters. Ultimately they were paid by the peasants for whom the traders and artisans plied"

Besides all this and the gānv kharc, there were taxes to defray the district expenses not provided for by government, in which were included many personal expenses of the Māmlatdārs and a large fund known as Darbār Kharc or Antastha, which was a sort of bribe to the district officer, his staff and the court officials, which had official recognition.

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"In addition to all these exactions, there were occasional impositions on extraordinary emergencies, which were called *Jāsti Paṭṭee* and *Yek Sāli Paṭṭee*. If these happened to be continued for several years, they ceased to be considered as occasional impositions and fell into regular *Sevāi Jamā*. Until the introduction of the farming system these were however rare."

The independent spirit of the Marāṭhā peasantry and a succession of mild rulers and good administrators saved the country from rack renting, but the inherent weakness came out when Peśvā Bājī Rāv II came to power, sold districts to the highest bidders and let loose on the country a swarm of rapacious harpies.

Other Sources of Revenue.

The other sources of public revenues were, (1) Zakāt, (2) Forest, (3) Mint and (4) Courts of Law.

Zakāt or Inland Customs:—When goods passed from one district to another they were subjected to transit duties which were computed on the basis of bullock-loads. Rates varied in proportion to the value of the article, the highest being eight rupees. As duty was levied separately in each district much inconvenience resulted owing to frequent stoppage and search of property at custom-posts. To remedy this, Hundekaries undertook to carry goods over long distances by arranging to pay custom officers in lump sum. Zakāt was always farmed out. According to Elphinstone, Zakāt before the cession of Pooṇā, produced about five lakhs of rupees.

Another source of revenue was the *mint*. Coining in *Peśvā's* time was done both by government, as well as by private agency. The goldsmith paid a royalty for the right of minting money and was expected to maintain purity of coinage. Breach of this was met with fine and forfeiture. Several coins minted at different places were in circulation. Copper coins were in common use, but silver rupees and gold *Mohurs* were also in circulation.

Abkāri did not yield more than Rs. 10,000, the use of spirituous liquor being forbidden at Pooṇā and discouraged everywhere. The result was sobriety among the general mass of the populace, though Marāṭhā chiefs like Daulat Rāv Sinde, Tukojī Holkar and Bhosles were known for their inebriating habits.

Forests were not a very great source of income. For cutting wood for building and fuel purposes, a licence fee was levied which was about four annas per bullock-load. For works of public utility, building materials were sometimes given free. *Kurans* and pasture lands brought in a modest sum.

Fines from losers in a suit and fees from winners were also added to the revenues from the districts.

Mulkgiri.—Another source of considerable yet uncertain revenue was Mulkgiri—tribute levied on neighbouring States. Year after year Marāṭhā armies would move out of their homeland to collect tribute—cauth as they called it. In the early days of the Marāṭhā State, Mulkgiri was no doubt a necessity. The State was surrounded by enemies and only a powerful army could hold them at bay. Where else could the ruler find sustenance for his armies, if not in enemy territory? Sivājī's expeditions in Khāndeś, Auraṅgābād, Gujarāt, Karnāṭak and the subsequent moves of Marāṭhā armies in Māļvā and Bundelkhand, originated in the exigencies of the State.

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The exigency was followed as a matter of policy by later rulers. Marāthā armies spread all over India demanding cauth from Rājās of Rajputānā and Bundelkhand, Navābs of the Deccan, Gujarāt, Oudh and Bengāl, and the polygars of Karnātak. "When the Marāthās proceeded beyond their boundaries, to collect revenue and make war were synonymous", says Grant Duff. "Whenever a village resisted, its officers were seized and compelled by threats and sometimes by torture, to come to a settlement. Ready money was seldom obtained, but securities from bankers, which later were exchanged for bills payable in any part of India." It was a principle of Marāthā commanders to increase the amount of their exactions whenever possible, but in no case to recede from the demands of their predecessors.

This levy of cauth has been defended as a measure adopted by the Marāṭhā State for the protection of its own subjects against foreign aggression and as a means of preparing ground for the establishment of its complete sovereignty. A powerful state requires no protection against weak neighbours; in fact these neighbours look to the suzerain authority for defence against external and internal enemies. The Marāṭhā policy of nibbling at the sources of the neighbouring states brought them little strength. Very little of the cauth reached the central treasury; it was swallowed by the armies and their officers. But the odium it brought on the Marāṭhā name was to prove disastrous to Marāṭhā cause. The policy of Mulkgirī found the Marāṭhās friendless and isolated when they faced the Abdālī at Pānipat. The amount the foreign tribute brought was so uncertain that no attempt has so far been made to estimate its yield.

Though one may not wholly agree with Munro's verdit that "the Mahratta (Marāṭhā) government from its foundation has been one of the most destructive that ever existed in India," one cannot but conclude that the debit side of *Mulkgiri* weighs heavily against the credit side. For want of consolidation Marāṭhā conquests proved ephemeral; the tributaries raised their heads the moment the tide

¹ See Jadunath Sarkar, Sivājī and his Times, (5th ed.), p. 373. Forbes, Rasmālā, Vol. I, p. 234, Vol. II, pp. 53-55, 119. Grant Duff's History of the Marāthās, Vol. I, p. 464.

² Gleig, Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. II, p. 14.

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Maratha Society and Culture. PUBLIC FINANCE. of invasion receded. "The sympathy which the religious aspect of the State might have drawn from Hindus was dissipated by the aspect of plunder which was applied as ruthlessly to Hindus as to Muslims. The peaceful Bengāli and the martial Rajput were equally subjected to it and equally welcomed deliverance from Marāthā hands.".

Total Income of Marāthā State and Peśvā's Debts.

The total income of the Marāṭhā State has been a matter of speculation. It is always difficult to reckon the income and expenditure of a State the boundaries of which were shifting from day-to-day. In the absence of a close study of the Peśvā archives we have to depend on statements made by British administrators and writers. Elphinstone at the time of taking over the Peśvä's territories (1818) reported to the Governor-General that "the Peśvā's whole revenue before the last treaty amounted to Rs. 2,15,00,000 of which Rs. 95,00,000 was paid into the treasury and Rs. 1,20,00,000, allotted to Jägirdärs." About this time the Marāṭhā confederacy had been wound up and the several States were operating as isolated units. Malcolm who was in charge of Central India Agency has put down the revenue of Sinde, Holkar and Pavars at Rs. 1,27,68,459, Rs. 17,96,183 and Rs. 3,76,000, respectively. This estimate excludes the revenues of two other great Marāṭhā feudatories, the Gāikvāds of Baroda and Bhosles of Nagpur.

Lord Valentia, who passed through India in the early 19th century, estimated the revenues of the *Peśvā's* State at Rs. 71,64,724. Mr. J. Grant of the East India Company estimated the total revenue of the Marāṭhā empire at six crores of rupees towards the close of the 18th century.

The historian of the Marāṭhās, Grant Duff, has a significant passage on this topic. "The nominal revenue of the whole Marāṭhā empire at the period of Māhdoo Rāv's (Mādhav Rāv's) death (1772), was ten crores or one hundred millions of rupees; but the amount actually realized including the Jāgheers (Jāgīrs) of Holkar, Sindhia (Sinde), Jānojī Bhosle and Damājī Gāekvār (Gāikvād), together with tributes, fees, fines, contributions, customary offerings and all those sources independent of regular collections, which in the State accounts come under the head of extra revenue, may be estimated at about seventy-two millions of rupees or about seven millions of pounds sterling annually. Of this sum, the revenue under the direct control of the Peśvā was about twenty-eight millions of rupees."

The major part of this revenue was spent on military operations, garrisoning forts, equipping armies and maintaining the court and the feudatories. On account of their constant wars, the *Peśvās*

¹ Elphinstone to Lord Hastings, G. G., 18th June 1818, P. ■. C., Vol. XIII, pp. 396-97.

could never rid themselves of debt. Bājī Rāv I writing to his guru says (in one of his letters) that "mounting debts were his constant worry.". The Diaries of the Peśvās show that the debts contracted by Bālāji Bāji Rāv Peśvā between 1740 and 1760 amounted to a crore and a half rupees. This Peśvā always talked of bringing rivers of gold from north and south and effecting their confluence at Poonā. Total Income of The defeat at Pānipat disorganized Marāṭhā finances and Peśvā Mādhav Rāv died with a debt of Rs. 24,00,000 hanging over his head. The last Peśvā had apparently no debts to pay, and was able to collect a large private treasure of his own.

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Nation building activities such as education, improvement of agriculture and industry, road-making, building of canals and culverts. public sanitation were conspicuous by their absence. Public roads were dirt-tracks which turned into quagmire and rivers became impassable during the rains. Where ferries were set up by enterprising persons, government swooped down to demand fees. According to Gordon, the first metalled road in Mahārāstra was constructed in 1835. In consequence of poor communications passenger traffic was limited to the horse and palanquin, and goods traffic to the bullock. In difficult terrain the bullock was displaced by the human being. This limited exchange of goods and emphasised isolation.

The expenditure on the military in the ultimate analysis reached a part of the people; but this class-the soldiery-made little contribution to the national income. Some of the rulers distributed charities to Brähmins and holymen, but these eleemosynary grants whatever merit they might have conferred on the donors, helped neither the cause of learning nor led to increased production.

Religion played an important part in the life of the mediæval people and the people of Mahārāstra were no exception to the rule. By sixth century India-north and south-had been culturally knit together and had come to share the same religious beliefs and ideas. The new Hinduism which had risen by absorbing the best in Buddhism turned its back on abstract nature worship and the accompanying sacrificial rites, and accepted the metaphysics of the Upanisads. The philosophical speculations, however, were reserved for the learned and the erudite. A simple form of worship, worship of idols, emblems of deities and relics of saints, found favour with the masses. The Smrtis gave their blessings to this new form of worship and a great mythology in the form of Purānas was created to sustain it and to explain the universal order.

RELIGION.1

¹ Religious practices of the people is the subject-matter of much of Marāṭhā poetry, right from Dnyāneśvar to Rām Jošī. Early British historians like Mill, Elphinstone, Duff devote a few pages to describe this aspect of the peoples' life. The Gazetteers (old edition) give detailed description of the religious life of the community.

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The basis of this religious fabric was that the great Divine Being pervaded the Universe, that the soul of every human being was part of that great spirit and it was his duty to seek perfection and reunion with Brahman by undergoing a process of purification. The highest bliss-Moksa was the ultimate reward of the good, while the wicked were punished by being reborn in forms distant from the reunion. The soul which animated the body of the Brahmin was nearest to this state of bliss, provided he fulfilled the ordinances of the faith; but if he did not, his soul would be detained in purgatory after death until sufficient torture had been inflicted to expiate the sins and then sent back to reanimate some other form on earth. Deliverance from countless births a man could obtain by being born Brāhmin and by winning merit to merge with the Ultimate. Sadhus and Sanyāsis, by their extreme piety and renunciation, could however attain Moksa direct and escape being born over and over again. This encouraged a large number of people to turn to the orders of recluse and take to the yellow robe.

The Divine Being, however, was not the active agent who called the universe into existence and made it move. This was the work of Prakrti. The Divine Nature urged by Prakrti took the form of Brahmā, the Creator, Viṣṇu, the Preserver, and Siva, the Destroyer. Brahmä, Vișnu and Mahes, with their consorts, became incarnate, assumed a number of forms on the earth to fulfil their missions. These incarnations are the Avatārs. Besides the Avatārs, the Triad produced a host of deities which amounted to thirty-three crores. Of these, only a few like Indra, the God of heavens, Varuna, the ruler of waters, Vāyu, the lord of winds, Yama, the lord of Death, Kuber, the God of wealth and Kāma, the God of love, were remembered; and fewer still like Ganapatī, Kārtikeya, Sūrya became the Most of the temples in Mahārāṣṭra were objects of veneration. dedicated to Siva, Visnu, Ganapatī and Devī Bhavānī. They occupied prominent places in towns, were raised on lonely peaks, by lakes and river-sides and studded the country-side.*

The ten Avatārs of Viṣṇu are famous and include with the Fish, the Tortoise, the great Boar, the Buddha who had revolted against Hinduism. Viṣṇu appeared in these forms to destroy tyrants and to preserve his world order. His exploits as Saviour are the subject-matter of the two great epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata and of the Purāṇas which came to be rendered in Marāṭhī in the 16th and 17th centuries by Eknāth, Mahipati, Sridhar and other Marāṭhī poets and saints and were recited at Kathās and other religious gatherings which were very popular in old days. Viṣṇu

The following are the chief places of pilgrimage in Mahārāṣṭra: Aunḍhā Nāganāth, Ghṛṣṇeśvar of Ellorā, Vaijanāth of Parali, Bhimā Sankar and Tryambakeśvar, all dedicated to Siva; Viṭhobā of Paṇḍharpur and Kālā Rām of Nāśik dedicated to Viṣṇu; Gaṇapatī temples are at Morgānv, Theur, Rāṇjaṇgānv, Leṇyādri, Ozar, Siddhaṭek, Maḍh and Muruḍ. Famous Devi temples are at Kolhāpūr, Tuljāpūr, Jogaicā Ambā, Māhūr, Səptaśṛṅgi, Kurkamb, and Aundh. Famous Khaṇḍobā shrines are at Jejurī, Pālī and Pemūr.

was worshipped as Nārāyaṇā with his spouse Lakṣmī or Rāma with Sitā by his side, Rāma's name was sacred and would be on the lips of a dying man. Gaṇapati was a god of happy omens and the remover of difficulties and would be invoked on all auspicious occasions. Siva's cult was a popular one. Siva was worshipped in the form of the phallus, obviously a relief of the prehistoric past and a compromise of Brāhmānism with pre-Āryan cults.

CHAPTER 9.

Maratha Society
and Culture.
RELIGION.

Siva's consort Bhavānī was as much an object of adoration as Siva himself. She is always represented in her beneficent form, shown as a beautiful woman riding a tiger in a menacing attitude to destroy the demons of sin and darkness. With Khaṇdobā, Bhavānī occupies the position of the tutelary deity of the Marāṭhās. Sivājī the founder of the Marāṭhā state derived inspiration from the Goddess Bhavānī¹. He had a shrine built in her honour at Pratāpgaḍ. Another femous temple dedicated to the Goddess stands at Tuljāpūr. Marāṭhī ballads always begin with invocation to Bhavānī.

Khaṇḍobā: Khaṇḍobā, literally "Sword Father" guarded the country. He was the "Iśvar Dev" or Guardian Deity of the Deccan. As a guardian he is shown at his chief shrine at Jejuri, as a king, the great protector, and more often as horseman with a sword in his right hand, and his wife, Mhāļṣābāi, sitting beside him. He was the chief household god of all Hindus in the Deccan from Brāhmins to Mahārs. His house image was always of metal, never of wood or of stone. He drove away the evil which caused sickness.

Māruti: Māruti, also called Hanumān, is the Monkey God. Very few villages in the Deccan were without their Māruti a rudely embossed monkey — figure, sometimes within the village and sometimes without but generally near the gate. He was supposed to be the guardian of the village and its crops. He was a special favourite of the celibate and the sportsman.

Equally important with the public or communal worship was the worship of the family deities. Every household would have a corner assigned to worship and here would be a small collection of the Arādhya Daivata, the Kulsvāmī or the tutelary deity, which in many cases would be Devi Bhavani or Khandoba. There would be small brass idols representing Bālkṛṣṇa, Pārvatī and Gaṇapati, śāligrām representing Siva, and a few taks which represented the family ancestors. A Marāṭhā after ablution in the morning would spend some time in the Pujā before starting the work of the day. The higher castes spent more time and money over the daily rituals. Special days and occasions were marked for the public worship of particular deities by offering them incense, flowers and fruits and other gifts through Brāhmin priests. The Ekādaśī of Aṣādha and Kāriika became occasions for pilgrimage to Pandharpur; Mahā Siva Rātri was dedicated to Siva and there were special days for public wership of Rama, Ganapati and Dattatraya.

¹ Sabhāsad, Life of Siva Chatrapatī, pp. 11, 23, 32, 37, 49.

CHAPTER 9.

Maratha Society and Culture. RELIGION. The family priest or Upādhyāya advised the family about religious and social observances. But its keeper of conscience was a saintly person of repute. In Hindu religion Sādhus and sanyāsis have always been held in respect on account of their selfless life and renunciation of worldly affairs. Some of these sanyāsis would get such celebrity that people would flock round them for advice and instruction. Such a person was styled a Guru or a Mahāpuruṣ. Sioājī, the founder of the Marāthā State, respected Rāmadās and on one occasion made a gift of his kingdom to his Guru; he likewise respected Mauni Bāvā of Pāṭgāri and found time to visit him amidst his busy rounds of duties. Brahmendra Svāmā was the spiritual guide of the Peśvā family and much respected at Śāhū Rājā's court. Marāṭhā chiefs sought his intercession in their affairs. Mahādjī Sinde used to seek advice of a Muslim Pīr Sāh Mansur and was accustomed to prostrate himself at his feet daily.

Despite the general prevalence of Hindu beliefs the worship of pre-Aryan tribal gods continued to thrive. The general mass of the people were ridden by superstition and Brahmin priests did little to discourage queer ceremonies and strange rites. In villages, temples to Bhairobā and Jotibā were common. Bhairav was kept happy by application of oil and sendur and cured snake-bites. He also forecasted the success or failure of undertakings. Mhasobā, Vetāļ, Vāghobā, Saṭvāi, Tukāi were other godlings the villagers feared and worshipped. These aboriginal godlings had been transformed into manifestations of Siva and his consort, and were supposed to look after the health and welfare of the villagers. The nearby fields and orchards, and hills had their spirits to be appeased with buffaloes, goats and fowls, depending on their degree of malevolence. There was not a river ford or tank which was not haunted by spirits and ghosts. Even the gates and walls of forts were not free from their influence.1

The Bhakti movement of the middle ages was a protest against the ritual of Brahmanism and the superstition of the masses. The supremacy of one god was the first creed with everyone of the saints. The various forms in which god was worshipped were believed to merge finally into one supreme providence. The grovelling concepts prevalent among the people, the aboriginal and village gods, their frightful rites and sacrifices were denounced in forceful language. In the annual concourses at Paṇḍharpur and Jejuri men forget their caste distinctions and hailed each other as brothers united in a common endeavour. The movement had a general liberalizing influence on society and created a healthy democratic atmosphere, rare elsewhere in India.

STATE OF LEARNING.² The Marāthās, generally speaking, were an unlettered people. The priestly class studied a few religious tracts and memorised ritual

¹ Mss. Accounts of forts Rāyagad, Sinhgad, Purandar, etc., in the Peśvā Daftar.

² Based on Selection of Papers from the Records at the India House, vol. IV, evidence of Elphinstone, Thackeray, Briggs, Chaplin.

which enabled it to conduct religious worship at temples and at private houses and ceremonies on occasions of birth, initiation, marriage, death, etc. The Puraniks read to the gatherings the stories from Puranas and mixed their recitation with philosophical dissertations about the nature of God, of the universe and of human destiny in the scheme. The rest of the Brahmins and Kayastha Prabhus were literate, but their learning did not go beyond the knowledge of reading, writing and a little arithmetic. Good handwriting and knowledge of accounts were looked on as great assets and found for the possessor a place in the establishment of a big ināmdār, jāgirdār or Māmlatdār of the district. If he had a patron at the court he would go to the capital and be absorbed in the central secretariat, the Daftar. The Peśvā and the chiefs as a mark of their interest in learning would collect manuscript copies of religious tracts and the Purānas and would distribute charity to learned Brāhmins once a year in the month of Srāvan. The Sāstri wellversed in Vedas got the highest reward of a sawl and a few hundred upces, others got them in a descending scale. In the days of Nānā Phadnis the Poona Government was annually spending Rs. 60,000 on the Śrāvan Daksinā. The expenditure increased in the time of his successor, not because there was more learning, but the charity became indiscriminate.

This encouragement to Sanskrt learning made little impact on the life of the people, resulted in no mechanical improvements and brought no tangible gains to society. No attempt was made to know the phenomena of the physical world and stock the mind with useful knowledge. If the object of education is to set the mind free to inquire and to rationalise, the primitive type of education that was in vogue in the eighteenth century Mahārāṣṭra, could not achieve it. No great universities comparing with Oxford or Cambridge rose and no great development in philosophy, literature or political thought, took place. The result was a thickening gloom of superstition and an irrational fear of the unknown.

Rājwāde has put the matter in a forceful manner in his Introduction to Volume I. He says "The fact of the matter was Marāthā culture had become stagnant and showed itself impervious to new knowledge and new ideas. Learning of those days ran into three and practical. The practical type of types-Vaidik, Sāstrik educated men found useful in administration and business of everyday life. The Vaidiks and Sastris received royal patronage while school teachers looked to popular support. Practical learning consisted of the knowledge of three "R"s - reading, writing and arithmetic. Bakhars of Marāṭhā and Muslim kings, tales of Vikram, Vetāļ, chronicles based on stories in the Rāmāyanā and the Mahābhārata or on the legendary accounts of Hindu and Muslim kings, knowledge of account-keeping, land measurements, of correct forms of address and a little religious poetry completed the stock-in-trade of a literary person of the day. Most of the Brahmins, traders and upper class Marathas acquired this type of learning. These three

CHAPTER 9.

Maratha Society and Culture, STATE OF LEARNING. CHAPTER 9.

Maratha Society and Culture, STATE OF LEARNING, classes had little knowledge of the world outside their personal experience. The geographical knowledge of even diplomats and soldiers did not extend beyond what they acquired by their personal exertion. These people were little aware of countries and people outside India. The rulers on account of their contacts with foreigners naturally came to know more. Compared to the wide extent of information of Western rulers, their knowledge was contemptible. There was none at the *Peśvā's* Court who showed awareness of the existence of European Sciences, none knew of schools, colleges, conferences, museums, associations in which study of critical sciences was encouraged."

Superstitions,

Belief in omens and prognostics was common to all classes. Not only thunder, lightening hail-storm and earth quakes filled men's mind with alarm but the hooting of an owl, chirping of a bird at an unusual hour or even twitching of the eye, frightened them and made them run to the priest to seek appeasment of the evil. Even forts and jägirs were supposed to suffer from the presence of evil spirits which could be exorcised with the help of priestly mediation.

In 1763 when Rāghobā was besieging the fort of *Miraj*, Govind Hari Patvardhan was assured in his dream by the *Pir* of the place of ultimate victory. *Rāghobā* often fasted and denied himself food so that his nephew whom he hated should come to harm. In 1774-75, ghosts played such havoc in Southern Konkan that special officers were appointed to punish persons who had raised the spirits. The dead wife of Amrt Rāv, son of Rāghobā, took to walking at night and frightening people. These irrational fears were carried to an excess and continued to dominate the minds of men in Mahārāṣṭra for a long time.

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
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
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




Memorial of Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Vadhu, Poona district.



Panoramic view of Pratapgad, Satara district



Kille Sindhudurg, Malwan, Ratnagiri district

